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NEBRASKA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
MEETING OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES

Wednesday, October 5, 1955
The House of Delegates was called to order in Hotel Paxton,
Omaha, Nebraska, at 9 :30 o'clock A.M. by Chairman Jean B.
Cain of Falls City.
JEAN B. CAIN : Gentlemen, the House of Delegates will now
be in order, and this is the roll call by Secretary George H. Turner.
(Roll call by Secretary George H. Turner.)
JEAN B. CAIN : There being a quorum present, we will proceed with the order of business.
The following committees have been appointed.
Rules and Calendar, Donald F. Sampson, Central City, chairman.
Committee on Hearings: C. Russell Mattson, chairman;
Charles F. Adams, Aurora; Carl Wiilard, Grand Island; Milton
C. Murphy, North Platte; Hans J. Holtorff, Gering.
The duties of these committees, I believe, are understood by
the committees. The Committee on Rules and Calendar has
charge of the order of business and any changes that are mad~
in reports and so forth must be approved by the Rules and Cal,
endar Committee.
The Committee on Hearings will receive resolutions which
will be referred to it as presented and it will act on those resolutions and report back later this afternoon.
Your attention is called to the fact that only delegates are
privileged to have the floor at this meeting. Anyone having a
resolution who is not a member of the House of Delegates must
refer that resolution to the Committee on Hearings and it must
first be presented to that committee. That committee will report
to the House of Delegates.
If there are no objections, the deliberations of this House of
Delegates will be governed by Roberts Rules of Order.
If the calendar is as printed and meets your approval, a
motion to that effect is in order.
DONALD F. SAMPSON: I move that the calendar as printed
be adopted for the program of this business meeting.
VOICE: Second.
JEAN B. CAIN: Gentlemen, you have heard the motion.
148
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Are there any remarks? The motion is that the calendar as
printed be accepted.
All in favor say aye.
Opposed, no. The motion is carried.
The next order of business is a statement of the president
of the Association, Honorable John J. Wilson.
PRESIDENT JOHN J. WILSON: Gentlemen, there is not much
to report at this time, but there ai·e two items that I would like
to have you give serious consideration to.
During the year we have tried to arrange for newspaper
publicity. Columns have been prepared and have been furnished
to the newspapers, and what I have to say in this regard should
be a matter of first order for each and every one of you.
Reference has been made in the report of the Committee on
Public Service to the newspaper columns which are being furnished to all of the newspapers of the state. These are columns
devoted to legal subjects and are designed to make the readers
of the papers aware of the fact that legal problems are involved
in nearly every phase of everyday living.
The columns are well prepared and interesting. As of now
three separate releases have been made. Some of the papers of
the state have welcomed these columns, while others have rejected
them entirely. Some editors regard them as advertising and
have written us letters criticizing the columns. Some editors
have written constructive letters of criticism, while other letters
received by me and our Secretary border on the insulting.
Some of the editors have voiced opposition to the use of our
columns because lawyers do not advertise, even to the extent of
carrying a professional card in the newspapers. This is a matter
over which we as local lawyers have no control. The use of professional cards in newspapers is not permissible under the canons
of ethics under the American Bar Association.
Under our constitution these canons are the rules of conduct
for the Nebraska lawyers.
The canons are now in process of being revised, and it may
well be that this restriction will be relaxed, but until a change is
made we are bound to respect them.
We know that the officers of the Nebraska Press Association are opposed to the use of these columns and are exercising
influence to see that member papers do not use them. By contrast, the Press Association officers in Missouri favor the plan,
and as a result one hundred seventy-one newspapers in Missouri
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are using columns prepared by the Missouri State Bar Association, and Kansas has had a similar experience.
The value of these columns is best tested by the fact that
the greatest farm paper in the midwest, the Nebraska. Fa.rmer,
has eagerly welcomed our column, and commencing with the
first issue of that paper in November legal columns prepared by
your Association will be a regular feature of that paper.
Already we have in the hands of the publishers of the Nebraska Farmer sufficient articles for a six months publication.
More are in the process of preparation, and the Nebraska Farmer
is willing and prepared· to make our legal discussions a valid
feature for years to come.
The same situation should exist as to the country weeklies,
but it does not. This publication of Bar Association columns can
be a success in Nebraska as it has been in other states. It will
succeed however only if you see that it does. It is a problem of
everyone in this room.
The articles are prepared and are being sent out by our
secretary every two weeks. You can get them in your local paper
if you will make the effort.
This is something about which each of you must see his own
editor and put the thought directly to him that this is preventive
law rather than trying to create law business.
This phase of public relations is your job, not the job of
your officers or the Executive Council. If each of you would go
to your local editor and tell him that you want this material used,
I doubt that many will refuse. They may call it advertising; we
do not think it is. Rather, it is a sincere effort on the part of
your Association to make the general public aware of the fact
that legal rights and liabilities are attached to nearly everything
we do. In this respect if the editor in your town wants to take a
purely selfish view and classify these columns as advertising, for
which he would like to be paid, it might do no harm to remind
him that he already receives a considerable amount of legal advertising and that as to some notices that we now publish in
his columns, just as effective service could be had by posting
a notice on a telephone pole.
A word from you who live in the area served by the papers
might change the picture. Much of the public relations program
can be done by your officers and your Committee on Public Relations, but this phase of the activity is yours and yours alone.
Its success and failure really depend on what you are willing to
do about it, and, gentlemen, that is a serious matter, a fight
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that might exist, but which we don't want; but I believe that by
sitting down and visiting with these editors, this job can be
carried over. If we carried paid advertising the expense would
exhaust our treasury. There are some three hundred newspapers
in this state, and if you carried a sizeable ad of twenty or twentyfive dona.rs in each newspaper your dues will be used for institutional advertising and nothing else.
If we thought that this was advertising it would be a different story. Other states have felt that it is not advertising,
that it is only preventive medicine, telling the public how to
guard their everyday living.
The other matter is in connection with a Mineral Law Institute held in Boulder, Colorado, during the month of July.
When we were advised that a Mineral Law Institute was going
to be held in the Rocky Mountain area it was too late to have an
Executive Council session so as to be a co-sponsor of this institute.
But your Executive Council directed that the president and
secretary of your Association attend this institute to see whether
it merited our sponsorship, to see the value which it could have,
and whether it was successful or not.
If I am n~t mistaken there were something like twenty-five
states represented at this first institute held between the 21st
and 23rd of July. Lawyers from practically every oil company
were present, or, rather, nearly every oil company had it's chief
counsel present.
The different types of mineral concerns had representatives
there. It was thought that if two hundred and fifty registered
it would be a success. Over five hundred and fifty registered.
It was one of the greatest institutes that I have ever attended.
There were some twenty-five from Nebraska there. I am sure
more would have been there if they had had ample notice or known
the ·magnitude of the institution. Everyone present thought it
was something that should be made a permanent organization.
At two different luncheons the representatives of the various
states and the law schools got together and felt that a non-profit
organization should be incorporated with representation to the
Bar Associations that were the sponsors, and giving the law
schools a right to have representation.
It is to meet again next year in Boulder, and I am firmly
convinced that while all the lawyers in the state may not want to
attend such an institute, we do have many lawyers who today are
practicing oil law. We have some mineral law, and this is one
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opportunity at no expense to the Bar Association to be a part of
a great institution.
I therefore have prepared a resolution which I would like
to have the House of Delegates consider.
"Whereas, the first meeting of the Rocky Mountain Mineral
Law Institute, held at Boulder, Colorado, bet\veen July 21st and
July 23, 1955, proved to be an outstanding success and drew an
attendance far in excess of the expectations of the original sponsors of such institute, and
"Whereas, it has been determined that the Rocky Mountain
Mineral Law Institute shall become a permanent organization,
incorporated by the sponsors thereof, with all the states in the
area interested in the mineral law participating, and
"Whereas, the Nebraska State Bar Association has been
asked to join as a sponsor the Rocky Mountain Law Institute,
and having been assured that no financial obligation was entailed by such sponsorship,
"Be it now resolved, that the House of Delegates of the Nebraska State Bar Association approve the sponsorship of the
Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute by the Nebraska State
Bar Association, and the officers of the Nebraska State Bar Association be authorized and empowered to sign the articles of
incorporation of such institute and arrange for representation of
this Association upon the governing body of the institute."
PRESIDENT WILSON : I move the adoption of the resolution,
Mr. Chairman.
c. RUSSELL MATTSON: I second the motion.
H.ARRY B. COHEN: Mr. Chairman, is this institute sponsored
by our Association or is it sponsored by the University?
PRESIDENT WILSON: Mr. Cohen, each Bar Association, it would
be Kansas, Missouri, Wyoming, Montana, North and South Dakota, and Nebraska, and maybe there ·will be one or two other
states, will have a representative, and each law school within
those states will also be given the opportunity to be a sponsor
or member of the corporation.
It was started last year by Dean King of Colorado Law School
and sponsored by some of the major oil companies who have district or home offices in the city of Denver.
But it will be taken out of their hands and put in the hands
of a group where everybody has an equal voice in conducting the
institute in the future.
HARRY B. COHEN : Well, the point I make is, it would be
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run and sponsored and operated by either Bar Associations or
law schools.
PRESIDENT WILSON : Well, it probably will have about fifteen
or twenty directors or representatives on the board and it will
be run by them; both Bar Association representatives and law
school 1·epresentatives.
JEAN B. CAIN: All in favor of the motion indicate by saying
aye.
Opposed, no. The motion to adopt the resolution prevails.
We now have the report of the secretary-treasurer, both as
secretary and treasurer.
GEORGE H. TURNER: It was quite a pleasure for once to be
able to report as secretary-treasurer that we are not in the red
as has been the practice for a number of years.
The books of the Association have been audited by the firm
of Martin and Martin, certified public accountants of Lincoln.
They report that the audit covers the period of October 1, 1954
to September 24, 1955. We closed the books for the Association
year six days early in order to permit an audit to be made and a
report ready for submission at the annual meeting. Had we
waited until the 30th of the month we probably could not have
had the report because our meeting this year is so early in
October.
Cash receipts during the period amount to $42,391.95.
Disbursements $39,737.43, producing an excess of receipts
over disbursements of $2,654.52.
This amount is reflected in the cash balance which increased
from $653.25 at the close of the last audit on October 1, 1954 to
a present total of $3,307.77 as of the close of this audit period.
The principal items of receipts of course are the dues of
members, amounting to $37,430.00 for active members, $4,865.00
for inactive.
The auditors break down the disbursements into classes.
They report that the major items of disbursements are salaries
and payroll tax, $10,326.30. Office supplies, printing, postage
and stationery, $1,561.18.
Officers' expense, $2,298.55. Expense of the delegates to
the American Bar Association, $1,016.66.
The annual meeting expense, $4,857.08.
Publication of the Nebraska Law Review, $4,958.61.
Activities of the Public Service Committee, $4,556.43.
The cost of our Tax Institute last December, $2,266.58.
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All cash receipts were deposited in the bank, receipts for
dues were verified by the auditors by reconciling the membership
cards issued by number.
The bank balances were verified by independent correspondence with the banks. Cash disbursements were verified by an
examination of the cancelled checks and when feasible by an inspection of the original documents supporting the disbursements.
In the opinion of the auditors the funds of the Association
have been properly accounted for during the period under review.
As to the cash balance on hand, Mr. Kotouc, the chairman
of the Committee on Budget and Finance, will later in the day
report the recommendations of that committee as to the handling
of a cash balance.
Mr. Kotouc is unable to be here this morning, but I will ask
Mr. Sampson to have his item laid over until afternoon.
JEAN B. CAIN: What will you do with the report?
JUDGE SPENCER: Move it be approved.
JEAN B. CAIN: It is moved that the report of the secretarytreasurer be approved and adopted.
Is there a second to the motion?
THOMAS c. QUINLAN: I will second the motion.
JEAN B. CAIN: Are there any remarks?
All those in favor of the motion will indicate by saying aye.
Contrary by saying no. The report is approved and adopted.
We will now receive resolutions from delegates. Anyone
have any resolutions to present?
Again I call attention to the fact that anyone who is not a
delegate can submit their resolutions to the Committee on Hearings.
JOSEPH T. VOTAVA: Mr. Chairman, upon the request of some
attorneys I will present this resolution.
"Resolved, that the House of Delegates of the Nebraska State
Bar Association approve the amendments of Section 4 of Article
VIII of the Nebraska state constitution which will be submitted
to the people in 1956 at the general election under the recently
enacted law L.B. 307, which measure will permit the legislature
to absolve real estate taxes and assessments delinquent ten years
or more.
"Be it further resolved, that the lawyers of Nebraska are
urged to take the initiative in explaining the measure to the
voters to the end that the electorate can make an intelligent decision on the matter on November 8, 1956."
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As you probably know, the constitution prohibits the remission of any taxes. That's Article IV, Section 4-Section 4,
Article VIII. Other states have a statute of limitations on delinquent real estate taxes.
The amendment to the constitution which was authorized by
the last legislature will be voted on in 1956, and this is to simply
give it our backing.
I shall present the resolution to the Resolutions Committee.
GEORGE H. TURNER: You are introducing it as your own?
JOSEPH T. VOTAVA: I will sponsor it, yes, sir.
JEAN B. CAIN: Then it does not need to go to the Resolutions Committee; you can move its adoption.
JOSEPH T. VOTAVA: Some of you attorneys, I think, know
more about the matter that is involved, particularly those of you
who examine a lot of abstracts.
I think that the subject is rather simple and does not need
much consideration; and I therefore move the adoption of this
resolution by this body.
THOMAS c. QUINLAN: I second the motion.
JEAN B. CAIN: Are there any remarks?
DONALD F. SAMPSON: Mr. Chairman.
JEAN B. CAIN: Mr. Sampson of Central City.
DONALD F. SAMPSON: Point of order. Is that motion in order at this time?
JEAN B. CAIN: It is so ruled that the members of the House
of Delegates can introduce resolutions direct from the floor without being referred to the Committee on Hearings. Is that correct, Mr. Turner?
GEORGE H. TURNER: That is correct.
JUDGE SPENCER: I move as a substitute motion that the resolution be referred to the Committee on Resolutions for study and
recommendations.
VOICE: Second the motion.
JEAN B. CAIN : You heard the substitute motion, that the
resolution be referred to the Committee on Hearings.
Are there any remarks?
All those in favor of the substitute motion indicate by saying
aye.
Opposed, no. The motion is carried.
Are there any other resolutions to be submitted?
(There was no response.)
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REPORT OF COMMITTEES
The House of Delegates received, considered and acted upon
the reports of standing and special committees. A full transcript
of the discussion of each report is on file in the office of the
secretary, as the official record of the proceedings of the House
of Delegates. Printed herein are the reports including amendments to the original reports as adopted by the House of Delegates.
The report of the Committee on Administrative Agencies was
presented by Bert L. Overcash, chairman of the committee. The
report, which was approved by the House of Delegates, follows:
Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Agencies
In accordance with the resolution of this committee adopted
in 1954 recommending that the governor convene a conference on
administrative procedure in the State of Nebraska, Governor
Crosby late in 1954 established such a conference and designated
Honorable Paul White, District Judge of Lincoln, chairman. The
governor appointed nineteen members of the bar, including four
members of this committee, to assist Judge White in this work,
and it is contemplated that the conference will complete its work
and draft legislation for consideration at the 1957 session of the
legislature. It is anticipated that the Governor's Conference Committee will prepare an administrative procedure act for presentation to the legislature.
This committee has tendered the Governor's Committee full
cooperation in this project, and conferences have been held with
Judge White with reference to such assistance. Your chairman
and Judge White have met with Governor Anderson, and he has
agreed that the conference should continue with its work. It is
expected that the members of our committee will be called upon
by Judge White to assist in the studies involved in this program.
A subcommittee of this committee headed by Mr. Franklin L.
Pierce has continued the studies reported by this committee in
1950 regarding appeals from administrative agencies. There is
great need for simplification and uniformity in this field, and it
is hoped that legislation which may be proposed will reflect this
need.
The President's Conference on Administrative Procedure completed its work this year and adopted forty-four recommendations
for improvement of administrative procedure on a federal level.
In recent years one agency of the state, the Railway Commis-
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sion, has adopted and placed in effect a set of Rules of Practice
and Procedure, copies of which were distributed to the bar. Certain states such as California and Massachusetts have adopted administrative procedure legislation.
It is recommended that this special committee be continuecl
for fhe next year in order that its assistance and coopemtion may
be available to the Governor's Confe'rence.

Bert L. Overcash, Chairman
Paul P. Chaney, Co-ordinator
George C. Holdrege
Louis A. Holm.es
Walter D. James, Jr.
Russell E. Lovell
Jack W. Marer
Franklin L. Pierce
Robert E. Powell
William A. Sawtell, Jr.
Einar Viren
David D. Weinberg
Richard D. Wilson
The report of the Committee on American Citizenship was
presented by Lloyd L. Pospishil, chairman of the committee. The
report was amended after discussion by eliminating the recommendation of the Committee on American Citizenship with respect
to the award of individual citations, and was adopted as amended.
The full report of the Committee on American Citizenship follows:
Report of the Committee on American Citizenship
Your Copunittee on American Citizenship recommends the
adoption of a program in which every Nebraska lawyer will be
encouraged to participate. The objectives of this program are
four-fold: (1) To furnish unto interested lawyers an even greater
incentive to participate in numerous activities, the general purpose of which is to promote a high standard of citizenship, especially among the youth of this state; (2) To compile statistics concerning such activity by the lawyers of Nebraska; (3) To apprise
the general public, through the office of the public service director, of the tremendous amount of such service which is being gratuitously rendered to the public by the Bar; and (4) To grant
appropriate recognition unto those lawyers, who, during the past
year, have done the most to develop and foster American citizenship in their respective communities.
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In order to facilitate the effective administration of such a
program, it is recommended that the president of the Association,
with the cooperation of the previous chairman of the Committee
on American Citizenship, appoint one lawyer from each of the
judicial districts of Nebraska, and one member at large who will
serve as chairman of that committee. This would constitute a
committee of nineteen members. Each member from a judicial
district would, in general, be in charge of that district.

The committee would prepare an appropriate letter to be forwarded to each lawyer in Nebraska, in which there would be enclosed a questionnaire, seeking information concerning the activities of that particular lawyer, as well as other lawyers in that
area, in the field of citizenship. Upon the completion and return
of such questionnaire to the chairman of the committee, an effort
would be made to ascertain which lawyer in each judicial district
has made the greatest contribution in the promotion of citizenship
in that district during the past year. Reliance would be made,
not only upon the questionnaires, but also upon the personal knowledge of the committee member from that district, as well as from
such other sources as the American Legion, which likewise is active
in this field in practically every community in the state. When
the chairman will have received all of this information, he, would
forward all that which pertains to the lawyers of a given district,
to the chairman from that district for study, anaylsis, and recommendation. Such chairman would then present to the committee
the five most representative lawyers, indicating the order in whicru
he makes his preference. The Committee on American Citizenship
would meet at a later date in order to select the most worthy representative from each district, based upon his activities during
the previous year.
The eighteen lawyers thus selected would then be recommended to the Nebraska State Bar Association for awards to be
presented to them either at the opening session of the annual
meeting or at the time of the annual banquet, in the discretion of
the officers and House of Delegates of this Association. The
award would be in the nature of a citation for outstanding accomplishments in the field of American citizenship. The presentation would be made by the chairman of the Committee on American Citizenship.
The public service director would assist in sending out the
letters and questionnaires to the lawyers of Nebraska. The questionnaires would be returned to the chairman of the committee.
The director also would assist in sending out a follow-up letter, if
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necessary, and in obtaining the citations for presentation at the
annual meeting. He could utilize all of the information secured
in this manner by apprising the general public of the great service which the lawyers of Nebraska are rending in the various
communities each year. Especially could he send to each newspaper in the judicial district an account of the accomplishments
of the lawyer honored from that district for that year.
This committee would assist in the maintenance of an effective speakers bureau among the lawyers of the state. Each member of this committee would be chairman of his own judicial district. He, in turn, could organize each county in his district for
this purpose, as well as for any other purpose in order to better
achieve the objectives of the Committee on American Citizenship.
Such a program, if properly administered, should cause the
public to hold the legal profession in higher esteem, and should
result in giving credit where credit is due. It should also provide
a greater incentive among lawyers, so inclined, to participate to
an even greater extent in the development and promotion of high
standards of American citizenship. Lawyers, since time immemorial, have done much in this direction, such as, for instance,
writing the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of
the United States; in the field of legislation and public administration; in combating Communism and subversive activities; in
gratuitousy assisting aliens to become citizens; in honoring individuals who have become U. S. Citizens; in assisting on local
board, such as school, selective service, village, city and veterans
boards ; in providing legal assistance, both in the office and in
the courts, to indigent parties; in Boy Scout work; in assisting
with oratorical and essay contests on the American Constitution
and the American way of life, junior baseball, Boys' and Girls
County Government; Boys' and Girls' State; in speaking on
Memorial Day and on other dedicatory occasions; in eliminating
corruption in government and juvenile delinquency; in conscientious law enforcement, and in assisting young people in their efforts to become good and law abiding citizens. The specific phases
of activity along this line are legion, and the lawyers have participated in all of them but, for some reason, the Bar has not been
given proper credit or recognition therefor, and therein it seems
that our public relations program may have broken down.
Attached to this report is a suggested letter and questionnaire to be forwarded to each member of the Bar immediately
after the annual meeting, should this report be approved and
adopted by the Association.

160

NEBRASKA ST ATE BAR ASSOCIATION

The committee has concluded that the reports, previously
submitted by similar committees, would probably be unworkable,
especially without the very active participation of the public service director therein, because, too much reliance was placed therein
on the cooperation of the schools of the State of Nebraska who, in
the opinion of the committee, are already overloaded with extracurricular projects continually being submitted to them for consideration by outside organizations. It was felt that reliance
should not be placed on the cooperation of the schools as a basis
for the activities of this committee but rather on the lawyers of
Nebraska who, as individuals, could continue to render a great
service in the field of American citizenship. It, therefore, is
recommended that the report of previous committees for the years
of 1953 and 1954 be set aside and that, in lieu thereof, the instant
report be adopted for immediate action.•
Lloyd L. Pospishil, Chairman
Paul H. Bek, Coordinator
C. M. Kingsbury
John M. Brower
Thomas M. Davies
Clarence C. Kunc
John F. McCarthy
John H. Keriakedes
L. R. Frerichs
Frank J. Mattoon
Robert C. Bosley
CITATION

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That the NEBRASKA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION does hereby proudly
recognize and highly commend
JOHN DOE
for distinquished service rendered by him in the field of AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP during the past year.
Dated this .................. day of.................................., A. D., 19...... .
President, Nebraska State Bar
Association.
Chairman, Committee on
Citizenship.
(Seal)
Attest:
Secretary-Treasurer.
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Dear Fellow Attorney:
In Re:

Committee on Ame1·ican Citizenship.

The Nebraska State Bar Association has just adopted a program on American citizenship in which every lawyer in the state
can participate, if he wishes to do so. The details of that program
were set out in the official report of the Committee on American
Citizenship at the last annual meeting of this Association. Please
refer to it for information and guidance.
Even though lawyers, since time immemorial, have rendered
great service to their communities, especially in the field of American citizenship, yet unfortunately the legal profession as such,
is not held in high esteem by the general public. One of the purposes of this program is to correct this erroneous impression on
the part of the lay public.
This committee seeks information concerning the numerous
activities in which Nebraska lawyers participate, the general effect of which is to improve the standaTds of American citizenship.
The enclosed questionnaire is for this purpose. Please complete
it and return it to the undersigned. The committee then will compile and analyze all of this information. Or if you know of other
lawyers in your community who are entitled to recognition for
their work in this field, please give us their names.
The public service director will utilize so much of this information as will apprise the general public of what lawyers have
been doing and are doing in this field. Certainly this should tend
to improve our public relations.
On the basis of this, and other reliable information, one
lawyer from each judicial district who has done outstanding work
in this field will be recognized. Such recognition will be made at
the annual meeting of the Association (where a citation will be
presented), and in the newspapers of the judicial district in which
that lawyer resides. This should provide an even greater incentive for lawyers to render service in this field. It also should
place the legal profession in higher repute with the general public.
The period for which this report is to be made will be from
July 1, 1955, to July 1, 1956. Therefore please return the questionnaire on or before July 15, 1956.
The success or failure of this program will depend entirely
upon the cooperation of the Bar. Your assistance in this regard~
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therefore, is earnestly solicited and will be deeply appreciated.
Sincerely yours,
Chairman, Committee on American
Citizenship, Nebraska State Bar
Association.
LLP/dw
Enc/
Name:
Address: ............................................. .
.Judicial District: ............................. .
QUESTIONNAIRE REGARDING YOUR ACTIVITIES IN
THE FIELD OF PROMOTING AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP FROM JULY 1, 1955, to JULY 1, 1956.
(Note : If the space allotted is inadequate, please furnish additional information on a separate sheet of paper).
1.

LEGISLATION:
(a) Did you serve in Congress or the legislature?
(b) If so, for what periods?
(c) What legislation did you sponsor and/or support which
would be conducive to improving American citizenship?

2.

JUDICIAL ACTIVITY:
(a) Do you hold a judicial position?
(b) If so, describe it.
( c) Did your work tend to improve the administration of
justice, or eliminate crime, corruption and/or combat
juvenile delinquency?
(d) If so, in what manner?

3.

ADMINISTRATIVE WORK:
(a) Have you held an administrative post?
(b) If so, what kind and during what periods?
(c) Did your work tend to improve the efficiency of administration of government or "clean up" graft and
corruption?
( d) If so, in what regard?

4.

MEMBER OF ORGANIZATIONS AND COMMITTEES:
(a) Name the organizations and committees of which you
are a member.
(b) As a member of such organizations or committees, just
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what have you done to improve the standards of American citizenship?
5. AMERICANISM VS. COMMUNISM:
(a) Have you engaged in any activity, the basic purpose
of which was to combat Communism and subversive activities?
(b) If so, just what have you done?
6.

VETERANS:
(a) If you are a veteran of a war, have you, as such, done
anything to improve the standards of American citizenship?
(b) If so, just what did you do?

7.

PUBLIC SPEAKING:
(a) If you have done any public speaking, did you speak on
such occasions and subjects as would foster American
citizenship?
(b) If so, in what manner and to what extent?

8.

YOUTH ACTIVITIES:
(a) Have you been a leader in youth activities, such as Boy
Scouts, junior baseball, Boys' and Girls' County Government, contests on the American constitution, etc.?
(b) If so, just what have you done in this connection?

9.

CITIZENSHIP CANDIDATES:
(a) Have you gratuitously assisted citizenship candidates?
(1) If so, to what extent?
{b) Have you arranged to honor individuals who have just
been granted their citizenship?
(1) If so, in what manner and to what extent?

10. ACTIVITIES ON LOCAL BOARDS:
(a) Have you served on local boards, such as school boards,
selective service boards, village boards or city councils,
veterans service committees, or as service officer?
(b) If so, describe the character and extent of this activity
on your part.
11.

GRATUITOUS LEGAL ASSISTANCE:
(a) How much legal service have you rendered gratuitously
both in the office and in the courts in behalf of indigent
persons?
(b) Describe the nature and the extent of it.

12.

MISCELLANEOUS COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES:
(a) Detail just what you have done.
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OTHER LAWYERS DESERVING RECOGNITION:
(a) Give their names and addresses.
(b) Short resume of their activities.

14. REMARKS:
Report of the Committee on Cooperation with the
American Law Institute
The report of the Committee on Cooperation with the American Law Institute was presented by Judge Harry Spencer, chairman of the committee. The report, which was approved by the
House of Delegates, follows:
The thirty-second annual meeting of the American Law Institute was held at Washington, D. C., on May 18, 19, 20 and 21,
1955. The chairman of the committee was in attendance for the
four days.
The material covered at the sessions were the Uniform Commercial Code, Federal Income, Estate and Gift Tax Statute, Restatement of the Law, which included Tentative Draft No. 3 of
Agency, Tentative Draft No. 2 of Trusts, and Tentative Drafts
No. 3 and No. 4 of the Model Penal Code. As previously reported,
the 1952 session officially adopted the Uniform Commercial Code.
The 1955 session considered some amendments set out in Supplement No. 1 which had been approved by the editorial board. As
of this date, only one state, Pennsylvania, has adopted the code.
It is the understanding of your committee that some amendments
are being offered in Pennsylvania and that there is some work
being done on the code in New York State. Inasmuch as the
code is designed to replace a substantial number of Uniform Acts
in that it comprehensively covers sales, commercial paper, bank
deposits and collections, bulk transfers, warehouse receipts, bills
of lading and documents of title investment securities and secured
transactions, it is the thought of your committee, as expressed
previously, that it would be unwise for us to recommend the
adoption of the code in Nebraska until its adoption and use in
some of the more highly commercialized states had demonstrated
its general acceptance.
Tentative Draft No. 10 of the estate and gift tax part of
the Federal Income, Estate and Gift Tax Statute was submitted,
discussed and approved with some minor changes.
Tentative Draft No. 3 of the Restatement of the Law, Second,
of Agency was presented by Dean Seavey and discussed at length
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by the membership. Some suggestions were made which are to
be further considered by Dean Seavey.
Austin W. Scott, the reporter for Restatement of the Law,
Second, of Trusts, presented Tentative Draft No. 2 which included
two Chapters-Chapter 1, "Definitions and Distinctions," and
Chapter 2, "The Creation of a Trust.'' These also were discussed
at length and were tentatively adpoted by the Association.
Herbert Wechsler, the reporter on the Model Penal Code,
Louis B. Schwartz and Paul W. Tappan, associate reporters, presented Tentative Draft No. 3 and Tentative Draft No. 4 of the
Model Penal Code. Tentative Draft No. 3 covered proposals for
the sentencing and treatment of young adult offenders under the
Model Penal Code. This was discussed at great length but no
definite action was taken. This material will undoubtedly be
covered by a further draft at a subsequent session.
Tentative Draft No. 4 of the Model Penal Code covered Articles 1, 2, 4 and Article 207. Article 4, "Responsibility," was discussed at some length, as was Article 207 covering "Sexual Offenses.'' With specific reference to sexual offenses, the crime
of adultery is eliminated from the Model Penal Code, as is sodomy
between two competent adults. The latter created considerable
controversy but was adopted by a small majority of those present.
The debate, however, was such that I am certain that the reporter
will discuss this matter further with the editorial board and it
is possible that changes will be made at a later session.
The institute is continuing and expanding its work in the
field of continuing legal education. This is a joint project with
the American Bar Association. It is suggested that those of our
members who are not familiar with this program on continuing
legal education should familiarize themselves with the publications of this committee. It is hoped that there will be a display
of these publications at our annual meeting.

It is the opinion and 1·ecommendation of you1· committee that
the Committee on Cooperation with The American Law Institute
continue to keep in close touch with the work of the institute,
lending such service as it is ca:pable of in the promotion of its
work in procuring for the membe1·s of the Bar and the public the
greatest possible benefits; that future committees consider the
fact that the restatements are undergoing revision and that further work should be done on the Nebraska Annotations to the
Restatements; and, further that the committee be authorized, at
Association expense, as deemed advisable, to have a -rnember there-
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of in attendance at the next annual meeting of the American Law
Institute.
Harry A. Spencer, Chairman
Chauncey E. Barney
Robert H. Beatty
Kenneth B. Holm
Lyle E. Jackson
L. R. Stiner
John W. Yeager
Harvey M. Johnsen
Robert G. Simmons
Laurens Williams
Report of the Committee on Crime and
Delinquency Prevention
The report of the Committee on Crime and Delinquency Prevention was presented by Alfred G. Ellick, chairman. Each of
the several recommendations of the committee was submitted separately and all were approved by the House of Delegates. The
report of the committee follows:
Your
met three
tion and
occasions.

Committee on Crime and Delinquency Prevention has
times in Lincoln since the last meeting of this Associasub-committees have met elsewhere on a number of
Our work has been divided into the following fields.
PAROLE AND PROBATION

Under the chairmanship of Robert A. Nelson a sub-committee
prepared and drafted a bill to create a state-wide probationary
system. This was recommended by our committee in its 1953
report and the recommendation was approved by the Bar Association at its annual meeting in that year. The bill prepared by Mr.
Nelson and his sub-committee was introduced as L.B. 210. Without detailing its provisions, suffice to say that it created a state
probation system, the cost of which would be borne by the state instead of by the individual counties, and which would be supervised
by the Department of Justice. A hearing on the bill was held
before the legislative judiciary committee, at which time members of our committee took an active part in explaining its provisions and the need for its enactment. At the same time a hearing was held on L. B. 268 which was largely prepared by Judge
Stanley Bartos and which divided the state into eleven separate
probation districts.
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Both bills were eventually killed in committee. We believe
that this was extremely unfortunate, since there seems to be no
dispute whatsoever about the dire need of a state probation system. The only problem arises out of the mechanics of setting
one up. The bill sponsored by our committee was first submitted
to Hon~ C. G. Perry, chairman of a committ€e appointed by the
District Judges Association to prepare a similar bill, and special
pains were taken to draw the bill in such a way that it would
not be objectionable to members of the judiciary. We realize the
problem is a difficult one and that there are many conflicting
viewpoints which must be reconciled. Nevertheless we believe the
ultimate objective is extemely worthwhile and should be pursued.

We recommend, therefore, that this committee continue its
efforts toward drafting and securing the adoption of a bill 1which
will establish a state-wide probation system.
REVISION OF LAWS RELATING TO SEX OFFENDERS

Under the chairmanship of James F. Brogan of Madison a
subcommittee of our committee spent considerable time studying
the laws of this state relating to sex offenses. A tremendous
amount of material was gathered together relating to this problem and the views of judges, law enforcement officials, correctional institution officials and others were obtained. No over-all
revision of our sex psychopath laws was proposed for the reason
that there was insufficient time to do so. However, our committee was instrumental in securing the defeat of L. B. 84 and
L. B. 85 which would, in our opinion, have weakened rather than
strengthened our procedures for dealing with sex offenders. We
endorsed L. B. 542 which changed the definition of a sexual psychopath.
This is a problem which currently is causing a great deal of
concern, and sometimes even hysteria. As lawyers it is our duty
to make certain that a proper perspective and balance is maintained so that, on the one hand, sex offenders are properly punished or treated as the individual case may require and, on the
other hand, their legal rights are protected. We recommend
further study of our laws relating to sex offenders with a view
toward determining whether corrective legislation should be introduced at the next legislative session.
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

In this committee's report of last year we made certain concrete recommendations and proposals dealing with the responsibility of lawyers in the field of juvenile delinquency. We pointed
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out the lawyer's unique position in domestic relations problems
and the tremendous opportunity he has to encourage families to
remain intact so that children can be reared in a home-like and
religious atmosphere. Approximately 85 per cent of all cases of
juvenile delinquency can be traced to some fundamental defect of
family structure. We also pointed out the lawyer's responsibility
in adoption cases and dependency hearings.
While we believe that most lawyers, as individuals, are making some contribution to community efforts to combat juvenile
delinquency, our studies have shown that in their professional life
neither individually nor collectively are they offering much help
in solving this problem. A survey of a number of midwestern
states reveals that in only one instance has the state bar association any kind of an educational program in this field. The American Bar Association only this past winter decided to place the
subject under the jurisdiction of its family law section. It is
apparently another indication of the reluctance of lawyers to act
in concert to help solve a common problem.

We recommend a program, under the sponsorship of this
conimittee, to inform attorneys of their responsibilities in this
field and of the many ways in which, during the course of their
professional practice, they can help combat juvenile delinquency.
OTHER MATTERS

We are pleased to report that largely through the efforts of
William J. Hotz, Jr., of our committee the American Bar Association's Special Committee on the Administration of Criminal Justice has tentatively selected Nebraska as one of the first states
to be studied in its survey project. The survey, if authorized,
\Vill be financed by the Ford Foundation and should prove of
great benefit to the lawyers of this state.
Other matters have been recommended in previous reports
upon which our committee took no action this year. Among these
is the transfer of the criminal investigation division from the
Highway Department to the Department of Justice; also passage
of a medical examiner's bill which would result in the employment
by the state of a trained medico-legal investigator who would be
on call to any county in the state to help in the investigation of
a violent or unknown death. We recommend that steps be taken

by the committee to secure the adoption of these proposals.
Alfred G. Ellick, Chairman
James F. Brogan
John E. Deming
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Robert G. Fraser
Jack H. Hendrix
William J. Hotz, Jr.
Robert A. Nelson
Louis J. Patz
Theodore L. Richling
James I. Shamberg
Hugh Stuart
William H. Line
Harry N. Larson
The report of the Committee on County Law Libraries was
presented by Joseph T. Votava, chairman. The report, which was
approved by the House of Delegates, follows:
Report of the Committee on County Law Libraries
The committee held a meeting at Grand Island on December
9, 1954. Most of the committee members were present. The meeting was also attended by last year's committee chairman, Mr.
Charles B. Paine. Mr. Paine not only gave us the benefit of his
experience but also turned over to us a complete survey made by
his Committee of the County Library Situation.
The survey does not portray a very encouraging picture.
There are some county libraries. Some additional libraries are
being installed but progress is very slow. An analysis of the
survey compels only one conclusion: If the lawyers in the county
actually want a central library, a library is started and maintained.
County commissioners almost invariably cooperate by appropriating all or matching funds to start and continue such a library.
The statutes to that end are adequate. The only thing lacking is
a real desire of the local attorneys to want a central library.
Acting upon the foregoing conclusion so clearly disclosed,
your committee decided that a program of education is the only
way to further the idea of county libraries. Therefore we announced that any member of the committee would be available to
discuss the matter at any of the county or regional meetings of
the Bar; that apparently there is no burning desire for a county
library is evidenced by the fact that no county or regional association placed the subject on its program.
As a further means of convincing the lawyers that they cannot practice law without law books readily available, and that a
county library is the only feasible method to that end, your com-
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mittee decided in each issue of the N ebmska Bar Journal to have
an article on this subject. As you have noted, such articles are
being published. This appears to be the best way to bring home to
the lawyers the benefits of a central library and ignite in the
hearts of some of them a desire to have it.
We believe that every average county should have a library
and that eventually it will have it; but first the lawyers in the
community must be convinced of the needs and benefits of such a
library.
La\vyers are constitutionally conservative and hold on to the
past. Older lawyers especially, who have either accumulated a
large library or who have practiced law with a limited number of
law books, are hard to convince. The future of central libraries
rests with the younger members of the Bar who realize the need
of a fu.ll working law library and who feel the initial cost and
expense of subsequent maintenance. These younger lawyers are
the ones who must take the lead in this project.
Only an educational program will move the lawyers to action.
Lawyers cannot be forced; but facts do convince them. We therefore 1·ecommend that the c01nmittee be continued and that the need
and benefit of a central library be brought home to our lawyers
again and again and again by discussions before Bar meetings and
by articles in our Journal.
Joseph T. Votava, Chairman
Joseph Ach
Edward Asche
Leslie Boslaugh
Lloyd E. Christensen
John C. Coupland
0. E. Drake
Donald C. Hosford
Joseph C. Hranac
Earl J. Lee
J. Jay Marx
Raymond B. Morrissey
Bernard B. Smith
Wayne 0. Stoehr
Archibald J. Weaver
The report of the Special Committee on the Investigation and
Disposition of Charges was presented by Clarence A. H. Meyer,
chairman of the committee. The report, which was approved by
the House of Delegates, follows :
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Report of the Special Committee on Rules Governing
Investigation and Disposition of Charges
The House of Delegates at its meeting of October 13, 1954,
approved the proposal of the Special Committee recommending
amendment of Section 7-114, Reissue Revised Statutes, 1943, and
the committee therefore arranged for the drafting and introduction of the necessary bill at the sbcty-seventh session of the Nebraska legislature. The bill, L. B. 27, was referred to the Committee on Judiciary, and representatives of your Special Committee
appeared before the legislative committee on behalf of the bill. It
was passed early in the session and signed by the governor.
The House of Delegates at its 1954 meeting also adopted a
motion providing that the Supreme Court of Nebraska be requested to give consideration to amending Article XI of the rules
creating, controlling and regulating the Nebraska State Bar Association, to the end that the disciplinary procedure therein set
forth be improved. In accordance with those instructions, your
Special Committee prepared recommended changes to Article XI,
and these were submitted to the Judicial Council, since that group
is charged with the duty of making recommendations tending to
the simplification of the pleadings, practice and procedure of the
judicial system of the State of Nebraska. We then met with the
Judicial Council on June 17, at their invitation, and at that time
a final draft of proposed changes was agreed upon, and this draft
was submitted to the Supreme Court with the recommendation of
the Judicial Council that it be adopted by the court.
The draft was adopted by the Supreme Court on June 24,
1955.
Early in 1955 there came to the attention of your Special
Committee a revised draft of the proposed Rules of Court for
Disciplinary Proceedings prepared by a committee of the American Bar Association. This draft was considered by the committee,
but since adoption of those proposals would entail such a f undamental change in the procedure now followed in this state, it was
the conclusion of the committee that their adoption should not
be considered at this time.

We recommend that the Special Conunittee on Rules Governing Investigation and Disposition of Charges of the Nebraska State
Bar Association be dissolved.
Wilber S. Aten
Donald F. Sampson
Daniel Stubbs
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Varro E. Tyler
Arthur A. Whitworth
Raymond G. Young
Clarence A. H. Meyer, Chairman
Appendix to Report of Special Committee on Investigation
~-and Disposition of Charges
AMENDED ARTICLE XI
ARTICLE XI.
INVESTIGATION AND DISPOSITION OF CHARGES
1. DISTRICT COMMITTEE ON INQUIRY; MEMBERSHIP; TERM. The Supreme Court shall appoint a Committee on
Inquiry in each district court judicial district, of not fewer than
three (3) members and two alternates who shall serve for such
term as shall be designated. One member shall be designated as
chairman, and one as vice-chairman to serve as chairman in the
event of the disqualification or unavailability of the chairman.
Where the chairman determines that a regular member is disqualified or unavailable, he shall select an alternate to serve.
2. ADVISORY COMMITTEE; MEMBERSHIP; TERM.
The Supreme Court shall appoint a committee to be known as the
Advisory Committee, which shall consist of one member from
each Supreme Court judicial district and a chairman at large. The
members of such committee shall serve for such term as shall be
designated.
3. INITIATION OF CHARGES. (a) All charges of unprofessional conduct on the part of any member of the Association
shall be first made to the Committee on Inquiry in the district
where such member resides, or to the secretary-treasurer of the
Association or the clerk of the Supreme Court who shall forward
them to the proper Committee on Inquiry; but in all cases where
such committee has information of conduct appearing to be unprofessional it shall forthwith undertake the investigation provided for in Section 5 of this Article even though charges have
not been filed with the committee. (b) Where the initial charges
are lodged with a Committee on Inquiry such committee shall
forthwith advise the secretary-treasurer of such fact.
4. COMMITTEE ON INQUIRY; DISQUALIFICATION OF
MEMBERS; POWERS OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE. (a) In
the event that the chairman is unable to assemble a full committee
because of unavailability or disqualification of regular members
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and alternates, or where a majority of the members of the committee, for reasons stated request it, the chairman shall forthwith
report the matter to the Advisory Committee for disposition, and
such committee shall have power to (1) direct that the members
of said Committee on Inquiry who are not disqualified shall proceed and determine such matter~ and in t1:1at connection the Advisory Committee may review and disallow claims of disqualification by members and alternates of Committees on Inquiry; or,
(2) direct that the matter shall be referred to some other Committee on Inquiry in which case the Committee on Inquiry to
which it is so referred shall have full power and jurisdiction to
the same extent and in like manner as if said matter had arisen
in its district and had been originally lodged with it; or, (3) take
jurisdiction of and determine said matter to the same e:i..'ient and
with like power as the original Committee on Inquiry might have
done if no disqualifications existed as to any of the members thereof; or, (4) direct the appointment of an investigator, who shall
submit his report, as directed by the Advisory Committee, either
to a Committee on Inquiry or to the Advisory Committee, after
which such committee shall proceed with appropriate disposition
of the charges.
(b) The investigator referred to in subdivision (4) above
shall be selected by the secretary-treasurer, with the approval of
the president. Investigators shall be paid their expenses and
such per diem as may be approved by the president.
(c) When charges are lodged with a Committee on Inquiry,
or with the Advisory Committee, the committee concerned shall
report progress on handling of the charges to the secretary-treasurer on the last day of the first full calendar month elapsing
after receiving the charges and each month thereafter, and shall
similarly report final disposition of the charges. If such report
is not received by the fifth day of the month, the secretarytreasurer shall request that the report be forwarded forthwith,
and if it is not received within ten days thereafter he shall report
such fact to the court. At the direction of the president, the
secretary-treasurer shall similarly advise the court if the reports
received by him indicate unreasonable delay at any stage in the
handling of disciplinary proceedings.
5. COMMITTEE ON INQUIRY; INFORMAL INVESTIGATION. It shall be the duty of the Committee on Inquiry, upon
having information of or upon receiving charges of unprofessional
conduct on the part of a member, to make an informal and private investigation of the matter; and upon being satisfied that
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any such information is 'Yithout foundation or that such charges
are without merit, the committee shall take no further action
except to dismiss the charges; but if it is not so satisfied, the
Committee on Inquiry shall forthwith advise the secretary-treasurer of such fact and may, if it deems it advisable, request the
appointment of an investigator. If the president approves the
request for an investigator, one shall be selected and paid in accordance with the provisions of Section 4 (b) of this Article.
6. ADVISORY COMMITTEE; INFORMAL INVESTIGATION. In case the Committee on Inquiry shall determine that
there is no reasonable ground to believe the members charged
guilty of an offense which justifies disciplinary action, the person
or persons making the initial charges may lodge with the clerk
of the Supreme Court an informal charge supported by affidavits
or other prima facie evidence. The clerk of the Supreme Court
shall thereupon obtain from the Committee on Inquiry the written
charges, statements, answer, affidavits or documents filed with
it and a report of the said Committee on Inquiry, and shall refer
all of such documents to the Advisory Committee for review and
recommendation.
7. COMMITTEE ON INQUIRY; FORMAL CHARGES;
HEARINGS; POWERS; REPORT. (a) If, however, a Committee on Inquiry, after making said informal and private investigation, concludes that there is reasonable ground to believe that
the member against whom the charges are made is guilty of an
offense which may require and justify disciplinary action, said
committee shall immediately reduce or cause the charges to be
reduced to writing in the form of a simple, unsworn statement,
specifying with particularity the facts which constitute the basis
thereof, and shall serve a copy of said written charges upon the
said member; and the committee shall hold a hearing upon twenty
(20) days' notice to the said member and the person making the
charges, at which hearing the parties may be heard and may file
with the committee any statement, answer, affidavit or document
and produce other evidence. At all such hearings, the investigator, if one be appointed in the case, shall at the request of the
committee conduct the examination of the witnesses and introduction of evidence for the committee. Notice of the time and place
of hearing shall be given to the parties by registered mail addressed to their last known residence or place of business. The
committee or the chairman thereof may continue and adjourn
hearing and proceedings from time to time and in case where
such orders of continuance or adjournment are made the committee or chairman shall give notice thereof to the party making
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the charges and respondents by registered mail or personal notice
unless such parties were present in person or by counsel when
such order of continuance or adjournment was announced.
(b) If the Committee on Inquiry finds that there is reasonable ground to believe the said member guilty of the misconduct
charged, it shall thereupon transmit to the clerk of the Supreme
Court the committee's report of investigation, a transcript containing the charges, and any statement, answer, affidavits or documents submitted and filed, and shall accompany the same with a
complaint prepared, verified by any member or members of the
committee, and ready for filing in the Supreme Court. The complaint shall be made in the name of the state on the relation of
the Nebraska State Bar Association.
8. ADVISORY COMMITTEE; REVIEW OF RECORD; REPORT. The clerk of the Supreme Court shall thereupon refer the
entire record including the report of the Committee on Inquiry,
the transcript and the complaint to the Advisory Committee for
review. The Advisory Committee shall have authority to hold
further hearing at which the person or persons making the initial
charges and the member charged shall have a right to be heard;
but the Advisory Committee may direct disposition of the charges
and complaint without further hearing. If the Advisory Committee determines that no probable cause for disciplinary action
exists, it shall so report to the clerk of the Supreme Court and the
matter shall stand dismissed unless otherwise directed by the
Supreme Court. If the Advisory Committee determines that probable cause for disciplinary action exists, it shall transmit its
report, the report of the Committee on Inquiry, the transcript,
and the complaint submitted by the Committee on Inquiry, together with such amendments thereto as to it may seem proper, to
the clerk of the Supreme Court who shall forthwith enter the
same upon the docket of the court as an original action.
9. COMMITTEE-POWER OF SUBPOENA AND TO ADMINISTER OATHS. Committees on Inquiry and the Advisory
Committee within their respective jurisdictions are empowered to
issue writs of subpoena, including subpoena duces tecum, in the
name of the State of Nebraska, requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and parties, and the production of records,
books and papers, at hearings before said committees ; to administer oaths to parties and witnesses and to take their sworn testimony or their unsworn statements as the committee may decide;
and to certify to this court, for appropriate action by the court,
any refusal of a party or witness to comply with the requirements
of a subpoena or to testify or answer questions at a hearing.
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10. Unless requested by the member charged neither the
hearings, records or proceedings of the Committee on Inquiry or of
the Advisory Committee shall be made public, nor shall any publicity be given thereto prior to the filing of a complaint in the
office of the clerk of the Supreme Court.
11. No complaint in any case shall be filed with the Supreme
Court until charges shall have first been presented to the Committee on Inquiry and considered by the Advisory Committee as
herein provided.
12. Upon the filing in the Supreme Court of a complaint for
disciplinary action as contemplated and provided by this Article
against a member of the Association, the Supreme Court in its
discretion may either designate the attorney general or appoint
any attorney of the court to prosecute the action. The attorney
general or attorney so appointed may in his discretion prepare and
file an amended or new complaint, and in case he has in his possession evidence which in his opinion warrants disciplinary action
on any additional charge or charges, he may incorporate such additional charge or charges in the complaint and prosecute same
regardless of the fact that such new charge or charges have not
been presented to the Committee on Inquiry or considered by the
Advisory Committee.
13. Actual expenses incurred by the District or Advisory
Committees in connection with hearings prior to the filing of a
complaint in the Supreme Court shall be borne by the Association.
14. In addition to the duties heretofore imposed upon the
Advisory Committee, the said committee shall confer and advise
with the Committees on Inquiry, and shall promulgate uniform
rules of practice and procedure for the hearings and disposition
of charges before such committee. The Advisory Committee is
further empowered in its discretion at the request of any member of the Association, to express its advisory opinion or give its
interpretation upon rules of professional conduct where such question has not been previously determined and is not pending in
any proceeding for a determination thereof.
15. The provisions of this Article shall be cumulative and
not exclusive.
The report of the Committee on the Judiciary ·was presented
by Robert Van Pelt, chairman of the committee. The report,
which was approved by the House of Delegates, follows:
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Report of the Committee on Judiciary
The Committee on Judiciary concluded for 1955 to put forth
its greatest effort in the drafting and support of the bills recommended by last year's committee. These provided for an increase
in the judicial salaries of district and supreme Court judges and
for a retirement system for those judges. The salary bill was
introduced by Senators Brower, Beaver, Bedford, Adams and Cole
as Legislative Bill No. 58. The retirement bill was introdued
by Senators Kotouc, lVIartin and Otto as Legislative Bill No. 38.
Legislative Bill No. 58 was i·eferred to the Miscellaneous Appropriations Committee and Legislative Bill No. 38 was referred to
the Judiciary Committee. Members of your committee assisted in
the presentation of these bills to the legislative committees. The
bar is also deeply indebted to the Honorable John W. Delehant,
United States District Judge for Nebraska, who made an appearance and excellent presentation on behalf of each of these bills.
We are pleased to report that both bills with amendments
that were approved by the committee and others interested in the
legislation, were enacted and were s_igned by the governor. Each
becomes effective September 18, 1955.
We will not prolong this report by setting forth the names
of the members of the legislature and others who rendered valuable support in the enactment of this legislation. It was pleasing
to the committee, however, to find widespread support among
both laymen and lawyers for this legislation. The officers of the
District Judges Association and its legislative chairman were at
all times most cooperative.
The committee felt that the effectiveness of its efforts should
not be diluted by supporting bills other than the two above named.
We did assure the county judges and their association that if they
did not receive deserved consideration from the 1955 legislature
that the committee would recommend that the Bar Association
assist them in presenting their matters to the 1957 legislature.

We 1·ecommend that the Bar Association cooperate with the
County Judges Association in their efforts to raise the standarc1..s
of eligibility for county judges and in securing compensation for
those occupying this important office, commensurate with its
duties and responsibilities.
Charles F. Adams
Auburn H. Atkins
Robert A. Barlow
Jean B. Cain
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Thomas F. Colfer
James D. Conway
E. B. Crofoot
J. D. Cronin
Lowell C. Davis
George L. DeLacy
Robert H. Downing
Daniel J. Gross
Maynard M. Grosshans
Earl Hasselbalch
Maurice S. Hevelone
Leon L. Hines
Thomas J. Keenan
William H. Lamme
James A. Lane
Alexander McKie
Robert R. Moodie
T. Simpson Morton
Earl J. Moyer
George A. Munro
Milton C. Murphy
Greydon L. Nichols
Kenneth M. Olds
William S. Padley
William B. Quigley
Alfred D. Raun
Varro H. Rhodes
Philip H. Robinson
Merle M. Runyan
Ernest S. Schiefelbein
Abel V. Shotwell
George A. Skultety
Walter H. Smith
Edward L. Vogeltanz
Robert Van Pelt, Chairman
The report of the Committee on Legal Aid was presented by
Robert M. Spire, chairman. The report, which was approved by
the House of Delegates, follows:
Report of the Committee on Legal Aid
Your committee has continued its investigation of the status
of Legal Aid services in Nebraska, and sul;>mits the following
report:
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The Omaha Legal Aid Clinic is jointly sponsored by the
Creighton University College of Law, the Omaha Bar Association,
and the Omaha Barristers Club. The office of the clinic is located
in the Creighton College of Law building.
The Lincoln Legal Aid Clinic is jointly sponsored by the
Nebraska University College of Law, the Lincoln Bar Association,
and the Lincoln Barristers Club. The office of the Clinic is
located in the Nebraska College of Law building.
The Legal Aid Clinic of Cheyenne County has been newly
organized during the year under the guidance of eight members of
the Cheyenne County Bar Association. The work of the clinic is
handled by volunteer members of the Cheyenne County Bar Association on a rotating basis.
The purpose of these three clinics is to provide free legal aid
services to persons who are financially unable to pay for legal
services which they require. It is the opinion of yoU1· committee
that necessary legal aid services are being rendered satisfactorily
in the three areas in which these clinics operate. Your committee
repeats its prior recommendation that local Bar Associations
should designate certain of its own members to handle legal aid
services on a rotating basis. In this connection, you')' committee
urges local Bar Associations to follow the example set this year
by the Cheyenne County Bar Association in order that proper
legal aid services may be available throughout the state.
Edward F. Carter, Jr.
Albert W. Crites
Robert V. Denney
Tyler B. Gaines
Joseph Ginsburg
Richard Hunter
Lynn D. Hutton, Jr.
Sam Klaver
Ralph S. Kryger
Milton A. Mills, Jr.
Robert D. Moodie
Charles B. Paine
C. Firman Samuelson
Rodney R. Smith
Thomas C. Quinlan, Coordinator
Robert l\f. Spire, Chairman
The report of the Committee on Legislation was presented by
Theodore J. Fraizer, chairman of the committee. The report,
which was approved by the House of Delegates, follows :
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Report of the Committee ori Legislation
The Committee on Legislation devoted its interest during the
1955 session of the Nebraska legislature to those measures which
previously had received favorable recommendation by the various
committees of this Association, the Executive Council and the
Judicial Council.
The committee has been composed largely of individuals who
were chairmen of special committees of the Association or who
had expressed particular interest in certain legislative matters.
The several 'recommendations of the Judicial Council were
embodied in Legislative Bills 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177,
178 and 179, all of which have been enacted into law.
The recommendations of the Judiciary Committee for increases in the salary of our judges were enacted into law in L. B.
58, and that for a judge's retirement plan was adopted in L. B.
38. The responsibility for the adoption of thei:;e measures was
due largely to the activities of Mr. Robert Van Pelt, who is a
member of this committee and is also chairman off the Judiciary
Committee.
A provision that municipal judges must be qualified members
of the bar in good standing was approved in L. B. 494.
I

In L. B. 27, certain details in disbarment procedures were
amplified.
Mr. J. A. C. Kennedy particularly interested himself in L. B.
49 which modified the required vote for corporate reorganization.
The taxation section proposed implementing changes in the
inheritance tax laws which was the responsibility of Flavel A.
Wright, and which are now found in L.B. 275 and 276.
The original recommendations of the Oil and Gas Law Committee were introduced in L. B. 198, but later withdrawn when
the proposals contained in this bill were embodied in other oil
and gas legislation sponsored by the industry. Mr. Floyd E. Wright
coordinated these matters in behalf of his Oil and Gas Committee
with members of the industry.
Although all of the foregoing legislative bills which have been
proposed or sponsored by the Association received favorable action, certain other measures did not become law. These were a
proposal in L. B. 210 for a statewide parole system; an expert
witness proposal in L. B. 332; a tort claims act, L. B. 350, and a
proposal that a surviving spouse may i·eceive wages of the deceased employee up to $500.00, free of debts.
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Legislative Resolution 43 recommending to the Congress of
the United States the adoption of the Reed-Walter amendment to
Article V of the U. S. Constitution was referred to the Legislative
Council Committee for study.
The proposed recodification of the Nebraska highway laws
was deferred because the proposed Uniform Vehicle Code was still
under revision by the national commissions interesting themselves
in this subject.
Several individual lawyers made recommendations to the committee which were received after the House of Delegates determined which measures should receive the support of the Association. These proposals which are worthy of further study involve
the waiving of privilege in Sec. 25-1207, R. S. Neb. 1943, and clarification of the Mechanics Lien Law in Sec. 52-101, R.R. S. 1943.

We recommend for consideration the f orm:ulation and adoption of an interpleader procedure which would largely follow the
federal rules, including jurisdictional amount.
We also recommend for consideration the matte,r of the autho,rity of guardians, appointed and qualified under authority of
other jurisdictions, being able to receipt for payments due under
Nebraska workmen's conipensation benefits, and from estates
being administered in Nebraska without 1·equfring the procedures
set forth in Sec. 38-801, R.R. S. Neb. 1943.
Charles F. Bongardt
0. E. Cassem
George A. Healey
J. A. C. Kennedy
Clarence A. H. Meyer
Robert Van Pelt
Flavel A. Wright
Floyd E. Wright
Theodore J. Fraizer, Chairman
JEAN B. CAIN: The report of the Joint Conference of Lawyers and Accountants. Mr. J. D. Cronin. Could you make your
report at this time, Mr. Cronin?
JULIUS D. CRONIN: The Committee on the Joint Conference
between Lawyers and Accountants has not taken any action nor
has there been any activity this past year due to the uncertainties
incident to the effort nationally to change the regulation with
respect to who may practice tax law.
Some years ago however either the Bar Association or the

182

NEBRASKA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION

accountants instituted the practice of having the two committees
meet at a dinner meeting in an informal gathering for the purpose of discussion of common problems.
Last year it was the Bar Association's turn to entertain the
committee from the Accountants Association, but due to circumstances beyond our control no meeting was held.
This year, and last month, we did have a joint meeting here
in Omaha between the two committees. No action of any kind
was taken, but mutual problems were discussed. That is the only
activity of the committee for the past year.
JEAN B. CAIN : You move the adoption of the report?
JULIUS D. CRONIN:
Chairman.
VOICE:

I move the adoption of the report, Mr.

Second the motion.

JEAN B. CAIN:

Are there any remarks?

(There was no response.)
JEAN B. CAIN:

All in favor of the motion indicate by saying

Aye.
Contrary No.
The motion is carried.
At this point in the proceedings of the House of Delegates
the following action was taken:
JEAN B. CAIN: Mr. C. Russell Mattson, chairman of the
Committee on Hearings, has an announcement he would like to
make at this time.
Mr. Mattson.

c. RUSSELL MATTSON: Mr. Chairman, if the committee
would meet with me at the table designated for our convenience
during the luncheon period, I think we can dispose of at least this
one resolution before us.
JEAN B. CAIN : Is there anything else to come before the
House of Delegates at this time? It seems that there are no other
committee chairmen available for reports this morning. We had
hoped to get some of those reports out of the way this morning
because there will be some reports this afternoon that will take
some time.
DONALD F. SAMPSON:

Mr. Chairman.
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Mr. Sampson.

DONALD F. SAMPSON: At what time during our program
do you wish to take up any new matters or suggestions of members
of the Association?
JEAN B. CAIN;
that.

I think now would be a splendid ti.ine for

Won't you come forward so that they can all hear you, Mr.
Sampson?
DONALD F. SAMPSON: Mr. Chairman, gentlemen. Two or
three years ago I know a number of you who are here were on
the committee that recommended an increase in the Bar Association dues. I was very much in favor of it. One of the purposes
was that we would have a public service director and considerable talk about putting out the pamphlets for distribution to the
public.
A number of those pamphlets have been put out, five, I think,
to be specific. I think they are fine. We bought one of the
display cases and pamphlets and have had them in our office, and
the reaction, the acceptance and comments, and, I might say, the
business that they have brought have been wonderful. I am
very much in favor of it.
We felt that it was no more than good public relations that
those pamphlets be put in other places where they were available
to the public. Some discussion this morning about the difficulty
that you have getting things into the newspapers, getting things
before the public. We thought that placing them in banks was
a splendid place. It so happens that we do not have any banks
in our country who are practicing law; they are all cooperative
with the lawyers. They welcomed and appreciated the display
racks and pamphlets.
It gives the Bar Association, it seemed to us, an opportunity
to disseminate these pamphlets to a wider segment of the public
than was possible just by having them in our own offices. Now
I come to the purpose of my remark.

On the face of the display box it says "Distributed by courtesy," I believe, "of the Nebraska State Bar Association," or something like that. It says the same on the bottom of each of the
pamphlets, but we lawyers have to pay for them. It is not very
much, I will grant that, a penny apiece, but it just seems to me
that that was one of the purposes of raising our dues. They are
not going to do any good as long as they are lying down in the
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secretary's office in Lincoln.
It just does not seem to me that
the individual lawyers who would take the initiative in getting
them distributed ought to have to carry even the penny apiece
financial burden in addition to paying their dues. And I believe
if it is proper I would offer a motion that the Nebraska State
Bar Association pay for or furnish the pamphlets free of charge
to members of the Association for distribution in their offices or
at public appearances made by them or in other public institutions.
JEAN B. CAIN :

Is there a second to the motion?

LAURENS WILLIAMS:
JEAN B. CAIN:

Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Williams.

LAURENS WILLIAMS: I rise to a point of order. I believe
that under our articles only the Executive Council can decide how
the Association's money shall be spent.
I would suggest the form of your motion might be changed
in the form of a recommendation or request of the council, but I
believe that is up to the council.
.JEAN B. CAIN: Any other remarks?
PRESIDENT WILSON: Mr. Chairman.
JEAN B. CAIN: Mr. Wilson.
PRESIDENT WILSON: Having been chairman of the Public
Service Committee one year and president of your Association
another year, these pamphlets came up during my year as chairman of a Committee on Public Service and were distributed primarily during my year as the president, and the second issue of
pamphlets are now published.
It is a question of what you are going to use your money for.
It has not been uncommon to have orders of a thousand or more
pamphlets come in from lawyers. If we would give each lawyer

who wants to display these racks and these pamphlets one thousand, they cost the Association fifteen dollars. We are charging
ten dollars per thousand but we a1·e spending fifteen dollars. If we
spend fifteen dollars of every lawyer's dues on these pamphlets
and racks, then we have five dollars with which to run your Association.
Now it is a question the manner in which the Association
should be run. It has been the custom of some of the associations
and some of the county organizations to take up a small collection
and buy the display racks and buy the pamphlets and make them
available. When banks buy the pamphlets we have been charg-
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ing them the actual printing. When we have been furnishing
them to the lawyers for display we have been charging them a
penny apiece.
It is just a question of how your funds are going to be used.
We can spend twenty-five thousand dollars very easily furnishing
these pamphlets which I think are wonderful. I know in my
office many persons are picking them up. Clients like them. I
think it is a wonderful thing, but I believe that is part of the
public service that the lawyers are going to have to carry on for
themselves, and I say that not to start a discussion but just as
a matter of explanation.
When this was discussed the first time by the Public Service
Committee a year ago we wanted to know just how far the Bar
Association could go in furnishing free pamphlets. A recommendation was made to the Executive Council that twenty-five
free pamphlets could be given to each member of the Bar and
not break the Bar Association on the theory that lots of them
would not ask for the twenty-five free copies. If each lawyer
asks for twenty-five copies we are then financially embarrassed
to carry on your institutes, to carry on your other public service
work, and it is up to the Executive Council then to decide how
they are going to spend your money which comes in the nature of
dues for an entire program for this Association.
I think it is out of the question to furnish them free beyond
the twenty-five. Just sit down with your pencil and start figuring how much it would cost us, and I think everybody could come
up with the answer. I wish we could furnish them free, and I
wish we had some way to furnish them.
Now the Lincoln banks and the Omaha banks have in many
instances bought in quantities of ten thousand each and have
furnished them as a part of their public service. The Scottsbluff
Bar, for instance, took up a small collection among the lawyers
and made them available to the banks at the expense of the
lawyers of the Scottsbluff Bar. That has been true of other Bars.
That is something that I think has to be left to the Executive
Council, but I want to answer you as to where I think your mone~r
is going if we carry out our idea, which I think is a good one, Don~
but it's a financial impossibility.
JEAN B. CAIN: Are there any other remarks?
HALE MCCOWAN: I propose a substitute motion that the
matter of the distribution and cost of the pamphlets be referred
to the Executive Council for their consideration.
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JEAN B. CAIN :
VOICE:

Do I hear a second?

Second.

JEAN B. CAIN:

Are there any remarks?

JEAN B. CAIN:

All in favor say aye.

Opposed, no. The motion is carried.
The report of the Committee on Public Service was presented
by Elmer M. Scheele, chairman of the committee. The report,
which was approved by the House of Delegates, follows:
Report of the Committee on Public Service
Your Committee on Public Service has attempted in the past
year to carry on a comprehensive public relations program.
This program is designed to develop a better understanding
between the public generally and the lawyers of the state with
respect to the service lawyers are qualified to provide the public.
We have also tried to educate the public to recognize situations
in their daily lives in which they would do well to engage the
services of a lawyer. We have tried to convince the public that
the legal profession is dedicated to public service.
We recognize that a planned program in public relations can
never be a substitute for exemplary conduct on the part of bench
and bar. We have tried to present a dignified display to the public
of the true meaning of the law, courts and lawyers. We have
solicited and encouraged the assistance of local bar associations in
carrying out this day to day program.
We feel that the term "public relations" is only another name
for what clients and the general public think of us as lawyers.
We have attempted to foster and develop a better understanding
between lawyers and the public generally.
After a proposed program had been carefully worked out by
the members of the Public Service Committee its details and estimated cost were presented to the Executive Council of the Nebraska State Bar Association on December 12, 1954. This program as approved by the Executive Council has since been carried
into effect.
1. Pmnphlets. Three entirely new pamphlets for public distribution have been prepared, printed and distributed.
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a. "Will You Be Next?" This pamphlet prepared in
its original form by William H. lVIeier of Minden, Nebraska,
describes in laymen's terms what to do in case of an automobile accident and advises the public how to safeguard
their driver's license. 10,000 copies have been printed and
are available for distribution.
b. "Buying and Selling Real Estate" was written by
John B. Cassel of Ainsworth, Nebraska, and 10,000 copies
have been printed.
c. A special pamphlet designed for the private use and
edification of our members only and not for public distribution entitled "Confidentially Mr. Attorney, Take a Look in
the Looking Glass" was written by Robert R. Wellington of
Crawford, Nebraska. A sufficient supply to furnish each
member of the Association with a copy of this pamphlet has
been printed and distributed to members only.

10,000 reprints each of the original pamphlets "Joint Tenancy" and "Wills" have been printed along with 5,000 reprints of
the pamphlet "Are You Sure You Want to Sign That?" 25 copies
of each pamphlet intended for public distribution will be furnished
each member without charge and additional copies are available
at one cent each. Requests should be addressed to Secretary
George H. Turner.
2. Pamphlet Racks. A quantity of handsome fabricated
pamphlet racks has been obtained. These are intended for use in
distributing the pamphlets through the medium of displaying them
as handouts in law offices, banks, trust companies, building and
loan associations and other public places. An adequate supply is
available at a cost of $2.00 each postage prepaid. Orders should
also be addressed to Secretary George H. Turner.
3. Jurors Manual. 20,000 copies of a revised and "dressed
up" pocket size Manual for Jurors in Nebraska have been printed.
20,000 copies of the original manual have been distributed as a
public service to persons called as jurors in the district courts of
Nebraska. Over 2,000 copies have been furnished at the request
of 117 schools throughout the state for use in classes in which the
principles of our jury system are taught.
4. Television Programs have been an innovation during the
past year. Viewers on KMTV Omaha's "Better Living" afternoon
program have seen 15 Bar Association-sponsored bi-weekly programs. The time for this program has been donated by KMTV.
Subjects facluded in some of the pamphlets together with other
matters intended to acquaint the public with the value of a lawyer's services have been presented by members of the Association
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from various parts of the state. A similar series of 10 programs
has been presented over KHOL-TV, Axtell, Nebraska. The favorable public response of these programs has been indicated by a
flood of requests for copies of the Bar Association pamphlets.
5. Legislative Bill Service. Another innovation during the
past year was the weekly furnishing of a mimeographed synopsis
of each bill introduced in the 1955 session of the Nebraska legislature. This service showed the nature of all bills introduced and
the standing of each bill during its consideration before committees and on general and select file. The service also listed the
sections of the statutes amended or repealed by bills introduced at
the end of each month. A sampling of the members indicates that
the members feel this service is worthwhile and desire that it be
continued each year the legislature is in session. Our president,
.John J. Wilson deserves special recognition for his efforts in the
preparation and distribution of this service.
6. The committee continued its cooperation with the extension department of the University of Nebraska in furnishing lawyers for speakers at various farm study group meetings. The
work of the Speakers Bureau was continued and with the cooperation of lawyers throughout the state a large segment of the ge:neral
public was reached.
7. News !terns. Twenty-six special news items have been
prepared and are available for publication in daily or weekly newspapers throughout the state. A sample story is captioned "Should
You Have a Will?" It is urged that all of our members contact
the editors of their local newspapers in an effort to obtain a wide
circulation of these news items.
We have continued to receive exce11ent general news coverage
in both the daily and weekly press throughout the state. Each
member can be of service in promoting a continuation of the excellent press relationship the Association now enjoys.
8. During the past year the Association's film "Living Under
Law" has been shown 23 times, including a showing at Boys State.
The committee has been searching for a suitable new film but as
yet has not purchased one. A film "Decision for Justice," a 26minute dramatization of one of Chief Justice John Marshall's most
famous decisions Marbwry vs. Madison is on loan for a period of
90 days. This film was originally shown on nationwide television
as part of du Pont's "Cavalcade of America" series. This film is
available and may be obtained from Secretary Turner at any time
prior to December 1, 1955.
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9. Recommendations. All of the 1·ecomrnendations made by
the previous Committee on Public Service have been complied with
during the past year. It is recommended that the present program be continued in full force and effect as a minimum public
service program to be supplemented in any manner the new committee shall deem advisable and in the best interests of the Association.
Milton R. Abrahams
John B. Cassel
James J. Fitzgerald
William H. Meier
Pliny Moodie
Henry Grether
Robert R. Wellington
Elmer M. Scheele, Chairman
The report of the Committee on Unauthorized Practice was
called up for consideration in the absence of James J. Fitzgerald,
chairman of the committee. Since the report of the committee
contained no recommendation, the report was received and filed.
The report of the committee follows:
Report of the Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law
Your Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law reports
as follows:
Your committee followed up on the citation against the George
S. May Co. discussed in last year's report, and one of the members of the committee, Robert G. Simmons, Jr., was appointed as
a special assistant attorney general with authority to follow the
matter through.
One other reference has been received by the committee from
the Executive Council but the facts developed to date are not
sufficient to warrant any concern by the Committee on Unauthorized Practice. At the present time, the matter is being held
by the committee to determine if there are additional facts which
should be considered. It is hoped that a final 1·ecommendation
may be forthcoming before the annual Bar Association meeting.
J. D. Cronin, Coordinator
H. L. Blackledge
Ernest A. Hubka
Daniel D. Jewell
Donald F. i\foGinley
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Daniel E. Owens
C. M. Pierson
Robert G. Simmons, Jr.
James J. Fitzgerald, Jr. Chairman
The report of the Committee on Expert Medical Testimony
was presented by George Healey for Earl M. Cline, chairman of
the committee. The report, which was approved by the House of
Delegates, follows:
Report of the Special Committee on Expert Medical Testimony
I

Such of the members of this committee as were able to be
present met with a committee from the Nebraska State Medical
Association on January 10, 1955. Present at the meeting, representing the Nebraska State Medical Association, were Dr. Harold
S. Morgan of Lincoln, Dr. J. P. Gilligan of Nebraska City, Dr.
Harley Anderson of Omaha, Dr. William Wright of Creighton,
Dr. Earl Leininger of McCook and Merrill C. Smith of Lincoln.
The subject of medical expert testimony was discussed in full,
and following this meeting, a draft of a bill was made, and the
same was introduced at the last session of the Nebraska state legislature. Hearings were held on this bill, and the bill was killed
by the committee to which it was referred.
Earl Cline, Chairman
George A. Healey
George Boland
Earl J. Moyer
Fred S. White
Harold A. Prince
Frank A. Hebenstreit
The report of the Committee on the State Tort Claims Act
was presented by George Healey, chairman of the committee.
The report, which was approved by the House of Delegates, follows:
Report of the Committee on Tort Claims Act
A Tort Claims Act was prepared and the bill introduced in
the 1955 legislature. Although it was presented to the committee,
it met opposition, and the Judiciary Committee failed to let the
bill go out of committee.

PROCEEDINGS, 195.5

191

This committee feels that such a State Tort Claims Act is
an advisable thing for Nebraska, an improvement over present
procedure, and a desired method for handling such claims.

It is the recommendation of this committee that the matter
be given thought by the House of Delegates at its next meeting.
James H. Anderson
George B. Boland
John E. Dougherty
Frederick H. Deutsch
Daniel J. Gross
Ralph D. Nelson
George Healey, Chairman
The report of the Committee on Legal Education was presented by 0. E. Shelburn, chairman. After discussion it was
agreed that, since the report of the committee contained no recommendation, it should be received and filed. At a subsequent
session of the House of Delegates it was moved that the reception of the report of the Committee on Legal Education be withdrawn and that the report be referred to the 1956 Committee on
Legal Education for further consideration. This motion prevailed.
The report of the Committee on Budget was presented by
Otto Kotouc, Jr., chairman of the committee. The statement of
Mr. Kotouc in submitting the report follows :
MR. CAIN: The report of the Committee on Budget and Finance, Otto Kotouc of Humboldt, Nebraska, chairman.
OTTO KOTOUC: Our secretary-treasurer, George H. Turner,
advises that the Nebraska State Bar Association has unexpended
funds this year approximating three thousand dollars. In recent
years our Association has not been so financially fortunate.
Therefore as a committee we recommend that a sum of perhaps two thousand dollars be segregated in a sinking fund and
invested in U. S. saving bonds. It is anticipated that in subsequent years additional funds may be similarly set aside. Scholarships to Nebraska law schools may be granted from the income
of this fund, or the income expended to otherwise promote the
objectives of our Bar Association.
Mr. Chairman, I move the adoption of the above recommendation.
JEAN B. CAIN:

Do I hear a second?

JOSEPH T. VOTAVA:

I'll second it.
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JEAN B. CAIN:

Are there any remarks?

JEAN B. CAIN : All those in favor of the motion say aye.
Opposed, no. The motion is carried.

The report of the Advisory Committee was presented by
Raymond G. Young, chairman. The report, which was received
by the House of Delegates, follows:
Report of Advisory Committee
During the year the Advisory Committee held meetings on
October 16, 1954, March 26, June 18 and September 23 and 24,
1955.
Further evidence was taken by it in three cases, and records
reviewed by it in three other cases of proceedings before Committees on Inquiry. The committee rendered six advisory opinions.
It considered two applications for reinstatement and decided to
adhere to its policy of not appearing in support of or resistance
to such applications unless otherwise directed by the. Supreme
Court.
The Chairman of the Advisory Committee, as a member of
the Special Committee on Rules Governing Investigation and Disposition of Charges, attended and participated in the meetings of
the Special Committee which prepared recommended changes in
Article XI of the Supreme Court Rules. Such proposed changes
were submitted to and approved by the Judicial Council. The
amended Article XI which embodies the Revised Rules on Investigation and Disposition of Charges was adopted by the Supreme
Court on June 24, 1955, and appears at Pages 32 to 36 of the
program of this annual meeting.
In substance, the changes made are as follows : Each Committee on Inquiry will consist of three members and two alternates. Charges may be lodged with the Committee on Inquiry,
the secretary-treasurer of the Association, or the clerk of the
Supreme Court. The lodging of charges with a committee is to
be reported to the secretary-treasurer of the Association. The
determination of claims of disqualification is simplified. In appropriate cases investigators may be employed. Upon request an
investigator may examine witnesses and introduce evidence before
a Committee. Committees are required to make frequent periodical reports of matters pending before them.
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It is believed that the amendments represent important improvements and will result in more efficient and expeditious administration.
During the year the Supreme Court rendered judgment of
disbarment in three cases, and administered censure in one case.
One complaint is pending in court, awaiting report of the referee.
A summary of the activities of the District Committees on
Inquiry follows :
In nine of the eighteen districts no charges were made and
no matters are pending. These are Districts 1, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14,
15 and 18.
Minor disagreements were satisfactorily adjusted, one in
each of Districts 7, 11and16.
One case is pending in District 2.
In District 3 (Lincoln) formal hearings were had in two
cases. Both were dismissed for lack of merit. One case decided
by the committee resulted in the filing of a complaint in the Supreme Court. Two matters of disagreement were satisfactorily
adjusted. Investigation resulted in two dismissals for lack of
merit. Two matters of minor importance are under investigation.
In District 4 (Omaha) four meetings were held. Four
matters were disposed of by dismissal or adjustment. One formal
complaint was filed and two matters are presently under investigation.
In District 6 investigation resulted in two dismissals for lack
of merit.
In District 12 charges are pending in one case. One matter
which was referred from District 11 because of the disqualification of the Committee of that District was dismissed because of
insufficient evidence.
In District 13 in two cases formal hearings were had, complaints were prepared and, with the transcripts, were sent to the
clerk of the Supreme Court. One of the cases is now pending in
the court, the other before the Advisory Committee.
The Advisory Committee recommends that each chairman
call a meeting of the regular and alternate members of his Committee on Inquiry for the purpose of discussing and making a
study of the Amended Rules, and of formulating questions or sug-
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gestions to be submitted to the Advisory Committee as an aid to
it in preparing rules for a simplified and uniform procedure.
Plans are being made for a conference to be held at a central
point in the state, at which the members of Committees on Inquiry
and of the Advisory Committee and other interested lawYers may
discuss and consider ethical problems and disciplinary procedures.
Suggestions as to time, place and subject matter of such conference will be gladly received by the Advisory Committee.
Respectfully submitted,
Charles F. Adams
Raymond M. Crossman
George B. Hastings
James G. Mothersead
Lloyd L. Pospishil
Frank D. Williams
Raymond G. Young, Chairman
The report of the Committee on Oil and Gas Law was presented by Dan Monen for James D. Conway, chairman of the
committee. The report, which "\Vas approved by the House of
Delegates, follows :
Report of the Special C-0mmittee on Oil and Gas Law
The Special Committee on Oil and Gas Law of the Nebraska
State Bar Association makes the following report and recommendations:
The previous Special Committee on this subject made a very
extensive study of oil and gas law changes. The 1954 committee
was headed by Mr. Floyd E. Wright, chairman. The 1955 committee took steps to follow this report and the recommendations
made by the previous committee and received valuable assistance
from Mr. Paul L. Martin, a member of the Executive Council,
in this regard. A number of bills were drafted covering the subject matter of the 1954 report and recommendations, and Mr. Paul
L. Martin and your chairman appeared before the committees of
the legislature in connection with these bills. We were not successful in obtaining legislative committee approval on all of these
bills, but quite a lot of the subject matter was accepted and approved, and adopted by the legislature as law.
Without going into the details of the bills passed, they are
enumerated as L. B.· 36, L. B. 37, L. B. 59 and L.B. 62, all of
which became law in September of 1955.
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Valuable assistance was rendered the committee by Senators
A. A. Fenske, Otto Kotouc, Sr., Donald F. McGinley and D. J.
Cole.
There was also introduced and passed L. B. 548 which concerned the authority to enter pooling and unit agreements on
school lands.
COMMENT

The legislature also enacted L.B. 216 which is known as the
severance tax on oil and gas, and provides for a levy of 2 percent
upon the value of such oil and gas taken from the ground, which
law is effective commencing January 1, 1956. The benefits of
this tax inures to the permanent school fund as established in
Article 7, Section 4 of the constitution of the State of Nebraska.
Your committee took no part in this legislation, as it had no
authority from the Bar Association to do so. The same is reported herein merely for information concerning legislation enacted which concerns oil and gas matters.
Recommendation No. 1 of the predecessory committee concerned appropriate legislation for the need of a conservation law.
The oil and gas industry independently drafted appropriate legislation for a conservation act and the members of this committee
were invited to an open meeting in Lincoln, Nebraska, on December 1, 1954, covering this subject matter. Your committee did
not participate in the drafting of the proposed legislation as it
was felt that the industry and its various counsel were far better
equipped to propose this legislation due to their experience in
other states on conservation legislation concerning oil and gas.
When the conservation law (L. B. 34) came up for consideration before the committee of the legislature, your chairman and
Mr. Paul L. Martin, member of the Executive Council, appeared
before the committee consistent with the report and recommendations approved at the annual meeting of the Bar Association on
October 13, 1954.
A controversy arose in this legislative hearing and opposition
to the bill was voiced by a number of independent producers principally concerning the pro-ration feature of the bill, which is also
referred to as ratable take. The introducers of the bill in open
committee hearing amended the bill to eliminate this particular
feature, but other controversies existed even after the elimination
of this feature which may be summarized by saying that certain
Nebraska producers objected to being policed by legislation concerning the drilling and production of oil and gas in Nebraska.
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The Committee of the Legislature hearing this bill killed the
bill in committee.
It was expressed by some opposing the bill that it was too
early to adopt a conservation law in Nebraska. While this matter
is a subject for the industry it.self and the legislature, there are
many features of a so-called conservation law pertaining to legal
procedure that the members of the Bar would be vitally interested
in, and if and when a conservation law is to be adopted, the Special
Committee on Oil and Gas Law can be of valuable assistance concerning the legal procedure phases of such a bill.
It is, therefo1·e, recommended that in connection with any
futu1·e proposals of a conservation law bill that the legal procedure
phases thereof be closely st·udied by members of the Special Oil
and Gas Com.mittee and appropriate action be taken by said committee with reference to the legal procedu1·e parts of the bill.
The new committee to be appointed following this annual
·meeting will, of course, have a fuff,l year to study matters, concerning oil and gas and 1nake appropriate recommendations with
·reference thereto, and make recommendations for submission to
the next session of the legislatUJ·e cornmencing in January of 1957.
This special committee should be continued in the future due to
the fact that the oil and gas industry is rapidly developing in the
State of Nebraska, and many legal problems concerning oil and
gas will originate in the futUJ·e in which the members of the Bar
will be vitally interested and in which the Nebraska Ba1· Association should take an active inte1·est.
Arthur 0. Auserod
Robert J. Bulger
L. M. Clinton
Daniel Monen, Jr.
Wendell E. Mumby
John W. Stewart
S. E. Torgeson
I van Van Steenberg
John H. Wiltse
James D. Conway, Chairman
The House of Delegates next received the report of the Committee on Hearings. which was presented by C. Russell Mattson,
chairman. The report of the committee follows :
JEAN B. CAIN : The next report is the Committee on Hearings and Resolutions, C. Russell Mattson, chairman.
'
C. RUSSELL ·MATTSON:

Mr. Chairman and members of the
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House of Delegates. Your Committee on Hearings met and considered matters to be referred to it.
The only matter to be considered by the committee was a
resolution offered to the House of Delegates by Honorable Joseph
Votava. This relates to the Association approving a proposed
amendment of the Section 4, Artiele VIII of the constitution of
Nebraska, which would permit legislative action to absolve 1·eal
estate taxes and assessments delinquent ten years or more.
The resolution also relates to the lawyers being urged to explain the measure to the voters before November 8, 1955.
Upon consideration your committee reports that it recommends opposition to adoption of the resolution, feeling that it
contains subject matter which should have neither the approval
or disapproval of this Association.
JEAN B. CAIN :

The report will be accepted and filed.

C. RUSSELL MATTSON: Our recommendation related to a
resolution of Mr. Votava, and I suggest that some action be taken.
We merely recommended opposition, and I think it calls for a
vote now from the House on the resolution itself.
JEAN B. CAIN :

Is there a motion on it?

c. RUSSELL MATTSON: Well, Mr. Votava moved the adoption of the resolution this morning and then it was 1·eferred to
us. We have reported it back, recommending opposition to adoption of the resolution.
JUDGE SPENCER: He had moved adoption but there was a
substitute motion that took the place of the motion, so there is
nothing before the House.

c. RUSSELL MATTSON: I move that the report of the Committee on Hearings be adopted.
JUDGE SPENCER:

I second the motion.

JEAN B. CAIN : It has been moved and seconded that the
report of the Committee on Hearings be adopted.
Are there any remarks?
(There was no response.)
JEAN B. CAIN:

All in favor say aye.

Opposed, no. Motion carried.
JEAN B. CAIN:

The H9use of Delegates will stand adjourned.
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NEBRASKA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
THURSDAY MORNING SESSlON

October 6, 1955
The opening session of the 56th annual meeting of the Nebraska State Bar Association was called to order at 10 o'clock
A.M. in Hotel Paxton, Omaha, Nebraska, by President John J.
Wilson of Lincoln.
PRESIDENT WILSON: Gentlemen, the 56th annual meeting of
the Nebraska State Bar Association will now come to order. Invocation will be pronounced by the Reverend Edward W. Stimson,
minister of Dundee Presbyterian Church.
REV. EDWARD W. STIMSON: Let us pray. Almighty God,
Lord of justice and righteousness, who throughout all ages has
sought to educate and discipline Thy children in the ways that
are right, and of whose pure justice all our laws and justice are
human approximations, we invoke Thy blessing upon this meeting of the Nebraska Bar Association.
Inspired by Thy spirit, may we catch anew the vision of
higher justice, renew our ideals for practice at the Bar and in
the counseling room; that principle may ever take precedence
over expediency, and that divine balance between justice and
mercy may be more clearly seen.
Make us faithful in the performance of our civic duty to the
highest we know, as Thou dost ever inspire our best. We pray
humbly in Thy name. Amen.
PRESIDENT WILSON: The address of welcome this morning
will be delivered by Tom Kelley, president of the Omaha Bar.
Mr. Kelley.
THOMAS P. KELLEY: Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Omaha
Bar and the city of Omaha, it gives me great pleasure to welcome
you back again for the Bar Association meeting, the 56th annual
meeting.
It is always a great pleasure to renew old acquaintances and
make some new ones every year, and we certainly hope that you
enjoy your stay with us this time.
We also hope that if we can be of any assistance to anyone,
that you do not liestitate to call on us.
PRESIDENT WILSON:

Thank you, Tom.
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The response by Murl Maupin of North Platte.
MURL MAUPIN: President Wilson, Mr. Kelley, ladies and
gentlemen of the Nebraska Bar Association. It is a pleasure to
have this opportunity of responding to the words of welcome of
the president of the Omaha Bar Association. We are indeed
thankful to you, we of the outstate Bar, for the trouble and the
efforts that you have gone to provide the program we have ahead
of us.
I, in examining the program, noticed that it has been prepared with care and considerable thought, particularly from the
standpoint of the type of social entertainment and the timing of
the events.
It is noted that this evening we have the cocktail hour, where
probably preparations will be made for the Kaffee Klatch to follow tomorrow morning for the ladies.
"Kaffee Klatch," as you know, in the language from which
the term comes means coffee with gossip.
So without further ado I again thank you. I am sure that
you have arranged a delightful social program to go with this
splendid program which we have for the Association.
We are indeed grateful to you. Thank you.
PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS

At this point in the program of our annual meeting it is required by the constitution of our Association that the president
deliver an address. Since I am a believer in supporting the constitution, I shall endeavor to comply with this requirement.
At previous annual meetings I have observed that some of
our presidents in the past have, at this point, modestly turned
the duty of presiding over to a vice-president who then proceeded
with great dignity to introduce the president so that he in turn
might proceed to make an address. This I shall not do for two
reasons. First, I feel no urge of modesty which requires me to
ask another to introduce me. You have probably guessed from
the proceedings so far in which capacity I address you. The second reason is that under our present form of organization there
are no vice-presidents.
In scanning the records of the proceedings of the association in earlier years, I find that presidents in the past have devoted themselves to such learned subjects as "The Sufficiency of
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the Common Law"; "The Grim Condition" and "Guides to Constitutional Construction." Sprinkled along the way have been
not a few presidential addresses suggesting ways of improving
the judiciary.
I have decided that while a learned address might be of some
interest to some of you, a more useful service can be rendered if
I spend my allotted time in rendering an account of my stewardship during the period you have honored me by permitting me to
serve as your president.
My address shall be in the nature of a report of the state of
affairs of your association and accomplishments achieved during
the past year. I find in my contacts with our members that many
of the members would like to know more about the way your
organization operates, and for that reason let me briefly describe
your Association to you.
The officers of your Association consist of a president, chairman of House of Delegates and secretary-treasurer. There is an
Executive Council and also a House of Delegates.
The Executive Council consists of one member from each
Supreme Court judicial district, three members at large, the immediate past president and the president and chairman of the
House of Delegates.
The House of Delegates is composed of thirty-five delegates
elected from eighteen district court judicial districts, the eleven
members of the Executive Council, two association delegates to
American Bar Association and the six section chairmen.
This is the second year the House of Delegates has functioned.
It is its duty to receive and act upon the reports of all committees
of the Association which they did yesterday, thereby leaving time
available during the two days of our annual meeting for section
meetings. The section reports are also subject to approval by
the House of Delegates.
The Executive Council is the executive organ of your Association. It has sole authority to approve expenditure of funds and
contracting obligations. It constitutes the nomination committee,
provides programs and entertainment, fixes compensation of officers, fills vacancies in offices, authorizes clinics and provides the
program at the annual meeting.
Your Association has sponsored many clinics and institutes
for which no charge has been made. It has made available certain
publications without cost, including the weekly log or bill digest
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during the past legislative session. Speakers are furnished to
your district bar meeting upon request and the expenses of such
speakers are paid by your Association.
There are eighteen committees whose functions cover nearly
every conceivable task that could be wished for and all did a
magnificent job trying to do for you those things which will improve your Association and your relations with the public generally.
Two clinics were held during the year. The first was the annual federal tax clinic which held instructive meetings during December at Alliance, Grand Island and Omaha under the leadership
of the Section on Taxation, and the other clinic was on new legislation which consisted of one-day meetings held at North Platte,
Kearney, Lincoln and Omaha.
A Section on Practice and Procedure and a Section on Municipal and Public Corporations are meeting for the first time this
year. The Executive Council appointed the Executive Committees
for these sections and helped them organize. Each has a wonderful program for you at their first meeting this afternoon.
I want to call your attention to the work of the Committees
on Judiciary and Legislation. Their reports are printed in the
annual program and need not be discussed in detail here. After
several attempts in the past, salaries of the judiciary were raised
and a retirement system for judges was adopted. A splendid
tribute is also due the nine members of your association who served in the last legislature, who, with your support, succeeded in
these fine accomplishments.
Many other committees were successful in their attempts to
have legislation either enacted or defeated. The efforts of these
lawyers are worthy of your commendation. Their reports show
their activities in detail.
At the beginning of my year as president, I outlined my
duties into the following four fields:
1.

2.
3.
4.

The Association and what could be done for it;
The judiciary, and what accomplishments we might make;
To carry on a legal educational program for lawyers; and
The individual lawyer.

It is my thinking that what we did for your Association, we
did for each member thereof. We are the only organization dedicated to justice. It has often been said the bench is no better
than its bar. We can be proud of such a fine organization and
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of the high standards and fine bench. We must be careful, whether
lawyer or judge, that we do not leave a mar or stain on the
trestleboard.
In Nebraska every lawyer and judge is proud of his position and almost universally is held in high esteem by the public
and his fellowman.
The public relations of the Bar Association can only succeed
so far as everyone is willing to help. Like a good reputation, good
public relations must be earned. No paid advertising, no press
agentry or public relations committee and no public service program can substitute for a sound lawyer-client relationship. If
people are to have faith and confidence in you as lawyers, they
must first know a lawyer and appreciate what he can do. Thus
the individual lawyer-client relationship is the doorway to public
respect and good will.
During the past year we have attempted to express to the
public what lawyers can do and to make it easier for the public
to acquaint themeslves with lawyers.
There are two television stations carrying items of public
interest in legal matters. KMTV, Channel 3 at Omaha, on the
"Better Living Program," and KHOL-TV at Axtell have made
their stations available. Both programs are of the "interview"
type, conducted by a moderator from the station staff who discusses with a lawyer, furnished to the program by your Association, some legal topic of interest to the public. The moderator
and the lawyer participant each receive a script for the program
prepared by your Committee on Public Service which is the basis
of the interview. It is not expected that either be bound by the
exact language of the script. Both are free to present the program in their own words.
The stations have been most helpful in placing the programs
in the hands of e}...'iremely competent moderators and the la,vyers
who have been asked to participate have responded generously.
We appreciate the interest these ti.vo television stations have stimulated in this field. These programs are being well received
by the public, judging by the correspondence received by your secretary.
We now have columns appearing in some of the weekly newspapers in the state. The columns are directed to problems which
might happen to anyone. These columns are designed to warn the
public of possible legal complications in every-day life. They
constitute "preventive law." They state that they are for the
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purpose of informing the public and not to advise the public.
Each column suggests to the reader that he should consult his
lawyer about any problems he might have.
The Nebraska Farmer, with the largest circulation of any
farm paper in our area, will be soon carrying bi-monthly legal
articles for reader interest which has been prepared on behalf of
your Association. The first article will appear in the early November, 1955, issue. These articles will be more in detail than
the articles in the weekly papers. They will be properly illustrated
and will be attractive in their makeup.
Two new pamphlets of interest to clients have been distributed to you during the past month, as well as the pamphlet
"Confidentially, Mr. Attorney." The Public Service Committee
spent many hours on these publications, and if properly distributed they will help cement good will with the public and will
bring clients to your office.
Your president and secretary have met with various committees of the Nebraska State Bankers Association during the
winter months, and as a result of these contacts we began to
really know each other and understand the mutual problems of
the two professions. Your Association was asked to furnish
speakers for various bankers' meetings, and we have received
many fine remarks for the cooperation accorded them. The
speakers were highly praised.
When the time for introduction of bills in the legislature
was approaching, the Nebraska State Medical Association, through
an appropriate committee, and the Committee on Expert Medical
Testimony of your Association met in a joint conference to work
out an expert medical-testimony bill. The bill was prepared and
approved by the Nebraska State Medical Association and the Executive Council of your Association. The bill was introduced in
the legislature. While the bill sponsored by the joint committees
met with defeat, fine professional relations began to be formed,
and now the lawyers and medics feel that they need each other's
support. In this regard the legal section of the American Bar
Association is holding a legal-medic clinic in Omaha on October
17th. Member of your own Association are appearing with other
distinguished experts in the fields of law and medicine.
During July of this year a mineral law institute was held at
the University of Colorado in Boulder, Colorado. It was sponsored by the Colorado Bar Association, Colorado Mining Association, Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Association and University of
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Colorado School of Law. Your Association was asked to join as
a sponsor, but due to the short notice of the institute we were
unable to have a meeting of the council and secure authorization
for such sponsorship. However we were accorded the status of
sponsors and have been asked to be a part of a nonprofit corporation to sponsor annual mineral law institutes. This was one of
the finest institutes I have attended. The registration exceeded the
hopes of the committee more than two-fold. It was declared a
success and will be conducted again next year in Boulder. I hope
that all lawyers interested in oil and mineral laws will attend.
Despite the late announcement this year, Nebraska was well 1·epresented.
The Supreme Court was requested to act upon the report of
the Committee on Rules Governing Investigations and Disposition
of Charges which recommended some changes in the disciplinary
procedure. The court approved the changes. The changes appear
in the appendix to the report of the Committee on Rules Governing Investigations and Disposition of Charges. Much credit is
due the members of the committee for this work as well as to
the members of the Advisory Committee and the members of the
Judicial Council. I have a strong feeling that these changes will
provide a more workable procedure to avoid the public criticism
we have sometimes received due to excessive delay in the conduct
of disciplinary proceedings.
It was my pleasure to attend the mid-winter and annual
meetings of the American Bar Association. The National Conference of Bar Presidents met before each of these meetings.
Many helpful suggestions -were made by representatives of other
associations, and by threading these new ideas into our program
we can keep abreast of plans for an ever-helpful Association.
I attended the annual meetings of the State Bars of Kansas,
South Dakota and Missouri as the representative of your Association. Every courtesy that could be offered was accorded Sue and
me. We enjoyed their hospitality and exchanged ideas on how an
organization for lawyers should be conducted. Public service was
of the utmost importance in their future plans and must be the
major item in ours.
One of the highlights of my year as your president was to
be one of the honored guests of the Nebraska State Medical
Association where I was accorded a place on the program and
given an opportunity to address their assembly. The time has
come when the members of our professions should be working
toward the sanie end. I think we are making progress.
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The officers and some members of your Association have
been serving in an advisory capacity for the Northwest Regional
meeting at the American Bar Association to be held in St. Paul,
Minnesota, October 12-15, 1955. Meetings of this character enable lawyers to meet other lawyers and to acquaint themselves
with new views on legal subjects. A fine program has been
planned and all are urged to attend.
Since this is the two hundredth anniversary of John Marshall,
who was a remarkable human being, Revolutionary soldier,
statesman, diplomat and "the Great Chief Justice of the United
States" from 1801 until 1835, let us commemorate the enduring
contributions he made to our national heritage.
John Marshall, fourth chief justice of the United States, was
a product of the Virginia frontier. He was born on September
24, 1755, in a long cabin deep in the forest of a portion of Prince
William County, Virginia.
After service in the Revoluntionary War, John Marshall turned to law and politics.
He soon became a leading member of the Richmond bar, noted
not for his· mastery of precedents or statutes but rather for a
supreme skill in isolating the crucial point of a case, and in addressing to that point an argument beginning with a premise of
broad principal and proceeding by rigorously logical steps to reach
the inevitable conclusion that favored his client's cause.
At the persuasion of George Washington, Marshall ran for
Congress and served one term in the House of Representatives.
He declined the office of secretary of war but became President
Adams' secretary of state. In that capacity he virtually presided
over the affairs of the expiring administration while President
Adams spent his time at his ill wife's side. The grateful President then nominated Marshall as chief justice and the Senate
confirmed the nomination, although without enthusiasm even from
the Federalist members.
Although Marshall's appointment to the Supreme Court attracted little favorable reaction, his role as chief justice soon became evident. He tried to protect the court and the federal judiciary generally against attacks by members of the new Jefferson
administration and Congress, who viewed the courts as a stronghold of the defeated Federalists. He persuaded his colleagues on
the court to reduce the number of their separate opinions in deciding cases in favor of single opinions for the court as an entity,
and he strove to achieve unanimity among his brethern. He sue-
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ceeded to a remarkable degree in moulding the court to his own
image, which was accomplished by subtle and persuasive qualities of leadership.
The tenure as chief justice was not serene. Almost the entire period was one of conflict involving the court in great issues
of the day. Sometimes the conflict was with the Executive. Near
the beginning the court was pitted against the President in a tense
struggle for power that was disguised as a minor lawsuit.
It will be remembered that in Marbury vs. Madison, Marshall's
opinion disposed of the case on jurisdictional grounds-the court
could not grant a writ of mandamus since the pertinent provision of the Judiciary Act, which purported to add to the court's
constitutional, original jurisdiction was unconstitutional in this
respect. Thus it can be said that there was no occasion to consider the question whether a cabinet officer was amenable to such
a writ. But Marshall did, and where he came out we all know.
He formulated his conclusions as follows:
. . . where the heads of departments are the political or confidential agents of the executive, merely to execute the will of the
president, or rather to act in cases in which the executive possessed a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more
perfectly clear, than that their acts are only politically examinable. But where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual
rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally
clear, that the individual who considers himself injured, has a
right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.

To say that this pronouncement was gratuitous is now quite
academic. The vitality of its influence is the important thing,
and there can be scant doubt that, like the decision of the English
judges in the famous case of Ashby vs. White, it has been a stout
support for the rule of law. It has meant in round terms that
executive officers, subordinate only to the President himself, are
answerable in the courts of law for denial of the legal rights of
an individual. This is also a landmark case on the power of a
court to hold an act of the legislature unconstitutional.
While serving as chief justice, there were many important
decisions by the court which have influenced our government.
In another famous case, McCulloch vs. Maryland, where the
interpretation of the Constitution and the doctrine of implied
powers were involved, Chief Justice Marshall said:
The people of all the States have created the general government,
and have conferred upon it the general power of taxation. The
people of all the States, and the States themselves, are represented
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in congress. and, by their representatives exercise this power.
When they tax the chartered institutions of the States, they tax
their constituents, and these taxes must be uniform. But when
a State taxes the operations of the government of the United
States, it acts upon institutions created, not by their own constituents, but by people over whom they claim no control. It
acts upon the measures of a government created by others as
well as themselves, for the benefit of others in common with themselves. The difference is that which always exists, and must
always exist, between the action of the whole on a part, and the
action of a part on the whole; between the laws of government
declared to be supreme, and those of a government which, when
in opposition to those laws, is not supreme.
If any one proposition could command the universal assent of

mankind, we might expect it would be this-that the government
of the Union, though limited in its powers. is supreme within
its sphere of action. This would seem to result, necessarily,
from its nature. It is the government of all; its powers are delegated by all; it represents all, and acts for all . . . . The nation,
on those subjects on which it can act, must necessarily bind its
component parts.

It was in such cases just cited and many others which 'vere
decided while Marshall served as chief justice that have been
important factors in developing and maintaining the historic liberties of the people of the United States.
It is for these reasons that a wider public knowledge and
appreciation of the work and achievements of such a great chief
justice are desirable today in order to strengthen the moral, social and political structure of our nation, and to help in the preservation and protection of the lives, liberties, and property of
all our people.
It is proper and fitting that we dedicate a part of our annual
meeting to the memory of John Marshall for the inspiring role he
played in our national life.
Today I hope you will all attend the luncheon in this room
where the Honorable John D. Randall, chairman of the House of
Delegates of the American Bar Association, will address the members in commemoration of the life of John Marshall and will introduce a film titled "Decision for Justice." The film is based
on the case of Marbury vs. Madison in which the court established
its right to declare acts of Congress invalid.
It has been a great pleasure and a wonderful experience for
me to be president of this fine organization. My tasks were
eased by the help of my good friend and your able and efficient
secretary, George H. Turner. His staff has been most helpful
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at all times. My contacts with the lawye1·s of this state and the
many friends I met through bar activities of other states and the
American Bar Association will be a lasting memory. Please accept my thanks for all the help and assistance you have given me
this past year. It has been greatly appreciated.
PRESIDENT WILSON:
secretary-treasurer.

We will now have the report of the

Report of the Secretary-Treasurer
GEORGE H. TURNER: It is somewhat of a pleasure to be able
for once at least to report that we operated exclusively with black
ink this year, which is a little unusual.
The accounts of the Association have been audited by the firm
of Martin and Martin, certified public accountants of Lincoln,
and it covers the period October 1, 1954, to September 24, 1955.
We closed the Association year six days early in order the auditors might complete their examination of the books in time for a
report to be made at this meeting.
The audit disclo_ses that cash receipts during the period
amounted to $42,391.95 and the cash disbursements $39,737.43,
which produced an excess of cash receipts over disbursements of
$2,654.52.
This amount is reflected in the cash balance which increased
from $652.25, as of the close of the previous audit in October of
'54, to a balance of $3,307.77 at the close of this audit. The
principal items of receipts, of course, were the dues of members,
and amounted to $37,430.00 from active members and $4,865.00
from dues of inactive.
Principal items of disbursements mentioned by the auditors
are salaries and payroll taxes of $10,326.30; office supplies, printing, postage and stationery, $1,561.18 ; officers' expenses, $2,298.55; the expense of the representatives of the Association in
the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, $1,016.16;
the expense of the 1954 annual meeting, $4,857.08; the publication of the Nebraska Law Review, $4,958.61, which incidentally
includes, as you know, the total cost of the publication of the one
issue of the Review which contains the proceedings of our annual
meeting; the expense for the public service program, $4,556.43 ;
and the expense of the December Tax Institute, $2,266.58.
All the cash receipts were deposited in the bank, receipts for
dues were verified by reconcilation with the membership cards
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issued. The bank balances were verified by independent correspondence with the bank; cash disbursements were verified by
examination of cancelled checks, and, when feasible, by inspection
of the original documents supporting the disbursements.
The report concludes; "In our opinion the funds of the Association have been properly accounted for during the period
under review."
This report was submitted yesterday to the House of Delegates, where it received approval; and was also submitted yesterday afternoon to the Executive Council for its approval.
PRESIDENT WILSON: We wm now have the report of the
American Bar Association delegates. The Honorable Clarence A.
Davis and Laurens Williams.
CLARENCE A. DAVIS : As one of the two delegates of this
Association to the American Bar Association it has been my privilege for three or four years now to give a report of the annual
meeting of the American Bar Association.
I have particularly enjoyed it and enjoy that privilege this
year because it is such a good excuse to come home and see assembled here such a tremendous group of acquaintances. There
is hardly anybody in the room that I do not call by his first name.
The 77th meeting of the American Bar Association was held
this year in Philadelphia, as you probably know. I think that
the Association rather outdid itself because of the celebration of
the John Marshall bicentennial. That was a tremendously impressive meeting. A lot of you were there; many more of you, of
course, were not. But Philadelphia after all is the original cradle
of American liberty and of the government of the United States.
So you have in the first place of course all of the background
of Independence Hall and of the events that grew out of the
early days of Philadelphia, so there rises first an emotional stimulating appeal from those circumstances.
Then our friend Lloyd Wright was President of the American Bar this year. He has been to many of our conventions here,
and many of you know him. I think Lloyd as President rather
outdid himself, with the aid, of course, of a lot of people, the
Board of Governors and so on. But it is the first time in the history of the American Bar when there were present at one session, at one meeting of that Association, the President of the
United States, the Vice-President of the United States and the
Chief Justice of the United States.
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The ceremony in celebration of Marshall held on the mall
of Independence Hall, which incidentally is to become a great national shrine right in the heart of Philadelphia, ultimately to be
several blocks square, with these old buildings as the focal point
of the shrine, where addresses by the President of the United
States and the Vice-President of the United States before a crowd
estimated at twenty-five to thirty thousand people, stretching
away for hundred of yards in every direction, was a very, very
inspiring thing.
Those of us who were there, I am sure, wi11 never forget that
setting and the occasion for it.
Now the American Bar Association is growing constantly to
be a great institution. Many of you belong to it. Many more of
you do not, I am sorry to say. The American Bar Association has
a membership now well past fifty thousand, perhaps fifty-five,
but after all there are about two hundred thousand lawyers in
the United States. I never miss an opportunity to say that it is
only through the American Bar Association, and it ought to be an
organization that represents more than a majority of the lawyers
of the United States, that the protection of the law can make
itself heard in the councils of the nation. We do very well as it
is, and I think that the American Bar Association by and large
has the confidence of the Congress and of the public, that after
all we are sti11 subject to the attack that it is just a minority
group.
The American Bar, as you know, and I repeat time and again,
is just as democratic in organization as is the Nebraska Bar Association, governed by a plan of a House of Delegates on a representative basis, which as you know we have largely adopted here
in our own state, and consequently I think all of us owe to the
profession which nurtured us and to the greatest profession in
the world an obligation to support the American Bar Association.
Now I can not hope here in the very few minutes that I want
to report from the Philadelphia meeting to even enumerate the
tremendous number of matters that come before the House of
Delegates of the American Bar. After all there are numerous
sections of the American Bar, each of them in turn highly specialized and divided into sub-committees and sub-sections. There
are literally dozens of committees for special purposes of one kind
and another. Short of taking the agenda of the House of Delegates and about a day's time, I do not think anyone could give you
any rundown on what happens at a meeting of the House of
Delegates of the American Bar. All that Laury Williams and
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I can hope to do is take three or four of the things that appealed
to us as high spots and give you some idea of what goes on.
We undertook to divide the fields just a little bit, so I am
going to tell you in just a few words of the Section of Administrative Law, because that field on a nation-wide basis is the thing
which profoundly affects the practice.
So far in Nebraska we have not been afflicted with quite as
much legislation through administrative agencies as has been
the country at large. Yet the procedures that are necessary to
maintain due process in the connection with the extension of
government by administrative legislation are things worthy of the
careful thought of all of us.
It is largely the American Bar Association's sponsoring of
the administrative procedure act which brought some order out
of the chaos that existed after the setting up of these numerous
agencies, largely during the '30's. As time goes on the question
is how we can refine that still more to keep the legal processes
behind the fences, with which we are all familiar.
This year as you probably know from the papers the Hoover
Commission has completed its report on government operations
throughout the government, and, among others, legal process
and procedures in government.
I will not discuss it all, the very elaborate plan which that
commission set up for the institution and control and regulation
of the legal staffs of the various government departments, including the Department of Justice, to try to keep some harmonious
system working between the various departments as they function
throughout the country. But the commission has gone much
farther in an attempt to aid this administrative law question by
suggesting without recommendation, unanimously, at least to the
commission, the establishment of an administrative court which
in turn would have jurisdiction over many of the appeals of these
in the so-called independent agencies and administrative tribunals.
That is far too elaborate to discuss even in any one day's address,
let alone in the few minutes I am to report to you. But it marks
another march down the road towards maintaining due process
of law and towards maintaining an orderly system of law under
the administrative process.
It has seemed to me as this thing goes on, as we lawyers
from time to time shudder more and more about the lack of regularity, about the inadequacy of the hearings which we are afforded, about the possible prejudice of hearing examiners and
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the people who are hearing these, and the-I want to say partisan, but I don't mean politically partisan-the tendency of the
agency to sustain its own people at all stages. The more of that
we see the more the Bar reacts toward the judicial process.
Now they come with the suggestion of administrative court,
and I have felt that we are approaching the time when it is quite
possible that the administrative procedure is going to be absorbed
into and become a part of the judicial processes of the United
States. The sooner that day comes in my judgment the better,
because this judicial process of ours has been developed over
several hundred years, and I do not think we are going to improve
it by any supposed shortcuts.
So much for that general subject.
Then of course the whole field of unauthorized practice is
still a hot subject in the American Bar Association. I am leaving
to Laury the discussion of those phases of what we call unauthorized practice in connection with taxes and treasury. I would
just like to tell you, however, the American Bar Association is
very active against unauthorized practice in the real estate field,
banking field, the insurance field, where we are now looking into
the question of gratuitous advice that is so freely given in connection with the estate planning and the writing of insurance policies. That field is getting a lookover, and that one I know treads
on toes of lawyers that are right in this room.
So it goes, and again I repeat that the only way to handle
these things, is to handle them on a top level on a national basis.
It is pretty difficult to handle them locally.
The other thing Jack discussed very well in his presidential
address and in the remarks that he made that followed is the
John Marshall celebration.
It is not too often that we get such a logical opportunity to
portray the place of the legal system in organized society, the
place of the lawyer, and the fundamentals of the American constitutional system as we get in connection with this commemoration of the birth of John Marshall.

As mentioned already, the American Bar Association celebration, I think Jack has done very well in bringing it to us here,
but we all know that organized society cannot exist as we know
it without an independent judiciary and without the supremacy
of that judiciary as an independent umpire free to restrain the
executive just as freely as it is to restrain the individual.
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That is so fundamental and so basic, yet I am shocked as
we go about the country to find out how little of that fundamental
conception our youngsters, and some not so young, have acquired
as they have gone through our educational system.
So this year we have a great opportunity right here in Nebi·aska, utilizing the celebration of Marshall's birth as our excuse to hold meetings in high schools and before various other
groups emphasizing the theme of Ma:rbury v. Madison, if you
will, the general theme of necessity of judicial supremacy to maintain an organized society. Into that, of course, fits exactly the
anti-communist theme where there is no restraint upon executive and arbitrary power.
It seems to me that the local Bar Association, the county
Bar Associations of the state, would render a very great service
to themselves and to the profession of the law and to the ultimate
welfare of the country if they would take as their project the
presentation to the schools and the various other groups of these
various fundamental things that we all know so well. It seems to
me that that is a program which reflects credit upon us, and
which can be very easily undertaken simply by a few aggressive
members of the Bar in their home towns, explaining what this business of the law and this business of the judges is all about in
language that people can understand.
That is the theme of the American Bar Association this year.
It is the theme of this Association as the president has laid it
down, and I hope you will make it your theme.
Now that is pretty fragmentary, but I am glad to have the
opportunity to say I am glad to be back with you. Thanks.
PRESIDENT WILSON: Thank you, Mr. Davis. And now we
will have Laury Williams' report.
LAURENS WILLIAMS: Mr. President, members of the Nebraska State Bar Association. I have been attending annual meetings
of the American Bar Association for lo these many years, and
while I have realized over these years that, as Clarence has indicated, the American Bar Association is a great and growing organization, it was not until the honor and the privilege came
to me of representiµg the Nebraska State Bar Association in the
House of Delegates of the American Bar Association that I really
began having an appreciation of first the scope of the activities
of the American Bar Association, and secondly, the importance to
the American lawyer of each of those activities.
As Clarence has indicated, the membership of the Association
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has been growing. I can give you a precise figure. As of August 25th the American Bar Association had 58,002 members
with fully paid-up dues. That was a substantial increase. Over
7,700 applications for membership were processed during the
past year. But here in Nebraska unfortunately we haven't been
keeping pace. There were 2,327 active members of this Association eligible for membership in the American Bar Association
as of the close of the last fiscal year of the American Bar Association, but only 603 Nebraska lawyers or 25.9 percent of the
Nebraska lawyers were members of our great national professional organization.
We ranked twenty-third in the forty-eight states in the percentage of our members who were members of the American
Bar Association.
The American Bar Association Membership Committee had
set up quotas for new members last year. Our quota was eightyfive and we had forty. I suggest to you that we need to put
forth a little more active effort in the line of membership in this
great organization.
It takes a lot of money to operate the American Bar Association. Last year the income of the Association almost exclusively
from dues was about eight hundred thousand dollars, but the
expenditures including that of the American Bar Association
Journal ran, I believe, within about thirty thousand dollars of
the income. While it is true that the dues are an element of expense for all of us, it seems to me that we owe a duty to our
profession to lend our financial aid through membership, as well
as our aid in other ways, to the national organization which speaks
for us. Whether we are members or not, they are going to speak
for us; and when we are members we have a voice in determination of what they say. So I want first to suggest to you who
are not members that there may be something of an obligation
to become a membe1~
First of all, the annual meetings. I think no lawyer can attend an annual meeting of the American Bar Association without coming away feeling that he has had true spiritual uplift
as a result, and he has gained much of very practical experience
which will be of real value to him in his daily practice. That
is true no matter in what area of the law your particular interests lie because the annual Bar Association sections and committees embrace, I assure you, every field and phase of the law.
At the annual meetings you have the opportunity to hear some
of the most effective and able lawyers in the country, who are
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-expert in particular fields advise you, so to speak, of better ways,
easier ways to do a better job for your client.
The annual meetings of the Association are scheduled well
in advance. Next year it will be held at Dallas, Texas, August
27th to 31st. Now while it gets warm in Texas, the TID..-as delegation kept assuring us that everything in Dallas is air conditioned. So next year it is Dallas, August 27th to the 31st.
Then the following year the American Bar Association repeats what it did back in the 1920's. We first meet in New York
City about July 8th for the business meeting, and then adjourn
for about two weeks, when we reconvene in London, England.
Now here is a beautiful opportunity to take that trip abroad
and have Uncle Samuel pay a substantial part, depending on your
tax bracket, of the expense of that European trip that your wife
has always wanted to take.
In 1958 Los Angeles, California; and in 1959, Washington,
D. C.; and in the meantime, of course, the regional meetings continue. Next week one will be held at St. Paul, Minnesota, and
then November 27th to the 30th at New Orleans, Louisiana.
This year marked the active opening, so to speak, of the
American Bar Center in Chicago, staffed by approximately one
hundred full-time employees of the American Bar Association.
There too is housed the American Bar Foundation. In fact
the Foundation owns the building, which, by the way, cost approximately $1, 750,000, and which was given one of the outstanding architectural awards this past year because of the beauty
of the building, its functional set-up and the fact that it is very
efficiently designed, and yet carries with it great dignity, great
beauty.
You don't have to be a member of the American Bar Association to see that building. I suggest that any lawyer who
would spend an hour or two would invest it wisely when you
are in Chicago by taking the time to go out and go through that
building. It is magnificent. I believe it will make you e:i..'iremely proud not only of our profession but of your national organization.
The American Bar Association, or Foundation, has now started several major projects. First of these is a study of the administration of criminal justice in the United States, something
which I think we'll all agree is long overdue. Then they are
starting a study of canons of ethics to determine if there should
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be revisions. They are preparing a source book on the background of rights of citizens under the Bill of Rights and under
our Constitution. Another study is being undertaken in cooperation with the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in certain areas. I wanted to get that in in
order to say one of the greatest honors which has come to Nebraska lawyers in the past year has been the election of Barton
H. Kuhns of the Omaha Bar to the presidency of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. A very
great tribute to one of our very great lawyers.
Turning now, I want to make one other thing clear. The
Federal Bar Association, of which Clarence Davis has just been
elected president, is a national organization of over two hundred
lawyers, most of them career people in government. That is a
great honor also.
Now I want to talk for just a moment about the problem
of social security for lawyers. That has been a matter of interest and concern to the profession since 1938. The traditional
stand of American lawyers has been that we want no part of
social security, that it is a type of government regimentation
which will, how I have never understood, somehow control the
American lawyer so that we will lose our traditional independence.
That stand has obviously been changed. Many, many lawyers,
and I know there are lot of them in this room, some of them on
the platform, desire social security coverage and have had it for
many years by simply converting what were retainers into salaries, et cetera. Obviously some of the younger men at the Bar
see the problem differently than do the older members of the Bar,
At the February meeting of the House of Delegates of the
American Bar in Chicago, the House of Delegates in part rnversed
the previous stand of the Association and endorsed social security
for lawyers on a voluntary basis, on the basis that each lawyer
might decide for himself whether he wanted coverage under social
security.
Those of us who have had some occasion to look at the problem of social security coverage not from the standpoint of the
member of the profession or of individuals but from the standpoint of government will, I think, in the main agree with those
members of Congress, who have lived with this problem, some
of them since its infancy, who find it very difficult on an intellectual basis to understand how it can be a rational approach
when no other profession and no other people in America are
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given the optional coverage, Christian Science practitioners, I
think, are the only exception. The whole concept of social security from the government standpoint is mandatory coverage.
Now the American Bar Association House of Delegates, I
think, is obviously aware of the problems created in the area
I have mentioned, and so at the Philadelphia meeting they adopted a resolution which in effect asks each state Bar Association
to poll its members, to submit questions which will be prepared
by the Board of Governors of the American Bar, so that each
lawyer may voice his own personal opinion as to what he wants.
That poll undoubtedly will be taken by our State Association. It
will be very helpful to the House of Delegates of the American
Bar Association to have a full and complete return on that poll.
I hope that when it comes out every Nebraska lawyer will fill out
that questionaire and send it in, so that those of us who represent
this Association in the House of Delegates may be governed in
our voting by the will of the majority of our lawyers here.
Now this problem of social security cuts into the ne::...1; problem I want to mention, and that is the problem of retirement income for self-employed.
As you know, for many, many years the tax law has permitted employers to create pension plans for employees and take current tax deductions for the contribution they make to the pension fund. The individual employees are not deemed to receive
any taxable income until the time comes when they receive, usually after retirement, their annuity, their pension from the fund.
This, of course, in a time of high surtax brackets is a very important tax benefit, because not only is there deferment of tax
on the current contribution of the employer, but there is additionally no tax currently on the earnings, the increment to and of
the fund itself. So those two things combine to mean that the
dollars in profit of an employee under a pension plan are normally
very much greater than they would have been if, instead of pension, the employee received additional salary in amount equal
to the contribution made in his behalf by his employer. That
type of thing has enabled corporate executives, for example, to
create for themselves substantial retirement plans on a tax-free
basis.
This year is the first time that Congress has apparently begun to look with some favor on that type of plan, because the
Ways and Means Committee this year, by divided vote, it is true,
adopted a modified plan which would permit lawyers if included
in social security on a mandatory basis, which is where social se-
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curity comes into this, to set aside up to ten percent of their
earned income annually on certain qualified investments tax free,
with a maximum of seventy-five hundred a year and a maximum
of one hundred thousand during their lifetime.
Now contrary to what you read in the press, that bill was not
reported out to the House of Representatives. It has simply been
voted on by the committee, put into what is called the "Bob-tail
Bill." I venture to express an opinion that it will not be reported
out in the current form. I expect Ways and Means will reconsider each of the bills currently in that, so that the future of the
bill is in doubt. Yet it is started; it is on the way; progress has
been made. I feel that is all I can say about that. If you want
the details I will be glad to get all the testimony in full detail on it.
Now a word about continuing legal education, the joint undertaking of the American Law Institute and the American Bar
Association, the joint committee of the two groups. We want to
mention that Harvey Johnson of our own Bar was one of the
charter or original members of that committee.
This year we started publication of a new practical magazine
for the general practitioner. It is called The Practical Lawyer.
You can find the details about it at the display booth outside.
When that project was undertaken and under consideration
we decided that if we could get five thousand subscriptions we
would be on the way, and it would be a great thing. There are
now over twelve thousand subscribers. We have so many requests
for back issues from lawyers who started buying it at the third
or fourth or fifth issue that we are out of print. We did not print
enough. I commend it to you. I suggest that you get a copy and
take a look at it. I suspect that twenty-five thousand American
lawyers are going to be subscribing to that "how to do it" practical handbook approach that is in that magazine.
It is not Law Review style. There are plenty of learned
erudite Law Review articles. These are practical articles in the
field of the general practitioner. I want to mention that the
American Bar Association group life insurance program now has
been adopted and is in effect. If you want the details write to
headquarters in Chicago.

Now Clarence assigned me, apparently without my realizing
it, Circular 230. Since I am in the middle of the government
side. I'm going to refrain, except to say that what happened this
year in the area, as far as the recommendations and urging of
the accountants that Circular 230 be amended, is that nothing
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has happened. The Treasury Department has not as of now
taken any steps to change or amend Circular 230.
Finally I want to simply say that I think that in my professional life nothing has done so much, has contributed so much,
nothing has so enriched, I think, my professional life as has membership and participation in the affairs of the Nebraska State
Bar Association and the American Bar Association. The two
complement each other.
I suggest to you also that few things have more enriched my
personal life than have membership and participation in the affairs of those two organizations, because of the friendships and
personal relationships developed in the course of it. So I want
to conclude by urging that every Nebraska lawyer who is not
currently a member of the American Bar Association become such.
He will find his professional and personal life better, in my view,
as a result of it. Thank you very much.

PRESIDENT WILSON : Thank you, Laury, for this fine report of the activities of the American Bar Association.
\i\Te now have a r~port on the House of Delegates meeting of
yesterday, Mr. Turner.

GEORGE H. TURNER: Jean Cain, the Chairman of the House
has asked me to make this report in his stead.
Report of the Chairman of the House of Delegates
The House of Delegates met on Wednesday, October 5, 1955,
to receive and act upon reports of Committees of the Association.
The first order of business was a report by the president of the
Association, John J. Wilson, who at the same time introduced a
resolution concerning the endorsement by the Nebraska State
Bar Association of the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute.
The resolution was adopted in the following form
WHEREAS the first meeting of the Rocky Mountain Mineral
Law Institute held at Boulder, Colorado, July 21 to 23, 1955,
proved to be an outstanding success and drew an attendance far
in excess of the expectations of the original sponsors of such institute, and
WHERE.AS it has been determined that the Rocky Mountain
Mineral Law Institute shall become a permanent organization
incorporated by the sponsors thereof with all states in the area
interested in mineral law participating, and
WHERE.AS the Nebraska State Bar .Association has been
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asked to join as a sponsor of the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law
Institute, and having been assured that no financial obligation
was entailed by such sponsorship,
BE IT NOW RESOL YED that the House of Delegates of the
Nebraska State Bar Association approves sponsorship of the Rocky
iliountain Mineral Law Institute by the Nebraska State Bar Association, and the officers of the Nebraska State Bar Association
be authorized and empowered to sign the Articles of Incorporation
of such institute and arrange for representation of this Association upon the governing body of the institute.

The House received the report of the Committee on Administrative Agencies and approved its recommendation that the
committee be continued in order that it might assist and be available to the Governor's Conference on Administrative Procedure.
The report of the Committee on American Citizenship recommended a program of issuing citations for service to members
of the bar and also contained a recommendation that the reports
of previous committees for the years 1953 and 1954 be set aside
and approval previously given thereto be rescinded. The latter
part of the committee's recommendation was adopted but the
House declined to approve the proposed program of issuing citations to members of the bar for civic activity.
The recommendation of the Committee on Cooperation with
the American Law Institute that this committee keep in close
touch \vi.th the work of the American Law Institute and render
such service as possible to that organization was approved. The
House also approved the recommendation of the committee that
consideration be given to the publication of possible annotations
to the Restatement. The House also approved the recommendation of the committee that a member be designated to attend the
annual meeting of the American Law Institute.
The House approved the several recommendations of the
Committee on Ctime and Delinquency Prevention. These recommendations are:
1. That the committee continue its efforts toward drafting
and securing the adoption of a bill which will establish a state·wide probation.
2. That further study be made of our laws relating to sex
offenders with a view to recommending corrective legislation.
3. Sponsorship by the committee of a program to inform
attorneys of their responsibilities combatting juvenile delinquency.
4.

That the transfer of the State Criminal Investigation
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Division from the Highway Department to the Department of
Justice be approved, together with a law relating to medical examiners.
The recommendation of the Committee on County Law Libraries that the committee be continued was approved.
The chairman of the Committee on the Revision of Rules
Governing Disciplinary Proceedings reported that substantial
amendments to the rules had been adopted by the Supreme Court,
and recommended the dissolution of the committee. This recommendation was adopted.
The House of Delegates approved the report of the Committee on the Judiciary and received the statement of the chairman advising that a test case is contemplated to determine the
validity of LB 38, the Judicial Retirement Act.
The reports of the Committees on Legal Aid and on Legislation were approved.
Mr. Sampson discussed the distribution of pamphlets and
moved that this distribution in the future be without cost to the
members of the bar. Mr. McCown moved as a substifute that the
question of the distribution of pamphlets be referred to the Executive Council. The substitute motion prevailed.
The House approved the report of the Committee on Public
Service and received the report of the Committee on Unauthorized
Practice.
The report of the Committee on Expert Medical Testimony
was presented by Mr. George Healey in the absence of the chairman, which report was received, and on motion of Mr. Healey the
House voted to continue the committee.
The report of the Committee on State Tort Claims Act was
adopted. The reports of the Committee on Legal Education and
the Advisory Committee were received and filed.
Chairman Otto Kotouc of the Committee on Budget and Finance reported for that committee with the recommendation that
in view of the favorable financial condition of the association the
House of Delegates recommend to the Executive Council that
$2000.00 be placed in a sinking fund and invested in U. S. Savings Bonds with the expectation that additional funds be added
in subsequent years, the proposed sinking fund to provide scholarships to further the objectives of the Association. The motion
was adopted.
The report of the Committee on Oil and Gas Law was adopted.
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C. Russell Mattson, chairman of the Committee on Hearings,
reported that the committee had met to consider the resolution
offered earlier by Mr. Votava in the following language:
RESOLVED that the House of Delegates of the Nebraska
State Bar Association approve the amendment of Section 4 of
Article 8 of the Nebraska state constitution which will be submitted to the people in 19.5 6 at the general election under the
recently enacted LB 307; which measure will permit the legislature to absolve real estate taxes and assessments delinquent
ten years or more.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the lawyers of Nebraska
are urged to take the initiative in explaining the measure to the
voters to the end that the electorate can make an intelligent
decision on the matter on November 8, 1956.
The Committee on Hearings reported as follows:
"Your Committee on Hearings met to consider matters to
be referred to it.
"The only matter to be considered by the Committee was a
resolution offered to the House of Delegates by Hon. Joseph
Votava. This relates to the association approving a proposed
amendment to Sec. 4 Article 8 of the constitution of Nebraska
which would permit legislative action to absolve real estate taxes
and assessments delinquent ten years or more. The resolution
also relates to the lawyers being urged to explain the measure to
the voters before November 8, 1956.
"Upon consideration your committee reports that it recommends opposition to adoption of the resolution, feeling it contains
a subject matter which should have neither the approval nor
disapproYal of this Association."

It was thereupon moved that the report of the Committee
on Hearings be adopted. The motion carried.

PRESIDENT WILSON: We will now have a report of the Judicial Council by Honorable Edward F. Carter, chairman of the
council.
Report of the Judicial Council
The Judicial Council has held three one-day meetings since
the last annual meeting of this Association. It has considered
many matters pertaining to court procedure during that period.
The council, with the approval of the Supreme Court, submitted
ten proposed procedural changes to the legislature, all of which
have been enacted into law. Briefly described, these statutes provide:
L. B. 170: An act providing for the removal of garnishment
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proceedings to the district court when the amount or value in
controversy is in excess of the maximum jurisdiction of the inferior court.
L. B. 171: An act providing for the transfer of the personal
property of a deceased person without judicial proceedings where
the value of the estate, less liens and encumbrances, does not
exceed seven hundred dollars.
L. B. 172: An act providing the time and manner of taking
an appeal to the Supreme Court from a ruling of the district
court on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or
granting or denying a new trial. The effect of this statute is
to fix the time for such appeal from the rendition rather than the
entry of the final order.
L. B. 173 : An act p1·oviding that the clerk of the district
court may settle and sign a bill of exceptions whenever for any
cause the judge before whom the case was tried has ceased to hold
that office.
L. B. 174 : An act providing in a proceeding to obtain a license to sell real estate for the payment of debts in a decedent's
estate matter that homestead rights shall be there determined.
L. B. 175: An act restating the qualifications of jurors, for
the drawing of additional key numbers in counties of three thousand population or less, and for striking women from key-number
lists in counties where women may not be called as jurors.
L. B. 176: An act limiting the exemption of voluntary firemen and those engaged in militia duty in time of peace.
L. B. 177: An act providing for the appointment of a guardian of the estate of a mentally ill or incompetent person who is
a non-resident of the state and is possessed of property in a county
of this state.
L. B. 178 : An act providing that investment or reinvestment of the proceeds of sale of real estate of a ward shall be made
by the guardian in accordance with existing laws, subject to the
approval of the county court having jurisdiction of the guardianship.
L. B. 179: An act providing one method of procedure for the
recovery of taxes, or any part thereof, that are for any reason
invalid.
In addition to the foregoing, the Judicial Council revised the
disciplinary procedure provided for in Article XI of Chapter IV
of the Rules of the Supreme Court at the instance of a committee
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of this Association. The revision was submitted to the Supreme
Court and was adopted on June 24, 1955, and became effective as
of that date. The purpose of the revision was to eliminate the
weaknesses of the procedure and expedite the handling of the
investigation and disposition of charges.
Many suggestions are before the council for future consideration. It will serve no useful purpose to recite them here because
of the very indefinite status they presently occupy.
Once again I would like to voice the feeling of the council
that members of the bar are too indifferent to this most important work. The fault may be ours in that a proper procedure
has not been found to get the work of the council before the bar
generally. We must rely, in part at least, upon the lawyers and
judges to call to our attention procedural defects that ought
to be remedied. New situations requiring new procedures or the
revision of antiquated procedures are more likely to be discovered
by those engaged in the practice. We desire that such instances
be called to our attention in order that corrective measures may
be brought about.
Until the creation of judicial councils, there was no systematic effort to evaluate the operation of the courts and no organized effort to consider improvement. In the code states, of which
Nebraska is one, the tendency toward archaicness was augmented
by reason of the divided authority between the legislature and
the courts. The legislature was charged with the regulation of
judicial procedure while the courts decided only the merits of
controversies. This has magnified procedure to the dignity of
legislative acts and, as members of the legislature are not usually
conversant with court procedure and the innumberable decisions
and interpretations which their laws evoked, procedures other
than judicial sprang up to the detriment of lawyers and the dissatisfaction of litigants. To alleviate this situation the judicial
council was created to provide an official and continuous agency
constantly engaged in providing information about the courts,
in weighing the possibilities of more effective administration,
and, where found, offering concrete proposals for improvements
in the administration of justice. Confidence in the courts requires that the people securely feel that the administration of
justice is accomplished with efficiency and integrity.
Legislative action with reference to judicial procedure in this
state had its beginnings largely in the imitation of legislation
from other states without adequate study of its basis or the conditions it was designed to meet, and the tinkering with details
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without an overall plan of improvement. We need to know that
which is universal and that which is local, a distinction that has
been given too little consideration.
The procedural law for the administration of justice in this
state is basically sound. It is not the purpose of the Judicial
Council to embark upon a crusade for its re:form. Any such program must originate elsewhere. But the needs of a changing
social, economic and industrial order must be met if lack of confidence in the courts is to be avoided. No one person can do it
alone the Judicial Council cannot do it alone. The collective intelligence of all members of the bar is needed. It is for this
reason that we urge you to lend your aid to the work of the Council. Efficiency and economy in the administration of justice will
tend to eliminate the growth of competitive agencies and thereby
result in keeping law business in the hands of lawyers where it
belongs. Greater confidence in the efficiency and integrity of
courts will likewise tend to eliminate commissions and agencies
as a substitute for judicial processes. We must be able to accept
the responsibilities to the satisfaction of the public if we are to
merit the confidence of those who entrust us with adjustment
of disputes and controversies.
Edward F. Carter
Chairman, Judicial Council.
PRESIDENT 'WILSON: The secretary-treasurer will now report the result of the election of officers for the ensuing year.
GEORGE H. TURNER: Mr. President and members. Following the directions of the constitution, the Executive Council made
nominations for the office of president, chairman of the House
of Delegates, and member at large of the Executive Council three
months ahead of this annual meeting and caused notices to be
sent to all members. No opposing candidates having been nominated, nominees of the council of course are elected automatically.
They are Wilber S. Aten, president; Hale McCown, Beatrice,
chairman of the House of Delegates; and Clarence E. Haley, Hartington, member at large. They will be installed tomorrm11.
PRESIDENT WILSON: At this point in the program we will
receive the report of the Committee on Memorials by C. L. Clark,
chairman of the committee.
Report of Committee on Memorials

Your committee regrets the necessity of reporting that since
our last annual meeting twenty-eight (28) members of the Bar
of Nebraska have received their final summons to answer for their
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accomplishments and activities while sojourning among us. All
of them proved faithful in the discharge of their duties to both
the courts and their clients. They made lasting contributions
to the fair and impartial administration of justice. They were
devoted to the ideals of our free institutions of government. They
left their influence upon the ever-developing field of the law.
We cherish in our memory the personal qualities of these colleagues who will not again be our associates or adversaries. Their
success in their chosen profession is not to be measured by their
individual material gains, but rather by the fact that they have
advanced and raised to a higher plane the just and equitable administration of the laws of this state and nation, all of which
benefits our citizenry as a whole.
It is our knowledge of their loyalty and their integrity, and
in recognition of their personal responsibility to their clients and
to the communities in which they labored, that prompts this brief
report.
The twenty-eight departed brothers of whom I speak with
deepest reverence are:
R. E. BANNISTER, Cozad
HARVEY A. BRUBAKER, Nelson,
ARCHER M. BUNTING, Lincoln,
ALLEN G. BURKE, Bancroft,
FRANKLIN J. CALLAHAN, Kansas City, Missouri,
D. 0. DWYER, Weeping Water,
WILLIAM M. ELY, Ainsworth,
MILTON R. FROHM, Omaha,
SIDNEY T. FRUM, South Sioux City,
EDWARD R. HARVEY, Portland, Oregon,
WILLIAM c. HEELAN, Valentine,
wALTER M. HERBERT, Lincoln,
LADD J. HUBKA, Beatrice,
EDWARD F. LEARY, Omaha,
PALMER MCGREW, Lincoln,
BERNARD A. MARTIN, Omaha,
BAYARD H. PAINE, Grand Island,
HAROLD. A. PALMER, Omaha,
SIDNEY c. POSKA, Lincoln,
PENROSE E. ROMIG, Alliance,
THOMAS P. SHANAHAN, Talmage,
CHARLES 1\1. SKILES, Lincoln,
WILLIAM SUHR, Grand Island,
CHARLES A. SWEET, Palmyra,
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GEORGE M. TUNISON, Omaha,
L. L. TURPIN, Omaha

.ARTHUR R. WELLS, Omaha
PERRY M. WHEELER, Omaha,
Your committee believes it to be fitting and proper that we
bonor these deceased members by pausing in this session and
arising and standing silent for a moment in their memory.
PRESIDENT WILSON: Thank you, Mr. Clark. We will now
recess until the next meeting of the assembly tomorrow afternoon.
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"The Trial of Lawsuits and the Perils of OverTrial" .................................................. Lester P. Dodd, Esq.
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SOME ASPECTS OF DISCOVERY UNDER THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
By

William E. Knepper
When Mr. Justice Murphy said that "The pre-trial depositiondiscovery mechanism established by Rules 26 to 37 is one of the
most significant innovations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," he made one of the understatements of the last decade.
That comment appears early in the opinion in Hickman vs. Taylor,
329 U.S. 395, 67 Supp.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451, in which the Supreme Court was confronted with the delicate problem of trying
to balance the competing interests of those who sought to pry
into the privacy of their adversaries' files on the one hand, and
the fundamental proposition that public policy supports reasonable and necessary inquiries on the other.
Since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective,
an entirely new and different concept of the trial of a lawsuit
has thundered its way into our jurisprudence. Under the former
federal practice, the pleadings were used to give notice to the
adverse party of the claims of his opponent, to formulate the issues in the case, and to make such revelation as was possible of
the facts to be tried. As we all know, the pleadings were most
inadequate to perform such a function. Under the new rules,
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however, the pleadings are restricted to the task of general noticegiving, and the deposition-discovery process is invested with a
new and vital role in the preparation for trial. Commenting on
this new procedure, Mr. Justice Murphy says, "Thus, civil trials
in the federal courts no longer need be carried on in the dark.
The way is now clear, consistent with recognized privileges, for
the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues
and facts before trial."
The four rules which are of particular importance in any
consideration of discovery are Rule 26, relating to the taking of
depositions, Rule 33, having to do with interrogatories to parties,
Rule 34, dealing with the production of documents and things
for inspection, copying or photographing, and Rule 35, providing
for physical and mental examinations of persons.
Rule 26 is particularly significant because it prescribes the
scope of the examination and says that the deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant
to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it
relates to the claim or defense of the examining party or to the
claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books,
documents, or other tangible things, and the identity and location
of persons having knowledge of relevant facts. That rule expressly states that it is not ground for objection that the testimony will be inadmissable at the trial if the testimony sought
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Any party may take the testimony of any person, including
any party, by deposition upon oral examination or by deposition
on written interrogatories for the purpose of discovery, or for
use in evidence in the action, or for both purposes. The deposition may be taken without leave of court, unless the notice of the
taking is served hy the plaintiff within twenty days after commencement of the action. The defendant may take depositions
without leave of court as soon as the action is commenced. The
theory behind the twenty-day period is to provide an opportunity
for the defendant to become conversant with the action and to
obtain counsel to represent him. The time from which the twentyday period begins to run is the date of the filing of the complaint
with the clerk of the court, and not the date of service.
Under Rule 26, a party is not deemed to have made a person his own 'vitness for any purpose by taking his deposition. Of
course the introduction in evidence of the deposition or any part
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thereof for any purpose other than that of contradicting or impeaching the deponent makes the deponent the witness of the
party introducing the deposition. But even that provision is subject to a qualification, namely, that the introduction in evidence
of the deposition of a party, or anyone who at the time of the
taking of the deposition was an officer, director or managing
agent of a public or private corporation, partnership or association which is a party will not make the deponent the witness of
the party introducing the deposition.
At this point it would be well to observe that if the deposition is to be used for any purpose during the trial it should be
filed with the clerk. A practice obtains in some states of taking
the deposition of an adverse party to be used for discovery or for
impeachment, and then the lawyer taking the deposition merely
retains it in his own file until he is ready to use it at the time of
trial. That is not a safe practice under the Federal Rules because some courts will refuse to permit the use of the deposition,
even for impeachment, if it has not been filed with the clerk.
The rules permit a very wide scope of examination in pretrial depositions. The Advisory Committee has said that the broad
scope of examination may cover not only evidence for use at the
trial, but also inquiry into matters in themselves inadmissible as
evidence but which will lead to the discovery of such evidence.
The committee says, "The purpose of discovery is to allow a broad
search for facts, the names of witness, or any other matters which
may aid a party in the preparation or presentation of his case."
The Supreme Court carried this same concept into the decision in Hickman vs. Taylor, wherein Mr. Justice Murphy said,
"Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both
parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party
may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his
possession." Thus is demonstrated this new concept of trial
practice, whereby the trial in the federal courts now becomes
more of a "search for truth" and less of a "battle of wits."
The general rule is that all parties over whom the court has
acquired jurisdiction may be required to be present within the
jurisdiction for the taking of their depositions by an adverse
party. A non-resident plaintiff is generally required to be present
in the district in which suit is brought, for the taking of his
deposition without pre-payment by the defendant of his travel
expenses. However, the trial court has the power to make any
order necessary for the protection of the parties, and will ordinarily consider the hardships which might result and condition
the orders for the taking of the depositions accordingly.
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Under proper circumstances, upon motion of an adverse
party, prepayment of travel expenses and fees of the adverse
parties' counsel may be made a condition of the taking of a deposition outside of the district of the forum. A number of the
district courts make specific provision for this in their local rules.
If a party serving a notice to take depositions fails to attend,
then any other party or his attorney who is present at the time
and place specified in the notice is entitled to reimbursement for
travel expenses and counsel fees. It has also been held that a
similar expense award may be made if the party giving notice
fails to subpoena a witness, and as a result of the absence of the
witness no deposition is taken.
Rule 33 prescribes a method by which a party may obtain
information from his opponents so as to prepare for trial, reduce
the possibility of surprise at trial and narrow the factual issues
so as to determine what evidence he will need at the trial. This
method is by written interrogatories to parties. It should also
be kept in mind that under Rule 26 depositions of parties or witnesses may be taken on written interrogatories.
The scope of the interrogatories available under Rule 33 is
the same as the scope of the examination by deposition under Rule
26. Interrogatories may be served after the commencement of
the action, and without leave of court, except that if service is
made by the plaintiff within ten days after his complaint is filed,
leave of court must first be obtained, but this may be obtained
with or without notice.
The rule requires that interrogatories must be answered separately and fully in writing under oath, and that the answers
must be signed by the person making them. The party upon
whom the interrogatories have been served is required to serve
a copy of his answers on the party submitting the interrogatories
within fifteen days after the service of the interrogatories unless the court, on motion and notice and for good cause shown, enlarges or shortens the time. If the party upon whom the interrogatories are served desires to make any objection to them, or
desires to try to avoid answering them, he must serve written
objections thereto, together with a notice of hearing the objections at the earliest practicable time, and those written objections must be filed within ten days after the service of the interrogatories. The serving of such objections as to some of the
interrogatories will not relieve the party from being required to
answer the other interrogatories as to which no objection has
been made. That he must do, and within time.
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A party is not required to choose between interrogatories or
depositions. He may have both, and in either order. However
the rule does say that the court may make such protective order
as justice may require and may limit the number of interrogatories or of sets of interrogatories to protect a party from annoyance, expense, embarrassment, or oppression.
While it is to be presumed that a party upon whom interrogatories are served will consult with his counsel in the preparation of the answers to those interrogatories, and that for this
reason, among others, interrogatories may not be quite as effective in obtaining information as would an oral examination upon
deposition, nevertheless interrogatories do have a real and substantial value in obtaining discovery. Many times at the taking
of an oral deposition a party will not recall matters as to his
past history, or the amounts of his expenses resulting from the
injury involved in the case at bar, and similar matters. Interrogatories can obtain this information just as effectively, and
with far less time and expense. Also, interrogatories may be
effectively used to obtain the names and addresses of witnesses
known to the adverse party, the names and addresses of persons
who have taken photographs at the scene of an accident, the
amounts of repair bills, medical bills, hospital bills and the like.
Interrogatories may be utilized to obtain the personal background
and history of a party, as well as his medical history and whether
or not he has ever been involved in other accidents or other litigation.
When interrogatories are addressed to a party and he does
not answer fully, he may be required to do so on motion. It has
also been held that a party who declines to answer interrogatories
may be precluded from offering proof at the trial and may be
similarly punished where he engages in dilatory and contumacious
tactics. Likewise there is authority that when a party is asked
to disclose the names of persons who have knowledge of the facts
out of which the litigation grows, he must disclose all of the names
at the peril of being refused the privilege of offering as witnesses
any whose names are not so disclosed.
It is clearly established,however, that a party cannot be
compelled to state the names of all witnesses who he will offer
at the trial and thus commit himself in advance as to the presentation of his case. There is a difference between an interrogatory
seeking that information and one asking for the names and addresses of persons having knowledge of relevant facts.
A party being interrogated under Rule 33 is required to give
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only matters within his knowledge and which are matters of fact.
He is not required to express opinions or state his contentions as
to matters of law or conclusions. He is not required to make research or to compile information which is not readily available
to him.
Whereas, under the former practice, it was customary to
use a motion to make definite and certain to procure additional
information as to the case of the adverse party, the courts now
generally hold that such information is to be procured by means
of discovery so that the pleadings will not be encumbered with a
great mass of evidentiary material.
Under Rule 34 a party may procure the inspection and right
to copy or photograph designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photography, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence relating to any of
the matters within the scope of the examination permitted by
Rule 26 and which are in his possession, custody or control.
Under that rule, also, a party may obtain the right to enter upon
designated land or other property in the possession or control
of an adverse party for the purpose of inspecting, measuring,
surveying or photographing it, within the scope of the examination permitted by Rule 26. However such rights are obtainable
only upon motion and a showing of good cause therefor, and notice of the motion must be given to all other parties. The court
making such an order is required to specify the time, place and
manner of making the inspection and taking the photographs and
copies, and the court may prescribe such terms and conditions
therefor as are just.
Under this rule the court has discretion whether to grant the
order and the court has an opportunity not only to know what
it is requiring the adverse party to produce, but also whether
there is in fact good cause for producing it.
On a motion for discovery and inspection, the items sought
must be designated, and a blanket request is not permitted. A
motion for an order permitting a defendant to inspect the records
of the plaintiff's treatment in a specified hospital and in any
other hospitals where the plaintiff was treated does not sufficiently designate the records. There are four conditions to the
relief authorized by Rule 34, and a court would not be justified
in directing the production of documents or papers unless these
conditions were complied with. The four conditions are: (1)
"showing good cause" by the party seeking to compel the production of (2) "designated" documents, etc., (3) "which con-
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stitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved" (4)
and are in the possession, custody or control" of the person against
whom the order is sought. Ma1·zo vs. Moore-McCormack Lines,
Inc., 7 F.R.D. 378, 380.
Somewhat related to Rule 34 and yet apparently designed
more for the purpose of procuring evidence than for discovery is
Rule 36, which has to do with the admission of facts and of the
genuineness of documents. The rule says that after the commencement of an action a party may served upon any other party
a written request for the admission by the other party of the
genuineness of any relevant documents described in and exhibited
with the request, or of the truth of any relevant matters of fact
set forth in the request. Here again if the plaintiff desires to
serve the request within ten days after the filing of his complaint, leave of court must be obtained. Each of the matters of
which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted, unless, within a period designated in the request and not less than
ten days after the service thereof or within such shorter or longer
time as the court may allow on motion and notice, the party to
whom the request is directed does one of two things. Such party
may serve upon the party requesting the admission either a sworn
statement denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested, or setting forth in detail the reasons why he
cannot truthfully admit or deny these matters; or such party
may serve written objections on the ground that some or all of
the requested admissions are privileged or irrelevant or that the
request is otherwise improper, in whole or in part, together with
a notice of hearing the objections at the earliest practicable time.
As in the case of interrogatories, if written objections are made
to a part of the request the remainder of the request must be
answered within the period designated in the request. It is
most important to bear in mind that affirmative action by the responsive party is necessary if he wishes to avoid an admission implied by his silence. The failure to respond constitutes an admission, even though the genuineness of documents had previously been denied under oath in the pleadings. Also, the answer
when made must be a sworn statement of the responding party.
The last of the rules to be considered here is Rule 35, dealing
with physical and mental examinations of persons. Under this
rule a party to an action whose mental or physical condition is
in controversy may be examined, provided good cause is shown.
The rule provides that the order may be made only on motion and
upon notice to the party to be examined and to all other parties,
and shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions and scope
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of examination and the person or persons by whom it is made.
It is within the discretion of the court whether to order repeated
examinations. Good cause therefor could be that the physical
or mental condition of the party had changed since the day of a
previous examination. Procedure under this rule requires the
exchanging of medical reports. If the person examined so requests, the party causing the examination must deliver to him
a copy of a detailed written report of the examining physician
setting out his findings and conclusions. Thereafter the party
causing the examination is entitled upon request to receive from
the party examined a like report of any examination, previously
or thereafter made, of the same mental or physical condition.
The failure to comply with this rule can result in the exclusion
of the testimony of the examining or attending physician. Also,
if the party examined requests and obtains a report of the examination or takes the deposition of the examiner, he thereby
waives any privilege he may have had in that action or any other
involving the same controversy as to the testimony of every other
person who has examined or may thereafter examine him in respect to the same mental or physical condition. For a discussion
of this rule, see Sibbach vs. Wil.son & Co. 312 U.S. 1, 61 Sup.Ct.
422, 85 L.Ed. 479.
Looking generally at the discovery provisions, we find that
many of the writers and many of the courts have said that they
were intended to eliminate surprise from lawsuits. There is
ground for debate as to whether that is good. In his interesting
address, "What's So Wrong About Surprise?," 39 American Bar
Association Journal 1075, Kenneth B. Hawkins, of the Chicago
Bar, says, "Surprise is as essential to a lawsuit as anaesthesia is
to surgery. Each helps to find the truth." And we may also
note the language of Mr. Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion in Hickman vs. Taylor wherein he says, "But a common law
trial is and always should be an adversary proceeding. Discovery
was hardly intended to enable a learned profession to perform
its functions either without wits or on wits borrowed from the
adversary."
Those pungent statements of today cause us to look back to
the comment of Sir James Wigram, in his Law of Discovery,
written a century and a quarter ago, wherein he said that the
courts of justice in England acted upon the principle "that the
possible mischiefs of surprise at the trial are more than counterbalanced by the danger of perjury, which must inevitably be incurred, when either party is permitted, before a trial, to kn°'"~
the precise evidence against which he has to contend, and ac-
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cordingly by the settled rules of courts of justice in this country
(approved as well as acknowledged), each party has thrown upon
him the onus of supporting his own case, and meeting that of
his adversary without knowing beforehand by what evidence the
case of his advernary is to be established, or his own exposed."
It is that conflict between the desirability of eliminating surprise on the one hand and the danger of perjury on the other
which has been such a serious problem in connection with our
modern theories of discovery. Professor Sunderland's answer
has been that "the true safeguard against perjury is not to refuse to permit any inquiry at all, for that will eliminate the true
as well as the false, but to so conduct the inquiry as to separate
and distinguish the one from the other where both may be present."
The Supreme Court, in adopting the rules, took cognizance
of the danger of abuse of the discovery procedures when it promulgated Rule 30, and in subparagraphs (b) and ( d) thereof
made provision for orders for the protection of parties and deponents, and for a motion to terminate or limit the examination.
Those protective provisions apply not only to all depositions under
Rule 26 but to others of the discovery procedures. In commenting on those sections, District Judge Johnson, of Pennsylvania,
(Madison i1s. Cobb, 29 F.Supp. 881, 882) has said, "In these provisions adequate safeguards are erected to prevent unjust use
of plaintiff's right to take the defendant's deposition, and defendant should resort to these provisions if necessary to protect
himself, rather than by arbitrarily refusing in the first instance
to attend the examination."
Whether that is a complete answer may be doubted~ but the
fact remains that discovery is here to stay, not only in the federal
courts but more and more in the courts of the several states. Surprise, as we have known it in past years, is a much less valuable
courtroom tool than it used to be. Literally thousands of pages
of the decisions of the courts have been devoted to the construction and analysis of these discovery rules. In this field, as in
many others, the problems in each particular case must be determined on the basis of the circumstances existing in that case.
The lawyer who uses the discovery procedures to their fullest extent is bound to benefit the cause of his client, whether he
be representing the plaintiff or the defendant. Therefore all of
us have much to gain by thoroughly familiarizing ourselves with
these rules and keeping abreast of the decisions of the courts
which interpret them and apply them to particular fact patterns.
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THE TRIAL OF LAWSUITS AND THE PERI.LS
OF OVER-TRIAL
by

Lester P. Dodd
The business of trying lawsuits is a baffling business. Because it is self-proclaimed, experts on trial techniques have been
finding a ready market for their wares since advocacy began.
Doubtless many of you have read Robert Graves' book,
Claudius the God.1 In that delightfully amusing chapter in which

the Emperor Claudius recounts his experiences as a Roman Magistrate, he tells of passing each day, as he came into the Market
Place from the Palace, a stuccoed building across the face of
which was tarred in enormous letters :
FORENSIC AND LEGAL INSTITUTE-Founded and Directed by
the most Learned and Eloquent Orator and Jurist Telegonius
Macarius of This City and of the City of Athens.

Underneath this on a huge square tablet appeared the following advertisement:
Telegonius gives instruction and advice to all who have become
involved in financial or personal difficulties necessitating their
appearance in Civil or Criminal courts; and has a positively encyclopaedic knowledge of all Roman edicts, statutes, decrees,
proclamations, judicial decisions, et cetera, past and present, operative, dormant, or inoperative. At half an hour's notice the most
learned and eloquent Telegonius can supply his clients with precise and legally incontrovertible opinions on any judicial matter
under the sun that they care to present to him and his staff
of highly trained clerks. Not only Roman Law, but Greek Law,
Egyptian Law, Jewish Law, Armenian, Moroccan or Parthian Lawl
Telegonius has it all at his fingers' ends. The incomparable
Telegonius, not content with dispensing the raw material of Law.
dispenses also the finished product; namely; beautifully contrived
forensic presentations of the same complete with appropriate
tones and gestures. Personal appeals to the jury a specialty.
Handbook of brilliant rhetorical figures and tropes, suitable for
any case, to be had on request. No client of Telegonius has ever
been known to suffer an adverse verdict in any court-unless
his opponent has by chance also drunk from the same fountain
or oratorical wisdom and eloquence. A few vacancies for pupils.

Insofar as I have been able to discover, Telegonius was not
only the first advocate of record to boast that he never lost a
lawsuit but was the first of the self-proclaimed experts to broad1 Claudius the God, by Robert Graves.
Haas.

Copyright, 1953, by Smith &
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cast his ability to teach his brethren at the bar how to accomplish
that same desirable end.
Seriously, of course, we all recognize that successful trial
techiques cannot be acquired from books or lectures. What is
one man's meat is another man's poison. Techniques and procedures that are highly successful for one lawyer may be ruinous
if another attempts to use them.
In short, there are no infallible standard trial techniques.
Efficient trial procedures are almost as individual as fingerprints.
They are, in the last analysis, nothing more nor less than the
end-product of a sound basic knowledge of the rules of evidence
and procedure, an instinctive knowledge of practical human psychology, and a modicum of native intelligence. I say a modicum,
because if any trial lawyer had real good sense, he wouldn't be a
trial lawyer.
And so, having established that no one, least of all I, can
better your trial techniques, I shall, like a true expert, attempt
that very thing.
I have long believed that few lawsuits are won but that many
lawsuits are lost. By that I mean simply that the cases in which
a lawyer's mistakes have caused him to lose a lawsuit far outnumber those in which his brilliant affirmative acts and techniques have resulted in winning it.
In plain everyday terms of results : We will best improve
our trial tactics by avoiding those mistakes which lose lawsuits.
Now what are the most common and most serious mistakes
in the trial of lawsuits? I believe they fall into a group which
collectively can be said to constitute Over-Trial. The over-trial of
a lawsuit means simply that a lawyer has tried too hard. He
has committed the cardinal sin of the duffer on the golf course-he has pressed. He has talked too much. He has offered too
many witnesses. He has over-examined. He has over-cross-examined. He has over-objected. He has over-argued. He has
over-acted. In short, he has given himself, his witnesses, the
judge and the jury, too many chances to err.
It is utterly trite but uttery true that to err is human. We
all make mistakes. After many years of trial experience I can
say truthfully that I have never encountered a superman or a
genius on the opposite side of the table in the trial of a law suit.
Any man who talks long enough will eventually say the wrong
thing. Any lawyer who tries to cover every possible contingency
that may arise in a lawsuit will find that he has undertaken an
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impossible task and one that must spread him so thin as to make
serious mistakes a likelihood if not a certainty.
Let us minimize our mistakes by minimizing our chances to
make mistakes. And let us realize that one of our best methods
of minimizing our chances to make mistakes is by talking less
and thinking more.
An anecdote is told of the late Senator James Watson concerning one of his early trial experiences in his native Hoosier
State. It seems that on one occasion he represented one of the
local citizens in a rural area in what was for that time and place
an important lawsuit. The trial began with Jim alone on his
side of the table but with two lawyers on the other side. Before
the trial had progressed very far Jim's client came to him to
inquire why their side did not also have two lawyers. Jim explained that he thought it unnecessary, but his client still did not
seem to be completely satisfied. Finally, noting his client's continuing dissatisfaction, Jim asked him why he was so impressed
with the fact that the other side had two la\vyers. "Well," his
client observed, "I've been watching how them fellows do it. One
of them seems to be doing the talking, and the other the thinking.
What's bothering me is-who the hell is doing the thinking on
our side?"
I do not suggest that two lawyers can think better or talk
less than one. I do suggest, however, that most of us can, with
profit, develop a better ratio between the two activities.
And now let me try to illustrate briefly some of the perils of
over-trial in relation to some of the actual steps in the trial of a
lawsuit.
Recognizing, of course, that the trial of a lawsuit begins in
a broad but very real sense long before you reach the courtroom,
and that thorough preparation, both upon the facts and upon the
law, is of primary importance, nevertheless I am confining my
observations to actual courtroom procedures and am assuming
that at this point you have carefully prepared your case and have
a thorough knowledge of it.
You begin, assuming that you are trying a jury case, with
the selection of the jury. Procedures vary, of course, in the selection of jurors. In some jurisdictions you draw your juries.
In others you strike from lists. In some you examine prospective
jurors yourself. In others you examine through the court. The
applicable principles, however, remain the same. In some manner you are attempting to ascertain the background, the pre-

240

NEBRASKA. ST ATE BAR ASSOCIATION

judices, the acquaintanceships or connections that may exist between the prospective jurors on the one hand and the parties,
the lawyers and the witnesses on the other. You do this, of
course, for two reasons : To establish the basis for possible challenges for cause and to establish a sound basis for exercising your
right to pre-emptory challenges. Reasonable precautions are only
good sense but over-examination or over-inquiry may be highly
dangerous. Don't pry. Jurors are apt to resent it. Don't put
the suggestion of racial or religious or political or economic prejudice into their minds by letting it become too apparent that it
is in yolll's. A void those general, frequently provocative and usually useless questions such as: "Would you entertain any prejudice against my client because of his being of a different race!"
In the overwhelming majority of all such instances the automatic
answer to such a question will be "no." Men do not often admit
and frequently do not consciously recognize that they possess such
prejudices. If they do they will usually deny them. By asking
such questions, therefore, and obtaining the almost certain answer,
you have accomplished nothing except possibly to have stirred a
dormant prejudice into an active one or to have left the prospective juror with a resentfully guilty feeling because you have
forced him to lie.
In fact in the rare circumstance in which you might get an
affirmative admission of prejudice in answer to such a question,
you probably would do well to permit the juror to serve on the
theory that if a man is honest and conscientious enough to recognize and admit his prejudice he is quite likely to be of the type
who will lean over backward to avoid an unjust result because
of them.
Avoid exhaustive examination of prospective jurors. If you
are for the plaintiff don't let the jurors get the impression, as all
too many lawyers permit them to do, that you are so concerned
about getting a favorable jury that you must have a weak case.
If you are for the defense, don't build up the importance of
the case by exhaustive examination ; you may find you have succeeded only in multiplying the damages.
I find that the longer I practice law the niore frequently inclined I am to indicate my approval of the first twelve jurors that
take their seats with a bare minimum of examination and frequently none at all. I may be, in fact obviously am, taking certain
chances is so doing. But just bear in mind that if I am opposed
by a lawyer who adopts the same strategy, we are taking equal
chances; we are at least starting even. But if, and usually this
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is the case, I am opposed by a lawyer who does not follow that
procedure but who examines exhaustively, I wind up both with
the benefit of his exhaustive examination and the psychological
advantage of having exhibited perfect confidence in my case, of
having asked no wrong questions, of having stirred up no prejudice, of having)Ilade no enemies on the jury. In short, I ha-v-e
given my opponent all the opportunities to make mistakes by the
simple expedient of keeping my mouth shut.
Be exceedingly sparing in the use of your pre-emptory challenges. Unless you are a better psychologist than most of us or
are possessed of phenomenal luck, or both, you will frequently find
that in exercising a challenge on a hunch you have succeeded only
in out-smarting yourself. The sour-visaged old gentleman whom
you were so certain would be for the defendant turns out to be
the benevolent, warm-hearted, openhanded type that is the dream
of every plaintiff's lawyer. The prim-looking spinster that you
were so sure would vote to hang your client because he had had
the customary two beers before the accident is herself a potential
candidate for Alcoholics Anonymous.
Don't permit guesswork or hunches to multiply your chances
to make mistakes. In pre-emptorily challenging a juror you
give yourself one chance to help your case but you give yourself
several chances to harm it. To me that is not a sound or winning
percentage. If you are wrong in your appraisal of the prospective juror you have eliminated a favorable rather than an unfavorable juror. Even if you are right in your appraisal you may
have eliminated an unfavorable prospect only to see him succeeded
by a far more unfavorable prospect. Or you may have eliminated
a poor juror at the cost of making other jurors resentful of your,
to them, arbitrary exercise of your power to excuse. And finally you may find, as I so frequently have, that if you will just
keep your shirt on your opponent will eventually dismiss the very
fell ow that you were most afraid of.
Having drawn your jury, your next step is the Opening
Statement. Here you are offered a really golden opportunity to
talk too much.
I assume that under the practice in your jurisdiction, as under
that to which I am accustomed, counsel for each side is obliged
to make an opening statement. There is thereby placed in the
hands of counsel that which can be a very valuable weapon but
that which can also be a very dangerous weapon.
Our Michigan Court Rule on the subject says in part:
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On the trial of a cause it shall be the duty of the plaintiff's
counsel, before offering evidence to support the issue on his part,
to make a full and fair statement of his case and of the facts he
expects to prove.

Note the language "a full and fair statement of his case and
of the facts which he expects to prove," but don't take that or
similar language in your own rule or statute too literally. In
interpreting or commenting on that rule, our courts have recognized that "the opening statement should be brief," "should relate to salient facts which form the basis of the claim or defense,"
"should contain ultimate facts rather than details of the testimony
to be adduced," and finally, and of prime significance, "any facts
stated in the opening statement can be taken as an admission by
the other party and thereupon need not be proved by such other
party."
Thus it is apparent that caution and economy of speech are
doubly important in connection with an opening statement. Not
only do you run the risk of prejudicing court and jury by overstating your case, by promising more than you can prove, by
making unnecessary promises of proof, etc., but you risk making
legally binding admissions which can ultimately prove to be your
undoing.
I have never known a lawyer to lose a lawsuit by saying too
little in an opening statement. I have seen many lost because
he has said too much. I can recall at least three cases in each of
which I have had a motion to direct a verdict granted on my
opponent's opening statement. I have on many more occasions
had the court give binding instructions on some important and
sometimes vital phase of the case simply because my opponent
has made an ill-advised, unnecessary statement in his opening
that later developed to be an important admission against interest.
No matter how carefully you have prepared your case, no
matter how sure you are that your key witness has been properly
ho1·se-shedded and will testify to exactly what he has told you, he
is quite likely, as we all have good reason to know, to take the
stand and pour out a version of the facts which makes you glance
nervously at your papers to make sure that you brought the right
file with you. In many cases the version given from the witness
stand, even though different than that given to you in your office, is still fundamentally truthful and sufficiently consistent with
your pleadings and with your general theory of the case that your
cause is not irretrievably lost. In such fortunate cases, assuming
you have not previously opened your big mouth and told the jury
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exactly what the witness was going to say, you have suffered
nothing more serious that that acute sinking feeling in the pit of
your stomach which, after all, is only a symptom of normalcy to
the experienced trial lawyer. But if you have made the mistake
of promising the jury earlier that the witness was going to testify
to a particular detailed story, you are in for it. You have made
yourself and your witness objects of suspicion to court and jury
and have lost ground that can never be regained.
If you have succeeded in getting a jury sworn and an opening statement made without having talked yourself out of business, don't despair. You still have many chances. You have
witnesses to examine and-God save us-some to cross-examine.

If it is your studied practice to think before you ask, to
ask in such manner as to elicit only the evidence that you are
trying to - develop, to ask it so that it is understandable both to
the witness and to the jury, to ask it in simple language, to ask
it in such manner as to avoid offense, and finally to ask only
necessa1·y questions of necessary witnesses, you are already a
better trial lawyer than I and I can be of no help to you on the
subject of examination.
But, if you are in love with the sound of your own voice, if
it is your chief purpose to convince all within earshot of your
own brilliance rather than the soundness of your client's case, if
you are willing to take your chances on asking a question which
the witness may interpret and answer in any one of six ways,
and, most vital of all, if you are willing to risk the dire consequences that so often result from putting on that unnecessary
witness or asking of a necessary witness that unnecessary question, I offer a suggestion.
All of you will recall that during the war when it was so
important to conserve transportation facilities for war-time needs,
we were constantly confronted with the question, "Is this trip
necessary?" I suggest to the earnest consideration of every trial
lawyer the desirability of hanging a mental sign in his own consciousness: "Is this witness necessary?" "Is this question necessary?"
Volumes have been written and countless papers have been
read by experts on the subject of cross-examination: "How to acquire the art of cross-examination," "How to be a successful
cross-examiner," "The secret of successful cross-examination,"
etc. To my mind such titles are as suggestively misleading as
"How to reduce weight without eating less," "How to learn to
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play the piano in six easy lessons," "How any woman can become beautiful by using our soap."
In my view, the lawyer who sets out to acquire the "art" of
cross-examination is asking for trouble. When a young lawyer
embarks upon his first cross-examination he takes a risk comparable to that involved in smoking his first marijuana cigarette.
The "habit" of cross-examination is much like the dope habit and
about as easily acquired. If the young practitioner is fortunate
enough to conduct his early cross-examinations with some degree
of success, he finds it exhilarating and exciting. But he quickly
finds it impossible to refrain from practicing his art upon every
available subject, \vith the inevitable result that he has soon become an incurable addict.
And so I propose to direct my few remaining remarks on
this subject not to the "how" of cross-examination but to its
"when"-or, perhaps better yet, to its "if."
Obviously there can be no cut and dried formula for identifying the situations in which cross-examination is desirable, but
I think we will find that the most common fall into three general
categories.
The first is what, for want of a better term, I call the desperation cross-examination. While its use is not in the exclusive
domain of the defense lawyer, he probably has more frequent
occasion to employ it than his brother across the table. The witness has testified to a set of facts which, if unchallenged, will
surely sink you without trace. You have no evidence at your
command to offset it. Your one and only chance, therefore, is
too try to weaken or destroy the effect of the testimony through
cross-examination. This is probably the only situation in which
you are ever justified in cross-examining on the basis of hope
rather than expectation.
Here you may roam. Here you may hunt and fish. Here
you may dig and pry. Here you may try your hand at cajolery,
persuasion, suggestion or, on rare occasions, even threat. You
will of course have to fit your precise methods to your own personality and to the type of witness with which you are confronted. No one can furnish you a blueprint or formula by
which to proceed. Two basic points, however, are common to
all. First, you must correctly identify the situation that appears
to justify this type of cross-examination. In short, you must be
very sure that you are confronted with an otherwise hopeless
situation before you resort to desperation measures. Second, and

PROCEEDINGS, 1955

245

equally important, you must be able to judge or sense when to
stop.
It will return you little profit to turn up something favorable to your case if, by the time you have done so, judge and jury,
to say nothing of you and the witness, are exhausted. By the same
token it will do you little good to discredit the witness or uncover
weakness or defects in his testimony if you allow him to wriggle
off the hook or to repair the damage through your failure to stop
short of trying to extract the last drop of juice from the carcass.
Just remember that anything favorable to your case you can get
in such circumstances is so much velvet. Don't crowd your luck.
The second in the categories of situations in which crossexamination is often justifiable is that in which you are in possession of definite contradictory material. To set the stage for
the introduction of impeaching evidence it is often necessary to
lay the groundwork through cross-examination. You may have
a signed statement, a letter, a telegram, a transcript of testimony given in another proceeding or other documents containing admissions or statements contrary to the witness' testimony.
To the habitual cross-examiner, the possession of such material
is a mandate to cross-examine. But to my mind, therein lies one
of the most common fallacies encountered in the trial of lawsuits.
Do not allow yourself, even in such circumstances, to be ensnared
by the habit of cross-examination. Do not let yourself fall victim
to the assumption that there is any situation where cross-examination is automatic. Before entering upon this type of crossexamination, ask yourself these questions: Is it necessary for
me to lay a foundation for the subsequent use of impeaching material or testimony by cross-examining this witness? Is there
any other method by which I may more safely use my material
than by confronting the witness with it? Is there substantial
danger that my attempted use of impeaching material or admissions against interest may backfire or offend?
In the earlier days of my practice I could no more have passed
up the opportunity to confront a witness with a signed contradictory statement than I could have taken jet passage to the moon.
But after several years and an all too painfully acquired knowledge of how many ways there are in which a wily and wellcoached witness, suffering excruciating pain and under opiates
at the time of giving the statement, can not only explain away
such a trifling document but can in the process convict its user
of forgery, larceny and, malpractice, I more often than not allow
such a decument to gather mildew in the files.
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Such cross-examinations invariably have elements of potential danger. An attempted impeachment that does not quite come
off puts the cross-examiner in an extremely bad light. Oftentimes a technically successful impeachment makes a martyr of or
creates sympathy for the witness and stirs up resentment against
the examiner.
Approach such cross-examinations therefore with extreme
caution. Be very sure of the validity of your impeaching material. Be especially wary of imputing intoxication, immorality,
lack of chastity, dishonesty or criminal record. Remember that
once you have embarked upon such a course there is no turning
back. Remember also that once you have opened up such a subject you must appear, even if successful, to take no pleasure from
it and must give the witness every opportunity to explain, justify
or evade, which he frequently does to your discomfiture.
In short, if you feel that you must cross-examine in this
range, do it-not apologetically, but without vindictiveness. Be
ultra-fair. Be very sure of your ground and treat success then
and in subsequent argument not as a victory over what may appear to the jury as a defenseless victim but as an unpleasant duty
performed as humanely as possible.
The third type of situation in which cross-examination is frequently justified is that in which the witness has demonstrated by
his attitude and demeanor on the stand that he is of the type
which will hurt or destroy himself if given sufficient opportunity.
Here as always your first problem is to determine whether the
witness has substantia1ly helped his own side or hurt yours on.
direct examination. Unless he has, leave him alone. Never try
to gild the lily. If it is very obvious to you that the witness is
of the type who will make a bad impression, the chances are that
he has already done so.
If, however, it is your considered judgment that he has made
a sufficiently favorable impression to require some attempt on
your part to change that impression, the reasoning which impels
you to that conclusion will dictate the precise methods to be employed. This general class includes the braggart who, if kept
talking, will eventually disgust court and jury and destroy any
confidence that might otherwise have been reposed in him. Another in this general category is the "over-coached" witness. He
has memorized the answer to key questions. If he is given repeated opportunities to tell the same story in the same words, he
may effectively destroy any originally favorable impression. An-.
other in this group is the obstinate witness. He is the one who
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will never agree with you even if he has to reverse his position
in order to disagree. Still another is the ultra-agreeable witness.
This one can't say "no." By permitting him to agree to absurdities, you permit him to destroy his effectiveness. These and many
others need only to be kept talking to talk themselves into trouble.
Witnesses in this category can usually be cross-examined with a
minimum of risk and with a reasonable prospect of profit. But
do not try these tactics on the obviously honest and intelligent
witness. You can have just as much fun trying to stop a buzzsaw with your bare hands. Cross-examining in this field is probably the simplest and safest type of cross-examination in which to
indulge. Do not, however, make the mistake of talking too much
yourself. Merely furnish the witness the leads. Do not center
attention on yourself or attempt to appear clever or brilliant. Let
the witness occupy the stage. Your job is to conduct, not to play
the music.
I have attempted to break down the more common occasions
for legitimate cross-examination into three general classes. Undoubtedly there are others. But whether there be three or thirty,
it will pay you to recognize every proposed cross-examination for
what it is-a potentially dangerous experiment. Not only are
you risking your own neck but your are frequently giving affirmative aid and comfort to the enemy. I believe there are many advantages, somewhat vague, perhaps, but nevertheless very real,
in waiving cross-examination even where it might be of slight or
moderate advantage to your case to cross-examine.
One such is the disruption of the timing of your opponent.
The simple fact is that most lawyers do have the habit of crossexamination. Most lawyers arise to cross-examine as a matter
of course at the close of every direct examination. Most lawyers
habitually over-cross-examine. Those who are afflicted with the
habit themselves tend to assume, naturally, that all others are
so afflicted. When you waive cross-examination against such an
opponent he must be prepared to proceed immediately with his
next witness. It is surprising how often he is not quite fully
prepared to do so. By crowding him, by keeping him under pressure, you disrupt his timing and his morale and hence his effectiveness.
How often have you observed the lawyer who has prepared to
have two or three witnesses available for the day, assuming that
because of expected lengthy cross-examination they will carry him
through? When cross-examination is waived or severely restricted and he runs out of witnesses, he must either make lame
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excuses, throw himself on the mercy of the court, or, what is
u~ually worse, stall so obviously as to create a bad impression on
court and jury. Of course I do not advocate waiving a necessary
or desirable cross-examination for so nebulous a possibility of
gain, but such a situation has often been, with me and to my
profit, the deciding factor when the question of whether or not to
cross-examine has seemed a very close one.
Again, have you observed how frequently a witness who has
done his side no particular good on direct examination has really
gone to town on re-direct? Even if your intervening cross-examination has done no harm in itself or has, perchance, shown a
slight profit, you have given your opponent time to pull himself
together, to think of the important questions he should have asked
on direct or to cover points that had been left uncovered or confused.
At the risk of boring you with a personal anecdote, may I
recall an early but still vivid experience which may serve to illustrate not only the perils of unnecessary cross-examination but also
the manner in which it sometimes relieves the direct examiner of
the consequences of his own shortcomings. Candor compels me
to admit that out of this one neither my opponent nor I emerged
with a laurel wreath on his brow.
I represented a seven-year-old plaintiff who had suffered a
skull fracture and a crushing injury to his leg, resulting in amputation just above the knee. It was necessary to put in my medical
proofs by deposition, and opposing counsel and I traveled several
hundred miles to take the testimony of the attending physician.
As a result of inexperience plus a woefully inadequate preparation on my part, the testimony on direct examination consisted
of little more than a bare statement by the doctor that the boy
had suffered a skull fracture from which he had made an uneventful recovery and a brief description of the amputation, from
which, very obviously, there could be no recovery.
Instead of leaving well enough alone and letting me suffer
the consequences of my own inadequacies, my generous adversary,
who had traveled many miles at substantial expense, felt it necessary to do some cross-examining. He began by asking the doctor
to assure us again that recovery from the skull fracture had
been uneventful and complete. This time the doctor was not
quite so taciturn. As a matter of fact I am sure he knew more
about trying a lawsuit than I did. He proceeded, at length and
in detail, to explain that, although the fracture had healed completely and without apparent untoward incident, such a healed
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fracture left a ridge of scar tissue on the under side of the skull,
constituting a potential source of irritation to the lining of the
brain, which not uncommonly resulted in a meningitis, etc. Realizing by this time that he would have been much better advised to
have used that eloquent two-word cross-examination, "No questions," my flustered opponent, thinking to salvage as much as
possible, broke in with what was intended to be a terminal question. This time he thought surely he was asking a safe one. It
went something like this :
"Well, at least, Doctor, insofar as the leg is concerned, it is
gone, and the worst that can happen has happened."
I can still see the old doctor lean back in his chair and smile
and hear him drawl, "Oh, I wouldn't say that."
He then went on there and at much greater length and detail on re-direct examination to bring out what any lawyer should
have had the good sense to know and to develop on direct examination. He explained how youthful bones continue to grow, and
in growing can push through the skin flap, requiring further
bone amputations and a long period of time with all the attendant
danger and pain and expense before a permanent artificial leg
could be fitted.
How much the damages may have been increased by that
testimony no one can know. Certainly they were increased and,
even more certainly, through no skill or virtue on my part. Although admittedly my story•has no hero, it certainly has a moral.
The blindest hog will surely pick up plenty of acorns if you insist upon pushing a full platter under his nose.
There are many other affirmative benefits, tangible and psychological, to be gained from the judicious waiver or severe restriction of cross-examination. I shall take time to mention only
one more. It has no novelty but it frequently pays dividends. I
refer to the psychological advantage of a display of confidence.
Confidence begets confidence. I have known many fine lawyers
who, by their very quietly confident manner of declining crossexamination, have done more to convince a jury of the utter lack
of merit in the witness' testimony than could have been accomplished by hours of cross-examination. When in doubt, try it.
Whatever happens you will have the comfort of knowing that
at least you did not ask the wrong question.
And now, gentlemen, the hour grows late. I have already
trespassed too extensively upon your time and your hospitality.
I have afforded you a living example of the man who talks too
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much. I hope that you will profit from that example and thereby
avoid the perils of over-trial.
I have been able to offer you no ne\Y nor novel nor startling
ideas. I am convinced there are none in the realm of trial techniques. As long as the fundamental purpose of a lawsuit is to
ascertain the facts, apply the law of the land and thereby do
justice between men and among men's causes, the basic and elementary rules of right and acceptable human conduct and deportment-plus a little horse sense-will be the trial lawyer's
best guide to successful courtroom behavior and methods. Be
yourself. Arm yourself with a thorough knowledge of the facts
and the law. A void the perils of over-trial. You may not win
more lawsuits, but you surely will not lose as many.
SECTION ON MUNICIPAL AND PUBLIC
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JUST COMPENSATION IN EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS
By

Henry B. Curtis
The law of eminent domain presents an interesting contrast
between the apparent clarity of the principles involved and the
uncertainty in the practical application of the law.
Any law school senior can accurately expound the theory of
the law, but its application raises questions which experienced
lawyers and learned judges find difficult of solution.
Like every other branch of the law, textbooks have been
written on the subject. In addition to Nichol's on eminent domain,
the standard authority on the subject, there are two excellent
books dealing with valuation. One of these is by Mr. Alfred D.
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Jahr of the New York bar entitled Eniinent Doniain 1'aluation
and Procedure and the other is Argel's 1'alua.tion Under Eminent
Domain.
In theory the law is simple. All property is held subject to
the implied condition that it must be surrendered whenever the
public interest requires it. Des Moines Wet Wash Laundry 'VS.
Des Moines, 197 Iowa 1082, 198 N.W. 486, 34A.L.R. 1517
In Campbell vs. United States 266 U. S. 368,45 S. Ct. 115, it
'vas said:
"The taking was under the sovereign power of eminent domain ...
and from the taking there arose an implied promise by the United
States to compensate him for his loss.
Thereupon he became entitled to haye tl1e just compensation
safeguarded by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution; that
is the value of the land taken and the damage inflicted by the
taking . . . such a sum as would have put him in as good a
position pecuniarily as he would haYe been if his property had
not been taken. Seaboard Airline Ry. Co. vs. United States 261
U. S. 299, 43 S. Ct. 354, 67 L. Ed. 664. But he was not entitled
to have more than that.

This power of taking private property for public use is one
of three essential attributes of sovereignty without which a state
cannot exist. The other essentials are the police power and the
power of taxation.
None of these fundamental powers is unlimited. The police
power cannot be exercised in an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable manner; taxation cannot be confiscatory, and the
power of eminent domain carries with it, either expressed or by
implication, the requirement that when private property is taken
for public use there must be just compensation.
The requirement for just compensation is found in the fifth
and by inference in the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution.
It is found in all or practically all of the state constitutions.
Even in those states which do not have an express constitutional
requirement for just compensation, the courts have held that the
owners of private property taken for public use are protected by
the "due process" clause, and by the principles of natural justice
and equity. McCoy vs. Union El R.Co. 247 U. S. 354,38 S. Ct.
504,62 L. Ed. 1156.
The Federal Constitution and some of the state constitutions
speak only of a taking of private property. Other constitutions
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provide for compensation when private property is damaged or
destroyed.
The result is there is considerable divergence in the decisions
as to when compensation is or is not due in cases where there has
been no actual taking.
In those cases where the constitutional protection covers damages to property, a good statement of the rule was laid down by
the Supreme Court of Nebraska in Snyder vs. Platte Valley Public
Power & Ir1"igation Dist. 144 Neb. 308,160 A.L.R. 1154,13 N.W.
2d 160 where the court said:
As to land, where land is not
ference in value before and after
causing the damage, taking into
the land was put and for which

taken, the measure is the difthe construction of the structure
consideration the uses to which
it was reasonably adopted.

In United States i~s. Campbell, supra, the court allowed damages (a) for the value of the land taken and (b) for the damage
caused to the remainder of the tract by the taking, but disallowed
damage caused or to be caused by the use of lands acquired from
others. Said the court:
The land taken from the plaintiff was not shown to be indispensable to tlle construction of the nitrate plant, or to the proposed use of the other lands acquired by the United States. The
damages to the remainder from the taking of a part were separable from those caused by the use to be made of the lands acquired from others. The proposed use of the lands taken from
others did not constitute a taking of his property.

JUST COMPENSATION
The courts have many times attempted to define "just compensation." Some of the decisions have held that just compensation is the equivalent of "fair market value." But an objection
to this definition is that there are cases where property has no
real market value because there is no market for that particular
type of property.
There is no absolutely satisfactory definition, but perhaps it
could be said that "just compensation" is the equivalent of "true
value."
In Minn - St. Paul Sanita1·y District vs. Fitzpatrick 201 Minn
442, 277 N.W. 394, 124 A.L.R. 897 it was said:
The just compensation to which the owuer of property taken
for public purposes is constitutionally entitled is the market
value thereof at the time of the taking contemporaneously paid
in money. The sum so to be paid is arrived at upon just con-
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sideration of all the uses for which it is suitable. and the highest
and most profitable use for which the property is adaptable and
needed or likely to be needed, in the reasonably near future is
to be considered to the extent that the prospects of demand for
such use affect the market value while the property is privately
held.
The market value of the property taken in condemnation is not
measured by the benefits to, or needs of the condemnor. The
question is ·what has the owner lost? Not what has the taker
gained?

The first principle in the determination of proof of fair
market value is that any evidence which can reasonably be expected to throw light on the real value of the property is relevant.
The discretion of the trial court in admitting such evidence will
generally be sustained. If anything, it would appear to be safer
to admit rather than reject evidence of doubtful relevancy.
Evidence is relevant which is descriptive of the prope1·ty and
its location, physical characteristics, advantages and surroundings.
Maxell vs. Iowa State Highway Commission 271 N.W. 883, 118
A.L.R. 862; St. Louis J.M. & S. R. Co. vs. Ma.cfielcl Co. 94 Ark.
135,126 S.W. 83, 26 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1111.

PROOF OF VALUE
In the determination of value there are various kinds of evidence or methods of proof which are generally accepted by the
courts as relevant. These are:
1. . Prior sales of the same property.

2.
3.
4.
5.

Sales of similar property in the vicinity.
Reproduction cost of building or improvements.
Revenue produced by property.
Opinion evidence as to its value.

Each of these methods of proof has advantages and disadvantages. Some may be relevant in one situation and not so
under other circumstances.
Proof of sales of the same property
Under certain circumstances a prior sale of the same property would be very good evidence as to its true value. It is not,
however, conclusive and in some cases may be almost irrelevant.
For example, the sale must have been made within a reasonable
time before the commencement of the condemnation suit. A sale
or purchase made many years before would have very little evidentiary value in determining the present value. It must be
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shown or at least presumed that the sale was made by a person
willing to sell but not obligated to do so, and that the property
was bought by a person who was willing to purchase but not
compelled by ulterior motives to acquire same. That is what is
meant by the willing seller and willing buyer rule. Baucum vs.
Arkansas Power & Light Co. (Ark 1929) 15 S. W. 2d 399, Lebanon
& N. Turnp Co. vs. Creveling 159 Tenn. 147, 17 S. W. 2d 22, 65
A.L.R. 440.
Even in those cases where it appears that the property had
been purchased by the defendant owner but a short time, say
six months or less, before, it would not follow that the price paid
was necessarily the true value of the property. The defendant
owner might have purchased the property at much less than its
real value or he may have made a poor bargain. While it has
been said that "sales at arm's length of similar property are the
best evidence of market value," it is also true that the state may
not confiscate the owner's bargain, nor be required to assume his
loss. Kinter vs. United States 156 Fed (2d) 5.
Again, where property has been acquired by the defendant
owner just a few months before the condemnation suit another
factor enters the picture.
If the defendant owner receives exactly what he paid for
the property and nothing more, he will undoubtedly suffer a certain loss. The legal fees and other expenses which he paid in acquiring the property are not ordinarily a part of the purchase
price. Therefore, if he is allowed just exactly the purchase price
the owner is going to suffer a loss. Now technically he cannot
recover for such fees or expenses, but the court or jury may very
·well find a slight increase in the value of the property, which will
thus serve to give full and complete compensation.

This problem does not exist if the owner has been able to
hold the property long enough to receive some return on his investment. Even in the case of vacant or non-revenue producing
property, at least the owner has had the opportunity of a possible
enhancement in value.
SALES OF SIMILAR PROPERTY IN THE VICINITY

This method is perhaps a fairer and more accurate method
of determining true value, because if there are enough sales of
similar property in the vicinity and these sales have taken place
within a reasonably short time before the condemnation suit, we
have a pattern which should portray a fairly accurate picture of
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the market value of the property. The disadvantage of this
method is that only in exceptional cases are two pieces of property exactly alike. The location with respect to cross-streets, the
condition of the buildings immediately adjacent to the property,
the flow of traffic and many other factors all affect the value of
property.
This method may give under appropriate circumstances an
accurate picture of the value of the land, but it is obvious that
one building, even though adjacent to another building, may be
of entirely different value because of its construction, age or condition. Perhaps the only information which can be derived from
method No. 2 is the value of the land less the building.
REPRODUCTION COST OF BUILDING OR IMPROVEMENTS

The cost of reproducing a building which is to be condemned
may be very relevant, and in some cases, it may be essential in
determining just compensation. There are cases where a building has little or no market value, in the sense that it is impossible
to find a person or corporation which would purchase the property except for the land upon which the building is situated. In
such cases the prospective purchaser would plan on demolishing
the building and erecting one suitable for its O\Vner's use. The
best example of a building which has little or no market value is
a church. It is seldom, though it sometimes happens, that one
congregation will purchase the church of another congregation.
These instances are so few and far between that we can perhaps
say that a church as such has no market value. Other buildings
constructed and designed for a particular use are in the same
category. In such cases, after determining the value of the land
upon which the building is situated, it would be necessary to determine the cost of rebuilding it somewhere else if we are to
award the congregation just compensation. On the other hand,
depreciation or obsolescence should be taken into consideration,
as it is obvious that a building which is so old or obsolete as to
have little or no value could not be considered in the same category
or as having the same value as a new and modern building. While
under certain circumstances value of property might be sho'\"\'11
by the amount of insurance which the owner carried upon it,
the general rule is that such evidence is immaterial. The theory
and practice of insurers and insured is to make the limit of insurance much less than the value of the property, while 0\1mers
are permitted to procure insurance in amounts far below this
limit. The result is that the amount of insurance has no fixed
or uniform relation to the value of the property it covers, and
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hence does not directly tend to disclose its value. Union Pac. R.
Co. vs. Lucas, 146 Fed. 374. Mere age is not necessarily a sign
of depreciation in value, because if the building has been kept
well it has been of necessity repaired from time to time so that
it has to some extent preserved its reproduction value.
In estimating the fair market value of land upon which a
flour mill is situated for the purpose of awarding damages in
eminent domain proceedings to appropriate the land, the court
may consider not only the cost of production but all the cost necessarily or reasonably expended in bringing the mill into effective
working condition, all to be weighed with other evidence of value.
Banner Mill Co. vs. State, 41 A.L.R. 1019, 240 N.Y. 533, 148 N.E.
668. But this does not include good will.
·
The cost of the erection of a new building on a different
piece of land in which a business conducted on land taken in
condemnation proceedings is to be continued cannot be included
in the compensation or damages awarded. Nor in the absence of
disclosures of like or closely similar constructions and conditiqns
in all respects can it be proved as tending to show its value of the
old building. Gauley & E. R. Co. vs. Conley, 7 A.L.R. 157 84 W.
Va. 489, 100 S. E. 290.
REVENUE PRODUCED BY PROPERTY

This type of evidence can be very helpful in the determination of value. There are several things to be considered in connection with the admissibility of such evidence. They include
the following:
(1) The valuation of the property should be based upon its most
profitable legal use. Any reasonable future use to which the
land might be adapted or applied may be considered in arriving
at present market value. Denver vs. Quick 108 Colo. 111,113 P
(2d) 999, 134 A.L.R. 1120. Johnstone vs. Detroit G.H. & M. R. Co.
245, Mich. 65, 222 N.W. 325, 67 A.L.R. 373.
(2) If the property is a zoned neighborhood, evidence as to the
revenue which it would produce if it were unzoned is too speculative. Long Beach City High School Dist. vs. Stewart 173 A.L.R.
249, 30 Cal (2d) 763, 185 P (2d) 585.
(3) The revenue produced by the property, i.e., its rental, must
generally be in accord with rental produced by other similar property in the neighborhood. If property is rented at an exorbitant
figure, obviously that does not represent its true value any more
than rental far below what the property should bring. In either
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case there would probably be special circumstances which would
explain the situation. If evidence of such rentals is received it
is always competent to rebut by showing that the property is
worth more or less than its rental figure would indicate.
Assuming that the revenue produced by a piece of property
is a fair indication of its value, the court or jury may use the
capitalization of income as a means of determining value.
This method involves the assumption of a fair rate of return
on invested capital and then dividing the net annual return by
this figure. Thus if we assume that 5 % net is a normal return
on money invested in real estate, and the property brings in a net
of $5,000.00 per annum, the actual value determined by this
method would be $5,000.00 divided by .05, which would be $100,000.00. This method, however, is not nearly as simple as it
seems. The money market, and hence the expected rate of return, may change; the property may depreciate; it will certainly
in the course of time become more or less obsolete; and other
factors will play a part. All of which means that the revenue
produced by property is not necessarily a true or accurate picture
of its value.
OPINION EVIDENCE

This type of evidence, like the opinions of witnesses in other
cases, should be received with great caution. It is an attempt to
substitute the opinion of the witness for the judgment of the
court or jury. In some cases, such as medical testimony or matters
involving highly specialized subjects, such evidence is relevant.
On the other hand, a realtor testifying as a so-called real estate
expert is not like a doctor, an electronics engineer or some highly
trained specialist. In such cases the medical or other eA"}Jert witness can be required to prove his qualifications. A real estate
man, on the other hand, while he might be qualified to testify as
an expert on the technical features of the real estate business,
may not be competent to pass on real estate values. Even less
is such a witness qualified to say how much a piece of property
is or will be damaged by the construction of some public improvement in front or on the side of the property, or on a part thereof,
when only a portion of the property is being e}.."}Jropriated.
In connection with the admissibility of opinion evidence, it is
interesting to read a decision of the Supreme Court of Nebraska.
rendered in 1881 in the case of F1'emont etc. RR vs. Whalen 11
Neb. 585, 10 N.W. 491 where the court said:
The practice indulged in on the trial of this and other cases of
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taking the opinion of witnesses as to the value of the land, subject to the location of the road over it, ought not to be permitted.
A strong objection to it lies in the fact that indirectly the damages are assessed by the witnesses instead of the jury, whose
duty it is, and most likely on an improper basis. It is doubtless
a proper course to take the opinion of experts as to the value
before it is affected by the location of the road. Thus done, the
testimony on the question of damages should be confined to those
matters affecting the value proper to be considered, leaving the
jury to draw their own inferences therefrom unaffected by the
judgment of others.

This decision was overruled a year later in Republican Valley
R. Co. vs. Arnold 13 Neb. 488, 14 N.W. 478 where the court said:
The proper mode of assessing damages is by calling experts, men
acquainted with the land and its value, and who are capable of
estimating the injury sustained.

The evidence as to the valuation put upon property for tax
assessment purposes is not generally admissible. These valuations are usually far below the actual value of the property and
have generally not been considered in eminent domain proceedings.
Minn. St. Paul Sanitary Dist. vs. Fitzpatrick, 201 Minn. 442, 277
N.W. 394, 124 A.L.R. 897.
In Louisiana there is also an apparent exception to this rule.
It is found in the Constitution of Louisiana of 1921, Art. XVI,
Section 6, which provides that lands or improvements actually
used or destroyed for levee purposes shall be paid for at a price
not to exceed the assessed value for the preceding year.
This is based upon the old theory that the owner of land
fronting on a navigable stream or body of water owed a servitude
or easement to the public to permit the building of a levee on the
bank of such river, stream or other water which would protect
not only the owner but also other properties in the vicinity. People
bought and acquired riparian property subject to such an easement in favor of the public. Wolfe vs. Hurley, 46 F. (2d) 515.
Also, in Louisiana there is a decision which is somewhat at
variance with the general jurisprudence. In City of New Orleans
'VS. Larroux, et al, 203 La. 990, 14 So. (2d) 812, the court held that
evidence as to the assessed value of the property, though not controlling, should be considered as a factor in determining the value
of the land.
CONCLUSION

To summarize briefly all of the decisions on the subject of
valuation in eminent domain proceedings, it can be said that it is
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and should be the object of the court to put the owner of the
property taken in the same financial position he would be in if
he sold the property at a time when he was willing to sell to a
purchaser who was willing to buy but did not have to have the
property. Actually this really should not be a difficult question
to answer. A person who wishes to know what the real value
of his property is can probably get a fair picture by offering it
for sale at a price which he is willing to take. He should not be
required to take less than the real value of the property, nor
should he be entitled to enrich himself at the expense of the state
or municipality. Everyone who purchases property does so with
the implied knowledge that whenever the property is actually
needed for public purposes it can be taken, provided he receives
the true value thereof.
But human nature being what it is, the usual result is that
the defendant owner will introduce or attempt to introduce every
bit of evidence which he or his counsel considers favorable to
their side, and the taker will, on its side, endeavor to minimize
the value of the property and the resultant loss to the owner.
PROCEDURE UNDER THE NEW EMINENT DOMAIN ACT
OF 1951
By

Herbert M. Fitle
The eminent domain procedure set forth in the Uniform Act
of 1951 amended some 20 chapters of Nebraska statutes. It is,
as named, a uniform procedure, applying to all condemnations
with the exception noted in Section 76-703-that is, where it is
sought to condemn property used or useful of a public utility
engaged in the rendition of existing services.
With respect to the city of Omaha, a city of the metropolitan
class, the procedure set forth in the Uniform Act has taken the
administrative power from the city council and given it to the
county court. Under the old "law" the city appointed its own
appraisers and approved or disapproved their awards. The property owner appealed directly to district court. Under the new
Act the condemner must negotiate, which means negotiators have
to be appointed, and if negotiations fail a petition must be filed
in county court, where the county judge appoints three appraisers
and hearings are held. Then where the Federal Government participates, there is often the requirement that a preliminary appraisal without contacting property owners be made before nego-
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tiations take place. This extends the procedure even further. But
all in all the new act does benefit the property owner who is involuntarily surrendering his property.
For purposes of discussion I have divided the subject matter
into three parts; one, negotiation, two, county court procedure;
and three, appellate procedure. Under the Act, the condemner
must negotiate with the condemnee before filing a petition to condemn the property in the county court of the county where the
property is situated.
Section 76-704 is clear in this respect, stating:
If an condemnee shall fail to agree with the condemner with

respect to the acquisition of property sought by the condemner.
a petition to condemn the property may be filed by the condemner
in the county court of the couny where the property or some
part thereof is situated.

If you represent the governmental agency condemning property, you must satisfy this requirement of the statutes. Our Supreme Court has said in effect that the condemner must in good
faith negotiate with the condemnee, and that it is not sufficient
that the condemner is unable to contact the condemnee personally
or is unable to agree on the amount of the damages requested by
the condemnee. This question has been discussed in the case of
Higgins vs. Loup River Public Power Dist'rict, ·which was appealed
to the Supreme Court on two occasions, the first case being cited
at 157 Neb. 653, 61 N.W.2d 213 and the second appeal being cited
at 159 Neb. 549, 68 N.W.2d 170. Incidentally, the condemnation
proceeding in the Higgins cases was instituted before the effective date of our Uniform Act. However the court in its opinion
pointed out this fact and stated that the requirement is the same
as far as the Uniform Act is concerned. In the first case, 157
Neb. 653, page 659 of the opinion, the court cites corpus juris on
eminent domain, paragraph 318, page 895, which reads as follows:
In order to satisfy the statutory requirement there must be a
bona fide attempt to agree. Thel'e m11st be an offer made, honest
and in good faith and a reasonable effort by the owner to ar:cept
it.

In the Higgins cases the condemner pleaded, among other
things, that it was unable to contact the condemnee. However,
the court stated that there were ways of satisfying the requirement of attempting to agree before condemnation was available
other than personal contact and verbal conversation of the parties.
To summarize the matter of negotiation, if you represent the
condemner you had better advise your negotiators not only to
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enter into negotiations with the condemnee but to make an offer
with a reasonable time for acceptance, and for the record you
should retain some evidence of the fact that negotiations are
carried on and an offer is made.
Throughout the period for negotiations there is no duty or
burden on the condemnee or the property owner to take any action. The condemnee is placed in a rather favorable position in
that the condemner must approach him and must make an offer.
However if the negotiations have failed, the condemner or his
representative, upon proper identification and after informing the
condemnee of the contemplated action, is authorized to enter upon
the land of the condemnee for purposes of examination and survey under Section 76-702 of the Act.
Now as to the practical aspects of conducting negotiationsthese questionable bits of homespun advice are not guaranteed,
so you take the same at your own risk.
If I represented the condemner I would attempt to get all of
the information that I could get through negotiations. Get the
property owner to give you his written appraisals, and of course
if possible get him to sign a purchase agreement or option. But
the idea is to arm yourself with all of the evidence you can get
in the event that you are unable to purchase the property, because
when you appear before the appraisers in county court you should
be ready to present your facts and figures and offset his case
if possible.

If you represent the property owner, the best thing for you
to do during negotiations is nothing and a lot of it. The condemner has to approach you. He has to make an offer. You
get another opportunity in county court before the appraisers if
you don't like the offer.
Incidentally, the condemner almost has to present his case
to the appraisers. He can't let the property owner run wild, and
there are not many occasions where the appraisers aren't going
to hike that offer somewhat to try to have the matter settled, so
the property owner has the best deal during negotiations. I
think he should keep his ears clean and his mouth shut.
So much for the negotiations. Now the procedure in county
court. The condemner must proceed with a petition filed in the
county court. We have always included the following elements in
our petitions: 1) A statement of the authority to proceed. 2) A
description of the property. 3) ,Names of interested parties. 4)
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Attach a copy of an acquisition or necessity ordinance. 5) Allege
that the condemnee failed to agree with the condemner and attach a copy of the resolution accepting the report of the negotiators and authorizing the law department to proceed.
The Uniform Act under Section 76-705 also provides the
right of the condemnee to file a petition in the county court in the
event that any condemner has taken or damaged property for
public use without instituting condemnation proceedings. It is
of interest to note that the language set forth in Section 76-705
is the same language found in our state constitution, Article I,
Section 21, which provision has been given a very liberal interpretation by our Supreme Court in the case of Qu~st vs. East
Omaha Drainage District, 155 Neb. 538, 52 N.W.2d 417 (March
21, 1952). The drainage district purchased a piece of property
near the property owned by the plaintiff. The defendant drainage
district excavated its property, leaving a cliff 40 feet in height.
Among other things, cliff swallows nested in the cliff, and these
swallows created noise and filth in the yard and on the person
and property of the plaintiff. Plaintiff sued for damages and
recovered, and this is what the court said on page 544 of the
opinion:
The purchase of property by a public corporation, where it could
have been acquired by the power of eminent domain, carries with
it all the incidents of taking or damaging by eminent domain insofar as the question of damages by reason of the taking or
damaging is concerned.
One of the incidents of taking property by eminent domain is
that not only is the condemnor liable to compensate for the
taking, but also is liable, by virtue of Article I, Section 21, of
the constitution of Nebraska, for consequential damage to other
property in excess of the damage sustained by the public at large.
The words 'or damaged' in Article I, Section 21 of the Constitution of Nebraska, include all actual damages resulting from the
exercise of the right of eminent domain which diminish the
market value of private property.

The point is that under the new Uniform Act the plaintiff
could come in under Section 76-705 and file his petition in county
court and have the damages determined by three appraisers.
The condemnee is not required to file any pleading in county
court. The condemner files his petition. Now the question has
arisen as to whether the condemnee can attach the petition by
direct attack in county court. The cases seem to indicate the
county court proceeding is merely an administrative one. Our
Supreme Court discussed this question in the case of Scheer vs.

PROCEEDINGS, 1955

263

Kansas-Nebraska Natuml Gas Company, 158 Neb. 668, 64 N.W.2d
333. And here is what the court said at page 675 of the opinion.
The securing of an appraisal of damages by appraisers appointed
by the county judge is an administrative act as distinguished
from a judicial proceeding. The method of appeal is procedural
only and contemplates a complete new trial upon plea~ings to
be filed as in the case of an appeal from the county court. There
can be no variance in the issues because no pleading, except the
petition of the condemner, is contemplated in the administrative
proceeding. The present appeal statute contemplates the filing
of pleadings and the framing of issues for the first time in the
judicial proceeding in the district court. The issue is not limited
to the question of damages only unless the pleadings limit the
trial to that issue.

In that case it was stipulated on appeal that no new pleadings need be filed and the case would be tried on appeal in the
same issue as in the court below. The Supreme Court said that
under those circumstances the issues on appeal would be limited
to damages only.
This question was also discussed in the case of Jensen vs.
Omaha Public Powe1· Disfrict 159 Neb. 277, 69 N.W. 2d, 591.
In the Scheer case there was a question of proper description
of the property in the petition. The court said the petition was
sufficient as against a collateral attack-that is, the particular
petition in that case. But in the Scheer case the court also talks
about the decision in F1·emont vs. Mattheis, 39 Neb. 98 57 N.W.
987, where the court said:
We think the petition filed with the county judge was sufficient
as against a collateral attack. In Fremont, E. & M. V.RR.C. vs.
Mattheis, 39 Neb. 98, 57 N.W. 987, this point was discussed
in the following language: Assuming the above description to
be less specific than contemplated by law, objection on that
ground comes too late when made for the first time after the
damage has been assessed and the road constructed. It cannot
be said there is not available to the land-owner in such cases an
adequate remedy by direct proceeding. Without doubt the county
judge is authorized to exercise the same control over the warrant
or commission to the appraisers as over any other process issued
by him. If the allegations of the petition are indefinite, an
amendment may be allowed: and if there is no authority for
the issuing of the writ, it may be quashed and set aside upon the
motion of one adversely interested. . .

This would indicate that you can file pleadings in county·
court. However, I would go along with the language used in
the Scheer and Jensen cases and say that you don't have a right
to plead in county court.
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Is the petition filed in county court by the condemner subject
to collateral attack?
In the Scheer case the court said that in the absence of an
appeal to the district court the condemner is bound by the description set forth in his petition, and if it be indefinite or inaccurate
in description it is subject to collateral attack. However if the
condemner appeals he is required to raise any or all issues in the
district court, and if he does not he is bound by the rule of res
judicata in a collateral attack.
After the condemner has filed his petition, Section 76-706
provides that the county judge shall within 3 days by order entered of record appoint 3 disinterested freeholders not interested
in a like question to serve as appraisers. The county judge directs
the sheriff to summon the appraisers to convene at his office to
qualify and proceed with the appraisal. The county judge administers the oath to the appraisers as required by Section 76708.
Notice of the time and place of hearing with respect to damages by the appraisers must be served on the condemnee at least
10 days prior to the hearing. Although the statute does not
indicate who should sign this notice, we have had the appraisers
sign the notice. Section 76-706)
The Uniform Act under Section 76-709 provides as follows:
It shall be the duty of the appraisers to carefully inspect and

view the property taken or sought to be taken, and also any other
property of the condemnee damaged thereby. The appraisers
shall hear any party interested therein in reference to the amount
of damages when they are so inspecting and viewing the property.

We have interpreted Sections 76-709 and 76-706 to mean
that the condemnee is entitled to two hearings 1) on the situs of
the property and 2) at a time and place determined by the appraiser. Therefore our form of notice has contained 1) the time
of the inspection of the property by the appraisers and 2) the
time and place of the hearing on damages by the appraisers.
The hearings by the appraisers are conducted in a very informal manner. The judge is not present and no record is made
of the testimony and both the condemner and condemnee present
their ideas of what the damages are to the board of appraisers.
Here is where I think the property owner should "shoot the
works." He knows what the condemner's idea of value is. Now
is the time for him to bring in his expert witness and present his
case to the appraisers.
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The property owner ought to meet these appraisers at the
situs of the property also--it's another chance to him to develop
his case.
If you represent the condemner you want to be prepared to
offer what you have. We have had cases where the prope~·
owner came in with a new and higher appraisal. Of course it
didn't help him much when we produced a copy of his lower value
ideas obtained during negotiations.
After the appraisers have arrived at the amount of the
awards they are required to file a report under Section 76-710
of the Uniform Act. The appraiser's report does not have to be
approved by the county judge. However, the county judge does
fix the amount of the appraiser's fee and the same are taxed as
costs to the condemnee.
Under Section 76-711 the condemner does not acquire any
interest in the property until he deposits the award with the
county judge. If no appeal is taken by the condemner he will be
deemed to have accepted the award unless he files an intention
to abandon the procedure within 60 days of the filing of the appraisers report. If the procedure is abandoned it may not be
instituted again for a period of two years.
Here's one for you to figure out. The last sentence under
Section 76-711 of the Uniform Act provides as follows:
Upon deposit of the condemnation award with the county judge
the condemner shall be entitled to a writ of assistance to place
him in possession of the property condemned."

Section 76-714 of the Uniform Act provides as follows:
The interest in the property acquired by the condemner shall be
such title, easement, right-of-way or use as is expressly specified
in or necessarily contemplated by the law granting to the condemner the right to exercise the power of eminent domain. The
condemner shall not dispossess the condemnee until the condemner
is ready to devote the property to public use, and such title or
interest as the condemner seeks to acquire shall not be complete
until the property is put to the public use for which taken.

Let's take the case of a residence being condemned. Suppose
the condemner pays the award into county court under Section
76-711. The condemner is entitled to a writ of assistance to place
him in possession of the property condemned. Under Section
76-714 the condemner is not entitled to possession until he is
ready to devote the property to public use. Can the property
owner retain possession after he has accepted the award? Does
he have to pay rent? Who pays the taxes?
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Under Section 76-714, the property o·wner seems to get a
"free ride" until the condemner is ready to devote to public use.
l\faybe this is unjust enrichment.
Upon deposit of the condemnation award the county judge
shall prepare and certify under his seal of office a true copy
thereof and shall transmit the same to the register of deeds of
the county where the property is condemned.
With regard to the procedure in appealing to the district
court after the report of the appraisers has been filed, the Act
provides that either the condemnee or the condemner may appeal.
The notice of appeal and the bond must be filed within 30 days
after filing of the appraiser's report. This is actually the first
occasion on which the condemnee files any type of filing in the
county court.
The bond must be approved by the county judge. It requires
one good and sufficient surety and it must contain the following
conditions : 1) that the appellant will prosecute such appeal to
effect without any unnecessary delays and 2) that if judgment
be rendered against the appellant in the appeal, the appellant
will satisfy any judgment rendered against him.
30 days after the filing of notice of appeal the county judge
must prepare and transmit to the clerk of the district court a
duly certified transcript of all proceedings upon payment of the
fee for the same. The proceeding is docketed in district court
showing the party first appealing as plaintiff and the other party
as defend ant, issues to be tried in the same manner as in the
appeal from the county judge to district court.
The question has arisen as to who must file the petition in
district court. In the case of City of Seward vs. Gruntorad, 158
Neb. 143, 62 N.W. 2d 537, the attorneys for the condemnee were
under the mistaken impression that the condemner had to file a
petition on appeal. The court in that case set forth the rule that
the failure of the appellant to timely file a petition in the district
court does not affect or defeat jurisdiction. However good cause
must be shown for failing to file a petition in district court within 50 days from the date of filing your notice of appeal, and for
the most part what is good cause is left to the discretion of the
district court.
This question was discussed in the above mentioned case on
page 149 of the opinion, which reads as follows:
"We construed this statute in in re Estate of Lindekugel,
supm, we applied it in in 1·e Estate of Myers, supra, and held: A
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discretionary duty is imposed upon a district court to determine
whether or not good cause has been shown for the failure of a
party to plead within the time required, and after the court has
heard the reasons of the pa1·ty in default for his failure to timely
plead, and in the exercise of a legal discretion has decided that
no sufficient cause has been shown, this court will not -0rainarily
disturb the decision of the district court."
"The question then is : Was good cause shown?"
Even though the only issue you want to try on appeal is the
question of damages, you still have to file your petition within 50
days after filing the notice of appeal. This question arose in the
case of Jensen vs. Omaha Public Powm· District, 159 Neb. 277,
66 N.W. 2d 591, quoting from page 284 of the opinion.
Apparently the condemnee's counsel became aware of this court's
opinion in the case of City of Seward v. Grmitorad, Supl'a., and
sought to follow the procedure set forth therein applying to
eminent domain. The condemnee's counsel takes the position
that where damages constitute the only issue in a condemnation
proceeding no petition need be filed in the district court. Cases
are cited to sustain the condemnee's position in such respect.
However, the cited cases are prior to our decision in city of
Seward 11'. Gruntorad, supra, and the condemnee's position is in
direct conflict with what this court said in City of Seward v.
Gruntoi·ad, supra, on procedure in eminent domain cases.

We had ~ case in Douglas County where the condemnee filed
his notice of appeal but failed to file his petition in the district
court within 50 days thereafter. The condemnee at an ex parte
hearing obtained an extension of time in which to file his petition in the district court. However we moved to dismiss the case
on grounds that there wasn't any good cause shown, and the
court sustained our motion. The cause in that case was just about
the same as the cause shown in the City of Seward case--that is,
that counsel was confused as to the procedure to take.
You can stipulate to try the case on the same issues in district court, which means in effect that you are trying the issue
of damages only on appeal. However in the absence of such a
stipulation a petition must be filed.
Now if you represent the property owner you have several
practical things to think about with reference to appeals. If you
appeal you don't get your money, which is usually a big item.
And of course you don't stop the condemner from proceeding after
he has deposited his award.
Under the Uniform Act the condemner can appeal, and here
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is where I think he should make his move if he thinks he is paying too much for the property. The same old story-a lot of
people don't want to go through a jury trial. Sometimes they
\Yill take less money. When the condemner appeals he ties up the
money. Section 76-719.
Either condemner or condemnee may appeal from the judgment
of the district court to the supreme court in the manner provided
by law for taking an appeal in a civil action. In case an appeal
is taken either to the district court or the Supreme Court, any
money deposited by the condemner shall remain in the hands of
the county judge until a final judgment is :r;endered.

This is the condemner's "break in the ball game."
get kicked around, exercise your right of appeal.

If you

Summarizing, the steps in taking your appeal from county
court to district court are as follows: 1) A notice of appeal must
be filed within 30 days after date of the filing of the appraiser's
report together with the proper bond. 2) The transcript must be
ordered and the fee for the same tendered and 3) You must file
your petition in the district court within 50 days from the date
of the filing of the notice of appeal.
This completes a brief statement of procedure under the
new Act. I have with me today one set of forms which we use,
including the petition, an oath given the appraisers, the notice
to the property owners and the appraiser's report which any of
you may peruse after the meeting.
ASSOCIATION DINNER FOR MEMBERS
AND THEIR LADIES ................................................6:30 P.M.
Presiding .............................................................. John J. Wilson, Esq.
President of the Nebraska State Bar Association

INTRODUCTION OF DISTINGUISHED GUESTS
"1956-Peace, War and Politics" ..............................Bob Considine
New York, N. Y.
Noted Author; INS Correspondent; King
Features Columnist; Star of Radio-TV
"On the Line with Considine."

1956 PEACE, WAR AND POLITICS
By
Bob Considine

I think we are in for an extended period of peace. Our atomic
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stockpile and our ability to deliver the atomic goods to any point
of the earth within hours after an act of provocation has made
war unthinkable. From what I've seen and heard in the master
control room at SAC headquarters here at Offut, I can't conceive of Russia's lasting a full week in any all-out war with us.
(China wouldn't last a day. It has no capability of waging a
modern war.) The Soviet Union is rimmed by our air bases.
Every major target in the U.S.S.R. and among the satellites has
been identified, and reasonable facsimiles in this country may be
under a mock bombing raid right now. One of the last times I
was in Omaha I had Gen. LeMay on my Mutual of Omaha sho\Y
and he remarked, in a casual way, that one of his planes was even
then practice-bombing a section of this city. Not a soul in
Omaha knew the plane was up there in the shrouds of night, too
high to be seen, too high to be heard. Yet Omaha lay naked on
the radar screen of that plane, and that portion of the city which
was marked for destruction was theoretically destroyed. On the
radar screen, that section resembled an important railroad junction far behind the Iron Curtain.
The men in the Kremlin may be cruel, conniving and contemptuous of a lot of the things we hold dear. But they're not
fools, and you have only to see them eat and drink to recognize
that they want to go on living and hold on to what power their
predecessors amassed for them.
The great, final communist world revolution can wait, so far
as these fellows are concerned. Sure, they'll keep their operatives
fanned out through the world, looking for soft spots in the armor
of the West, looking for political vacuums to fill. But the big
pay-off doesn't have to be tomorrow. Karl Marx put no time
limit on it. Neither did Lenin. Neither did the man who made
these present rulers--Stalin. If there is to be a Pax Americana
or Pax Atomica for twenty, thirty, even fifty yea1·s--so what?
One day, they feel, the world revolution will succeed. One day,
they feel, we'll go bust or be sucker enough to let down our guard,
and then they can move. The present crop in the Kremlin may
have died off, but the system will dredge up new leaders and
bring them to the top.
At Geneva I asked Chip Bohlen, our ambassador to Moscow,
to tell me something about the current Russian leaders. He said
that he had given them a good study and was convinced that
there is no one boss, as Stalin was boss. Bulganin, Khrushchev
and Molotov sat at Stalin's feet like schoolboys, afraid to open
their mouths. He chose no heir among them. He could send
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12,000 Polish officers to their death in the Katyn Forest without
batting an eyebrow, or starve and shoot millions of kulaks to
death, or condemn millions-maybe as many as 15,000,000-to
the slow·er death and degradation of slave labor camps.
These fellows who form the committee that succeeded Stalin
look like tame people only by comparison to Stalin, one of history's most brutal despots. They are dangerous products of a
system that lives on deceit. But they can be reached. They can
be talked to, where Stalin could not be. With German tanks in
the suburbs of Moscow early in the war and the Russian government fleeing to Kuibyshev, Stalin entertained the Polish premier
at dinner in the Kremlin and said, in effect, "Now, after the war,
we will annex much of the eastern section of Poland...."
I don't know if "appeal to" is too strong a term, but I'll
chance it: Bulganin and Khruschev, who appear to be of about
equal rank, can be appealed to-if the right man is entering the
appeal. So can Marshal Zhukov. Molotov and Gromyko abide by
the Book-Lenin's Book-·which emphatically says it is not possible for a communist state to co-exist with a capitalistic state.
But Molotov and Gromyko are not running the show. Bulganin and Khrushev and, to a lesser degree, Zhukov are the decision-makers. And they just don't seem to be the sadistic type.
Bulganin looks a bit like a Russian Foxy Grandpa. Khrushchev
likes to get drunk. At Geneva, Zhukov looked like a man trying
to get Eisenhower's autograph, or an old chorus boy from the last
road company of "The Student Prince."
They're not going to sniile us into relaxing our vigilance,
of course. We're not dumb enough to fall for anything as simple
as that. What our side did at Geneva was to sound out these
fellows like a doctor applying a stethoscope, or an, attorney in a
pre-trial interrogation. And they stood still for the examination.
Which brings me to the man who did the principal sounding,
the man who tonight lies in his hospital bed on the eighth floor
of Fitzsimmons Army Hospital.
Your political leanings are none of my business. I don't
want to talk now about Eisenhower the politician at this point,
anyway. I want to talk now about Eisenhower, the Man of Peace.
His performance at Geneva was the most thrilling, inspiring, wonderful job I've seen turned in by a statesman in twenty-five years
of reporting. He transcended party affiliations and all other
considerations and performed as an American. They called it
the "Meeting at the Summit." But only one man truly made it
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all the way to the peak, and he was our President. It makes you
proud to be an American.
Ike talked to those Russians not in the high-falutin' language
of diplomacy. He looked them in the eye and talked to them man
to man. And in basic English-Basic Kansas English.
This happened:
One day over a drink at the buffet which followed formal
meetings, Eisenhower and Bulganin got into a discussion about
the horrifying effects of the H-bomb.
Suddenly Ike looked at him and said, "You know, don't you,
that the prevailing winds of the earth blow from west to east. . ."
Bulganin answered, after a bit, "You mean that we would
get your radioactive dust?"
"Yes," Ike said, looking at him steadily.
Bulganin nodded and said, "Yes, but you'll also recall that
the winds continue to blow from west to east and in time blow
from our land to yours. You would get our dust, too."
"Right!" Ike agreed. "But these winds flow mainly over
the upper portions of the world, where our two countries lie. We
could destroy you; you could destroy us, perhaps. But if you did,
don't you see that you'd be gone, but many free places like South
America and Africa and Australia and New Zealand would still
exist. . .and free?"
Bulganin was plainly moved by what he heard. He mumbled
something in Russian, several times over.
It meant: We must do something...We must do something.
The Russians were thoroughly unprepared for Eisenhower's
proposal that we exchange military blueprints and let observers
fly over each other's country. They couldn't comprehend such
open-handedness. Their furtive, scheming lives had not conditioned them to understand goodness of heart. Ike couldn't have
stunned them more if he had rapped them on the noggin with a
baseball bat.
That evening, more than before, the four of them rubbed
shoulders as they left the Palais des Nations, as if for mutual
support. They had nobody to call home to for advice. Ike knocked
them completely off balance.
It is one of the curious contradictions of our time that Eisenhower would emerge as the temporal symbol of peace on earth.
For years and years his business was mass destruction. At West
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Point he studied Clausewitz, Napoleon, Grant, Lee, Lundendorf.
At Leavenworth he graduated Number One in his advanced postgraduate studies on how to conquer and defend. In World War
II he had under his command the greatest armed force in history,
more than 5,000,0.00 men on land, sea and in the air. His forces
laid waste to cities, armies and to some extent populations from
North Africa to the Baltic.
And then, almost like Saul on the road to Damascus, he
traded in his s-\vord for an olive branch. But he retained something not always associated with a peace-maker. He retained
that fighting jaw. He began to fight for peace.
In the course of those battles Eisenhower has achieved a
miracle. He has made peace exciting. He has become to peace
what Churchill was to war. The bugle he sounds calls men to
peace, not to arms.
I flew to Korea with him, after he made that campaign
promise to go there and try to bring that exhausting war to a
close. It was a memorable experience. . . the bitter cold. . .the
disgust of the m~n with the war...the suffocating smell of Korea
...the slim little "token" forces that other United Nations sent
to fight UN's first war...and tender moments such as when Ike
took leave finally of his son John, then serving with a forward
element. He told his boy that he could somehow bear it if John
was killed in the service of his country but he wondered if he
could carry on as president if John was captured. "For God's
sake," he said, "don't let them capture you."
Each day, Eisenhower flew from Seoul to a different portion
of the front in a tiny single-engined plane. In that terrain an
engine failure would almost automatically mean death. A Mig,
such as those which came over Seoul the night we left, apparently
looking for his transport plane, a MiG could have shot down the
little plane with:a single burst of fire. A Chinese anti-aircraft
gunner could have done the same wit4 hardly much more trouble.
But Eisenhm~rer was spared for the great jobs that lay ahead.
He has the gift of da.ring a hesitant world to take a more trustful attitude. That speech before the UN after the Bermuda conference, for instance. That's where he proposed that the nations
of the world pool their peaceful atomic knowledge, that all join
in, contributing what they could, for the benefit of all.
Russia said. "Ridiculous!" at the time, and even some of our
friends ,;;.ere, 'v~ry
..
'

.

But at Geneva this summer, thirty-some nations, including
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Russia, met in the atoms-for-peace conference, met in the most
cordial and cooperative manner. Russia showed her 100-kilowatt atomic power plant and spread out her plans for a 100,000
kilowatt job. An Indian outlined the breath-taking potentialities
of hydrogen power, power from the H-bomb. A man from Westinghouse sold the Fiat Co. of Italy an atomic reactor. Tne nations
of the world gathered around an operating reactor built by us
and owned by the Swiss, and around the walls of the building
were exhibits whose captions were written in English, French,
Spanish and Russian.
Ike's imaginative dream of December 8, 1953, the date of his
speech before UN, had come true in eighteen months.
But where will he be, eighteen months after Geneva? That
would bring him up to election time in '56.
I don't think he'll run. I have no inside information, and
the signs may be deceptive. But right now I'd say he'll slowly,
surely regain his health to a point where he can assume much
(but not all) of his past responsibility and activity, concentrate
on convincing Russia and the rest of the world that the people
of the U.S. feel exactly as he does about peace-and when he's
decided that he has made his point, he'll say, "That's it boys.
Come up to Gettysburg and see me sometime."
When he says that, I wouldn't advise any of you to stand in
the doorway of either the Republican national convention or the
Democratic national convention. You might be trampled to death
by would-be candidates, favorite sons and the like.
It's going to be a scramble when Ike bows out, as I think
he will. (In further support of the brief that Ike won't run,
the Vice President told me in an interview a week before Ike's
heart attack that the President considered his health one of three
major factors involved in whether he'd seek re-election. The other
two concerned the international situation and the continued domestic prosperity. As for health, the President then was pictured as being a man who knew he had to come to peak physical
and mental fitness time after time after time. The President
estimated that he averaged one fateful decision per hour, each
of which made tremendous demands on him. He'd have to see
whether he felt he could keep that up for four more years. He'd
have to see. In the meantime, you'll recall, he said on several
occasions that there were plently of good Republicans in the woods
and that there ·was no such animal as the "indispensable man.")
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To repeat, don't stand in any open doorways.
The woods may indeed be filled with good Republican candidates, but it seems to me the GOP needs more than a good candidate. It needs a good dramatic Republican. It's the minority
party in this country and has been for longer than we might
suppose. Gallup Poll indicates that if all Americans of voting age
were required to register today there would be 54.3 Dem. : 34.3
GOP. It had to go outside of its party ranks to come up with the
last two presidents it elected-Herbert Hoover and Eisenhower.
Neither had ever run for public office before. Both earned their
fame in non-political fields. Both had toyed with the notion of
running as Democrats. It seems a bit hard to believe now, but
Hoover was asked to head the Democratic ticket and run against
Coolidge. He declined (just as Ike declined to run with Truman's
support in 1948).
No vice president in our history was ever given a truer power
of attorney than Dick Nixon. The young Californian has been
an assistant president from the start. He has conducted the
weekly meetings of the cabinet, the National Security Council
and the legislative leaders, in addition to presiding over the
Senate. He has visited 35 countries as Ike's personal representative and has the President's complete confidence.
But Eisenhower admires him more wholeheartedly than do
some of the factions and splinter groups within the GOP hierarchy. It is plain by now that Governor Knight, rather than the
second highest office-holder in the land, will control the powerful
California delegation to the convention in San Francisco next
August. Governor Knight would like the nomination himself, as
perhaps would Senator Knowland.
Which brings us to a fourth Californian, who now says he
wants no part of it-Chief Justice Earl Warren. He's Ike's age
and plainly would prefer to stay on the high bench. But there
is precedent for leaving it-Charles Evans Hughes did-and
there's no doubt that if Eisenhower feels he can't cauy on, tremendous (and very possibly successful) pressure will be put on
Warren to pick up the torch. With Eisenhower's endorsement
I think he'd be tough to beat.
Now the Democrats. Stevenson, it seems to me, faces two
problems: 1) He has been a man without a platform for nearly
three years of prosperity and wide employment and 2) he's got
that 1952 loss going against him. On the other side of the ledger,
some Democratic leaders will figure that the voters considered
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him the second best man in the country three years ago, and
now if the best man isn't playing ball any more, they'll take the
next best. They gave him a tremendous number of votes the last
time.
Averell Harriman has the most important platform in the
country as governor of New York. He says he's for Stevenson.
But Carmine Di Sapio, the Tammany leader who handles Harriman's political business, say he's for Harriman-not Stevenson.
Harriman is 64.
I saw Estes Kefauver's picture in the World-Herald today,
wearing an Indian turban and a garland of flowers. He should
carry the Calcutta vote hands down, but he can't get the leaders
of the Democratic party to go for him. As for the most respected Democrat on Capitol Hill, Dick Russell of Georgia, he'll be
passed up, I suspect, because the Democrats must depend to some
extent on the Negro vote in the North.
There will be a sprinkling of other names-John Foster Dulles, Harold Stassen, Christian Herter, even Tom Dewey-for the
Republicans, Soapy \Villiams and Gov. Lausche for the Democrats.
It'll be a scramble all right. Had a card yesterday from Bernarr
McFadden. He's thrown his parachute in the ring. And Tommy
Manville.
And everybody expected that it would be one of the quietest
of them all, with Ike running and winning without trouble.
The people will know what to do. They'll know because they
are the best-informed people in the world today-with free courts,
newspapers, radio and TV.
This, incidentally is National Newspaper Week. The slogan
this time is "The People's Right to Know." There is certainly
nothing to complain about the coverage of the Eisenhower illness.
Probably never before in history has the exact condition of a
chief of state been so completely communicated to the people.
This is infinitely better than leaving us in the dark-where the
American people were left in the matter of the condition of President Cleveland, Wilson and F.D.R.
Cleveland was operated on for cancer of the upper right jaw
on July 1, 1893. But the only people who knew about it were a
handful of doctors, a few personal friends and perhaps the crew
of the private yacht "Oneida," on which the operation was performed. The story was broken several months later by a Philadelphia newspaper but vigorously denied by a White House
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spokesman. The public considered it a hoax. The full account
was not published and believed until 1931, years after Cleveland's
death.
Woodrow Wilson, by an astonishing coincidence, was taken
ill in Denver within a few hours of the very hour Eisenhower
was stricken thirty-six years later. He insisted on going on by
train to Wichita where he suffered what several of his biographers
agree was the first of two strokes. The public never knew. Just
who ran the country until the end of his term is still a matter of
debate-though some say it was Admiral Grayson and Mrs. Wilson.
Roosevelt's . physical condition was extremely bad before he
went to Yalta and worse when he returned. But the public wasn't
told.
Churchill suffered a slight stroke in 1949, while out of office.
It briefly affected his speech, but he recovered sufficiently to
campaign in 1950 and return to office. On June 24 at 10 Downing Street, at the end of a statedinner, Churchill suffered a second stroke which deprived him of his speech for twelve hours.
His meeting with Ike at Bermuda was postponed indefinitely.
Yet to the amazement of his doctors he recovered and carried on
until this April, at which time he first told the world that nearly
two years before he had had what he called "a very serious illness which paralyzed me completely physically."
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It is always good to meet with fell ow lawye1·s, but I am especially grateful for the invitation which has brought me back home
to Nebraska today to be with old friends of the Nebraska Bar
and particularly to participate again in a program sponsored by
the Real Estate, Probate and Trust Law Section, in the work of
which I have been vitally interested ever since its organization
in 1936.
Before reaching the announced subject, you may be interested
in a few more general words about the operations of the Lands
Division in the Department of Justice. Before going to Washington, I would never have supposed that the work of the Lands
Division could possibly offer such a variety of experience and involve such a diversification of problems. For example, it was beyond my most fantastic imagination that I should be engaged in -
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the defense of the Government against the assertions of the claims
of tribal Indians involving potential liabilities in the estimated
aggregate of as much as ten billion dollars. Little did I anticipate
that I would be trying to help figure out the responsibility of
the United States to pay, if at all, for the northerly half of an
international bridge across the Rio Grande now collapsed under
the waters of the reservoir behind Falcon Dam. 1 I could not
conceive that I would be working upon a case involving an old
dispute between secretaries of two of the executive departments of
the same Federal Government at the suit of a county in Oregon,
involving the administration of 1/2 million acres of valuable
timber land. 2 I could not have guessed that a real-estate lawyer
would have much to do with the question whether the Government
is liable for the killing of Indian ponies and allegedly driving
certain individual Indians from some desert grazing lands in a
well-nigh undiscovered portion of the State of Utah. 3 Little did
I know that I would be involved in a vast program of slum clearance in the District of Columbia and in testing the constitutionality of the Act under which it is being done. 4
But these are just a few samples of the problems within the
scope of the work and responsibility of the Lands Division.
I consider it a privilege almost without parallel to be in
charge of the title work and real estate litigation of the biggest
landowner, the biggest land buyer, the biggest landlord, the biggest land seller, and at the same time the biggest land tenant in
America. A recent survey by the General Services Administration shows that the Federal Government now owns 21 % of all the
land in the United States.0
The staff of the Lands Division is divided among eight sections, each with a particular field of responsibility. I would not
impose on your time to describe the function or work load of each
of these sections. One may suffice for illustration. In the Land
Acquisition Section alone we have cases now pending for the condemnation of more than 30,000 separate tracts of land. Under
the Declaration of Taking Act, permitting the advance deposit of
estimated just compensation, we have on deposit in -the Court
1 United States vs. 85237 Acres in Zapata County, Civil 529, Laredo
Division, Southern District of Texas. Pending.
2 Clackamas County, Ore. vs. :McKay, 219 F.2d 479, vacated as moot,
:.J49 U.S. 909.
a Bill Hatahley vs. United States. 220 F.2d 666.
4 Berman vs. Parker, 348 U.S. 26.
u Inventory Repo;·t on Federal Real Property, Senate Document No. 32,
84th Cong., 1st Session, p. 9.
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Registries a fairly constant balance of somewhere around $40,000,000, with the monthly new deposits and withdrawals averaging
roughly $3,000,000. Aside from condemnations, this section also
handles the title work on so-called "direct purchase" matters
where the acquiring agencies have successfully negotiated voluntary purchases, and there is an average volume of around 4,300
of such transactions pending in the office most of the time. In
the 26 months I have been in office more than 23,000 title opinions of the attorney general have been prepared in this one section, and in many cases a single opinion will cover several tracts.
Out of all the mass of interesting questions which are constantly confronting the Lands Division it has been rather difficult to decide on one for this discussion. The subject which has
been announced has at least the virtue of being ultra-modern.
It has to do with some of the consequences of the collision between
the flight of modern aircraft and some very durable old common
law concepts about the ownership of air-space. The rapid advances in aviation, particularly the recent developments of jet
planes for the military services, have brought into sharp focus
many questions regarding the nature and extent of the rights of
landowners whose property is in the immediate vicinity of an
airfield. There is such a widespread misunderstanding of some
aspects of the problems created that a discussion of them here
may be both timely and helpful.
Sir Edward Coke, who died in 1634, in his Institutes of the
Law of England, expressed the ancient common-law rule in a way

which at least had the advantage of simplicity :6
And lastly, the earth hath
only of water, as hath been
up to heaven; for cujus est
is holden in 14 H. 8. fo. 12.

in law a great extent upwards, not
said, but of ayre and all things even
solum, ejus est usque ad coelum., as
22 Hen. 6. 59. 10 E. 4. 14.

Blackstone7 and Kent,8 in their Commentaries, restate the rule
given by Coke. Blackstone can be forgiven since he died in the
year 1780 and the balloon was not invented until 1783. But
Kent, who lived until 1847, does not have this excuse. As early
as 1815, Lord Ellenborough considered a case in trespass for
cutting a tree, the brances of which overspread the defendant's
land. He is reported to have said :9
6 First American Ed., 1853, Ch. 1, § 1 ( 4a).
The three cases relied
on by Coke in support of the maxim all had to do with the ownership of
young birds in their nests in trees.
7 Lewis ed., 1902, p. 18.
s Gould ed., 1896, p. 621.
9 Pickering vs. Rudd, .June 20, 1815, 1 Stark. 56, 58.
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I recollect a case where I held that firing a gun loaded with shot
into a field was a breaking of the close. ·would trespass lie
for passing through the air in a balloon over the land of another?

Lord Ellenborough did not answer his own question, probably because of the fine English sensibility about not disposing
of questions which are unnecessary to a decision.
The prophetic question of Lord Ellenborough was one of the
earliest expressions of doubt about the inflexibility of the common-law maxim that the ownership of land extends from the
center of the earth to the periphery of the universe. But even
so, the courts have struggled with the philosophy of airspace
problems from very early times, while trying generally, nonetheless, to keep their decisions within the framework of the
common-law maxim. The reported cases dealing with so-called
ownership of airspace are so numerous that their collection here
would be impractical. These include actions of various kinds relating to the overhanging of natural growths, 10 such as the
branches of trees; the protrusion of man-made structures such as
cornices, 11 eaves, 12 crossarms, 13 elevated railways,14 power and
telephone lines ;1G and the firing of projectiles across land without
touching the surface.16 The variety of the cases is almost unlimited. One curious case in 1874 arose because the defendant's
horse had kicked and bitten the plaintiff's mare which was standing on the other side of the boundary fence. No part of the horse
touched plaintiff's ground. This vrns held to be actionable trespass because the horse's nose and leg protruded in the airspace
over plaintiff's land.17
I cannot resist the temptation to include passing reference to
another unusual airspace case. The trespass consisted of the defendant reaching her arm across the boundary fence during a
bitter quarrel between neighboring landowners. The Iowa court
amusingly observed that ownership extends not only downward,
but upward. to the heavens, "although it is, perhaps, doubtful
E.g., Lemmon vs. Webb, 1894, 3 Ch.D. 1; same, 1895, .A.C. 1.
E.g., Fay vs. Prentice, 1 C.B. 828 (1845); Harrington vs. McCarthy.
169 Mass. 492, 48 N.E. Z78.
12 E.g., Smith vs. Smith, 110 Mass. 302.
13 E.g., discussion in Harris vs. Central Power Co., 109 Neb. 500, 191
N.W. 711.
H E.g .. "i\Ietropolitan "\Yest Side Elevated Ry. Co. vs. Springer, 171 Ill.
170. 49 N.E. 416.
1G E.g., Butler vs. Frontier Telephone Co., 186 N.Y. 486, 79 N.E. 716.
10 Infra, notes 33 and 34.
l i Ellis vs. Loftus Iron Co., L.R. 1874, 10 C.P. 19.
H•

11
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whether owners as quarrelsome as the parties in this case will
ever enjoy the usufruct of their property in the latter direction." 1 '
Until the arrival on the judicial scene of some of the special
problems created by avigation, there could be detected in the reported cases some disagreement in basic theory. Some courts inclined to the view that the airspace is not capable of ownership
and that invasions of it are only actionable when they are breaches
of duties otherwise owed to the subjacent landowner. Generally
speaking, the argument has been much hotter among theoretical
commentators than it has ever been deducible from reported decisions. By far the greater number of cases adhered to the common-law concept that the superjacent airspace belongs to the
owner of the surface. When confusing language is sometimes
found in the courts' opinions, it is often quite obviously due to the
opinion writers' attempt to justify a particular result on the
merits either by means of or in spite of some very rigid distinctions made at the common law between particular forms of action, as, for example, the differences between ejectment, trespass
quare clausum fregit, and trespass on the case-differences which
have in various degrees disappeared with the progress of modern
concepts of pleading and remedy. If the maxim is limited to the
e:i..'"tent to which it has been applied in adjudicated cases, practically all of which have dealt with trees or buildings or other manmade structures having ground support somewhere, there should
be nothing amazing about refusing to apply it to aviation, or
modifying it to suit the practical requirements of the new problem.
In this perspective, the 1946 decision of the United States
Supreme Court in United States vs. Causby 19 is fairly understandable. In that case the majority opinion, after referring to the
common-law doctrine, sweeps it away by saying:
But that doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air
is a public highway, as Congress has declared. '\Vere that not
true. every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to
countless trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To
recognize such private claims to the airspace would clog these
highways, seriously interfere with their control and development
in the public interest, and transfer into private ownership that
to which only the public has a just claim.

In an effort to confine this discussion as much as possible to
aspects of real estate law, any extended reference to regulatory
powers and functions of federal, state or local authorities will be
18
19

Hannibalson vs. Sessions, 116 Ia. 457, 90 N.W. 93.
328 u.s. 256.
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purposely avoided. It is, however, helpful to note at this point
that Congress, by the Air Commerce Act of 192620 and the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938,21 exercising its power under the commerce clause, has recognized "a public right of freedom of interstate and foreign air navigation" 22 through the navigable airspace
of the United States, and has defined navigable airspace as meaning "airspace above the minimum safe altitude of flight prescribed
by the Civil Aeronautics Authority." 23 The regulations adopted24
pursuant to these Acts prescribe the minimum safe altitudes of
flight as 1,000 feet over congested areas and 500 feet elsewhere,
except for take-offs and landings which are required to conform
to a given flight pattern and "path of glide." Military aircraft
are subject to the rules of the Civil Aeronautics Board in the
absence of military regulations to the contrary.25 Exercising
their police powers, several of the states have enacted laws dealing with sovereignty in the airspace, lawfulness of flight within
certain limits, and ownership of airspace by the subjacent landowners subject to the right of flight.
However, the effect upon the "ownership" aspects of avigation of a federal or state "commerce power," comparable to that
exercised by Congress over rivers and harbors, has never been
decided with regard to the landing and take-off areas near airports,26 and hence is a completely virgin territory which I shall
not explore today.
While seeming to repudiate what it calls the "ancient doctrine" as to the ownership of airspace, the Causby case goes on to
hold the Government liable for frequent, low-level flights by military planes over private land. It may be said more accurately,
therefore, that what the Causby case really does is to trim the
doctrine down to the size required by modern life in the air age.
The Causby case was brought in the Court of Claims to recover for the alleged taking of an interest in Causby's home and
20 44 Stat. 568, 49 U.S.C. 171, et seq.
::n 52 Stat. 977, 49 U.S.C. 401, et seq.
22 49 u.s.c. 180.
23 49 u.s.c. 180, 401 (24).
2414 Code of Federal Reg., Sec. 60.17 (1952). To the effect that these
regulations supersede local ordinances, see Allegheny Airlines vs. Village
of Cedarhurst, 132 F.Supp. 871 (E.D. N.Y. 1955).
2li Cameron vs. Civil Aeronautics Board, 140 F.2d 482.
26 In the Causby <:ase, supra, the court found it unnecessary to decide
"the question of the validity of the regulation" since the "path of glide"
for landing and taking off was not within the regulation's definition of
"navigable air space."

PROCEEDINGS, 1955

283

chicken farm located about 2,200 feet from the end of the main
runway of an airport leased by the Government. Frequent and
regular flights of Army planes, in taking off and landing, passed
over Causby's land at about 83 feet, which was only 18 feet above
the highest trees. It was claimed that there was great noise,
vibration and glare of light which deprived respondents of sleep,
made them nervous and frightened, and killed so many of their
chickens that they were driven out of business. The Supreme
Court agreed with the Court of Claims2 i in this respect that the
actions of the Government in the particular case constituted a
taking of an easement of flight over the Causbys' land for which
they were entitled to receive just compensation as provided by
the fifth amendment.
Neither the Causby case nor any other provides any precise
yardstick for judging whether in any other given state of facts
there is or is not a taking of an easement for which compensation must be paid. The result must invariably depend upon the
facts of each case. Yet there can be summarized from the decisions several general rules against which any particular facts
must be measured.2 8
It is firmly established that a landowner has no such exclusive proprietary right to the superjacent airspace as would permit any recovery for occasional flights of aircraft over his land
on a theory of trespass or taking. In that respect the "ad coelurn"
part of the common-law maxim is as dead as Lord Coke. The
airplane is part of the modern environment of life, and the fact
that it may sometimes cause certain inconveniences or annoyances must be accepted. On the other hand, frequent low-level
flights of Government aircraft over private land, resulting in
direct interference with the use and enjoyment of the land substantially diminishing its value, may constitute the imposition of
an easement upon the land requiring payment of just compensation. Thus the landowner clearly has some rather definite rights
in the airspace immediately above his land. And those rights are
real property rights. The word "taking" and the word "ease2; Opinion of Court of Claims:
2s A few illustrative cases are:

60 F. Supp. 751.
Causby, supra; Hinman vs. Pacific Air
Transport, 84 F.2d 755, cert. den. 300 U.S. 654; Smith vs. New England
Aircraft Co., Inc., 270 i\Iass. 511, 170 N.E. 385; Northwest Airlines vs.
Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (3rd paragraph of concurring opinion by Jackson);
Hyde vs. Sommerset Air Service, 61 A.2d 645; Antonik vs. Chamberlain,
78 N.E.2d 752; Swetland vs. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 201; Vanderslice vs. Shawn, 27 A.2d 87; Thrasher vs. Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173
S.E. 817, 99 A.L.R. 158, and note, 173.
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ment" are very much at home in the field of real-estate law, as
distinguished from tort law. It may be noted parenthetically that
the Causby case was decided May 27, 1946, whereas the Federal
Tort Claims Act was not passed until August 2, 1946. In the
Government's brief in the Causby case there was a short argument that the claim, if actionable at all against a private operator, was beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims because
it sounded in tort as for nuisance. There has been some spe8Ulation whether the Causby decision, applying the taking-of-an-easement theory, may have been influenced by the then-existing sovereign immunity from tort claims. But that is a little like arguing which came first, the chicken or the egg. The fact is that
the Causby opinion is in the record, and that is that.
While the surface owner has some rights in the superincumbent airspace, these rights are definitely limited. He has
exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the atmosphere only
to the extent necessary for his full enjoyment of his property
and his exploitation and development of it according to its present or immediately foreseeable highest and best use. His protection e}.."i;ends at least as far as the airspace is, or economically
can be, physically occupied or used in the conventional sense. But
that is just a part of it. It also means that the intrusions in the
airspace must not, without compensation, be so low and so frequent as to cause substantial impairment in the use of the surface. It is the character of the invasion as related to the character of the property-not the amount of damage, so long as substantial-which determines whether there is a taking.29 Any
diminution in the value of property not directly invaded or peculiarly affected, but sharing in the common burden of incidental
damages arising from lawful governmental activities, is not a
taking of property.30 Only damages not experienced by the public at large may be the basis for recovery of compensation.31 In
other words, the liability of the Government for payment of just
compensation arises only when the damages differ in kind and
not merely in degree from those suffered by the public at large.32
Another factor in considering whether there has been a
taking and if so the extent of it, is the probability of the intention of the Government to continue the particular operation. This
:!!•United States vs. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328.
30 Richards vs. ·washington Terminal Co., 233 U. S. 546, 554.
31 Baltimore and Potomac R. R. Co. vs. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S.
317, 332.
32 Thompson vs. Kimball, 165 F.2d 677, 681; United States vs. 357.25
Acres of Land, etc., 55 F.Supp. 461 (W.D. La.).
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element is well illustrated by the history of two airspace cases
which did not involve airplans but did involve the firing of a
coastal artillery battery. In the first case, decided in 1913, the
Supreme Court held that the mere erection of a coastal battery
with a field of fire extending over the plaintiff's land and the
subsequent discharge of only th1·ee shells did not evidence a.n intention on the part of the Government to impose a servitude on
the land.33 Yet nine years later when the same parties plaintiff
again brought suit alleging repetitions of acts of this nature by
the Government, the court said, "While a single act may not be
enough, a continuance of them in sufficient number and over a
sufficient time may prove it. Every successive trespass adds to
the force of the evidence."34 Thus we see that there is no single
factor which may be the basis of judgment, and great importance
is attached to the cumulative result of several factors.
It should be noted that the fifth amendment to the Federal
Constitution, as distinguished from its counterpart in many state
constitutions, including Nebraska's,:ii; provides just compensation
only for takings of, not damages to, private property. The
borderline between takings and damages may sometimes be a
little fuzzy, but it is nonetheless very important. If the impairment of property caused by an authorized federal activity is sufficiently substantial, it may be a taking of an interest in that
property, even though the interest taken is in the nature of an
easement or use, either permanent or temporary, requiring the
payment of just compensation for that particular interest less
than the fee. But the Federal Government, under the fifth amendment, is not required to pay for consequential damages.36
Although it is implicit in what I have already said, it may
be well to observe specifically that there are at least three principal ways in which the United States may acquire real property
or some interest in it. First, of course, the Government may
purchase the property or interest in an ordinary free negotiation.
Secondly, it may acquire by condemnation proceedings which it
institutes in exercise of its power of eminent domain. The third
33
34

Peabody vs. United States. 231 U.S. 530.
Portsmouth Harbor Land and Hotel Co. vs. United States, 260 U.S.

327.
After remand, the claimants were unable to prove a case, the petition
was dismissed, 64 C.Cls. 572, and certiorari was denied, 277 U.S. 603.
35 Article I, Sec. 21:
"The property of no person shall be taken or
damaged for public use without just compensation therefor.''
36 United States vs. Petty Motors Co., 327 U.S. 372, 377-8; l\litchell vs.
United States, 267 U.S. 341, 344; United States ex rel. T.V.A. vs. Powelson,
319 U.S. 266, 281.
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method of acquisition, which is not familiar to the laws of some
states, is called inverse condemnation. This is likewise an exercise of the power of eminent domain, but it is done without affirmative legal proceedings. It is outside the scope of this paper
to examine the ramifications of that form of acquisition in detail. It happens to be exactly the kind of acquisition which was
involved in the Causby case. Inverse condemnation occurs when
the Government intentionally and physically appropriates private
property to its own use for an authorized federal purpose. This
appropriation is a taking in the constitutional sense just as much
as the taking which results from a condemnation proceeding. The
time of the taking by inverse condemnation, generally, is the time
of the first substantial invasion of the private property.37 The
remedy of the landowner is by an action for compensation under
the Tucker Act.38 In a negotiated transaction the interest which
the Government acquires is, of course, the precise interest described in the contract of the parties. In a condemnation proceeding the just compensation must be limited to the exact estate
condemned, for the Government acquires and must pay only for
what is expressly taken. 39 The same concept is also present in
the cases of inverse condemnation.40 This is illustrated by the
fact that in the Causby case the Supreme Court considered the
findings of fact of the Court of Claims insufficient as to the accurate description of the easement taken by the Government and
remanded the case to the Court of Claims to make such necessary
findings.
Another essential point to remember is that a suit against
the Government under the Tucker Act may be commenced only
within six years after the cause of action accrues. 41 If someone
has purchased land after the easement has already been imposed
by the process of inverse condemnation, the title which the purchaser acquires is, of course, just as much subject to the easement-12 as it would be subject to any prescriptive easement, the
extent of which could be ascertained by reasonable examination
37 United States vs. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748.
3828 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1346(a)(2), as to United States District Courts;
and Sec. 1491. as to Court of Claims.
39 Karlson vs. United States, 82 F.2d 330, 335-6 (C.A. 8, 1936) (affirmed
on other points, Olsen vs. United States, 292 U.S. 246); United States
vs. 2,648.31 Ac. of Land, etc., 218 F.2d 518 (C.A. 4, 1955).
40 United States vs. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328-9.
n 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2501. Cause of action accrues when "situation becomes stabilized," United States vs. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 7 45, 7 49.
42 Cf. Smithdeal vs. American Air Lines, 80 F.Supp. 233 (N.D. Tex ..
1948).
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of the premises at the time of the purchase even though there may
be no evidence. of ft in the abstract or the record.
Finally, we should give some consideration to the basis for
and elements of evaluation of the easement, which is now commonly known as an avigation easement. The general rule is exactly the same as applies to the valuation of any kind of easement.
The measure of just compensation is the amount by which the
fair market value of the property is diminished as a direct result
of the imposition of the easement.43 It is simply an application
of the familiar "before and after" principle. An extreme case
could be imagined in which the value of land might be totally
destroyed, and in such case the value of the easement would be
the same as the fee. 44 At the other e:ll..-treme it is easily possible
that the value of the easement may be little more than nominal.
In cases of inverse condemnation the same facts which would result in a conclusion that there was only nominal value to a socalled easement would probably require the conclusion that there
had, in fact, been no taking at all. While it is important to keep
separate the legal principles of taking on the one hand and the
rules for valuation on the other hand, it is nevertheless true that
both determinations will be governed by the cumulative result of
most of the same factors.
There are well documented studies45 showing that generally
the establishment of an airport enhances rather than decreases
the land value in its vicinity, even in the approach zones. The
pattern for the development of areas in the vicinity of numerous
airports has been historically similar. Airport sites are generally
selected in relatively undeveloped areas where land is rather
cheap, at least until people know that Uncle Sam wants it, and
there are few obstructions to the natural approaches to the runways. Access roads and other public utilities are made available
primarily for the airport. The airport and its activities attract
people-the general public and the workers who require homes
close to their jobs. Land developers see an opportunity to develop
at a profit the surrounding land where utilities are already available. All of this generally results in an enhancement of land
values in the airport vicinity. The historical pattern indicates
43 United States vs. Causby, supra; United States vs. 2648.31 Acres etc.,
supra; United States vs. 26.07 Ac. of Land, etc., 126 F.Supp. 374 (E.D.
N.Y., 1954).
44 The Causby opinion proceeds from exactly this premise.
45 Walther, "The Impact of l\Iunicipal Airports on the l\Iarket Value of
Real Estate in the Adjacent Areas," XXII The Appraisal Journal, 15 fo
25 (January 1954).
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that people adjust very readily to the seeming nuisances of airplane operations. Mere proximity of property to an airport, without more, does not justify a conclusion that there has been a
taking, since damage due solely to proximity is common to the
public at large and any difference in the amount of damage is
one of degree only.46 In valuing the easement, if it is determined
that one has been taken, there must be excluded from consideration all matters which are conjectural, speculative, remote, fanciful or imaginary.
The highest and best use to which the land and superjacent
airspace may be adapted may be considered, but only when the
prospective use is reasonably probable, as distinguished from being
merely possible.47 This will depend primarily upon the character
and location of the land, the existing development of the neighborhood, the market for comparable land, the existence of zoning
regulations or building restrictions limiting the use of the land
or the height of structures on it. From data readily available to
appraisers, the elevation of the path of glide over each property
should be definitely ascertained. The glide-angle plane does not
represent the actual line of flight but is the minimum elevation
of the approach zones including the allowance of a safety factor.
Generally, in military operations this minimum glide-angle plane
commences at ground zero at least 1000 feet from the end of the
runway and rises one foot vertically to every fifty feet horizontally.
The easements, no matter how acquired or imposed, include
the right to clear physical obstacles and to prohibit the erection
of structures which would extend above the glide-angle plane at
any given point. When it is necessary to remove or reduce the
height of an obstruction as, for example, a smokestack, the necessary cost of the alteration may be the measure of compensation to
the extent that the alteration will diminish the amount of damages.48
Some journal writers have asserted,49 incorrectly, I think,
4G Richards vs. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 554; Thompson
vs. Kimball, 16.S F.2d 677, 681; United States vs. 357.25 Ac. etc., 55
F.Supp. 461 (W.D. La.).
'17 Olson vs. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255-6 (1934).
48 Cf. Porrata vs. United States, 158 F.2d 788 (C.A. 1, 1947), that willing buyer would consider availability of substitute loading station. And
see, Gohman vs. City of St. Bernard, 146 N.E. 291, 299 (Ohio, 1924);
Hartshorn vs. County of Worcester, 113 Mass. 111, 114; Baltimore Steam
Packet Co. vs. United States, 81 F.Supp. 707, 710.
4!1 E.g., Howard, "Valuation of an Avigation Easement," XXII The App1·aisal Journal, 336 (July 1954).
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that avigation easements have nothing to do with noise, vibration or glare of light. How such an assertion could be reconciled
with the precise facts of the Causby case, I am at a loss to understand. I think it is unquestionably clear that these factors do, in
appropriate cases, enter into the valuation problem in precisely
the same way that they are factors in determining whether there
has been a taking, no more and no less. It is essential to repeat,
however, that in the modern age a landowner has no vested right
to freedom from annoyance, inconvenience, or even discomfort.
For such factors to be considered in valuation, their effect must
be such as would be harmful or dangerous to the health and comfort of reasonable people of ordinary sensibilities who can usually
adjust themselves to the conditions of the locality.50
Such intangible factors as fear of danger or interference
with television are, I think, beyond the limits of reasonable consideration. Statistically, aerial navigation is demonstrably safe,
and danger to persons on the ground is so remote that an assertion of fear is fanciful. 51 Even bicycles kill more innocent bystanders than do airplanes.
These, then, are a few of the real property aspects of avigation. The entire subject is new enough that its rapid development is certain to command the increasing attention of both the
bar and the bench as the line between the rights of landowners
and the rights of airspace navigation becomes more clearly defined. None of such cases may be on your desk today; but do
not be too sure that you may not have to grapple with one of
them tomorrow. Many of the general principles which we have
examined today are already sufficiently clear that there is little
excuse for some of the professional misunderstanding about them.
But even if the books already contained a thousand decisions on
the subject the individual case would necessarily depend on its
own facts. I am reminded of a recent news item to the effect
that the General Services Administration had granted the attorney general authority to buy a bull for one of the federal prison
farms without asking for competitive bids. An official of the
Prison Bureau explained that "it is awfully hard to write up
specifications for a bull."
oOSmith vs. New England Aircraft Co., 270 l\Iass. 511, 170 N.E. 385;
Hyde vs. Somerset Air Service, 61 Atl.2d 645 (N.J.); Antonik vs. Chamberlain, 78 N.E.2d 752 (Ohio); Thrasher vs. Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E.
817, 99 A.L.R. 158, 162.
;;1 "The Airport and Its Neighbors," Report of the President's Airport
Commission, 1952; "Accident Facts,'' National Safety Council, 1954.
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THE PROPOSED MODEL PROBATE CODE

By
Barton H. Kuhns

The Model Probate Code had its origin in a series of articles
published .in 1939 and 1940 by Professor Thomas E. Atkinson,
who then taught wills at the University of Missouri. The final
article by Professor Atkinson, ·which was published in the February, 1940, issue of the Journal of the American Judicature Society,
was entitled "Wanted-A Model Probate Code." This suggestion was taken up by the Probate Division of the section on Real
Property, Probate and Trust Law of the American Bar Association, the chairman of which division, incidentally, at that time,
was our fellow lawyer, Fred Hanson, of McCook.
Professor Atkinson wrote his article in a background of a
movement for reform of our probate law. During the 1930's a
number of jurisdictions had adopted new probate codes, among
them being Minnesota in 1935 and Michigan in 1939. Other jurisdictions were studying reforms in their probate laws, and it
is fair to say that in quite a number of states there was general
dissatisfaction with much of the statutory law pertaining to probate matters.
A special committee of the Probate Law Division of the Real
Property section of the American Bar Association was appointed
at the 1940 annual meeting of the Association for the purpose of
making further study of the suggestion for a model probate code.
Considerable progress was made by the committee between
the 1940 and 1941 annual meetings of the American Bar Association, and at the 1941 annual meeting held in Indianapolis the desirability and the feasibility of a model probate code had become
apparent. The general topics to be covered by such a code and
the general plan or arrangement of the code had been developed.
Many of the section titles of the Model Probate Code in its final
form came directly from topics suggested by that committee.
It had also become apparent by 1941 that the task of actually drafting such a model probate code was one which was too
tremendous for a committee of a section of the American Bar
Association composed of busy lawyers serving on a voluntary
basis. Fortunately about that time the University of Michigan
Law School came to the rescue, and in 1942 the actual drafting
of the code became a research project of the Research Department
of the University of Michigan Law School.
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The preparation of the code was in charge of Professor Lewis
1\:1. Symes, who was relieved of part of his teaching duties for
this purpose and who was ably assisted by Professor Atkinson,
who has since become a professor of wills at the New York University Law School, and Mr. Paul Bayse, then a research assistant and now of San Francisco. Their work not only included the
drafting of the proposed model probate code, but the actual drafting work was preceded by extensive research into the many problems suggested by the variety of statutory provisions in the probate laws of the different states. Not only the statutory la-w
but the case law and the practical workings of the probate law
in the various jurisdictions were included in the research project.
It required approximately five years to complete the work on
the Model Probate Code, and the result is a code in five parts
which are divided into these subject matters:
I. General Provisions.
II. Intestate Succession and Wills.
III. Administration of Decedents' Estates.
IV. Guardianship.
V. Ancillary Administration.

The suggestion of a model probate code was not just an
academic idea. There has been a continuing movement for probate reform in many of our states. Some jurisdictions have
adopted entirely new probate codes. Others have been making
piecemeal changes in their probate laws. The last session of the
Texas legislature adopted an entirely new probate code. Even in
Nebraska, where I suspect that many lawyers are of the impression that we have not substantially changed our probate law for
many decades, there have been since 1943 more than twenty
amendments made to sections of our Chapter 30 dealing with decedents' estates up to the time of our 1955 legislative session. And
this figure, of course, does not take into account the many bills
introduced but not enacted by our legislature. The e:x'"tent of the
movement varies in different states, but I believe it is safe to say
that there are only a limited number of states where it can be
said that there is complete satisfaction by the profession with all
the provisions of the existing probate la\v.
I want to emphasize that the Model Probate Code is what it
is described to be; namely, a model act as distinguished from a
uniform act. This distinction is of considerable importance, in
that in using the code as a guide it should be clearly understood
that it was never intended that all states should adopt it without
change. It is strictly a model and was so intended. Uniform
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acts are promulgated on subject matters where it is felt that uniformity of the law is necessary or desirable. Uniform laws fail
in their complete accomplishment of purpose to the extent to
which an entire uniform act is not adopted in any given state.
A model act, being more in the nature of a guide, may tend in
some degree to promote uniformity of legislation, but the principal purpose of a model act is to set forth an example of a potential code or act without the necessary thought that uniformity of
its adoption is essential or desirable. It is rather the thought
that a model act in whole or in part may serve as a useful suggestive guide to the enactment of legislation on the subject matter.
Contrary to a general impression, the Model Probate Code as
such is not a product of the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws; however, there is embodied in the code a
number of uniform acts, some very short and some very more
lengthy. These include uniform acts on the subject matter of
Execution of Wills, Secured Creditors' Dividends in Liquidation
Proceedings, and also ·the Uniform Veteran's Guardianship Act.
In addition, the part of the code dealing with ancillary administration is composed primarily of uniform acts in this field, including
the Uniform Powers of Foreign Representatives Act and the Uniform Ancillary Administration of Estates Act.
These uniform acts, of course, should be adopted without
change, and, as a matter of fact, they can be lifted out of the
Model Probate Code and enacted in any jurisdiction as a separate
item of legislation on the particular subject matter involved.
I think it is rather important to understand that to take advantage of the Model Probate Code it is not necessary that all of
the probate laws of the state should be repealed and supplanted
by the Model Probate Code. It is one of the objectives of the
code that the more desirable provisions may be removed from it
and enacted in states which wish to adopt those provisions, without necessarily abandoning all existing law on the subject matter
where that law has proved satisfactory. In only a very few
states, of which Arkansas is an example, has the legislature seen
fit to supplant all existing probate law with the Model Probate
Code. I think it is likely, for example, that in Nebraska there
would be a reluctance to change the established and accepted plan
of intestate succession as far as concerns closely related heirs.
To illustrate, under the Model Probate Code the surviving spouse
is entitled to one-half of the estate regardless of the number of
issue. It seems· to me that it would be a very substantial, and
perhaps unwarranted, change in. our probate law to attempt to
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alter our accepted plan of intestate succession, so that the surviving spouse would receive one-half where there is more than one
child. Likewise, in procedure for the probate of wills and the
appointment of personal representatives, the practice of the various states is well established. In some states the will is offered
for probate and there is a publication, usually of three or fonr
weeks, before a hearing is had on the probate of the will, after
which the executor or administrator is appointed and notice to
creditors is then given. In other states, and this is the plan of the
Model Probate Code, the will is proved as the initial step in the
probate proceedings, and the personal representative then gives
notice of his appointment combined with a notice to creditors.
Under this procedure the period of administration can be shortened. Of course under this procedure the period within which a
contest can be made is usually longer than in jurisdictions where
the objections must be filed prior to a decree admitting the will
to probate. Unless there is substantial objection to the length of
time required for the administration of estates in those jurisdictions which follow the plan of giving notice before the probate,
the probabilities are that the practice is so well established that
if reasonably acceptable there is no particular point in recommending change.
Then, too, in some states there are constitutional provisions
with respect to the establishment of the probate court, the qualifications of its judges, and even its jurisdiction, which might
render unconstitutional some of the provisions of Part I of the
Model Probate Code under the heading of General Provisions.
Unless the dissatisfaction with existing probate laws is so
substantial that the Bar is clamoring for a complete reform of
the probate laws, the Model Probate Code should be used as a
reference and a guide whenever reform is felt desirable in any
particular area of probate law. It would be desirable if there
could be prepared a section-by-section comparison of our existing
probate laws and the recommendations of the Model Probate Code.
The very making of this section-by-section comparison might reveal undesirable features of existing law, but whether that should
be the case or not, the comparison would then be available in the
event that any suggestions are made to change any particular
section or sections of our existing statutes. Occasionally some
isolated section of our probate statutes is amended simply because
one lawyer or a very small group of lawyers may have encountered
a particular problem involving that section, and the proposed
amendment comes before the legislature without a full study of
all the ramifications which the amendment may involve. A more
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intelligent appraisal of the desirability of a proposed amendment
could be made if such a comparison were available. Many sections
of the Model Probate Code can be isolated from other sections
and taken over as an improvement of one particular phase of the
probate laws. Certainly it is not an indictment of the Model
Probate Code to say that it should not be approached with an attitude of take it all or leave it all alone.
Let me cite some instances where helpful suggestions might
be obtained from the study of the Model Probate Code.
As you know, our Statute, Section 30-111, provides that
"Kindred of the half blood shall inherit equally with those of the
whole blood, in the same degree, unless the inheritance came to
the intestate by descent, devise or gift of some one of his ancestors, in which case all those who are not of the blood of such
ancestor shall be excluded from such inheritance." Thus the way
in which the intestate acquires the property makes a difference
in the manner of its descent. This presents extremely difficult
problems in cases where there has been commingling of inherited
and non-inherited property, and involves the necessity of having
to trace the source of particular property. The Model Probate
Code simply provides that "Kindred of the half blood shall inherit the same share which they would have inherited if they
had been of the whole blood."
In Nebraska illegitimate children are not allowed to claim,
by right of representation of either their father or mother, any
part of the estate of the father's or mother's kindred unless the
parents have married and had other children and unless the
father, after such marriage, shall have acknowledged the child in
writing before a witness, or adopted the child. See Section 30-109.
The Model Probate Code simply provides that the illegitimate
child will be treated as the legitimate child of the mother for
purposes of inheritance to, through and from such child, and that
if the parents marry the child is treated as the legitimate child
of both.
With reference to questions of inheritance in connection with
adopted children, our Statute, Section 43-110, provides that "After
a decree of adoption is entered, the usual relation of parent and
child and all the rights, duties and other legal consequences of
the natural relation of child and parent shall thereafter exist
between such adopted child and the person or persons adopting
such child and his, her, or their kindred." Our statute is silent on
the effect of the adoption upon the rights of inheritance between
the adopted child and his natural parents. The Model Probate
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Code provides that "An adopted child is treated as though he were
the natural child of his adopting parents for purposes of inheritance to, through and from such child, and for purposes of intestate succession, an adopted child ceases to be treated as a child of
his natural parents."
The law with respect to advancements illustrates another area
wherein the Model Probate Code might profitably be studied. Our
law with respect to advancements seems to be confined to an
advancement "to any child or other lineal descendant." (See Section 30-112.) Under the Model Probate Code an advancement "to
any person who would be entitled to inherit if the intestate had
died at the time of making the advancement" is counted toward
the advancee's intestate share. The code contains a further provision whereby if the advancee dies before the intestate, the advancement is taken into account in determining the share of a
lineal descendant of the advancee, with a carefully phrased provision as to the proportioning of the advancement if the lineal
descendant's intestate share is less than that of the deceased advancee.
There is an interesting provision in the code whereby a surviving spouse has an alternative election to receive life income.
In the field of execution of wills, the Model Probate Code
offers valuable suggestions. It is, I believe, common practice to
have the testator sign in the presence of attesting witnesses who
sign in the presence of each other. Our statute (Section 30-204)
does not specifically provide that the witnesses must sign in the
presence of each other. The Model Probate Code does specifically
require that the witnesses and the testator all sign in each other's
presence.
Our statute (Section 30-201) makes "full age" one of the
requirements of testamentary capacity. The question of the age
at which a testator may be considered as sufficiently mature to
make a will received extensive study by the draftsmen of the
Model Probate Code. There is statutory authority in other jurisdictions for permitting minors to execute wills. Sometimes the
exception is founded on the minor being a member of the military
or naval forces of the United States. The possibility of persons
under twenty-one years of age making an appointment under a
general power of appointment is recognized in Section 2503 ( c)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, in connection with the
circumstances under which gifts to minors will not be considered
as gifts of a future interest. The draftsmen of the Model Pro-

296

NEBRASKA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION

bate Code have provided that any person of sound mind, eighteen
years of age or over, should be able to make a will.
On the question of revocation of a will by burning, tearing,
canceling or obliterating, with the intention of revoking it, our
statute (Section 30-209) provides that this shall be done by the
testator or by some person in the presence and by the direction
of the testator. Our statute does not provide that there must be
any other witness to the destruction of a will. Some states specifically require that a destruction at the direction of the testator
must be proved by at least two witnesses, and the Model Probate
Code likewise provides that there must be two witnesses to the
destruction.
In the field of administration of estates, there is a provision
of the Model Probate Code which specifically allocates those
powers which can be exercised only by two or more personal
representatives when there are two or more such personal representatives, as distinguished from those powers which can be exercised by any one of two or more personal representatives. The
powers the exercise of which requires joint action are as follows:
(1) instituting a suit, (2) employing an attorney, (3) carrying on
the business of the deceased, (4) voting corporate stock, and (5)
powers which a will specifically provides shall only be exercised
by all the personal representatives. Any other powers may, under
the provisions of the Model Probate Code, be exercised by any
one of two or more personal representatives.
There is a provision in the Model Probate Code for the appointment of a special administrator, without notice, even after
the appointment of an executor or a regular general administrator, without removing him, under which such a special administrator may perform duties with respect to specific property, or
perform other particular acts.
There are specific provisions in the Model Probate Code to
meet the situation where a will is discovered after administration
proceedings have been commenced. The code provides a fiveyear statute of limitations on the probate of a will.
In the area of guardianship law, helpful suggestions may be
found in provisions of the Model Probate Code for the appointment of a temporary guardian for an incompetent, pending completion of the formalities of the appointment of a regular guardian.
Provision is made for the filing of claims against a guardianship.
And there are specific provisions governing the procedure for the
termination of guardianships.

PROCEEDINGS, 1955

297

The foregoing comments upon the provisions of the Model
Probate Code could be expanded many fold. Other features which
I believe would be found especially interesting are those dealing
with the right of a surviving spouse to elect, the election procedure, and the provisions for waiver of the right to elect. There
is, for example, a provision of the code whereby the clerk of the
Probate Court gives notice to the surviving spouse of the right to
elect, a feature which does not exist in many states.
There are interesting provisions pertaining to the bonds of
fiduciaries. There is, for example, a section which states that
in the case of a corporate fiduciary a deposit of cash or collateral
with the state treasurer may be in lieu of any other bond. There
is also a provision that where one bond is signed and filed by two
or more personal representatives, no personal representative shall
be deemed a surety for another personal representative unless the
bond so provides.
Other subject matters such as pretermitted heirs, qualifications of witnesses to wills, the effect of a witness to a will being
interested, and just what makes an attesting witness interested,
all present considerations which might well be studied.
I trust that the foregoing discussion conveys the message
that there is at hand, completed within the last ten years, a probate code which in whole or in part can be used as a model for
purposes of studying probate reform, as well as for studying the
drafting language with respect to almost any particular detailed
item of proposed probate legislation. The code was authentically and carefully prepared with extensive research. Many of its
provisions have been well seasoned by virtue of adoption in different jurisdictions. The code should, I believe, be more widely
known by lawyers generally than is the case. If my remarks
will at least tend to prompt consideration of the provisions of the
Model Probate Code whenever general reform or even minor
tinkering with our probate statutes is contemplated, they will
have served some useful purpose.
REVIEW OF LEGISLATION AFFECTING REAL ESTATE,
PROBATE AND TRUSTS PASSED BY THE 1955 NEBRASKA
LEGISLATURE
By

Herman Ginsburg
The purpose of this review is to challenge the practitioners'
attention to legislation affecting the branches of law in which the
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members of this section are interested, which may be novel or
important. This review will not attempt to cover all of the details of the legislation affecting such subjects where it is felt
that such new legislation makes no material change in the existing law. Neither will this review attempt to cover in minute detail the provisions of each bill discussed, but will only touch upon
the major provisions of such legislation, leaving it to the individual practitioner to check carefully all of the details of such legislation.
With reference to decedents' estates, L.B. 171, it is of interest
and represents a further demonstration of the activities of the
bar in its service to the public in attempting to decrease the expense in connection with small estates. Many of you may recall
that in the 1953 legislature L.B. 143 was adopted, which is now
Sections 60-111.01, .02 and .03 of the 1953 supplement. This
bill when first proposed was intended to cover all estates where
the value of .the property of the decedent was less than $700.00;
however, as passed the bill was limited wholly to the matter of
the vesting of the title to motor vehicles. L. B. 171 of the 1955
legislature extends this Act to all of the personal estate of the
decedent. It provides that the surviving spouse or the distributees of the estate shall have a defeasible right to the personal
property thereof without the necessity for the appointment of an
administrator or the probate of a will, if the value of the entire
estate of the decedent, less liens and encumbrances, does not exceed the sum of $700.00. The 1953 Act provided that it was applicable if the value of the entire estate did not exceed $700.00,
and therefore it soon became evident that in cases where the
estate exceeded $700.00 in value in gross but there were liens and
encumbrances against the same so that the actual equity was less
than $700.00, the distributees or surviving spouse still could not
take advantage of the provisions of the Act. The 1955 Act eliminates this difficulty because the value of the estate is now determined after liens and encumbrances. Any person having possession of such personal property is required to make delivery thereof upon presentation of an affidavit setting forth the facts establishing the defeasible right of a surviving spouse or distributees
in accordance with the provisions prescribed by the Act. The
Act purports to relieve any such persons from liability for making
distribution of personal property in reliance upon such an affidavit.
It will be noted that there are a number of questions remaining unsettled by the provisions of this Act. Thus, the Act states
that the personal property is to be turned over to the surviving
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spouse or the distributees; it leaves unanswered the question of
what is to happen when both the surviving spouse and the distributees, as defined in the Act, may make adverse demands. Likewise, what is to happen when demand is made by one set of distributees claiming under a will, and by another set of distributees
who claim that the will is invalid? There is no provision in
the Act for the person having possession of the personal property to relieve himself of liability in case of such duplication or
uncertainty of claimants. Under the Act he can be sued by any
claimant, and thus be put to the expense and trouble of defending
himself against such suit and perhaps setting up at his own expense and cost the claims made by the adverse or conflicting
claimants. In the ordinary case the Act will serve a useful and
beneficial purpose in permitting prompt distribution of personal
property of small estates to persons entitled thereto without the
cost and expense of legal proceedings. However, the holder of
such property is not protected in the instances which I have mentioned, nor is there any protection for creditors where the distributees obtain possession under an affidavit which eventually is
demonstrated to be false.
L. B. 174 provides that in proceedings in the district court
for the sale of decedent's property to pay debts, etc., that the
court may determine whether or not the property was a homestead. This Act serves a most worthwhile purpose. Undoubtedly
all Nebraska practitioners are familiar with the fact that the
homestead cannot be sold by the administrator or executor under
the statutory provisions for sale for payment of debts and expenses, and matters of that kind. If an administrator's sale were
held and it was later established that the property constituted the
homestead of the deceased, the administrator's sale would be
wholly void. Yet there was no statutory provision for the determination of the question as to whether or not the property was a
homestead. L. B. 174 will now eliminate all questions and will
facilitate the examination and approval of titles, in that it provides that the petition for sale shall assert that the property is
not a homestead and that the court shall hold a hearing on that
issue and shall make a determination which will then be binding
upon everyone.
L. B. 269 provides procedure for dispensing with the administration in the event of the death of a person under guardianship or who has a conservator appointed over him. In such
cases, where the assets in the hands of the guardian or conservator do not exceed a sum sufficient for the payment of the expenses of the last illness and burial expenses not in excess of
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$350.00, and the costs, administration shall be dispensed with;
and the court, in the order closing the guardianship or conservator
proceedings, shall make final distribution of the property in the
hands of the guardian or conservator. This Act is an elaboration
and amplification of L. B. 12 of the 1951 legislature.
L. B. 93 repeals Sections 30-228.01 and 30-228.02 of the Revised Statutes, Supplement, 1953, and in effect re-enacts 30-228
as it existed in the 1943 Revised Statutes. It does provide, however, that the Act shall apply to devisees or legatees named as a
member of a class and who may have predeceased the testator,
leaving issue; and provides that when any devise or legacy shall
be made to any child or other relation to the testator, either by
name or by designation of such relationship, singly or as one of a
class, and the devisee or legatee shall die before the testator,
having issue who shall survive the testator, such issue shall take
the estate so given by the will in the same manner as the devisee
or legatee ·would have done if he had survived the testator, unless
a different disposition should be made or directed by the will. It
will be noted that this is almost identical with the language of
Section 30-228 of the 1943 Statutes, with the addition that it applies to the designation of a devisee or legatee as a member of
a class. The history of this Act is interesting. L. B. 331 of the
1951 legislative session repeals Section 30-228 of the Revised
Statutes of 1943 and provided in Section 1 that any devise of
real or personal property which shall be void or lapse shall become
a part of the residue and shall pass to the residuary devisees, unless the will makes a contrary disposition. Section 2 provides
that unless the will made a contrary disposition, \Vhen any adopted
child of the testator or blood relative within the fourth degree
is designated as a devisee and such person dies after the making
of the testamentary instrument and before the testator, leaving
issue surviving, or is dead at the time of the execution of the will,
leaving issue surviving and the fact of the death is unkown to
the testator, then such issue as represents a deceased devisee shall
be deemed substituted for him. In the 1955 legislature attention
was called to the fact that Section 2 of the 1951 Act referred
only to a devise. It was asserted that since a devise applied only
to real estate, the Act might not apply to bequests or legacies of
personal property. This argument was made even though Section 1 of the 1951 Act specifically referred to a devise of real or
personal property. It was suggested to the 1955 legislature that
Section 1 was already the law of the State of Nebraska, and that
Section 2 was uncertain and indefinite because of the use of the
term devise only, and therefore it was felt that the 1943 statutes
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amended to take care of class gifts would be sufficient. Accordingly, L. B. 93 repealed L. B. 331. It is submitted that the language of L. B. 93 is also indefinite and will raise a question as to
whether it is applicable to cases where the testator may have
made a devise or bequest to a person who was already dead at
the tim€ of the execution of the will, hut the death of such person
was unknown to the testator. A strict grammatical reading of L.
B. 93 would lead to the interpretation that it does not apply to
such cases. On the other hand, L. B. 331 of the 1951 legislature
did provide for such cases. It is submitted that it would have
been preferable to simply have amended Section 2 of the 1951
Act to use the word "devise or legacy" if there was any question
about the meaning of said section.
In the field of trust law, L. B. 315 specifies the forms and
kinds of investments lawful for trust funds. The provisions of
this Act are so detailed and comprehensive that it is impossible
in a review of this kind to give a full, detailed analysis thereof.
It suffices to say that every la-wyer who advises trustees, guardians, executors, administrators, and other fiduciaries must
thoroughly familiarize himself with the provisions of this Act.
A significant change made in L. B. 315 is the specific provision
that it shall not apply to any incorporated religious, charitable or
eelemosynary institution or corporation except to the extent that
any such institution or corporation may be named as specific
trustee under a will or other trust instruments.
By a series of bills dealing with the subject of oil and gas,
the legislature made provision for the authority and power of
trustees in such matters. These are L. B. 36, L. B. 61, L. B. 62
and L. B. 59. I shall not attempt to review all of these bills but
simply call attention to the fact that they all deal with the power
and authority of trustees relative to contracts with pipeline companies and the granting of easements therefor, and trustees for
oil and gas leases and provisions for obtaining the authority to
enter into such leases. L. B. 62 provides for the appointment of
trustees to represent and take care of the interests of contingent
remainder men for the purpose of leasing land or entering into
oil and gas developments. The bills deal not only with trustees
but also with similar powers and authorities for administrators,
executors, guardians and other fidicuiaries.
In the field of real property law, the 1955 legislature has
adopted novel and significant changes. Particularly interesting
in the light of the presentation made at this meeting by the Honorable Perry W. Norton relating to air rights and navigation, we
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find that the 1955 legislature by L. B. 541 made specific provisions limiting the rights of the owner of the soil insofar as the
rights of aerial navigation are concerned. Section 1 of this Act
declares that there exists in behalf of the citizens of the United
States a public right of freedom of transit in air commerce through
the airspace of the State of Nebraska, and that any obstruction
to air navigation interfering therewith is dangerous to life and
property, and that the public health, safety and welfare require
that the erection and maintenance of obstructions to air navigation be regulated and controlled. By this Act the legislature has
placed and recognized limits to the old common-law right of the
owner of the soil to control the airspace above his land. Section
3 of the Act limits the height of any structure within the State
of Nebraska to not exceed 400 feet above the surface of the
ground unless a permit in writing shall have first been obtained
from the Department of Aeronautics; and no such permit will be
granted which will constitute a hazard to air navigation or will
interfere unduly with public right of freedom of transit in commerce through the airspace affected thereby. Section 7 also makes
provision for a requirement for the owner of the soil to mark and
light all structures which are located outside corporate limits and
which exceed 150 feet in height and all structures within corporate limits which exceed a height of 500 feet. Any structure
erected in violation of the Act is declared to be a nuisance and
may be removed on 5 days' notice.
It may be of interest to note that as first proposed the Act
contained a provision for graduated heights and structures depending upon the distance of the location thereof from the existing airports. Thus ground immediately adjacent to an airport
might be prohibited from having any structure thereon whatever.
While the Act as passed was not this drastic, it is interesting to
note that now the legislature has recognized that the right of
ownership of the grounds is subject to the right of air transportation, and the legislature may from time to time hereafter further
limit and prescribe the rights of the owner of the fee above
ground. It will be interesting to observe in the future which will
be given preference, the right of aerial navigation or the right
of the owner of the soil to use it as he may desire. Eventually
some reconciliation is going to have to be made between these
two interests, since it is quite apparent that they can, and in
many instances will, conflict. It may very well be that the owner
of land immediately adjacent to an airport, if he erects any structures thereon, may create a hazard to air navigation; and yet, on
the other hand, the owner of such land may have to erect struc-
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tures therein in order to make full use of his investments or his
ownership. At some point these two interests will clash, and one
or the other will have to give way. As of 1955, the legislature
has determined that the rights of the owner of the soil do not
interfere with freedom of aerial navigation where the structure
does not exceed 400 feet in height in a mu..'11.icipality or 150 feet
in height outside of corporate limits. Only the future can foretell what the ultimate resolution will be.
L. B. 127 grants to foreign corporations, incorporated under
the laws of the United States or the laws of any state of the
United States, the right to acquire and own oil and gas leases and
to acquire and own the fee or to lease for any period such real
estate as may be necessary for producing gas, oil or other hydrocarbon substances and of treating, processing, storage and disposal
thereof. This Act further provides that no corporation doing business in the state which owns or holds any real estate shall elect
aliens as members of its board of directors in a number sufficient
to constitute a majority of the board or elect aliens as its executive
officers or managers, or have a majority of its capital stock owned
by aliens. This Act is an extension of the rights of foreign corporations to own real estate in the State of Nebraska.
While not particularly in point so far as real estate law itself
is concerned, L.B. 230, I am sure, will be of interest to the members of this section. This bill provides for the allowances of
fees in partition proceedings. Heretofore it has been the law
that only the plaintiff's attorneys could be awarded any fee, and
then only in cases where the proceedings were amicable. This was
a highly technical rule laid down by the Supreme Court as to
when proceedings could be said to be amicable. While the court
held that where the proceedings were adversary no fee could be
allowed, yet there were few if any instances where the court ever
held such proceedings to be adversary. The case of Lor·enz vs.
Lorenz, 150 Neb. 20, is interesting on that point. In that case,
even though there was an argument over the respective interests
of the parties and the liens which existed thereon, the court nevertheless held that the proceedings were not adversary. It is also
true, on the other hand, that many practitioners have had the
experience of being required to appear in a partition proceeding
in behalf of certain parties named as defendants in order to set
up the defendants' rights and interests where the plaintiff's counsel failed to set forth properly the respective interests of the
parties. Thus it was in many instances necessary for the defendant in a partition action to procure his own counsel to protect
his own interests and naturally to pay his own counsel. At the

304

NEBRASKA ST ATE BAR ASSOCIATION

same time such defendant, who was compelled to employ an attorney to protect his interests because of the neglect or failure
of the plaintiff to properly plead the same, still had to pay his
portion and share of the attorney's fees. L.B. 230 takes care of
this situation. It provides that in all cases reasonable attorney
fees shall be taxed as costs, and that if the shares of the parties
have been properly pleaded and properly set forth such fees shall
be awarded entirely to plaintiff's counsel. However in the event
that the plaintiff's pleadings do not properly set forth the shares
of the parties and expenditures thereon, then the court may
order such fees to be divided among all of the attorneys of 1·ecord.
This bill should be of considerable value both to the public and
the bar and eliminate a troublesome situation in many partition
cases.
The title to L. B. 263 states that it is a bill for an act relating to decedents' estates. However, the bill really has nothing
whatever to do with estates, but attempts to establish a procedure
to determine title in certain cases. Normally all questions as to
title to real estate are to be determined by the district courts.
This Act purports to enable certain of such questions to be determined by the county court. The Act is intended to take care of
cases where the title is vested in a certain person subject to a
limitation over to the children or heirs of another person. Its
use can be illustrated by the following example : Assume a conveyance to A with remainder on the death of A to the children
or issue of A. A dies leaving no estate to be administered. How
are the persons who are to take the remainder to be determined?
L. B. 263 provides that in such case any person having an interest in the property may file a petition in the county court in
which the property is situated or in the county court of the county
in which the deceased resided at the time of his death, seeking
a determination of the time of death, who are the heirs at law,
devisees, legatees, or surviving issue, and their degree of kinship.
The statute then prescribes the procedure whereupon the county
court shall make such determination. Such decree of the county
court shall then be binding and conclusive upon all persons interested, including heirs at law, devisees, legatees or surviving
issue.
This statute must be considered in the light of the famous
Fisher vs. Sklenar case in 101 Neb. 553 wherein the Supreme
Court made it evident that the county court can act only in connection with the settlement of estates and said:
The object of a decree of distribution [in the county court] is
to determine to whom the estate of the deceased should be de-
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livered. Neither adverse claims nor title to the property can be
litigated in the proceedings. The title itself may not be drawn
in question. No title passes by the decree to the persons named
as heirs.

Under the rule of this case, if there is no estate to be administered, it is, to say the least, hig:.h.ly questionable whether the c9m1ty
court can enter any sort of decree which will be of any utility.
Since the county court is precluded from acting where title to
real estate may be drawn in question and is only permitted to act
where a distribution of an estate is to be made, it is difficult to
see how the county court may be permitted to make a finding of
heirship where there is no estate to be distributed.
Also, it must be borne in mind that our Supreme Court has
said:
The district court has original jurisdiction to make a finding of
heirship where the question becomes material in a proceedings
of which such court has original jurisdiction.

Dennis vs. Omaha National Bank, 153 Neb. 865.
Since the district court is the court which has original jurisdiction over the questions of title to real estate, it would seem that
L. B. 263 is an attempt to deprive the district court of its original
jurisdiction to make a finding of heirship where the question is
material in a proceedings where the title to real estate may be
drawn in question.
Also, we are confronted with the situation that in many instances the heirs are to be determined not as of the date of the
death of the decedent but as of a much later date. (See In ?·e
Estate of Mooney, 131 Neb. 52, and the Dennis case hereinbefore
cited.) The act does not make it clear as to what date the county
court may make its determination. Section 1 provides that it is
to determine the time of death of the decedent and who the heirs
are. Is this determination to be made as of the date of the death
of the decedent or is it to be determined as of the date of the filing of the petition? If as of the date of the filing of the petition, there is all the more question as to the jurisdiction of the
county court, since it would be clearly evident that the finding was
being made in connection with the title to real estate and not for
any determination as of the date of the death of the testator.
It must be further remembered that our Supreme Court has said:
A county court in Nebraska . . . has no power to construe wills .
. . . The construction of the will by the probate court was not incident to distribution of the estate, but solely for the benefit of
the executor in advance of any distribution. Such a decree bound
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no one, but could only be for the guidance of the executor..
This jurisdiction was long committed to the doctrine that the
construction of the will in such a case in probate court is for the
benefit and information of the executor or administrator only. . . .
It adjudicates nothing beyond his rights and liabilities in the
execution of his office; controversies between adverse claimants
under the devise, or between the executor or administrator and
persons claiming adversely to the estate will not be affected
thereby.

In Jones vs. Shrigley 150 Neb. 137, the Supreme Court said:
The county court has jurisdiction to construe wills when necessary for the benefit of the executor in carrying out the terms of
the will, but it has no jurisdiction to construe wills to determine
rights of devisees or legatees as between themselves and has no
authority to bind the heirs, devisees or legatees by any construction.

Section 1 of L. B. 263 provides that if any person shall die
testate or intestate without leaving an estate to administer the
county court is vested with jurisdiction to determine who are the
heirs, devisees and legatees or issue of the decedent. Section 3
provides that the court shall make a decree determining who are
the devisees and legatees of the decedent and such further matters
as may be necessary for proper determination. Section 4 provides
that the decree of the county court shall be a final order and shall
be binding and conclusive upon all persons interested, including
devisees and legatees.
It would seem that this act is directly contrary to the holdings of our Supreme Court. Thus, supposing, in a case which
we have heretofore posed, there is a dispute between parties as
to who are the legatees or devisees entitled to take. By our constitution and the cases announced by our Supreme Court the
county court has no jurisdiction to make any determination. As
a matter of fact the decree of the county court in such case is a
nullity, and the district court does not apply any jurisdiction in
case of an appeal from the county court. (See Hahn vs. Verret,
143 Neb. 826.) Since the county court cannot make any determination as between adverse claimants, how can it make a determination under this statute which would settle any problems as
to the rightful takers under a will? Even in a case where there
is no dispute, an attorney could not pass a title based upon a decree of the county court because such decree would not be binding
upon any person who wanted to dispute the finding of the county
court.
Furthermore, the proceedings as to notice specified in this
Act would seem to be questionable. In case proceedings are in-
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stituted in the district court, service of summons must be had on
all available persons, and only when summons cannot be personally served can service be had by publication. Even where service
is permitted by publication, there are certain safeguards which
protect the rights of the defendant to notice. L. B. 263 simply
provides for the publication of a notice in the county where the
petition is filed, which may or may not be the county where the
interested parties live, or where the property is situated, and
even though the interested parties may be known to the petitioner,
the petitioner is under no requirement to serve notice upon them.
I personally cannot believe that the rights of any persons interested in real estate can be shut off by procedure of this kind.
It is quite evident that this legislation demonstrates again the
hazards of piecemeal legislation designed to take care of a particular problem, but is adopted in haste without considering the
implication and application of all the other rules of law which may
be affected. This bill demonstrates the need for study of the
effect of any particular legislation in the entire field of the law
before adopting such a bill to meet a particular problem. For
myself I cannot recognize the validity of any proceedings instituted under this act until such time as the Supreme Court shall
pass thereon.
Another departure in the law with which all the members of
this section should be familiar is L. B. 197. This also purports
to be, by its title, an act relating to decedents' estates. However,
it does not affect decedents' estates but affects the law of joint
tenancy. Simply stated, L. B. 197 provides that upon the death
of a joint owner of any real or personal property the surviving
joint owner shall be liable for the debts and obligations of the
deceased joint owner under the following conditions: (1) a creditor or personal representative of the deceased joint owner shall
institute an action in a court of competent jurisdiction within three
months after the death of the deceased joint owner against the
surviving joint owner, setting forth the claim; (2) the surviving
joint owner shall be liable to the creditors or personal representatives of the deceased to an amount equal to the value of the amount
contributed to the jointly owned property by the deceased joint
owner, for the payment of lawful debts and obligations of the
deceased, but subject to all homestead and legal exemptions in
the decedent's jointly owned property.
Apparently if a deceased joint owner contributed nothing to
the acquisition of the property, the creditors get nothing; on the
other hand, if the deceased joint owner contributed half of the
cost of the jointly owned property by advancing x dollars, the
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fact that such half\ interest may now be worth 2x dollars is immaterial, and all that the creditors can require is payment of the
original advancement of x dollars. Even this is subject to exemptions to which the decedent would have been entitled. It must be
emphasized that the obligation is personal against the survivor,
and there is no obligation as against the property itself. The
Act does not create a lien upon the title but imposes a personal
obligation wholly upon the surviving joint tenant to the extent
of the amount advanced by the decedent for the acquisition of
the joint property.
L. B. 197 further provides that in any action instituted thereunder it shall be necessary for the persons interested to allege
and prove that there is not sufficient other property standing in
the name of the deceased joint owner at the time of his death,
subject to the payment of his debts, provided that if no petition
to probate the estate of the deceased is filed within thirty days
from the date of his death, there shall be a presumption of lack of
such property.
The genesis of this bill is very interesting. The bill was
sponsored by parties who felt that joint tenancies were being made
use of to avoid the payment of debts. While there was no desire
to eliminate joint tenancies entirely as their legal estate in the
State of Nebraska, it apparently was felt by the proponents of
this bill that property in joint tenancy should, upon the death of
a joint tenant, be liable for the payment of his debts. The bill
as first introduced provided that:
all jointly held property . . . shall be liable for all the debts and
obligations of the joint owners, both their joint debts and !lbligations and their separate and individual debts and obligations.
That on the death of either or any of the joint owners, any and
all property that was held jointly at the time of his or her death
shall be liable for all the debts and obligations of the deceased.

There were a great number of objections to this bill as it
originally read, not only because of defects in draftsmanship and
the failure to coordinate with other rules of law also applicable
to these situations, but because of the fact that this bill would
tie up the title to joint properties so as to make the same wholly
unmerchantable. If the bill as originally drawn were adopted,
it would be manifestly impossible ever to pass title to jointly
owned property. This was recognized by the proponents, and
consequently various amendments thereto were proposed, including a proposal that only the share of the deceased joint owner
would be liable for the payment of debts. When it was pointed
out that upon the death of a joint owner there was no share, the
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bill was finally amended on the floor of the legislature to read in
its present form.
Since this bill does not directly affect the passage of title to
real estate but only lays down a rule as to personal liability, it
is not our position as lawyers to question the public policy which
may lie behind the legislative adoption of this statute. Whether
public policy requires the imposition of personal liability in such
case is a matter for the legislature as a solid spokesman for the
people to decide.
Certainly this bill requires interpretation by the court before
the full extent of its meaning and use can be determined. There
are many problems created by this bill which may possibly exceed any good to be accomplished thereby. It is, however, a bill
with which every member of this section should be familiar.
In conclusion I cannot refrain from making several observations as the result of my study of the new legislative enactments
above referred to and the process of their enactment. Apparently
the Bar Association has been quite active in proposing new legislation deemed to be beneficial and in the public interest. The Bar
has not, however, been as active in watching proposed legislation
to see whether such legislation is well thought out and will best
serve the public interest. It is submitted that in the case of both
L. B. 263 and L. B. 197, a study by a responsible committee of
the Bar Association would have been very helpful in enlightening
the members of the legislature as to what was being considered
by them. Both of these bills involve technical problems in fields
of law where the layman is not competent to judge. Yet the
legislature could receive no assistance in the consideration of
these bills from any authorized spokesman of the Bar Association
or of the section of the Bar interested therein. Only individual
lawYers who were willing to take the time and trouble to appear
could be heard, but such lawyers had no authority to speak on
behalf of the Bar. It is submitted that it would be very helpful
and a great public service in the future if at least this section
would appoint a legislative committee charged with the duty of
examining all proposed legislation affecting the fields of law in
which the members of this section are interested and, speaking on
behalf of this section, to enlighten the members of the legislature
and help guide it in these technical fields. The Bar should not
only inspire legislation, but should also act to endeavor to prevent undesirable legislation.
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EXECUTIVE RECORDS IN CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS-DUTY TO DISCLOSE-DUTY TO WITHHOLD
By

Roman L. Hruska
United States Senator for Nebraska
Powers of investigation by Congress are well established since
early years of the Republic. They include the right of subponea
to secure presence of witnesses for examination, the right to demand and enforce production of papers and records, and the right
to punish for contempt. Such powers are extensive. They are
indispensable to proper discha1·ge of legislative duties.
But precedents are neither clear nor certain when attempts
were made to project those powers into the area of the Txecutive
Department.
Frequent conflict has arisen when Congress or one of its
committees insisted upon the Executive Department's duty to disclose in order to subserve the legislative function. In resistance
to such demands, the Executive on occasion has cited its "duty
to withhold" information because of its confidential nature or because its disclosure would be incompatible with the public interest
or jeopardize the safety of the nation.
The purpose of this paper is to cite some of the instances of
such conflict and to consider some underlying principles.
The present administration first asserted its duty to withhold
testimony papers and records in May, 1954. The sub-committee
of the Senate Committee on Government Operations had called on
the Department of Defense to produce certain records of conversations and communications and of correspondence pertaining
to the controversy between Senator McCarthy and the Department of Army. President Eisenhower, in a letter dated May 17,
1954, instructed Secretary of Defense Wilson to instruct department employees in all appearances before the sub-committee regarding the subject inquiry that "they are not to testify to any
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such conversation, communications or to produce any such documents or reproductions. This principle must be maintained regardless of who would be benefited by such disclosure."
The President's reasons for giving such instructions will be
set out later in my remarks.
Immediately upon publication of the President's letter, a loud
chorus of anguished criticism was loosed. It was quite apparent,
however, that the controversial and emotional nature of the issue
at hand had much to do with many of the denunciations made.
The effort to make partisan political capital was also quite evident. It was a Congressional election year. Criticism leveled on
this latter basis was not very pursuasive. President Eisenhower's
predecessor had invoked "the duty to withhold" in about a dozen
major instances during his tenor as president.
Of course there are some who would not consider actions of
President Eisenhower's predecessor as valuable or even as very
pertinent precedent. Aside from this, however, as lawyers we
would do well to explore the historical origin and development of
this subject. In doing so, we find that it is based on impressive,
time-honored practice and on sound principle.
The very first instance dates back to 1792 under President
George Washington. A House resolution created a committee to
inquire into the "failure of the late expedition (against Indian uprising) under Major General St. Clair; ... and that said Committee be empowered to call for such persons, papers, and records
as may be necessary to assist their inquiries." (President and
Congress, Wilfred E. Binkley (1947) pp. 40, 44; Richardson's
Messages & Papers of the Presidents, Vol. I, pp. 194-6).
The House based its right to investigate on the control of
Congress over public money expenditures. This being the first
example of a demand on the Executive for papers, President Washington called his entire cabinet together to consider it. He stated
his wish that so far as it should become a precedent, this matter
should be rightly conducted.
Thomas Jefferson, then Secretary of State, reported the event.
The unanimous conclusion of Washington and his very notable and
distinguished cabinet members ·was :
First that the House was an inquest, and therefore might institute inquiries. Second that it might call for papers generally.
Third. that the Executive ought to communicate such papers as
the public good would permit, and ought to refuse those, the
disclosure of which would injure the public; consequently were
to exercise a discretion. . . .
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Washington applied the same rule in 1796 regarding certain
papers regarding treaty negotiations with Great Britian.
In 1807, President Thomas Jefferson asserted the same denial
to Congress in its demand for "any information in possession of
the Executive ..." in regard to the Aaron Burr conspiracy against
the United States. In that instance for the first time the "raw
file" nature of information at hand and means of gathering it
entered the picture. Jefferson's reply to Congress brought up to
date the news he had received regarding the illegal combination
of private individuals against the peace and safety of the Union.
He then pointed out that he had recently received a mass of data,
most of which had been obtained without the sanction of an oath
so as to constitute formal and legal evidence. He went on to say:
It is chiefly in the form of letters, often containing such a mixture

of rumors, conjectures, and suspicions as renders it difficult to
sift out the real facts and unadvisable to hazard more than general outlines, strengthened by concurrent information or the particular credibility of the relator. In this state of the evidence,
delivered sometimes too, under the restriction of private confidence, neither safety nor justice will permit exposing of names, except that of the principal actor, whose guilt is placed beyond
question.

(Richardson's Messages and Papers of the Presidents Vol.
Ip. 412.)
In 1835, President Jackson received a Senate resolution requesting him to communicate copies of charges which had been
made to the President against the official conduct of one Gideon
Fitz, late surveyor-general, which caused his removal from office.
The President declined to furnish the information, stating that in
his judgment the information related to subjects exclusively belonging to the Executive Department. The request, therefore,
encroached on the Constitutional powers of the Executive. In
his message, President Jackson referred to many previous similar
requests which he deemed unconstitutional demands by the Senate.
He went on to say:
Their continued repetition imposes on me, as representative and
trustee of the American people, the painful but imperious duty of
resisting to the utmost any further encroachment on the rights
of the Executive.

The President noted the fact that the Senate resolution had
been passed in executive session. From this he presumed that if
the requested information were communicated, it would be applied in secret session to the investigation of fraud in sale of
public lands. Thus, he stated, the citizen whose conduct the Sen-
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ate sought to impeach would lose one of his basic rights, namely,
that of a public investigation in the presence of his accusers and
of the witnesses against him. In addition, compliance with the
resolution would subject the motives of the President, in the case
of Mr. Fitz, to the review of the Senate when not setting as judges
on an impeachment; and even if such a consequence did not follow in the present case, the President feared that compliance by
the Executive might thereafter be quoted as a precedent to similar
and repeated applications.
Such a result, if acquiesced in, would ultimately subject the independent constitutional action of the Executive in a matter of
great National concernment to the domination and control of the
Senate. . . .

In 1843, President Tyler issued what is considered one of
the best reasoned precedents of a President's refusal to permit
the head of a department to disclose confidential information to
the House of Representatives. The House had demanded reports
relative to the affairs of the Cherokee Indians and to the frauds
which were alleged to have been practiced upon them.
The Secretary of War informed the House that negotiations
were then pending with the Indians for settlements of their
claims ; therefore publication of the report at that time would be
inconsistent with public interest. It was further reported, however that Lt. Col. Hitchcock, who had been charged to investigate
this matter, rendered a report containing information which had
been obtained by ex parte inquiries of persons whose statements
were without the sanction of an oath and which the persons implicated had had no opportunity to contradict or to explain. Promulgation of those statements at that time would be grossly unjust
to those persons and would defeat the object of inquiry.
The answer of the Secretary of War was not satisfactory to
the House committee, which claimed the right to demand from
the Executive and the heads of departments such information as
might be in their possession relating to subjects of the deliberations of the House.
President Tyler in his message to Congress vigorously asserted that the House of Representatives could not exercise a right
to call upon the Executive for information, even though it related
to a subject of the deliberation of the House, if by so doing it
attempted to interfere with the discretion of the Executive.
One of the most famous of Congressional investigations occurred during the Civil War. In 1861, by joint resolution of both
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Houses, a joint committee was appointed "to inquire into the conduct of the present war; that they have power to send for persons
and papers ..." This was the first instance of a joint Congressional committee. Apparently Congress did not trouble itself
with the reflection that inasmuch as the president is commanderin-chief of the Army, such interference constituted a serious infringement of the Executive prerogative. The vote of the Senate
on the resolution was 33 to 3. In the House there was not even
debate or division. The committee went about its duties vigilantly
during the entire course of the war. Its reports comprise four
large volumes. It has been said that this committee virtully took
over a partial control of Union operations. Practically no phase
of the conflict escaped the inquisitorial eye. Battles, disloyal employees, naval stations, surrenders at sea, military and naval supplies were investigated. War contracts were inspected with great
zeal. It has been further said that if legislative meddling could
be shown to have been damaging from a strategic standpoint, at
least Congress was able to legislate with adequate knowledge and
to hold officials in Washington and upon the line of battle to
strict accountability.
President Theodore Roosevelt, in 1909, was confronted with
a Senate resolution directing the attorney general to inform it
whether certain legal proceedings had been instituted against the
United States Steel Corporation, and if not, the reason for nonaction. The President replied, refusing to honor this request upon
the grounds that:
Heads of the Executive Department are subject to the Constitu~
tion, and to the laws passed by the Congress in pursuance of the
Constitution, and to the directions of the President of the United
States, but to no other direction whateve1·. ·

Thereupon the Senate summoned Herbert K. Smith, the head
of the Bureau of Corporations, and requested the papers and documents in question on penalty of imprisonment for contempt. President Theodore Roosevelt then took personal possession of all
the papers, informed the Senate Judiciary Committee of what he
had done, and stated that the only way the Senate could get them
was through his impeachment. He also explained that some of
the facts were given to the Government under the seal of secrecy
and cannot be divulged, "And I will see to it that the word of
this Government to the individual is kept sacred."
While the foregoing are some of the outstanding instances
in this field, almost every President encountered the same problem. There are well documented instances under Presidents Mon-
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roe, Polk, Fillmore, Buchanan, Grant, Hayes, Cleveland, Coolidge,
Hoover and :franklin D. Roosevelt, in addition to the presidents
already mentioned in this paper.
It has been demonstrated that in every case where a president has supported the refusal of a departm~nt head to testify,
the result w~s that the subject information was not furnishea.
"Public interest" was invariably given as one of the reasons.
One of the underlying principles evidencing itself throughout seems to be this : The president can withhold information
or direct its withholding whenever he finds that it is confidential
or that its disclosure would be incompatible with the public interest or endanger the safety of the nation.
Bases for this principle include the following: That officials
and employees of the Government must be candid in advising
with each other on official matters; that channels of information
sources must be kept open-confidences cannot be breached. Further, that the doctrine of separation of powers in our constitutional form of government precludes the exercise of arbitrary power
by any one branch. This is necessary if we are to be saved from
autocracy, whether it be executive or legislative in character.
The president is head of the Executive Department. He is given
certain powers. He may use discretion in exercising those powers.
His accountability is not to the Congress but to the country in
his political character, and to his own conscience.
This does not necessarily mean that the president is all-powerful and that the Congress is impotent. The Congress still has
power over legislation and over appropriations. Its investigations around the periphery of any given situation can be so searching and so relentless as to raise suspicions and pressures in public opinion which would make silence on the part of the Executive
Department impossible.
For over 150 years this basis of conduct has served well in
the relationship between Legislative and the Executive. It contains the elasticity of give and take. Very often the powerful personalities on either side may have much to do in determining its
exact course. The procedures and results under them have been
such as to withstand all attempts to clarifying legislation or Constitutional amendment.
What about court action or proceedings? It seems that whenever the aid of a court was sought to obtain information or papers
from a president or the head of departments, it has universally
been held that the president and his department have an uncon-
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trolled discretion to withhold the sought information and papers
in the public interest, that the courts will not interfere with the
exercise of that discretion, and that Congress has not the power
as one of the three great branches of the Government to subject
the Executive Branch to its will any more than the Executive
Branch may impose its unrestrained will upon the Congress.
SECTION ON TAXATION

Robert R. Moodie
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Vice Chairman
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HALE McCOWN: The first section of our program this afternoon is on social security provisions with particular reference to
the one affecting farmers. I have asked Tom Davies if he will
introduce our speaker.
THOMAS DAVIES: Our speaker today is district manager of
the Lincoln office of the Social Security Administration, and we
had him last year for the Institute of the Lincoln Bar Association
and he did a swell job for us.
I want to tell you a little bit about him. He was graduated
from the University of Minnesota in 1932 and received his degree
in electrical engineering. He was a Lieutenant Commander,
USNR, and was in the Pacific for approximately three years on
the cruiser "Denver." He was a radar technician and an assistant
gunnery officer.
I hope that he had a better reception in the Navy than I did.
When I went aboard my ship, the skipper said, "What are you?"
And I said, "I am a lawyer."
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He said, "My God, we need engineers and they send us lawyers!"
So I assume that Joe Sewell had a better reception in the
Navy than I did. He was assistant manager of the social security
office in Des Moines from 1940 to 1948, except for his Navy duty.
And it is a pleasure to present Joseph Sewell.
JOSEPH SEWELL:

Thank you, Tom.

Well, gentlemen, what I would like to do is just very briefly
review the Social Security Act, bringing it up to date, and then
spend most of my time talking about these new amendments with
particular reference to coverage of farmers.
The original Act went into effect on January 1, 1937. At
that time the only people who were covered were persons working
as employees in commerce or industry. Self-employed were not
covered, no sort of agricultural work was covered, no government employees or anything, just people working as employees in
commerce or industry.
So far as coverage is concerned, that Act remained in effect
substantially without change until January 1, 1951. As of that
date the Act was broadened to take in some of the previously excluded groups.
At that time the big group that was brought in was the selfemployed businessman in town. The self-employed fam1 operator
was still excluded. There were certain professional groups, professional self-employed groups, still excluded, among them, of
course, lawyers, doctors, dentists, and so forth.
In 1951 farm hands, not the farmer, but the farm hand, was
covered to a limited extent. Coverage was made available then
to state and local employees, and the State of Nebraska passed
the necessary enabling legislation bringing all state employees
under in 1951, and in turn making it optional with each political
subdivision.
And in the intervening four years since then, ninety-two out
of the ninety-three counties in the state have brought their employees under, and I would estimate that somewhere between eighty
and ninety percent of the larger municipalities and other political subdivisions-well, I shouldn't say "other"-very few townships, but eighty to ninety percent of the larger municipalities
have brought their employees under.
Coverage was also made available in 1951 to employees of
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non-profit organizations such as churches, schools, and so forth
on a basis that was optional with the employing entity, and at
least two-thirds of the employees.
As of January 1, 1955, there was another broadening of
<:overage. As of that date the self-employed farm operator came
under social security, and our office and every social security
office in the country that had anything to do with farmers has
been swamped with questions about this farm coverage.
I will just touch on a few of those questions, and perhaps you
will raise others in the question and answer period afterwards.
By far the commonest question that we have received is,
"Is it compulsory? Can I take it or leave it?" It is compulsory
on exactly the same basis as the program has been compulsory to
all other covered employees ever since it went into effect. Farmers are treated no differently than anybody else in that respect.
If the farmer is still operating his farm he is covered by social
security. If he is not operating a farm or if he is not in any
other kind of work covered by social security, he is not covered
even though he might want to be. It is compulsory in both directions.
Another question of course that most of you know the answer to is, "When do I pay my social security tax? What steps
do I need to take?"
Of course the first one is that the farmer should get a social
security account number if he does not already have one. If he
already has one he should get a duplicate if he has lost it, as most
of them probably have. We are very much concerned about the
farmers getting social security numbers and you can be a help
to us and to the farmer.
In the spring of 1952 when the first self-employment tax returns became due, I think on the afternoon of March 14, 1952,
we got about five thousand letters saying, "Please rush me a
social security number. I need it tomorrow morning." Of course
you cannot open that many letters in half a day, let alone issue
the numbers. So we are very anxious that those people, self-employed farmers, who are going to need numbers get their numbers now and not wait until that last minute.
For those of you who will be helping farmers prepare returns, be sure that that number gets on the return. We have had
untold numbers of self-employment tax returns where the fellow
had a number but they just failed to put the number on the re-
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turn. When a return comes in from John Smith without a social
security number, we have no way in the world of knowing what
John Smith that is. The only way we can keep track is by the
numbers.
So if you do help anyone prepare a return, be sure that his
number gets on that return. Another question is, "What type of
income is covered? What type is not covered?" Well, just roughly, the Act says that operating income, that is, the net profit from
the operation of the farm, is covered. The big exclusion in the
farm area is rental income. Rental income is not covered, regardless of whether it is received in the form of cash rental or
crop shares. By far the largest rental income or most common
type of rental income here in Nebraska is crop-share rental, not
very much cash.
For a long time we had a great deal of difficulty just determining what income was rental income and what was not. There
is a twilight zone in there where it is extremely difficult to make
a determination.
Regulations were recently approved, and thus they have the
status of administrative law more clearly defining what constitutes rental income.
There are four elements that we consider in deciding whether
or not the income is rental income.
First, where the landowner and the share farmer, sometimes
called the tenant and sometimes called a partner, regardless of
what he is called, the fellow who is doing the work, the landowner and the share farmer, agree that the share farmer will
produce a crop or livestock.
Second, on the landowner's farm, for which, third, the landowner will receive a share of the crop or livestock, or a share of
the proceeds of the crop or livestock.
And, fourth, where that share, the amount of the share, depends on the amount of crop or livestock produced.
If those four elements are all present, then the regulations
provide that the income is considered to be rental income regardless of what the farmer may choose to call the relationship.
He can call it a partnership or an employer-employee relationship or whatever he wants. If those four elements are met, the
share farmer agreeing to produce a crop on land owned by the
farmer, and they share that crop and the amount of the shares
depend on the amount of the crop, then it is considered to be
rental income and will not be covered.
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And another question that has been asked very often is,
"Does the farmer have to deduct all his operating expenses? Can
he, in order to boost up his net profit for social security purposes,
not consider his operating expenses but simply get credit for his
total receipts?"
And there again he must deduct all his operating expenses.
The Social Security Act defines net income as being the same as
it is so defined in the Internal Revenue Code, and of course the
Internal Revenue Code defines net income as total receipts or
gross income minus operating expenses. The Social Security Act
has exactly that same definition.
Another question that has been asked is, "Does the farm wife
need a social security number? They file joint income tax returns
as a general rule. Does that mean that she also needs a social
security number?" No, she does not. The mere fact that a husband and wife file joint returns does not in itself create a partnership, and the only situation in which the wife would need a
social security number is if she is actually a valid legal partner
in the operation of the farm. And for our purposes we will consider that the farmer himself is the primary operator of the farm.
The wife will qualify for social security benefits based on his
wage record without needing a social security number herself.
Whenever we get a pair of applications in the same envelope
from the same address and it appears that one of them is from
the farm wife, we will go ahead and issue the number to the
farmer and return her application along with a little note that
she will not need a number. However if she is actually working
in town or someplace where she needs a number, or if she is in
fact a legal partner, we just tell her to send it back to us, if she
will, for a number, but normally the wife will not need one.
As a matter of fact there has been a lot of misunderstanding
as to computation of benefits. People have gotten the impression,
I do not know where, that by splitting the income between the
two of them and each one qualifying on his own record they can
get larger social security benefits. Well, that is true only providing the entire net profit from the farm is somewhere in the
area of fifty-four hundred dollars a year. And if the income is
less than that and they split it behveen the husband and the wife,
each one will qualify for benefits only based on half of the income, and the combined benefits in that situation will not be as
large as if the farmer had shown the whole income and she qualified on his wage record. So in most cases they are going to injure themselves by splitting the earnings. And I say whether
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they are going to injure themselves or not, they should not split
the earnings unless the wife is actually a recognized legal partner in the operation of the farm.
I am going to pass on here to some of the other changes.
Back in 1951 farm employees were covered only to a very limited
extent. For all practical purposes the only farm hands that were
covered were those working on a full-time, year-around basis for
one employer. Starting this year, 1955, a farm hand is covered
if he works long enough so that he is paid cash wages of one
hundred dollars or more during the year by one employer. So
that is going to cover a lot more farm employees than were covered though 1954. If he goes out and maybe helps with the planting in the spring and earns fifty dollars, goes back and helps
with the harvesting in the fall from the employer and earns another fifty dollars, then that employer is required to deduct the
two percent social security tax, match it with two percent of his
own, and send it in at the end of the year just like the employer
in town. The only difference is that the employer in town sends
in the tax quarterly while the farmer only sends it in annually.
There has been only one large extension o:f coverage, and
that was the possibility of extension to teachers in the state. Under the 1951 amendments they were barred from coverage because they had their own existing retirement system. In the
fall of 1954 the Act was amended to permit them to come under
social security co-existent with their existing retirement system,
providing a referendum is held in which the majority of the
members of the existing system voted for coverage.
The legislature has passed the necessary enabling legislation for them to hold that referendum, and it is presently planned
that the referendum will be held sometime in December. If
the vote is in favor of social security coverage, the coverage will
be effective January 1, 1955.
There were some changes in the computation of benefits,
but I am going to pass over those very rapidly. Essentially the
method of computation is the same. It is based on the average
earnings over the entire period from January 1, 1957, or from
January 1, 1951, up to the date the computation is made, with one
change.
Under the new amendments we drop out the low four or
five years. We simply drop those out of the picture and base
it on the remaining high years. The primary reason for dropping or putting in that four or five year drop-out was simply for
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the benefit of those new groups who are coming under now for
the first time who have not had any coverage during the years
'51, '52, '53 and '54. Those drop-outs will permit them to get
rid of those zero years in there and thus their average will not
be hurt.
So for all practical purposes for these new groups who are
coming in now, 1955, for the first time, their benefit will be based
on their average earnings from January 1, 1955, up to the date
the computation is being made.
Benefits are substantially the same as they were beforebenefits to the survivors of a qualified wage-earner who dies,
that is, mostly the widow, children under eighteen, or to the widow
past sixty-five, or in the case of a single wage-earner benefits
to his dependent parents.
The retirement benefits, that is, the benefits to the living
retired wage-earner past age sixty-five, benefits to the wage-earner
himself, or to herself as the case may be, and to his wife, to his
children under eighteen. I did not mention in the survivors' side
of it a minute ago that in addition to the monthly survivors benefit there is also a lump sum benefit payment made in every case,
either to the surviving spouse or, in the case of a single wageearner, to the person who has paid his burial expenses.
The retirement test has been changed. I mentioned a moment
ago that the benefits were paid to the living and retired wageearner past sh..'ty-five. The newer benefits define retirement as
being earnings of twelve hundred dollars a year or less, or, putting it a little differently, a person can earn up to and including
twelve hundred dollars a year and still get the full amount of
his social security benefit for all twelve months of the year. If
he earns more than twelve hundred dollars, then he is considered
only partially retired and his benefits are suspended for some of
the months of the year, depending on how much more than twelve
hundred dollars he earns.
Well, I might as well get a little technical here, I guess. For
each additional eighty dollars of earnings above twelve hundred
dollars, he loses one month's benefit, because up to twelve hundred
dollars there's no benefits lost; he receives twelve payments. Up
to twelve hundred and eighty dollars he'd lose one month's benefit and receive eleven. Up to thirteen sixty he'd lose two and
receive ten, and so forth, until he gets up to two thousand eighty
dollars a year, and by that time all twelve payments have been
suspended.
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After age seventy-two there is no retirement test. A person
age seventy-two or over can draw the full amount of his benefits for all twelve months of the year, regardless of the amount
of his earnings. The only type of earnings that applies to that
twelve hundred dollars income or retirement test is earned income. There again, rental income, investment income, income
from another retirement system, life insurance proceeds, and so
forth have no application to that twelve-hundred;.dollar test. It
is only if the pei;son keeps on working and earning twelve hundred dollars or more a year that the retirement test is applied .
. I might also mention the disability freeze. That's something
that was new in 1955. The disability freeze does not provide for
the payment of any disability benefits to the person who is under
sixty-five. It does provide that if a person is totally and permanently disabled that he can freeze his status as of the date
his disability commenced. So that when he does reach sixty-five
at some date in the future he will get just as much benefits as
though he kept on working, as though he had not become disabled and kept on working at the same average earnings rate
that he had up to the time of his disability. It simply protects
his status at age sixty-five, but does not provide for any immediate cash benefits.
Now you folks are probably, in connection with that disability
freeze, in a position to be of great service to disabled persons,
particularly to persons who may have become disabled at some
time in the past. We have no way of knowing about them unless
somebody contacts and calls them to our attention. Many of them
are not aware of this disability freeze. They are not si:id;y-five
yet so they haven't made any application for benefits, or if they
did make inquiry at the time they became disabled we simply
had to tell them that there was no provision whatever for disability in the Act. That was true probably at the time we talked to
them, maybe three or four or five years ago. We had no way of
anticipating this change in the law.
Anyhow, they may not know about it and may have failed
to file an application for disability freeze. Those applications are
fully retroactive from the time they became disabled, providing
they get their application on file before July 1, 1957. If they
file their application after July 1, 1957, then it is retroactive
for not more than one year. So any person you know of who
has worked under social security for at least five years, and that
is a requirement, worked under social security for at least five
years and has become disabled sometime in the past, that person
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should be encouraged to contact his nearest social security office
to find out whether or not he might be eligible for a disability
freeze, and before July 1, 1957.
Most of you are probably aware of the fact that the veterans
of World War II or the post-World War II period received social
security credit for the period of their military service. The Act
just recently extended that: I think that under the old Act that
credit expires as of July 1, 1955. It has been extended to April
1, 1956. Why they selected that particular date, I will guess
with you. But anyhow, up until April 1, 1956, as the Act is now
in effect, veterans still receive credit for social security purposes from the military service.
Well, that's been a pretty fast go-over of what is actually
a pretty technical and complicated piece of legislation, and no
one knows it better than we do in those social security offices.
Now if you have a few question, I will be glad to answer them
as long as time will permit.
VOICE: With a farmer, that man owning the land, the tenant's feeding stock for him, both the landowner and the tenant
own the stock, is that an income or is that rent?
JOSEPH SEWELL: I will repeat the question for the benefit
of those of you who may not have heard it so you will know what
question I am answering here.
Landlord-tenant relationship in which the landlord and tenant own stock jointly, equal share. The tenant is feeding the
stock. What is the landlord's income, rental income or profit?
Going back to that regulation that I read a while ago, if the
tenant performs substantially all of the services in connection
with feeding and caring for that stock and the landlord performs
substantially none of the services as we interpret it, that would
constitute rental income.
Now if the landlord himself, owning fifty percent of the
stock, has fifty percent of the investment, he has fifty percent
of the risk of loss. If he actually performs a reasonable amount
of services, it would not have to be fifty percent of the services,
but if he actually performs a reasonable amount of physical services and participates in the management aspect of it, that is,
the determination of when to buy the stock, when to sell it, and
who to sell it to and so forth, the kind of stock to buy, I would
interpret him as being self-employed, and he would be covered
with respect to his share of the net profits from feeding the
stock, not from the rest of the farm, just the stock-feeding.

PROCEEDINGS, 1955

325

VOICE: Are you able to tell me why it is that the Social
Security Administration seems reluctant to deal with lawyers?
JOSEPH SEWELL:
to deal with lawyers.

Well, I did not know they were reluctant

VOICE: I have had several eases, and invariably I would
begin by writing the Social Security Administration, asking them
for blanks for a client of mine, usually a widow, whose husband's
estate I am probating. They will send the blanks directly to the
widow. The widow would then have to come down to my office
to have them made out. She does not know how to make them
out.
I will make them out and send them to your office with a
letter from my office, and if something is needed they will turn
around again and write the widow directly. They will never
correspond with me.
On one occasion that I can remember I sent a widow down
to the Grand Island office and told her to make application for
social security benefits. She went down there, and for some
reason, though I was thoroughly convinced in my own mind that
she had some benefits coming, they questioned her down there
and told her, "No, you do not have any benefits down there because your husband ·was not covered." I knew at the time that
her husband failed to file a tax report because he was convinced
that he did not make enough money. I checked into her income and
was in the process of sending in an amended return to Lincoln,
but they told the lady that because her husband was not covered
there was no sense in her signing an application.
Now I did not kno\Y that until approximately a year later
when I went down there, and then the question came up as to
when her benefits would start; were they to start the day I sent
her down there to sign the application or the date she actually
signed the application, a year later?
Now if the social security office had seen fit to talk to me,
we could have alleviated a lot of that.
JOSEPH SEWELL: Of course in the territory served by the
Lincoln office, and I think in most service offices, we have no
reluctance whatever to deal with attorneys.
Of course we are in a rather difficult position there. For instance, if some widow comes in and she does not say she has been
sent in by an attorney, we will question her: "Did your hus-
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band work in the kind of employment covered by social security,
or the kind of self-employment?"
"Yes, but he never earned enough to file a tax return. His
income was always less than four hundred dollars a year, and he
never filed any tax returns." And we will probably do the same
thing as the Grand Island office, and 'Ye will say if he was not
covered, there is no sense in filing an application. And unless
she tells us her whole story, that she has already gone to her attorney and he is in the process of preparing that return, and if
she does not tell us that, we would have no way of knowing that.
And as I say, it depends on the information that is given
to the field office at the time the application is made. We are not
in the business of making meaningless claims. If the person
comes in and says, "My husband never worked under social security," why, it seems futile to make application for benefits that
are not going to be paid.
And if she makes an application and says he worked under
social security benefits, we would certainly try to get the additional information.
Now when you write a letter to the social security office and
they answer directly to the claimant without going back through
your office, I will say I do not think it should be done. In my
own office, I hope it is never done that way. Any time we get
an inquiry from any attorney, we will answer the claimant through
the attorney.
VOICE: Well, it is very habitual at the Grand Island office.
VOICE: Omaha office too.
JOSEPH SEWELL: I say, if we are doing it, it is something
that we should straighten out.
VOICE: Well, I received the impression that the social security office thinks that lawyers are preying on these widows and
charging them huge amounts to get social security benefits. Actually I do not think I have ever charged a client of mine, and
I do a lot of work for them in obtaining social security reports.
If I could get a little cooperation out of them, I could get it done
a lot quicker and a lot sooner.
JOSEPH SEWELL: Where are you from?
VOICE: I am from Burwell, in the Grand Island area.
JOSEPH SEWELL: Sometime when you are down there in the
Grand Island area, why don't you stop in and visit with the manager in the Grand Island office about that problem.
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VOICE: It does not make any difference.
JOSEPH SEWELL: Of course I have no control. We serve
our territory and they serve theirs. We should all be doing it
on the same basis, but apparently we are not, and, I say, we should
be, and I hope we are not doing that in our territory. At least
we will do something about it if it is eaHed ta my attention.
Thank you.
HALE MCCOWN: I am sorry to shut off your questions here
so rapidly, but we are forced by the schedule this afternoon to
vacate for the Hoase of Delegates later on.
There will be a five-minute recess right now, and I would like
to have you all back promptly after five minutes so that we can
go ahead.
Mr. Sewell, I'm sure, will be glad to answer any individual
questions that you may have during this five minutes.
(Short recess at 2 :15 o'clock p. m.)
HALE MCCOWN: Gentlemen, if you will come to order we
will go ahead with the program for the afternoon, and which is
as you note from your program notes the panel discussion of
developments under the 1954 Revenue Code.
First, may I call your attention to the fact that the regular
13th annual Tax Institute \Yill be held again in December commencing the week of December 12th, starting Monday of that
week. It will be held as previously in two-day sessions, commencing at Scottsbluff the first two days, Kearney the second
two, and Omaha the last two. Laurens Williams and Bob Moodie
will both be with us again on that clinic. I am sure that all of
you will want to be here again for the regular December clinic.
The panel today, as I think probably most of you know from
the program, Mr. Mason on my left, Bob Denney to my right,
Jack North, the next gentleman over, and on the far right, Leo
Eisenstatt.
Now we have simply selected certain individual things and
individual topics which we thought might be of interest to all
of you. We are not going to attempt to follow any set routine
or any proposal or any specific set of subjects. It will be moving
from one to the other of the fellows on this panel.
At the close there will be time for questions. However if
something is not clear as we go along, please feel perfectly free
to ask for a clarification at that time. We have to be out b)·
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not later than 4 :15, if possible, and we will try and leave possibJy
fifteen or twenty minutes at the close for a question and answer
period.
First, I think that there has been considerable discussion
about provisions with respect to dependents on the new '54 code.
There have been some additional matters come out on that.
Bob Denney, would you comment on the specific provisions
with respect to dependents under the '54 code?
ROBERT DENNEY: yes, I will, Hale. I want to say this, that
there have been very few regulations issued with reference to
dependency, and this paper will primarily be concerned with a
review of the changes in the law with reference to dependents
from the '54 code and the '39 code. I would like to call to your
attention that effective for tax yea1·s begining after 1953 and
after, and ending after August 16, 1954, the internal revenue
code of 1954 created several special classes of dependents for
whom under certain conditions a taxpayer was entitled to a six
hundred dollar dependency deduction.
These included children, stepchildren and adopted children
under nineteen year of age or attending school. That seemed to
be one of the most import.ant.
And then, secondly, other individuals, including non-relatives
whose principal place of abode was the taxpayer's home. And,
third, mentally or physically disabled cousins receiving institutional care.
Now with reference to that first class of dependents, children
under nineteen and students, the income test, that is, the dependent's income must be less than six hundred dollars, is no longer
a prerequisite to qualifying for a dependent in these two situations, where the child is under nineteen or is attending school five
months or more according to the taxpayer's calendar year, is a
full-time student at a regular school or college, or is pursuing
full-time or on-the-farm training under the supervision of an
educational institution or state agency.
But we must keep in mind that the taxpayer must have contributed over one-half of the child's support. An example of this:
The total cost of supporting a son who is under nineteen years
of age or is attending school is twenty-four hundred dollars. The
son earns eleven hundred dollars by his own efforts, which he applies to his own support. The father contributes thirteen hundred
dollars, and of course the father's entitled to the exemption.
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And in determining with reference to the child in school, if
he earns a scholarship of five or six hundred dollars, Section
152 ( d) of the new code provides that a scholarship does not
count in figuring whether a parent contributed more than half the
child's support. A warning that some writers have given on
these tax matters : Attendance at night school while holding a
job is not considered full-time attendance.,
Another observation. Enrollment for part of a month constitutes enrollment for the full month. February through part of
June will qualify.
Now take the second one, other individuals including nonrelatives. You must assume the support and earnings tests are
niet and that the taxpayer is entitled to exemption for any individual making the taxpayer's home his principal place of abode
for the entire taxable year.
Temporary absence due to special circumstances will not disqualify, such as attendance at a boarding school or college or
hospitalization. This removes the inequities of the prior law, because now you can claim the dependency of a foster child or a
child awaiting adoption. And of course the cousins. That would
not happen often, but, assuming that the support and earnings
tests are met, a cousin of taxpayer can qualify as a dependent if
he receives institutional care by reason of mental or physical disability, and before receiving such care he or she was a member
of taxpayer's household.
Another important point under this dependency which I kno\\~
comes to all of you is the multiple support of dependents, sometimes called the multiple-support problem.
It often happens that two or more taxpayers contribute jointly to the support of a close relative or other person who could be
a dependent of any one of them. Who can claim the exemption?
If one contributes more than half the support, he and he alone
can claim the exemption. If no one contributes more than half
the support and they can all cooperate and agree, then one of
them can claim the exemption if he has contributed more than
ten percent of the dependent's support, and each other person who
has contributed to that support more than ten percent files a
written declaration as prescribed by the commissioner that he
will not claim the support.
For example, two sons contribute to their mother's support,
each son five hundred dollars. The mother spends seven hundred
dollars of her capital. Her income is less than sb~ hundred dol-
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lars. Either son may claim, provided the other son files a written
waiver. Or A, B, C and D contribute thirty, twenty, twenty-nine
and twenty-one percent respectively to support of their mother.
Each contributes over ten percent. Any one could claim dependency if all others execute a Form 2120 or a comparable instrument. But it would not be enough, for example, for either
A or D to claim the credit and the other execute the waiver, even
though between them they contribute over fifty percent of their
mother's support.
Now about the only other regulation that I'm aware of right
now with reference to individuals is this rounding-off regulation
with reference to the figuring of the tax. After you have added
up the gross income and subtracted your deductions, it's my understanding that under the new regulation you can take the nearest dollar-if it's below fifty cents drop down to the next dollar,
if above fifty cents to the higher dollar-and when you actually
arrive at the tax you can drop the cents off the tax itself, and of
course when the government pays a refund they can ignore the
cents when they make the refund.
HALE MCCOWN : As I recall too that election is made by putting on your return. You should probably check that regulation.
I would like to have Jack North, if he will, cover the changes
of the '54 code as made in the taxation of corporate acquisition
and disposition of property.
JOHN NORTH: Well, Hale, the general problem in connection
with corporations, with corporation sale or corporate acquisitions
of property, is simply this: A corporation may hold some property that it wants to sell, and the shareholders want to know
whether or not the corporation will recognize income upon sale
and whether that income when it is distributed to them will be
taxable to them.
Under the 1939 code the best way to make savings was to
have the corporation distribute the assets in liquidation and then
let the shareholders sell. That way they would incur a tax only
at the shareholder level and not a double tax, which would occur
when the corporation would sell, since we have a tax on the corporate income and then when a distribution is made to the shareholder he pays a second tax.
Naturally corporate shareholders decided that when they
would sell property they would use the first method, and this
presented a problem which was decided in Court Holding, and
that is, where a corporation solicits the sale and then prior to
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consummation of the sale distributes the corporate assets to the
shareholders, that the commissioner will be allowed to look through
the transaction and treat is as if the corporation made the sale,
tax the corporation on the income from the sale, and turn around
and tax the shareholders when the distribution is made.
So the shareholders then decided that the smart thing to do
would be to have the acquiring corporation just purchase their
stock, and in that way they would only recognize a capital gain
upon the sale of their stock and they'd get the same percentage of
the selling price that they would have had by reason of the distribution and liquidation.
Now this presents the problem on the other side of the table;
that is, whether or not the corporation that is going to acquire the
property wants to purchase personally all of the shares of stock
of the owning corporation, or whether that corporation wants to
purchase merely the asset.
Now a simple illustration would be a corporation that owns
an apartment building and wants to acquire another apartment
building. Should they buy all the stock of another corporation
owning the building, or should they buy outright from that corporation the apartment building?
If the corporation apartment building is worth seventy-five
thousand dollars, that will be the purchase price whether they
buy the building outright or whether they buy the stock. Now
the transfer of the corporation that owns the apartment building
may have a base of fifty thousand dollars, so the acquiring corporation will have this problem: If they invest seventy-five thousand dollars in the stock they acquire the apartment building, but
they'll acquire the apartment building at the basis that it has in
the hands of the transferor corporation, that is, at the lower
basis of fifty thousand dollars.
Now the commissioner, when the basis would be stepped up,
the commissioner would assert you should look through the transaction and treat the acquiring corporation as merely purchasing
the building, just actually reverse of the situation in Commission
vs. Court Holding.
And in the Kimball-Diamond case, the Supreme Court, the
Circuit Court of Appeals, went along with the commissioner, that
is, said that you could look through the step transaction and where
the acquiring corporation pays fifty thousand dollars for the
asset and seventy-five thousand dollars for the stock, you could
look through the transaction and say that that's the purchasing
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price of the asset rather than the purchasing price of the stock,
and they'll take that as a basis of the asset.
Now the 1954 code makes some rather significant changes in
application of Commission vs. Court Holding and the KimballDiamond case. The effects of the Court Holding case are eliminated; that is, if a corporation decides to sell property and makes
that sale as a part of liquidation, it doesn't make any difference
whether the corporation itself or the shareholders consume the
sale. There will only be a tax levy at the corporate level.
Now it is important to remember that, because when you're
on one side of the transaction or the other you can remember
that the buyer should be the one to determine the mode of the
transfer because the buyer is the only one that will be adversely
affected. tax-wise by the manner which the sale is made, because
under the 1954 Act, whether the shareholders make the sale or
the corporation makes the sale, the tax consequences will be the
same-that is, if it is consummated within the year period.
Now as to the Kimball-Diamond case, the 1954 code presents
this legislative clarification. If at least fifty percent of the acquired corporation's stock is purchased within a twelve-month
period and if the corporation is liquidated within two years thereafter, the basis of the assets received should not be the transferor's basis but the price paid for the stock. In other words,
saying that the purchasing corporation ·will take as its basis the
amount that it pays for the stock and not the basis that the
transfer or had.
Now many of you may have this problem in mind. Why is
it that the transferee corporation just could not liquidate the transferor corporation and then take the increased basis upon the recognition of its being in liquidation?
The reason for this is that when a corporation liquidated a
subsidiary that under the old Act and under the new with slight
modifications, the1·e was no gain or loss, and the corporation that
did the liquidating merely took the transferor's basis, that is, the
first corporation's basis.
The enactment as this automatic Kimball-Diamond rule posed
this problem. The Kimball-Diamond decision was favorable to
the government; that is, the taxpayer's basis, the acquiring corporation's basis was stepped down because he had paid less for the
stock than the transferor's basis. The commissioner after the
Kimball-Diamond rule tried to assert that it only applied where
the taxpayer's basis was stepped down; that it, where he paid
less for the stock than an amount equal to the transferor's basis.
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But the problem that arises under the 1954 Act is whether
that is exclusive; that is, supposing the taxpayer decides not to
comply with the provision, that is, not to complete the liquidation
within a two-year period as required. Then naturally if the
amount paid for the stock is less than the transferor's basis, the
acquiring corp-0raticn would not want to require liquidation, and
the questions is, can the commissioner come back then and say
that he will look at it as a stepped-down transaction and treat it
as a legal transaction?
Now I have covered that hurriedly, but I have given you
some idea of both aspects under the elimination of the Court Holding rule and the legislative adoption of the Kimball-Diamond rule.
HALE MCCOWN: Thank you, Jack.
There have been a number of changes, of course, in the state
gift-tax field. So far the regulations are not yet out.
John, would you cover briefly what we ought to be looking
for in those regulations when they come out.
JOHN C. MASON: There are a few areas in the gift and
estate tax sections of the new code in which there may be some
room for difference of interpretation of the Act. I will attempt
to go through just a few of those situations to call your attention
to what the Act might say and so that we may, when the regulations are issued, examine them and see just what position the
Treasury Department has taken.
The most important change in the estate tax law under the
1954 code was the elimination of the premium payment test in
determining whether proceeds of a life insurance policy are taxable to the estate of the insured at his death.
Section 204.2 provides specifically that the value of the gross
estate shall include the value of all the property to the extent of
the amount receivable by the executor-for example, as insurance
under policies on the life of the decedent-and also to the e:i..-tent
of the amount receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance
under policies on the life of the decedent with respect to which
the decedent possessed at his death any of the incidence of o·wnership, exercised alone or in conjunction with any other person.
The Section then goes on to define incident of ownership,
and including a reversionary interest, whether arising by the express terms of the policy or other instrument or by operation of
the law. Only if the value of the reversionary interest, however,
exceeded five percent of the value of the policy immediately before
the death of the decedent.
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Now the term "reversionary interest" is further specifically
defined to include the possibility that the policy or its proceeds
may return to the decedent or estate or may be subject to a power
of disposition by him.
The situation which usually comes to mind is the method of
taking advantage of this section of the code, is to have the insured make gifts of his insurance policies to his wife or children
or to have new policies taken out on the life of the insured by
the wife or children. By reason of the elimination of this premium payment test, the fact alone that the insured paid the premiums would not seem to make the policies taxable in his estate if
he did not possess any of the incidence of ownership of the policy
at the time of his death.
However, court questions arise at the interpretation of this
section with respect to what is an incident of ownership, and
that is the area in which you will be interested in seeing the
position which may be adopted by the Treasury Department. For
example, if a reversionary interest includes the possibility that
the policy or its proceeds may return to the decedent or his estate
or be subject to a power of disposition by him, does the possibility
that the insured may inherit from his wife who has been made
the owner of the policy, amount to a reversionary interest?
Tax lawyers generally, I have found by reading articles on
the subject, are quite interested in seeing what the regulations
may provide in connection with that particular problem.
There is also a question, a very incidental question perhaps,
as to whether it is possible that insurance policy in which a fractional interest may be owned by the decedent at his death would
be taxable entirely to his estate or only fractionally to the extent
that he had the fractional interest which might occur in some
situations.
There has been a change in the gift tax part of the law with
respect to gifts to minors. As you Jiecall, if a gift is not a future
interest, then the gift is subject to the annual three thousand
dollar exclusion in the donor's determination of gift taxes for
the year.
However there was a question under the old law as to whether
gifts in trust, for example, were future interests or not future
interests when the gifts were for children or the beneficiaries
were children.
Specific provisions have been made in the new code defining
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what interests will qualify and what interests will not qualify for,
as future interests, in that respect; and generally, if the gift
gives a present interest so that the principal and income can be
used by the child before the child becomes twenty-one, and if the
child should die before reaching twenty-one, if the proceeds would
be available to the child's estate or subject to a power of appointment by the child, then (I'm speaking generally now) the policy
would qualify for the annual exclusion-I don't mean the policythe gift would qualify and it would not be a future interest.
In interpreting this the statute says that the child must be
entitled to have the property go to his estate if he should die before twenty-one, or the property should be subject to a power of
appointment. Now there is the question in some people's minds
as to whether that's used in the disjunctive sense, that "or" that
I mentioned, so that a power of appointment alone would qualify
it or giving the property to the child's estate alone would qualify
it without the power of appointment, and we'll see what the
Treasury rules when the regulations are issued.
In the use of marital deduction under state tax law, there
have been a couple of changes. For example, primarily, I understand, for the benefit of this section of the country, or at least
agricultural areas of the country, it is now possible to qualify a
gift of a life estate for the marital deduction so that a husband
can leave a life interest in a property to his widow if he also
leaves her the requisite power of appointment to appoint the
property.
Formerly, under the old 1948 amendments life estate did not
qualify for the marital deduction. If you are contemplating using
a life estate in this manner you may be interested in a caution
which might be in order, and that is to be sure that you do not
restrict her use of the income.
For example, if she, by reason of the language you use, will
be required to use some of the income in a way which would be
interpreted as an investment in the principal-for example, some
type of a replacement of a portion of the property, or something
of that sort-it may be a restriction on income which would disqualify the gift for the marital deduction because in order to
qualify it, it has to give her the entire right to the income from
the property.
And likewise if you want to give her a power of appointment,
be sure that the power of appointment is not too restrictive. For
example, a power for her to use the property or sell the property
if she was in need during her life would not be sufficient to
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qualify the gift for the marital deduction. One other point that
I might mention is that under the marital deduction provisions
now it is possible theoretically to create a trust in which a portion of the interest is granted to the wife, a portion of the income,
and the power of appointment over a portion of the principal of
the property, with the other portion of the trust being for the
benefit of other people, and the portion which is for the benefit
of the wife, if it beats the terms of the statute, will qualify for
the marital deduction.
In this connection there is some difference of opinion which
may or may not be resolved by the regulations, as to whether the
portion of the income in which she is given an interest has to be
the same portion as the portion of the principal over which she
has the power of appointment. And to take a conservative approach to it you would want to make those portions the same.
There is also a question whether in a trust of that type it is
necessary to have a portion of the trust segregated or set aside
in the administration of the trust for the benefit of the wife, or
whether undivided interests are adequate, and again to play it
safe until it may be further clarified by the regulations, it probably would be well to frame such a marital deduction trust in
such a way that it would really constitute two separate trusts
although all under the terms of one instrument.
Those are a few of the things that we might look out for in
the regulations when issued.
HALE MCCOWN:

Thanks, John.

There have been a number of changes with respect to partnerships. Leo, would you cover the ones with particular reference
to the basis of contributed property to the partnership.
LEO EISENSTATT:

Yes, Hale.

I think I ought to preface my remarks by an admonition to
all lawyers that the field of partnership tax law is in my opinion
not so simple, and the new code did a lot to clarify conflicting
provisions. But the field itself is not too simple and requires a
moderate amount of study. The one basic fact that you should
keep in mind with respect to whatever remarks I make is that
the new code considers the partnership as an entity, that is, something separate and distinct from the partners, and that thread
or idea will run through almost all of my remarks.
Now to get to the subject of contributed property. I think
it can be best summarized by the statute itself that says that
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property contributed by a partnership to the partnership in exchange for an interest in the partnership takes the same basis as
it has in hand. For example, if A and B form a partnership and
A contributes one thousand dollars for fifty percent interest and
B contributes a piece of property which has a fair market value
of one thousand dollars for a partnership interest, the cash, of
course, on the books of the partnership takes the basis of one
thousand dollars.
The property, machinery or real estate or whatever it might
be remains the same so far as the basis is concerned on the books
of the partnership. Supposing in this case that the partnership
had a basis of two hundred dollars. The partnership would pick
up that property at a basis of two hundred dollars, and the depreciation, capital gains treatment and so forth would follow from
that fact. And that might lead to some inequitable results between the two partners.
For example, suppose that soon after this partnership was
formed the partners sold that asset for one thousand dollars or its
fair market value. The partnership would have a capital gain.
Assume it is a capital asset of eight hundred dollars. If the
partnership agreement is silent on the matter, the division of income and losses in the partnership agreement would control in
its division of this particular gain. So partner A would have to
pick up in his own individual return four hundred dollars of
capital gain and partner B also. And that is in most cases to A
in equity, because partner A has contributed a thousand dollars
in something that he thought he was getting a fifty percent interest in, and theoretically within fifteen minutes after the partnership is formed, he has a fifty percent interest and a four hundred dollar capital gain that he has to pay tax on.
A similar thing is true, you might say, that in putting in this
thousand dollars into the partnership, the partner A bought a
fifty percent interest in an asset that lie thought was worth a
thousand dollars, and it ends up that from the tax standpoint he
bought one that was only worth two hundred dollars, and so
when it comes to depreciation, instead of his being able to depreciate the asset on the basis of a thousand, it has to be cut
down to a fourth of that or a fifth of that, twenty percent.
Now this result can be varied by the partners by specific
provision in the partnership agreement. In order to protect the
interests of the partner who contributed the thousand dollars and
to prevent an inequity to him, the partnership agreement could
provide that in the event of the sale of that particular asset the
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capital gain attributable thereto would be taxed solely to him,
and you can word that so as to try to take into account future
developments, because the partnership, fair market value, can
change after the partnership is formed, and you could preserve
it by language to the effect that the differences between the fair
market value and the basis at the time it was contributed, just
that portion would be charged to that partner.
Now to some extent you can, with respect to depreciation,
protect partner A who is losing, in a sense, some of the depreciation that he ordinarily would have been entitled to if the partnership had gone out and bought that piece of equipment for a thousand dollars. The partnership agreement can provide that all
dep1·eciation with respect to the contributed property can be taken
on the return of the non-contributing partner, so that if there is
a full year life remaining, a partner A who contributed a thousand dollars could pick up fifty dollars depreciation, and partner
B nothing.
Now the code specifically provides for this effect. When
you are attempting to take into account the difference between
the basis and the fair market value, that is specifically covered
in the statute by specific wording and also in the regulations, and
if you have these provisions in a partnership agreement which
attempt to perform other acts than to pick up the difference between the base of the fair market value, you have got to be careful that the commissioner or bureau will not describe the purpose of evading or avoiding tax. If the only purpose is to evade
or avoid tax according to the proposed regulation, of course the
attempted redistribution will be eliminated and the tax incidence
of, say, depreciation or gain, will be affixed according to the
partnership gains and losses.
I might conclude this particular subject by saying that my
discourse has been rather sketchy in that it has only attempted
to hit the high points of this particular problem, and it is something that should be kept in mind when you are drafting new
agreements or in renewing existing agreements that your clients
may presently have because you can make amendments to take
advantage of the benefits that the new code allows.
HALE MCCOWN:

Thanks, Leo.

There has been a lot of discussion about the new depreciation
provisions of the code. I thought it appropriate to repeat those
again briefly. Bob, will you cover the depreciation provisions?
ROBERT DENNEY:

I suppose many of you ladies and gentle-
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men have had the same problem that we have down in my section
of the country. The farmer has read in his farm periodicals
about new methods of depreciation, and he comes in to talk to
you about why have you not done something to take advantage
of this tax saving.
That is why we decided to briefly review the new methods
set forth in the '54 code. Of course, the '54 code re-enacts the
straight line method of depreciation, and then it adds what is
known as the declining balance method, the sum of the year's
digit method, and any other consistent followed methods which
do not during the first full two-thirds of the useful life accumulate a depreciation reserve greater than would be accumulated on the declining balance method at such time.
We can see from those methods that are set forth that the
useful life of a certain article has not been changed at all by the
'54 code, but the manner in which such apportionment shall be
made has been very substantially affected by the new code, and
in looking at the declining balance method we can see that there
are certain characteristics which I think are interesting and
which can be used to describe to the client how it differs from
the straight line.
It uses a fifty percent rate of depreciation, not exceeding two
hundred percent of the straight line method. It exceeds the
straight line rate but it is applied each year to the remaining balance of cost rather than the original capital sum.
The annual allowances decline each year. There will always
be some depreciation left if you stick to that method, concentration of cost recovery in early years of the life of the asset; it may
be used in group accounting as well as item accounting, and you
may change back to the straight line method without the commissioner's approval.
It was interesting to me to compare that with the sum of
the year's digit method. It resembles the straight line method in
that the rate is applied each year to the original cost. The rate
changes each year and produces a lot of depreciation in the earJy
years.

Now just for example I took an item of a life for five years
having a cost of one hundred fifty dollars and no estimated salvage value. Under the declining balance method of course your
rate of depreciation for the. first year would be sixty dollars,
straight line thirty, and the sum of the year's digit's method
which would be, your enumerator is the remaining life, your de-
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nominator of course is the addition of the life of the article, such
as fifteen, if you have a five year life. You would have fifty
dollars the first year. You go on down; when you get through
with the declining balance method, you have $11.66 left over; onto
the year's of the digit, of course you depreciate it out, you simply
take the straight line method, you depreciate it out completely.
Any other consistent method provides the use of miscellaneous other reducing changed methods, most of which are variations of the declining balance method. The new methods referred
to are not available to intangible property, property having a
useful life of less than three years, property acquired before January 1, 1954, used property, new or reconstruction completed
prior to January 1, 1954.
Section 167 (d) of the new code provides that the taxpayer
and the government may make a written agreement specifically
dealing with the useful life and rate of depreciation of any property. And also it should be kept in mind the taxpayer can use a
different method at the same time for different assets or a group
of assets.
HALE MCCOWN:

Thanks, Bob.

I think that we might also keep in mind that under the declining balance method you do not have to use any salvage value
in making your computation.
Now also a long time ago they finally plugged this one, between husband and wife. A man owned a piece of property and
it depreciated in value, so he sold it to his wife and reported a
capital gain and his wife started to depreciate it on a new basis.
In the new code there are provisions with respect to distribution of depreciated property so far as corporations are concerned.
Jack, will you cover those, please?
JOHN NORTH:

Yes, Hale.

I think that everyone understands that there was no basic
change in the taxation of corporate distributions other than the
annual exclusion of fifty dollars and four percent credit; that is,
corporate distributions are taxed to the extent that the corporation has earnings of profits, just as we have a corporation using
a cash dividend, that cash dividend would be a tax to the extent
that there are any profits.
But you have a peculiar problem when the corporation distributes depreciated property, because on the one hand we have
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a code provision which states that property distribution will be
treated as a dividend to the extent of the fair market value.
Suppose we have a corporation which has depreciated property that is worth one hundred fifty dollars, which could be an
air-conditioner or anything else. Supposing that the corporation's
basis for that property was a hundred dollars. If the corporation
sold the property it would recognize the fifty dollar gain. Suppose that the corporation has earnings and profits of one hundred
and twenty dollars. The corporation, instead of selling the assets and distributing the fifty dollar profit or the one hundred
fifty dollars, distributes the asset.
Now on the one hand the commissioner will contend that the
taxpayer has a dividend to the e};.i;ent of one hundred and fifty
dollars, the fair market value of the property distributed. The
taxpayer on the other hand will contend, "No, I have a dividend
only to the e};.i;ent of one hundred and t\venty dollars, the corporate accumulated earnings and profits."
The Tax Court under the 1939 code agreed with the taxpayer. The Tax Court agreed that only one hundred t\venty
dollars would be taxable, and that was the Godley case. The
House report indicates that the language of the section relating
to this particular problem in 1939 code need not be changed because they adequately expressed existing law, and the House was
of the opinion that existing law should be continued; that is,
when there is a distribution of depreciated property the corporate earnings should not be increased by the amount of depreciation and thereby increasing the dividend, but the dividend should
be limited to the corporate earnings and profits at the time of
the distribution.
And using the precise example that I have stated, the House
report stated that it would be taxable only to the extent of one
hundred and t\venty dollars.
Now after the House bill had been passed and sent to the
Senate, the Godley case was appealed and the Circuit Court of
Appeals said, "No, when you distribute depreciated property the
taxpayer has a dividend to the extent of the fair market value of
the property just as long as there are earnings sufficient to cover
the basis."
Now the reasoning is simple, that when they distributed that
property having a fair market value of a hundred dollars, they
actually have a gain of fifty dollars, and that fifty dollars should
be added to their corporate earnings, thereby making the corpo-
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rate earnings one hundred and seventy dollars and determining
the total amount of the tax to be the one hundred fifty dollars
worth of property would be taxable in full.
Now the Godley case in the Third Circuit was followed by
the Hirshon case in the Second Circuit. Both of these cases decided that the taxpayer should be taxed on the distribution as a
taxable dividend to the full extent of one hundred fifty dollars
even though the corporation has only one hundred twenty dollars
earnings prior to the distribution.
Now there is a rather interesting point in connection with
this problem because the House, or the Senate, rather, did not
change the provisions. The Senate Finance Committee made a
comment on the House's comment to this effect. The House report-and this is what it contained in the Senate Finance Committee report-the House report indicated that this rule clarified
existing law. Subsequent to the date of the House report two
court decisions have taken a position to the contrary, and the Finance Committee cited the Hirshon and Godley cases.
"In view of this decision your committee does not intend any
implication from the enactment of such 312 (a) with respect to
the effects of a distribution of property on earnings and profits
and on shareholders under the 1939 Code."
Now it is interesting that the Senate Finance Committee
made a comment in connection with the effect to be given in the
1939 code in passing the 1954 code, because this query immediately comes up : Do they intend any implication in connection
with the 1954 code? Do they intend that the House's construction of the bill as indicated in the House committee's comments
then to control, or do the Hirshon and Godley cases as determined
by the Circuit Court of Appeals control?
The commissioner in his proposed regulations has taken the
position that was taken by the Second and Third Circuits; that
is, that the entire amount of the one hundred and fifty dollars
fair market value in property is taxable even though prior to
the distribution there was only one hundred twenty dollars in
corporate earnings in profit.
Now just last week a rather interesting development occurred.
The same situation arose in the Tax Court of the United States,
and the Tax Court openly refused to follow the Hirshon and
Godley cases. After Godley had been reversed by the Third Circuit and the theory of reversal followed by the Second Circuit,
the Tax Court turns right around now and follows the same rule
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that is originally followed; that is, that the distribution of depreciated property would be taxable only to the e::1..1;ent of earnings and profits at the time of the distribution.
So here we are left with this rather interesting problem controlling decision. Now this decision of the Tax Court was an
interpretation of the 1939 Act, but we have this problem: In interpreting the 1954 Act, should we follow the comment of the
House committee and the theory that's adopted by the Tax Court,
or should we follow the commissioner's regulation and the position
taken by the Second and Third Circuits? I think there will probably be clarifying litigation.
HALE MCCOWN:

Thanks, Jack.

A number of us have had the decision from time to time,
where is it best to take the deduction for attorney's fees, and so
forth, in an estate? One of the factors to keep in mind in deciding is whether to take them on the income tax return of the estate
or to take them on the estate tax return.
John, would you cover that, please?
JOHN C. MASON: I think that it would be well just to point
out the tax deductions which are available, either for estate tax
or income tax or both, in the administration of an estate, and
then point out for you briefly what some of the factors are that
are to be taken into consideration.
T:here are three general sections or groups of sections of the
code which pertain to this problem, and of course we have the
estate tax sections which impose an estate tax and grant certain
deductions in computing the estate tax.
These deductions, as you are all familiar, administration expenses, claims, funeral expenses, mortgages against property which
is included at full value in the gross estate. There are two other
sections then in the income tax parts of the code which pertain
to income taxation and deductions in computing income tax in
connection with estates.
Section 641 and the sections immediately following generally
provide that executors are to be, and estates are to be taxed in
the same manner as individuals are taxed, except where specifically changed by the sections that are grouped there.
One of the limitations imposed by Section 642 is that the income tax deductions cannot be taken if they are being taken as
a state tax deduction. Therefore in computing the income and
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deductions of an estate for income that is accumulated or accrued
or paid during the course of administration, you have your choice
of taking either an income tax deduction or an estate tax deduction, but not both.
Then Section 691 and the sections following it deal with income in respect of a decedent. Now that, generally speaking,
means income items which if paid prior to the decedent's death
would have been ;taxable to him. They have the character of income, and when they are paid during the course of administration
they are still treated as income.
And by the same token deductions which have that general
character are also deductible.
Now there is no provision in this part of the code that deductions cannot be taken both for income and estate tax purposes.
So when you are dealing in income with respect to decedent, and
if it also qualifies as an estate tax deduction, you can have the
double deduction.
Just a brief check list to illustrate the point. Items which
are deductible for estate tax only, which would include, for example, funeral expenses, of course would not be deductible for
any income tax purposes. Payment of unpaid mortgages and
other indebtedness, payment of claims which represent personal
obligations of the decedent and would not be in the nature of
business sense obligations, such as claims for expenses and so
forth.
In the field of deductions available only for income tax, there
would of course be any normal income tax deductible item which
did not qualify as an estate tax deduction. In the field, for example, of administration expenses, if you hold an estate open for
an unduly long time· so that apparently the purpose of holding it
open is to manage and conserve the property and produce income
rather than merely to accomplish the usual purpose of turning
the property over to the heirs, then you may get into a situation
where it is not a normal administration expense and would not
be deductible for estate tax purposes.
I am referring to such things, for example, as executor's and
attorney's fees, b.ut it "\YOuld be deductible in computing the estate's
income taxes.
Items which would be deductible for both income and estate
taxes would include such things as interest accrued at date of
death but unpaid until after death, property taxes which were
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accrued up to the date of death or prior to the date of death but
not paid until during the administration of the estate, and expenses which would have been deductible as trade and business
expenses, non-trade or non-business expenses which were accrued
up to the date of death.
The general principles which are involved here, and this
relates to income in respect of a decedent, are limited in this fashion. It must be a situation where the decedent was liable for the
item at the time of his death, the liability having been founded on
a promise or agreement which was supported by full and adequate
consideration. It must be an item which was not properly allowable after deductions in the final income tax return of the decedent or in any prior year of the decedent, and it must be an
item which is actually paid during the course of administration.
Now in the area of deductions which are allowable on an
alternative basis either as income tax or as estate tax deductions,
we include basically administation expenses which would include
such items as the following: court costs, filing fees, certification
and notarial fees, appraiser's fees, proper traveling expenses, executor's expenses, attorney's fees, accountant's fees, storage and
maintenance expense and selling expense, preparing of income and
state inheritance tax returns, tax litigation, cost of operating and
maintaining real estate, and the litigation respecting the properties or the tax on the properties.
In addition to these items which would be deductible in the
alternative either as income or estate tax deductions, any casualty
losses incurred during the course of administration to the extent
not compensated by insurance "\Vould be deductible, one or the
other.
It is interesting to note that the minimum income tax rate on
taxable income of the estate is twenty percent. This percentage
rate is not in the estate tax brackets until the taxable estate is
forty thousand dollars after allowing all deductions, including the
marital deduction and specific exemption.
Thus in any estate where there would be no estate tax or
where the taxable estate is not over forty thousand dollars for
estate tax purposes, it vrnuld seem that income tax deductions
should be taken at least to the extent that there was taxable income. The estate tax bracket does not exceed thirty-seven percent until the taxable estate reaches one million dollars, which
for practical purposes probably limits our discussion here.
Yet the income tax bracket reaches thirty-eight percent when
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the taxable income reaches ten thousand dollars, an amount which
would not be unusual in many of the estates which are probated
in other states.
It is therefore probably indicated that the attorneys should
check carefully into the possibility of income tax deductions in
either foreign field.

One other point which was satisfactorily answered by Treasury rulings under the '39 code and which will no doubt be the
same under the '54 code is that administration expenses, for example, may be split between estate tax and income tax, from a
deductibility standpoint, so that part of an item may be claimed
for income tax deduction and part for estate tax deduction, and
some items may be claimed for income tax deduction while others
may be claimed for estate tax deduction. This gives the executor
greater flexibility in minimizing taxes.
There's one other way in which the executor has a certain
amount of flexibility, and that is, that it was possible, or was
possible under the old code and apparently is still, for you to claim
it both ways. You can file an estate tax return and claim the
deduction or file an income tax return and claim the deduction, and
until one or the other of the returns is audited, you may continue
reinspecting the situation, so that when the first return is audited
you may at that time make your choice. You have no limitation
on your right to take the estate tax deduction, but your right to
take the income tax deduction is limited in this way: If you
have been allowed the estate tax deduction or have claimed it, if
you have been allowed the estate tax deduction, then you could
not take the income tax deduction, so until the estate tax deduction is actually allowed, you apparently would have the right to
avoid making up your mind, which may give a little opportunity
for hindsight in some situations.
HARRY B. COHEN: Mr. Chairman, do you not have to file
an election along with your income tax return that you are not
taking it on your estate taxes?

JOHN C. MASON: The answer to that, I believe, is that under
the Section 642, which allows the income tax deduction, but with
the limitation, it is provided that the deductions which are allowable under the estate tax, under 2053 and 2054, in computing the
taxes of the estate shall not be allowed a deduction in computing
the taxable income of the estate unless there is filed within the
time and in the manner and form prescribed by Secretary of the
Treasury a statement that the amounts haYe not been allowed
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as deductions under those sections, and a waiver of the right to
have such amounts allowed as tax deductions under those sections.
Now the filing of that waiver does not have to be made at
the same time that the income tax i·eturn is filed, but it can be
filed, at least prior to the 1954 code sections and rulings it could
be filed, at the time the income tax return is being audited, for
example, which gives you an opportunity to delay making the decision.
It is possible that regulations could be issued which would
require the filing of that at the time the income tax return is
filed, but at no later time. If such was the nature of the regulations when they are to be issued then you would not be able to
avoid making up your mind, but the same situation existed before, and the Treasury Department did not require the making
of the election at the time the income tax return was filed.
Therefore if they follow the same procedure as they did before, I think it will still be possible to avoid making the decision
until a later time.
HALE MCCOWN: Thanks, John.
With respect to the old provisions of partnership agreements,
and so forth, where one partner had a guaranteed salary and also
ther~ was income, there was no deduction for the salary except
as a part of the partnership income.
Leo, would you take the proposition of the treatment of a
guaranteed salary to a partner?
LEO EISENSTATT:

yes, Hale.

This particular subject is based upon Section 707 (c) of the
'54 code, which says that to the extent determined without regard
to the inco~e of the partnership, payments to a partner for
services or for the use of capital shall be considered as made to
one who is not a partner, and it says though that it can only be
used for the purpose of Section 61 (a), and that is included as
gross income of the partner, and Section 162 (a) would be contributed to the expense of the partnership. I paraphrased the
provisions of the code.
Now suppose you have a partnership agreement which provides that partner A who is a one-third partner shall receive ten
thousand dollars by way of salary. The partnership return will
show that as "any other salary." It will be an expense, and in
computing the profit or the loss of the partnership will be shown
as "any other salary."
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Now the partner must pick that up in his return as "other
ordinary income," as "other salary." Now the proposed regulations answered one point with respect to that.
The question \Vas raised, "Would such a salary be subject
to withholding and social security?" The regulations very specifically provided that that income so far as the partner is concerned has no application to any other section of the code. In
other words you do not eat up social security payments with respect to those guaranteed salaries.
Now keep in mind that a salary, to qualify for this type of
treatment, must be payable irrespective of the income situation
of the partnership. If it is keyed to profit, then this does not
apply. The old treatment, it would be considered just merely as
a distribution of the partnership. In other words, the agreement
that there is ten thousand to be paid if there is profits would
not qualify for this section. Now the same treatment is afforded
for those cases where you have an interest payment to a partner
for the use of his capital, which is sometimes common. That is
treated as any other interest and expense and picked up by the
receiving partner as an interest expense.
Now let us take a few more examples to illustrate the proposition. Suppose a partnership has made exactly ten thousand dollars profit over-maybe it's easier to figure. I am not too good
with my arithmetic-nine thousand dollars in addition to the ten
thousand dollar salary to Mr. A. Now on his return for that
year he will show ten thousand salary from the partnership, and
then his distributed share of the ordinary income of three thousand dollars, or a gross of thirteen thousand dollars income.
Let us take the converse of the situation. Suppose as a
result of the payment of this ten thousand dollar salary the partnership suffers a nine thousand dollar loss. Now he would be
required on his individual partnership return to show the ten
thousand dollars income and then, to the extent there is such
sums credited to his account as the basis of his partnership, he
can show a three thousand dollar loss as his share of the partnership loss for that particular year.
The partnership return as filed for the partners would show
a nine thousand dollar loss. Each partner would pick up his
third on his own return. This partner then would net a seven
thousand dollar gain as a result of that transaction.
There is one other situation that is mentioned in the proposed regulations, and it deals with a partner who is entitled to
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a salary up to, say, ten thousand dollars if there is pa1tnership
income to cover it.
In devising a partnership provision when you are forming a
partnership, you want to take into account this pa1ticular provision of Section 707 ( c) , because you may have a situation where
a partnership is consistently losing money and the partners' interest in that partnership is continually decreasing because of
such losses, and then at the same time he may have to pick up
ordinary income by way of the salary provisions.
Another section of the code limits the amount of loss that
a partner can take to the amount of his basis in the partnership,
and it could very easily happen that after a year or two of bad
business he would be having to report income without being able
to offset it with corresponding deductions for a partnership loss.
CHARLES PHILLIPS : Now that limitation of loss to their
partnership, was that just under the '54 code?
LEO EISENSTATT:

That is just with respect to the code.

HALE MCCOWN : I would like to have Bob, if you will, cover
soil and water conservation, which I know is of inte1·est to a
great many of you.
ROBERT DENNEY: Section 175 of the code provides that the
taxpayer engaged in farming shall elect to treat expenditures for
soil and water conservation in respect to land used for farming
or for prevention of erosion as currently deductible. It defines
"land used in farming" as land used by a taxpayer or his tenant
for production of fruit, crops or other agricultural products or
for grazing.
Deduction is limited to twenty-five percent of gross income
from farming, and not from all sources, and not from just one
farm should be recognized. Any excess is carried forward and
deducted on succeeding years.
For example, Farmer Jones's gross income is twenty thousand dollars from all sources, nineteen thousand from farming.
He spent five thousand dollars for conservation work. Deduction is limited to twenty-five percent of nineteen thousand or four
thousand seven hundred fifty dollars; the remaining two hundred
and fifty dollars is carried over the next year.
The '54 code specifically lists types of expenditures included
within this concept of soil and water conservation and prevention
of erosion of land, such as fertilization, leveling, grading, terrac-
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ing and contour furrowing, construction, control and protection of
diversion channels, drainage ditches, earthen dams, watercourses,
outlets and ponds, eradication of brush and planting of windbreaks.
The farmer can elect to deduct currently those expenditures
in the first taxable year beginning after December 31, 1953, and
ending after August 16, 1954, without permission of the Internal
Revenue Service. Once election is made it is binding on him for
subsequent years unless permission to make a change is requested
and granted from the district director where the return is filed.
The election is made by attaching a statement to the returu
specifying the amount and type of each expenditure.
There is one warning that should be recognized. The expenditures unused due to the twenty-five percent limitation which
normally would be carried over and used to reduce income the
following year cannot be used in an addition to basis in the event
the farm land is sold before the deduction is used.
VOICE:

Bob, what is the situation on metal tube?

ROBERT DENNEY: Well, of course if it was construction and
control-well, for one thing, you cannot take any deduction on
depreciable items, and I believe that that would be a depreciable
item.
HALE MCCOWN:
ciable one.

Yes, normally your tube would be a depre-

It used to be you could have a preferred stock issue and then
later on after a necessary period you would have the corporation
redeem it and get capital gain treatment, and thus get some money
out of the corporation.

There are some new provisions with respect to those pref erred stock bailouts.
Jack, would you tell us about those.
JOHN NORTH:

Yes, Hale.

I think that it should be mentioned that under the 1939 code
whenever a corporation made a distribution in its own stock that
no taxable dividend resulted in the relative interest of the stockholders in the corporation after the dividend was substantially
the same as before.

Now this gave rise to a neat device for a tax saving; that is,
ordinary income could be distributed and treated as a capital gain
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in this manner. A corporation with earnings and profits, instead
of distributing those by way of an ordinary cash dividend, if it
had only common stock outstanding, would declare a dividend in
preferred stock.
The stockholder could then allocate the basis of his old common stock between the new preferred and the old common. He
could turn around and sell the preferred stock with this allocated
basis and recognize instead of ordinary income a capital gain,
report it as a capital gain.
Now oftentimes in closely held corporations there would be
an arrangement with an insurance company whereby the insurance company would agree to buy the preferred stock from the
shareholders and the preferred stock might have redemption provisions providing for a sinking fund so that the insurance company would be entirely protected.
Now after the insurance company had acquired all of the
preferred stock and the stockholders had recognized the earnings
and profits of the capital gains raised by a sale, the corporation
would actually take the earnings and profit and redeem the pref erred stock and cancel it and start the whole process all over
again, and in that way the ordinary income of a corporation will
be distributed to its shareholders at capital gains rates.
Now the 1954 code attempted to frustrate this device by establishing what we call Section 306 stock. Now Section 306 stock
is defined rather simply. It's defined as any stock other than
common stock received by way of a non-taxable stock dividend.
Any stock other than common stock.
Now I might say that in talking about the distribution of
property, many of you may have wondered whether or not a
distribution by a corporation of its own stock would be property
and taxed in the same way as the air-conditioner that I mentioned.
Well, the answer is no, because stock of the distributing corporation is not considered property within the definition unless
the stock is issued in discharge of an obligation under preferred
stock, for example, to pay to preferred dividend or unless the
stockholder has an option to take cash instead of the stock dividend.
Well, the second aspect of the definition is any stock other
than common stock which is received in a corporate reorganization or separation, to the e:ll..'ient that the effect of such receipt
was substantially the same as the receipt of a non-taxable stock
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dividend, or the stock was received in exchange for Section 306
stock.
Now you can see if you received 306 stock, you might be
able to transfer, if you didn't come under that specific provision.
You might also, if you have received some Section 306 stock, give
it to your son, and your son could sell it, and then you wouldn't
have any Section 306 stock on hand. But the legislature provided
for that by saying, "Any other stock, the basis of which is determined by reference to the basis of Section 306 stock."
Well now, if the corporation does not have any earnings or
profits at the time the preferred stock dividend is declared, we
have no problem, because it cannot possibly come within the definition of the Section 306 stock.
Now once it is determined that it is 306 stock, and that is
a typical illustration that I have given, common outstanding, and
the distribution of the preferred; then these are the rules that
are applied. If the stock is redeemed from the shareholder by
the corporation, the amount realized by the shareholder is taxed
as a dividend to the extent that they are corporate earnings and
profits at the time of the redemption.
So that there are two things you have to remember: If the
shareholder sells back to the corporation, the redemption situation, it is taxed as ordinary income, and that is determined by the
earnings and profits at the time of redemption, not at the time
that the stock is issued.
If disposition of the stock by the shareholder is made by a
sale, then the amount realized by the shareholder on the sale is
treated as a gain upon the sale of property which is not a chattel
asset, that is ordinary income to the extent that the amount realized would have been a dividend if the corporation had distributed
cash instead of stock.

So that means that if at the time the stock is distributed the
corporation has earnings and profits, and if the stockholder waits
three years to sell this Section 306 stock, he is going to recognize
a non-capital gain upon sale to the extent that the corporation
has earnings and profits at the time of distribution.
It would seem that this effectively frustrates the preferred
stock bailout, but there is one possibility for some tax savings.
I do not know; I might say that the possibility is really impractical in a sense, but it is this : Supposing that a corporation has
earnings and profits, and it is ready to distribute those earnings
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and profits and would distribute them in the ordinary way and
wants to know whether it should also make stock dividends. Well,
the advice would be, first, to distribute the earnings and profits,
thereby reducing the earnings and profits that would be considered upon a later distribution of stock. Now after you have
reduced the earnings and profits, then preferred stock dividend
must be advanced.
The stockholder may hold that preferred stock; that is, it
may have no substantial economic value at the time it is distributed, but he may hold that stock while that corporation is earning money. Then after two or three years go by he may sell the
stock, and he will recognize a gain only to an extent to the earnings and p1·ofit that the corporation had at the time that the stock
was distributed, since they distributed all they could at that time.
But the difficulty with the process is that it cannot be continued; that is, you cannot then buy it back and reissue another
stock dividend because the difficulty is clear that they have earnings and profits at such time, and the subsequent stock dividends
will be taxed.
But the rule of thumb, at least the first time, would be to
declare a stock dividend on 306 stock after you have reduced
earnings and profits as much as practicable.
HALE MCCOWN: For a number of years we have heard
many comments about joint tenancies. The '54 code made a number of changes which had some effect on the validity and the advisability of joint tenancies.

John, will you cover briefly the joint tenancy problem?
JOHN C. MASON: Well, our panel members and speakers at
various meetings of our Bar Association have often criticized this,
and this criticism has been based largely on certain inadvertent
pitfalls which may many times unnecessarily trap the layman.
It seems to me that generally speaking the Bar Association
has given the impression that joint tenancies are not desirable.

It is certainly common knowledge among Nebraska lawyers,
however, that joint tenancies are widely used. Many of the pitfalls resulting from earlier tax laws have been removed under the
1954 tax code, and it is my own thought that in the future joint
tenancies can be an even more valuable estate planning tool than
ever before.
The danger in respect to the joint tenancies prior to the 1954
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code may be summarized in part at least under the following headings: First, under a joint tenancy the property did not pass by
the decedent's will, and does not. And therefore the decedent
does not have the power to prescribe by his will who shall benefi,t
from his property, and thus he may inadvertently make it impossible for his children, for example, to take an interest in his real
estate if he has previously placed it in joint tenancy with his wife.
Secondly, the basis of the property for income tax purposes
under the former law continued the same as at the original creation of the joint tenancy, and the surviving joint tenant (I am
assuming a gift without consideration at the creation of the joint
tenancy) the surviving joint tenant did not receive a stepped up
basis commensurate with the value of the property at the time of
the husband's death, in a typical situation.
When the wife went out to sell the property at some later
time after her husband's death, she found a considerable capital
gain problem.
Thirdly, gift tax liability was often incurred at the inception of the joint tenancy without the realization of the joint tenant
and without their reporting the gift and without their paying the
tax, which created a certain problem in the question of trying
to clear up that problem at a later date, perhaps after the death
of the original joint tenant who made the gift but did not realize
that he \Vas making the gift.
Another problem was that there was no avoidance of a state
tax which would have been the case if the husband had transferred the property as a tenancy in common, for example, in which
case he probably vvould have avoided at least half of the property
being taxed in his estate, or if he makes it an outright gift, of
course he would theoretically get it all out of his estate.
Another point is that if almost all of the property of the
decedent was owned in joint tenancy there may not be enough
property left subject to claim to result in a deduction for funeral
expenses, claims and administration expenses under the old code.
Now the 1954 code has eliminated many of these objections,
and I will enumerate some of the changes which help make joint
tenancies a more useful tool in estate planning.
First, with reference to the basis of the property. Under
Section 1014 (b) 9 of the '54 code a new cost basis attaches the
joint tenancy property to the extent that the property is included
in the decedent joint tenant's gross estate, the estate of the first
of the joint tenants to die. And in these illustrations we are as-
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suming that the first to die is the husband and the husband has
made the gift without consideration; that is a rather typical situation.
The new basis in that situation under the new code is the
fair market value of the property on the day of death, or on the
6ptiona1 estate tax date, and it is applicable beginning with the
date of death. Apparently it is not required that any estate tax
be found due on a decedent's estate but only that the property be
includable in the definition of the gross estate.
The basis is reduced by any amounts which were allowable
as deductions prior to the date of death, such as depreciation, depletion, amortization and other similar type of deductions. The
stepped up basis applies only to that portion of the property which
is taxable in the estate.
If the husband had furnished all of the consideration for the
purchase of the property, then it would be entirely includable in
his estate, and the stepped up basis would apply to the entire property.
If he had furnished less than all of it, then there would be a
proportionate share rather than a full stepped up basis.
In another field, with reference to deductions for debts and
administration expenses, Section 2053 (a) of the estate tax section allows deductions for funeral expenses, administration expenses, claims and mortgages in the amounts allowable by the
jurisdiction where the administration of the estate occurs. Subsections (b) and ( c) provide now that the e:x.-penses of administration of property not subject to claims are also allowable as
deductions in computing estate taxes to the same extent they
would have been allowable if the property was subject to claims
if the payments of the claims are made within the period allowed
for filing an estate tax return.
So you would now be able to get estate tax deductions for
the normal claim, payment of claims, and administration expenses,
even though the property is not subject to probate. Therefore
that situation has been corrected.
With reference to gift taxes, this is the field in which the
most important change has occurred. Now in the creation of a
joint tenancy where one tenant furnishes more than his proportionate share of the consideration, the creation of the joint tenancy which previously was considered a gift to the donee joint
tenant no longer need be considered a gift for gift tax purposes.
It is still possible to treat the transaction as a gift if the donor
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chooses to file a gift tax return and so declare ff. If no such
declaration is made then it is treated as though no gift was made
at the time the joint tenancy was created.
In this case when the joint tenancy is terminated a gift is
deemed to be made to the extent that the donee receives no more
than his proportional share of his property proportioned in accordance with the original contribution as consideration in the acquisition of the property. For example, if he had furnished all
of the consideration in the acquisition of the property, and at the
termination of the joint tenancy if he receives back all of the
consideration, then there need be no gift deemed to have occurred
at either time.
If, however, his wife receives half of the proceeds when the
property is sold or when the joint tenancy is terminated, then it
would be deemed that a gift were made to the wife of one-half of
the value of the property at the time the joint tenancy was terminated.
VOICE: Is that limited to joint tenancy by the entire issue?
JOHN C. MASON: I am not sure. I think it applies to tenancies by the entities, but I was not really conscious of studying
that part of it.
VOICE: Could it not apply to father and his sons?
HALE MCCOWN: I was checking that. At the moment my
recollection is that it is limited to husband and wife and to real
estate. It does not apply to joint tenancies between other than
spouses, if my recollection is right, and it only applies with respect
to real estate.
JOHN C. MASON: I am sure that's right, and I am sorry I
did not make that clear when I was preparing this thing.
Now here are same factors than which should be considered
in connection with this joint tenancy between husband and wife,
real estate between husband and wife, to be precise.
If the property is held until death there will never be any
gift tax if no gift tax is declared at the inception of the joint
tenancy. Therefore it is possible to avoid it altogether.

If the property is transferred or the joint tenancy is terminated and the property has increased in value, then treating the
transfer as a gift in time of termination will result in a greater
gift than if it had been declared a gift at its inception.
Thus if it is likely that the property will depreciate in value
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and the joint tenancy will be determined prior to the death of
either joint tenant, it may be advisable to declare it a gift at the
time of the inception of the joint tenancy.
On the contrary, if it is a home, for example, which is likely
to depreciate in value, then it may be better to wait until the
termination of the joint tenancy before having any gift declared.
If the property is treated as a gift when the joint tenancy is
created and then if upon the sale of the property the donor husband takes back all the proceeds, it will be treated as a second
gift from the wife to the husband at the termination of the joint
tenancy because she in effect is giving to him half of the proceeds, which otherwise would have been treated as belonging to
her. Thus in that situation there would be a double gift tax.
One type of problem will doubtless arise. Possibly its solution will be indicated by the regulations when issued. I refer to
a situation where a joint tenancy is created in a resident property
and no gift is declared at the time of the creation of the joint
tenancy. Then if the property is sold later and a new home
purchased, the proceeds of the old home being applied as partial
payment on the new home, there may be a question as to whether
the wife received any share of the proceeds of the old home.
Probably to avoid there being a gift at the time of the second
transaction it would be well to have the proceeds of the old home
paid to the husband so that they can be clearly traced and then
paid by the husband in the purchase of the new home, so that the
wife does not have any interest in those proceeds.
In such case I believe that no gift would have been deemed
Unless the lawyer is closely in
touch with such a transaction, it is certainly possible that the
matter could be innocently handled in such a way that the gift
was deemed to have taken place at the time of the second transaction.
to have taken place at any time.

It is hoped that the foregoing analysis will help the Nebraska
lawyers in guiding their clients in the use properly and effectively
in joint tenancies.

LLOYD POSPISHIL: A question. What happens to the marital deduction in a joint tenancy when a joint will is executed? I
am thinking of the Autry case; what is the status of that rule now?
HALE MCCOWN: I am not sure. Unless I am mistaken, so
far your two circuits are in opposite directions. At the moment
they are still taking the position at least that a joint will will
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destroy the marital deduction. Now what the effectiveness of
it is going to be, I do not know. I think it depends on whether
there is a contest. I think Dan Stubbs can probably tell you more
about that than I can.
What is the present status of the decisions on it?
not checked it for a while.

I have

DANIEL STUBBS: We are about to get a mandate from the
Tax Court so far as Nebraska is concerned in line with the Autry
case. I do not have it yet. They have agreed to it so I don't like
to get to theHALE MCCOWN: We are getting close to closing time.
have one or two other topics that I wanted to cover.

I

Leo, would you cover the question of transactions between a
partner and the partnership?
LEO EISENSTATT:

Yes, Hale.

Going back to the opening remarks, the first topic I covered,
the code in specific words says that the partnership is a separate
entity to be considered in the same light as any stranger, and the
transactions between the partners with the partnership are to be
treated as if they were disinterested persons, except in a few
cases.
Now in this regard you must keep separate the distinction
between transactions with the partnership and contributions to a
partnership. If the partner contributes a thousand dollars to a
partnership for a ten percent interest, that is not a taxable transaction. However, if he were to sell an automobile to the partnership for five hundred dollars and receive money for it, that is not
a contribution but a taxable transaction, and in treating that on
his return he would consider it just as if he had sold it to any
stranger.
Now the1·e are exceptions to when this type of treatment will
be permitted, and that exception deals with controlled partnerships. If a partner owns fifty percent or more of a partnership's
capital or profits, then he will not be permitted to take any loss on
that transaction.
Now the same rule applies to a partnership having transactions with another partnership; if there is a fifty percent ownership factor in both partnerships and then the losses will not be
recognized or allowed.
And there is one other situation where the entity rule so far
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as transactions between partner and partnerships are not recognized, and I suppose that the best example to apply to it would be
in the case of depreciable business property or a non-capital asset.
Any gain recognized in a transaction with a partnership in which
the grantor owns eighty percent of the interest in the capital
p-r0fits of th€ partnership, why, they tax him as the gain on sueh
a transaction as ordinary income. And there is the specific provision in the code and proposed regulations are declaratory of it
and the examples given in the proposed regulations make that
clear.
So keep in mind that partners may, by observing the provisions of this controlled partnership, have their own businesses.
They can still retain the controlled section and jurisdiction of
property so, long as they do not involve themselves in the controlled partnership feature, and they can get losses. In other
words, you have under your control the ability to, in a sense,
hold onto that asset and at the same time take the partnership
loss. You can pick it off in a year when your father has a considerable income, for example, take some transaction in which a
loss would ordinarily be recognized, he does not really want to
get rid of. The exception to the entity rule then applies strictly
to recognizing losses in controlled partnerships where the person
involved owns fifty percent or more of the capital profits.
HALE MCCOWN: Thanks very much. We are now open for
questions from the floor.
VOICE: On the question of joint tenancies, assume that a
husband buys a piece of real estate for three thousand dollars and
puts it in his name and his wife's name, and he dies, and upon
the date of death it is worth ten thousand dollars, and that is all
of the estate he had; he had no estate; that is all of the property
he had.
Does it take the new stepped up basis?
JOHN C. MASON: Assuming that he bought it after the '54
code went into effect. That is assuming that the date of death
was after December 31, '53.
VOICE: The point of it is, he does not have to have a sh·ty
..
thousand dollar estate.
VOICE: I have a question. I would like to question the panel
concerning the state tax and income tax deductions.

If you take the attorney's fees, for example, on the income
tax deduction, do you have a greater adjusted gross estate in
figuring the marital deduction?
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HALE MCCOWN:

John, do you want to answer that one?

VOICE: Do you follow me? Instead of taking the deduction
off the estate which you are permitted to do, you take it off the
income tax.
JOHN C. MASON: It is a question of whether you have to
take the deduction in the state tax for the attorney's fees to adjust the fees for the purpose of computing marital tax deductions.
VOICE:

I don't know.

JOHN C. MASON: I would think not. I would think that you
would only be entitled to take the deductions which you are claiming for estate tax purposes in order to determine the adjustable
gross estate in order to compute the marital deduction, but it is
just a guess. I do not know.
VOICE: Then you can hurt the children. You give the wife
more-I do not know if that is the law or not, but I will put it
up to you.
HALE MCCOWN: I should think as an offhand comment that
that probably is the situation. You do not use it or claim it; then
your net and your marital deduction ·would be figured on the
estate as computed, and it would therefore increase your marital
deduction.
VOICE:

And injure the people taking the residue.

JOHN C. MASON: I think that you raised a very interesting
point which was not really involved in these papers, but it is collateral to what you are talking about when you say it would
injure the children, for example. I think that there is an area
which could well be examined by all of us and could well be the
subject of papers or studies on the duties of an executor or an
attorney in administering an estate where there can be that sort
of situation.
You have conflicting interests between the widow and the
children. We are concerned with it presently in connection with
a situation where a formula clause has been used, and you normally would go into an inheritance tax appraisal, for example, and
try to get as low a valuation as possible, and in setting up the
estate tax return you would try to get as low a valuation as possible on all the property.; but when you have conflicting interests,
with some- properties going into the marital deduction part of
the estate and others going into the residuary part of the estate,
you can not do that because it would hurt somebody, as you say,
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and what the duties of the various people connected in a fiduciary
capacity with the administration of the estate are taxed under
the situation, I am not entirely sure, but it is an interesting problem to think about and one to be aware of.
VOICE: If I could comment on that, I think something that
we can all watch in drafting is to give the executor absolutely discretionary power to determine whether to take those deductions
one way or the other, thus avoiding that problem of whether you
can or cannot do it.

HALE McCowN: You also get into the problem of income.
Supposing you have one beneficiary who is entitled to the income,
and you take the deductions on the income tax return. The effect
then is a great deal more benefit to that income beneficiary than
to the residual ones in the estate, no matter who they might be,
so I do think that those suggestions are good.
VOICE: It is not conclusive that an asset is worth what it
brings at public sale under the present law-is that right?

HALE MCCOWN:

Excuse me, I did not get that.

VOICE: If an asset in an estate is sold at public sale, that
is not conclusive of its value, is it?

HALE MCCOWN: Well I would say normally it has been
treated so. At least the department normally has treated it so.
You have the provision that if you have a sale within a year that
value is the value, and of course it would depend on your optional
valuation date there. Of course that might make a difference, for
example.
VOICE: Well I am thinking of unproductive leases, for instance. They get rooked on the appraisement. Now what I
thought was that the Bar Association ought to get behind the
proposition and have the Treasury either make a regulation or
amend the law, if necessary, that if you have an asset in an
estate which has a potential value, I mean, it has a present value
if you sell it on the open market, but when you go to appraise it,
they appraise it on its potential capacity, and a lot of times your
productive stuff wouldn't be sufficient to pay the inheritance tax
on an unproductive asset.

Now why would it not be a good rule and why should we not
contend for the proposition that if that asset is sold that the
heirs or beneficiaries could buy it at public sale and that would
establish the value in order to protect it for the heirs? For instances, on all leases. Now would that make sense?
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HALE McCowN: Well, I do not know. Again it is a question
of valuation. There's a factual question, and whenever you have
a valuation problem you are likely to have some trouble with the
department. Normally, however, if it has been a public sale I
do not think they are going to raise too much of a question; if
you have it limited to the family or something of that sort you
may have some trouble.
VOICE: The only time they question it is when part of the
family buys it at public sale, and they say, "Well, of course, then
the sale is rigged." If we could get avmy from that thing, I
vrnuld be happy and satisfied. That is when the department comes
in and says, "He got what he had in it. He paid a small price
for it, and we are going to soak him."
Now why would it not be a good idea for the department to
make the rules on public sale, make it possible so that you are
not paying on an unproductive asset, which you would pay the
present market on it now, but you want the family to have that
potential?
HARRY B. COHEN: You would still get away from it if you
have your public sale and have your family member be the highest
bidder.
HALE MCCOWN: I was going to say if I had that situation
and I had a public sale and somebody bought it at a public sale,
I would go right ahead with it.
HARRY B. COHEN:
litigation there.

That might be, but you have a lot of

VOICE: Why would it not be a good idea to make the recommendation that if an asset is sold at a public sale it establishes
conclusively its value, which it does not do today. It is the best
evidence, but it is not conclusive. That is the point I am trying
to bring out.
(Thereupon, at 4 o'clock p. m., the meeting was adjourned.)
SECTION ON INSURANCE LAW
Jesse D. Cranny, Esq.
Chairman

"Developments in Standard Automobile Coverages" ................................................ Floyd 0. Terbell, Esq.
Chicago
Lumbermans Mutual Casualty Co.
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DEVELOPMENTS IN STANDARD AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY
COVERAGE
By

F. 0. Terbell
The policy which is the subject matter of this paper is officially known as "Standard Provisions for Automobile Liability
Policies." It is the "Fifth Revision" and became effective April
1, 1955. In promulgating this revision to its membership, the
Bureaus' interpretive bulletin requires the members for all policies
written on the older form on or before April 1st and outstanding
as of that date to interpret such older edition policies with respect
to accidents occurring on and after April 1st so as to afford any
broader grants of protection as to the same coverages. The companies rely upon this bulletin because there was not simultaneously
prepared an amendatory endorsement to be used with the old
policy until the companies' supplies of those printings were exhausted. On and after July 6, 1955, the Bureau membership are
required to use the Fifth Revision.
To fully comprehend the significance of the standard provisions program, a brief look into its historical origin seems worth
while. In the early '30's and with the rapid growth of automobile
insurance, all companies were faced with filing problems necessary to meet a multiplicity of state regulations. Even at that
date approval of policy forms for writing automobile insurance
was required in a number of states. Almost simultaneously two
voluntary industry associations, the American Mutual Alliancelater replaced by the Mutual Casualty Insurance Rating Bureauand the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, began exploring a program of policy uniformity for their respective members.
About the same time the Insurance Section of the American Bar
Association became interested in related legal problems. Among
other things, this section set about compiling an annotation of
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prov1s10ns commonly found in automobile policies. Eventually
these activities became a united effort from which evolved the
first standard automobile policy. As the work of developing the
auto policy progressed, the Bureau committees sought and received valuable assistance and advice from representatives of the
Insurance Section of the American Bar Association as well as
other interested groups. These various endeavors culminated in
the first standard provisions automobile policy which became effective January 1, 1936.
Viewed in the light of twenty years' experience, the manner
in which this program has developed, the breadth of its acceptance, and the way it functions, particularly in the way of state
filings, is worthy of some comment. While the standard provisions policy is not a statutory policy such as the standard fire
policy, at the same time many state insurance laws establish
standards for writing automobile insurance. It is not uncommon
for such insurance laws to lay down requirements for prior approval of policies before they are used by any company.1 The
more modern insurance rating laws which give recognition to
rating bureaus acting on behalf of their member companies also
recite requirements as to policy filings and approval.2 It, therefore, is to be observed before standard language is ever used in
a policy form by any company. It is first filed by the two Bureaus
with the insurance supervisory authority which in turn approves
the standard provisions as appropriate policy terminology. Once
so approved, the Bureaus' instructions to the member companies
state : "This policy is expressed in standard language which may
not be amended and no part of which may be altered except ...."
(The exceptions are noted later.) Therefore under the Standard
Program, a member company must strictly adhere to the language
in the several parts of the policy.
The mandatory aspect of the program has now been sanctioned by state regulations in thirty-odd states. In the areas
where the standard policies are used, the legal rule for interpreting an insurance police-being the language of the company, is to
be strictly construed against it-is not in complete harmony with
l Section 44-34A, Nebraska Insurance Code:
"No insurance policy or
certificate of any kind shall be issued or delivered in this state unless and
until a copy of the form thereof has been filed with the Department of
Insurance and approved by it."
:i Section 44-1412, Nebraska Rating Law 1947:
"Beginning ninety days
after September 7, 1947, no insurer shall make or issue a contract or
policy except in accordance with filings which are in effect for said insurer as provided in Section 44-1401 to 44-1442."
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the current practice of policy preparation. Rather it approaches
a legal fiction, for Insurance Department approval is not always
a simple ministerial function. At numerous points policy language reflects Departmental rulings. This rule of construction was
first evolved long before the first standard automobile policy or
before there was any such orderly process regulating policy terminology. It is not my thought that this rule of construction is to
be disregarded simply because of increased state regulation of
insurance generally and policy forms in particular. Is it, nevertheless, not plausible to suggest the very breadth of the acceptance
of "standard language," coupled with the stamp of approval placed
thereon by insurance directors, is sufficient to bring this rule of
strict construction into question? After all, a basic function of
insurance directors is protecting the public interest. No longer
is it axiomatic that a Bureau insurance company is solely responsible for the words in its policy. Gradually and with increasing prevalence, courts seem to take judicial notice of the standard character of the policy before them. 3 While most such comments
have been by way of dicta, at least in a few instances the fact
that the policy was "standa1·d" appears to have been partially
persuasive as to the result.
The modern rating laws, such as Nebraska's, spell out in
considerable detail the director's responsibility for approving underwriting rules and i·ates applicable to the grants of coverage as
reflected in the underwriting manuals prepared by the National
Bureau. Under these rating laws, coupled with Bureau membership, the companies, broadly speaking, are obligated to adhere
not only to the approved rates but to provide the protection expressed by those manual rules. In essence, standard provisions
are the expression of such underwriting bases. In one state at
least, a court has allowed the introduction of a manual rule by
way of explanatory proof of the sense of the words used in the
policy.4
3 I. L. Logging Co. vs. Manufacturers and ''\'holesalers Indemnity Exchange, (Ore. 1954) 275 P. 2d 226. 229; Farm Bureau l\Iutual Auto Insurance Company vs. :\Iarr (USDC-N.J.-1955) 128 F. Supp, 67, 68; Continental Casualty Co. Ys. Padgett (USCA-4th Cir.-SC-1955) 219 F. 2d 133,
137; Seavey vs. Erickson (l\Iinn., 1955) 69 N. W. 2d 889, 891; Koehn vs.
Union Fire Insurance Co. (1950) 152 Neb. 254; 40 N. W. 2d 874, 878;
Bazar Ys. Great American Indemnity Co. (N. Y. Ct. App.-1954) 119 N. E.
2d 346, 4 AC 2d 791.
4 Kennedy vs. (Amer.) Lumbermens 1\Iutual Casualty Co., 85 NYS 2d
428. "We conclude the defendant (insurer) by adopting the rule (Underwriting Manual) followed by annexing the amendatory endorsement . . .
extending the policy . . . fully intended to make that rule applicable to
Insuring Agreement V of the policy."
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It may be well to emphasize this is a program of "standard
provisions" rather than "standard policies." Under the previously
noted exception in the general instructions, companies are given
options for including or omitting any major insuring agreement
and all policy provisions relating solely to that class of insurance.
Moreover, the companies are allowed certain latitudes as to the
arrangement of the several parts of the policy. In a few instances they have the option of combining provisions. For example, the limits of liability may be stated either as a policy condition or as an integral part of an insuring agreement.
Turning directly to the changes brought about in the Fifth
Revision, one of the most significant innovations is in the definition of "insured." If the named insured is an individual, his
resident spouse is given approximately an equal status. The resident spouse no longer need prove the actual use of the automobile
was with the named insured's permission, express or implied.
Furthermore, the resident spouse can now extend permission to
another so that such permissive user becomes an "insured." This
extension of coverage to the spouse is further reflected in a comparable provision in the basic medical payments. The same intent
is reflected in modifications made in the "temporary substitute,"
the "newly acquired" and the "use of other automobiles" provisions.
The definition of "insured" makes the policy applicable to
many persons or interests other than the named insured. The
inclusion of such multiple interests in the term "the insured" has
created interpretive problems. Questions such as: Are the omnibus insured's rights the equivalent of the named insured's? Conversely, does the inclusion of these additional insureds curtail the
rights of the named insured? Does a breach of the policy by one
insured affect the coverage afforded another? Does the policy
afford coverage to an omnibus insured for a claim made by the
named insured? Heretofore a determination of these questions
turned on whether the policy was so drawn as to treat all insureds as a class or as individual interests; whether "the insured"
should be interpreted severally or joint and several.5 On this

u For an able discussion of the principle of severability, see "Who is
the Insured in the Automobile Policy?" by Norman E. Risjord, General
Counsel, Employers Insurance Corp., and June i\I. Austin. 5 Fed. of Insurance Counsel 52, 61, 1954. Cited with approval in Employers Mutual
Ys. Byers. 114 A. 2d 888.
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point there has been a difference of judicial opinion.6
For the Standard Provisions policies, such questions have
been resolved by the insertion of a new condition, Severability of
Interest. This condition negates the class construction by specifically saying, "The term 'the insured' is used severally and not
collectively . . . ." This means all policy provisions applicable to
liability coverage are to be construed according to the particular
insured against whom claim is made or suit is brought. The
change which has been effected by this new condition can be best
illustrated by the much discussed case, Standard SU1·ety vs. Maryland Casualty, 119 NYS 2d 795. Here the holder of a general
liability policy and the owner of a steam-shovel sought protection
as an omnibus insured under an automobile policy because of an
injury to the truck driver, an employee of the named insured in
an automobile policy. The truck driver's injury occurred in the
process of unloading the steam shovel. The automobile insurer
argued the omnibus clause did not apply because, by virtue of
the employee exclusion, the named insured would be denied coverage if the same claim were being made against him. In upholding the denial, the court said, "The purpose of the exclusion is
to exclude certain risks or probabilities of injury which the insurer considered too great to cover. . . . The risk was not that
an injured employee of an insured would sue or otherwise claim
against his own employer, but that the employee of any user of the
'insured' vehicle would be injured. The exclusion ... should be
interpreted in terms of injuries to be excluded, not in terms of
the persons who are to be indemnified." Subsequent to this decision and before the new automobile policy was promulgated, the
two Bureaus issued an interpretive bulletin expressing the underwriting intent on which the severability condition is predicated by
stating the exclusion in question is to be interpreted severally so
that it will apply only to the interest against whom the claim is
made or suit is brought. This bulletin, issued in face of the aforementioned contrary judicial expression, as an implement of the
standard provisions program, has legal significance. It makes
clear the severability condition is to be considered as replacing
the judicial interpretation found in Standard Surety and other
6 Pullen vs. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. (La. App.), 72 So.
2d 353; Associated Indemnity Corp. vs. Wachsmith (Wash.) 99 P. 2d
420, 127 ALR 531; Standard Surety and Casualty Co. vs. Maryland Casualty Co., 100 NYS 2d 79; Continental Casualty Co. vs. Pierce (Miss.) 154
So. 279; Purcell vs. Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Co. of N. Y. (Texas)
260 S. W. 2d 134; Kaifer vs. Georgia Casualty Co., 67 F. 2d 309; Shanahan
vs. Midland Coach Lines (Wisc.) 67 N. W. 2d 297; Employers' Mutual
Liability Insurance Co. vs. Byers (N. H.) 114 A. 2d 888.
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similar cases. In fact after the Standard Surety case the Bureaus
participated amicus curiae in another New York case involving an
analogous point arising from a suit by a named insured against
an omnibus insured. This decision supported the severability
principle. 7
The proposition that the insurer's duty to defend is only coextensive with its obligation to pay on behalf of the insured, with
a few minor exceptions, has been generally recognized.8 A test
most commonly applied by the courts in deciding whether the
insurer correctly refuses to defend a suit is to look at the allegations in the complaint. If those allegations state a cause of action within the coverage, the insurer is bound to defend even
though the facts of its investigation point to an ultimate possibility of no coverage. As a corollary, it was also believed an
insurer was not required to defend additional actions if its policy
limit had been exhausted.9 In fact some companies held to the
view that, after exhausting the limits in payment of judgments
or settlements of claims, they were entitled to return pending
lawsuits to the policyholder if in doing so, his rights were not
prejudiced.
In American Employers vs. Gobel, 131 NYS 2d 393, the court
took exception to these general principles. After characterizing
as frivolous and captious arguments that the duty to defend was
no broader than the duty to pay, it concluded that, even though
the total ad damnum on eleven suits already filed far exceeded
the policy limit and more suits were anticipated, the insurer was
nevertheless obliged to defend at least the pending actions. This
decision, among other cases, cites Michigan Poultry vs. Hawkeye
Casualty, 298 N. W. 114. The court in this suit strongly relied
upon the introductory wording of an older defense agreement:
"It is further agreed that as respects insurance afforded by this
policy ... the company shall..." The justice in the Gobel case
did not take into account this introductory statement had been
changed to "as respects such insurance as is afforded by other
7 Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. vs. General Casualty of America, N. Y.
Sup. Ct. App. Div. (l\Iay 10, 1955) 23 L. W. 2613, 140 NYS 2d 670. In
considering the coverage agreement with the definition of insured, the
court concluded, "They express an undertaking on the part of the company to indemnify an authorized user . . . regardless of who makes the
claim against him. The coverage afforded is full and complete. . . . "
s "Insurer's Duty to Defend," J. P. Faude, Assistant General Counsel,
Aetna Casualty Company, Jnsumnce C01msel Jow"?W..l, Vol. XV, Oct. 1948,
p, 331.
9 Lumbermens l\Iutual Casualty Company vs. :McCarthy, SA 2d 750.
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terms of this policy ... the company shall..." This change made
in 1946, with the expectation of overcoming the Michigan Poultry
decision, was an attempt to state more clearly the defense agreement and the undertaking to pay damages are not several and
independent. In American Casualty vs. Howa,,rd (USCA 4th Cir.)
187 Fed. 2d 322, after the peliey limit had been exhausted, the
court did not agree that the insurer was relieved under its agreement " ... to defend any suit," etc., and e:ll..-pressed belief in the
proposition that the defense agreement was independent of other
related coverage provisions in the policy.
Largely as a result of the Howard and Gobel decisions, another editorial refinement has been made in the introductory
statement of the defense agreement. In addition, the subsections
have been re-arranged. The subsections relating to the defending
of litigation have been separated from the provision for supplementary payment such as bond premiums, court costs, interest,
immediate medical and other expenses. The concluding provision
which refers to applicable limits of liability now modifies only
the supplementary payments subsection. By implication, the defense agreement in subsection (a) is, therefore, subject to the
applicable limit of liability.
The definition of "automobile" is a vital insuring agreement
of this policy. This edition accomplishes a number of editorial
refinements. Only three points of significance will be mentioned.
All previous policies required the automobile covered be described
by motor or serial number in the declarations. The companies
now have the option of preparing a policy either on a describedcar basis as in the past or, if they so desire, incorporating additional language in the described auto definition: ". . . or, if none
is so described, any private passenger automobile owned on the
effective date of this policy by the named insured or by his spouse
if a resident of the same household." For the no-description
policy, there are two additional provisions. First, a declaration
by the insured of the total number of owned private passenger
automobiles on the effective date of the policy. Second, a definition of "private passenger automobile."
The definition of "automobile" has further been expanded
with regard to trailers. This definition has been broadened to include any non-described trailer which is designed for use with
a private passenger automobile if it (1) is being used w~th either
a private passenger automobile for either business or non-business
purposes or (2) is being used with a commercial or truck-type
automobile for non-business purposes only. These qualifications
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are stated negatively so the coverage continues while a trailer is
not attached to a commercial automobile. The effect of this
change is to provide liability insurance without additional premium charge not only for the utility trailer but also for the home
trailer which was formerly excepted from this definition.
The newly acquired automobile definition has been changed.
"Acquired" still implies ownership must arise subsequent to the
effective date of the policy. It still distinguishes between a new
automobile replacing the described automobile and the one which
is an additional automobile. For the replacement automobile the
coverage is fully automatic without any time requirement of notice. For the replacement automobile there is no requirement
the company insure all owned automobiles. If it is an additional
automobile, automatic insurance will be afforded provided (1)
all automobiles owned by both the named insured and spouse on
the date of the delivery of the new automobile are covered by the
company and (2) thirty days' notice of acquisition is given.
The language of this revised agreement should be distinguished from that in older policies which were the basis of two
decisions in your jurisdiction. In Home Mutual vs. Rose, 150 Fed.
2d 201, the court concluded the reference to insuring all owned
automobiles signified that portion of the agreement was to apply
only if the contract had been prepared as a "blanket policy." In
an insurance man's vernacular, the term "blanket policy" is unfortunate because it is used to characterize a policy embracing a
hazard by a class description and without identifying the units
falling within such class. Excepting the no-description option for
individually owned private-passenger automobiles, this policy
never functions as a blanket policy in that it requires a specific
description of all vehicles insured. Fundamentally, the court was
right in the Rose case, but its language may lead to confusion
because at least one standard reference work has adopted the
Rose opinion without any editorial comment.10
In Koehn vs. Union Fire, 40 N. W. 2d 874, an insured, under
a policy describing a pleasure car, acquired an additional commercial automobile. The opinion stresses the policy provision
which said coverage applies only " ... to the extent applicable to
all such previously owned automobiles. . . ." Since the purpose
of use for the described car was pleasure and business and since
the policy draws a distinction between such use and commercial
use, the court concludes coverage was not to be extended to the
10 See annotation 34 A.L.R. 2d 936.
The text also quotes the First
Edition provision which has long since been replaced.
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additional commercial vehicle. This agreement is no longer limited
to the extent coverage was initially provided for owned automobiles; therefore we no longer expect to get the result of the
Koehn case.
From its inception the automobile liability coverage agreements read '' ... because of injury ... caused by accident." Various aspects of the meaning of "accident" have been before the
courts on innumerable occasions. Time permits consideration of
only one aspect which until comparatively recently had seemed to
be relatively free from dou}?t. The auto policy, like the other
liability policies, state limits of liability for the bodily injury
coverage in terms of "each person" and "each accident" and for
property damage liability in the terms of "each accident" only.
In the middle .'20's a California court was presented with a
question11 of applying the property damage limit to a multipleclaimant case. In this litigation the insured's automobile struck
another vehicle, damaging its steering mechanism and causing a
collision with a third. The question was, was this one accident
or two? The majority answered "one accident," reasoning the
term referred to the cause and not the resulting damage or injury.
Stressing the cause rather than the resulting injury is entirely in
harmony with the use of" . . . because of injury . . . caused by
accident" in the standard liability agreements. This phraseology
has been purposely used to overcome decisions under the older
insuring agreements which read "accidentally sustained" or "accidentally suffered" and which had been interpreted from the
viewpoint of the person injured.
Anticipating St. Paul vs. Rutland, ................ Fed. 2d ............... .
(August 24, 1955), the California court observed, "It would no
more be correct to say of such a case that there were two accidents than it would be to predicate two or more accidents on a
general freight train wreck merely because two or more cars in
the train might have been demolished in the same catastrophe."
The case of Anchor Ca.sualty vs. McCaleb, 178 Fed. 2d 322,
arose under a general liability policy covering oil-well drilling
operations. The policy had both an "each accident" and an "aggregate" property damage liability limit. There is some dispute on
the facts, but it seems that as the result of a blowout the well
spewed sand, mud, oil, etc., on the adjoining property. The well
was out of control some fifty hours, during which time the wind
shifted, thus bringing about claims by the owners and the ten11

See Hyer vs. Inter-Insurance Exchange 246 P1055.
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ants of several pieces of property. The following is the significant statement on the limits question : "The blowing out of the
well was not a single accident but a series of events, a catastrophe.
Numerous accidents were the product of this motivating force
and the wind as a supervening force. The eruptions continued
intermittently for over two days; and during this period the wind
changed from time to time blowing mud and sand on different
properties. The wording 'each accident' as used in the policy,
must be construed from the point of view of the person whose
property was injured." One of the statements relied upon is
from Couch.12
Now in the Rutland case the insured motorist collided with
a freight train, causing a wreck. As a result of that wreck, cars
owned by sixteen different carriers were damaged and, in addition, there was damage to the operating railroad's right of way.
The automobile policy had an "each accident" property damage
limit of $5,000. The court was called upon to determine whether
the insurer was liable for only $5,000 or whether the limit was
to be applied repeatedly to the claim of each owner. In its original opinion of December 15, 1954, one panel of judges in the
fifth circuit, relying on the same statement from Couch and a
:::iimilar statement from Corpus Juris, concluded the policy was
"strongly indicative of an intention to provide coverage for sP.veral
or any number of accidents which may happen in a single wreck
or other occurrence." The court cites McCaleb with approval.
Upon granting of a petition for rehearing, the original opinion was withdrawn. The case was heard by another panel, and
a second opinion reversing the earlier holding was filed August
24, 1955. In the second opinion the court observed, " . . . when
ordinary people speak of an 'accident' in the usual sense, they
are referring to a single, sudden, unintentional occurrence. They
normally use the word 'accident' to describe the event no matter
how many persons or things are involved." Judge Dawkins goes
on to observe that, in the absence of cited cases, the court would
be obliged to conclude it was the intention of the parties to this
policy that the word "accident" be given that meaning; that the
policy in question had three different coverages, one a bodily injury liability coverage which was on an occurrence basis, another being automobile property damage liability which was on
12 Cyclopedia- of Insurance Law, Volume 5, page 4136.
"If one cause
operates upon several at one time, it cannot be regarded as a single incident, but injury to each individual is a separate accident." Couch cites
only an old English case: South Staffordshire Tramways Co., Ltd., vs.
The Sickness and Accident Assurance Association, Ltd., (1891) 1 Q. B. 402.
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an each-accident basis, and the third being a property damage
other than automobile subject to both an each-accident and to an
aggregate limit. The difference in the treatment of the limits
in the various insuring agreements was commented upon as manifesting an intended difference. Finally, he concluded that the word
"accident" as used in the declarations is intended to be interpreted
from the standpoint of cause rather than effect.
In disposing of the McCaleb case, the court points out the
factual difference by observing the damage resulted from a series
of events rather than a single collision. Stress is placed upon
the "catastrophe" aspect of the oil-well blowout. This is the rule
which is expected to prevail under the new limits condition which
states the declared limit comprehends "all dama.ges arising out
of the injury to or destruction of all property of one or more
persons or organizations, including the loss of use thereof, as the
result of any one accident."
While the Rutland case was pending on rehearing, two other
cases arose. One is Truckers InsU?·ance Exchange vs. Rohde, Superior Court, Yakima County, Washington. Rohde, while driving
down the highway, met three motorcycles. The first two motorcycles each had a passenger in addition to the operator. The first
motorcycle collided with Rohde's vehicle, caromed into the second
motorcycle and collided with the third. Two of the cyclists were
killed. At the time of this accident the policy was on an occurrence basis, but subsequently it was amended by endorsement to
"each person," "each accident." In his opinion the trial justice
discusses the multiple-accident question from the standpoint of
the people injured, reaching the conclusion there was an accident
or occurrence on each impact. Reference is made to both McCaleb
and Rutland.13 This litigation is still pending.
There is also pending in a Federal District Court in Pennsylvania the case of Tri-State Roofing Company vs. New Amsterdam.
which was held on the docket for decision on the rehearing in
the Rutland case and from last 1·eport is still pending.
To summarize, it seems fair to observe that this new limits
condition, by its very difference in treatment of multiple claimants, in contrast with the similar condition for bodily injury,
creates a clearly discernible distinction. For the bodily injury
liability, the limits condition first treats the individual claimant's situation and then makes the proviso for each accident sub13 The Court also considered:
Bruener vs. Twin City Fire, 222 P. 2d
833; Perkins vs. Fireman's Fund, 112 P. 2d 670.
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ject to the each-person qualification. The property damage limit
says the each-accident limit shall always be applicable irrespective of the number of persons whose property is damaged in a
single happening or accident.
In speaking of the financial responsibility (F. R.) condition
of the policy, it is necessary to distinguish between the "security"
provisions and the "proof" provisions of these statutes. Some of
the confused thinking concerning this condition may be attributable to court decisions which are not crystal clear as to which
section of the law is being applied. In fact, some cases seem to
treat decisions under motor vehicle carrier laws as authority in
passing upon the effect of the financial responsibility condition.
Such a construction is contrary to the policy drafters' intent. In
examining judicial interpretation of this condition, it is necessary
to distinguish between the older type F. R. laws and the more
modern safety responsibility laws. Most of the older statutes
contain only proof provisions applicable to future accidents. By
far the greater number of decisions construing the automobile
policy arose under the older type law. 14
The "security" provision of an F. R. law comes into play
when an accident occurs by calling for evidence of existing insurance. Evidence of such insurance counteracts the penalty
feature in the proof section. Many of these F. R. laws specify a
standard provisions automobile liability policy with stated limits
as adequate evidence of security. Such evidence of insurance
under this section is usually designated as an "SR-21." An SR-21
simply means the motorist voluntarily carries automobile liability
insurance. The security provisions of an F. R. law do not interfere with the contractual rights and obligations of the parties.
The policy exclusions and conditions are controlling as to the
insured, the insurer and the injured third person. They are not
affected by either the F. R. condition or F. R. statutes.
H Specific authorities have not been cited, rather the reader is referred
to "Analysis of Policy Defenses under F. R. Laws," Allan P. Gowan, Insurance Counsel Journal, Vol. XXI, July, 1954, page 295.
Later decisions: New Zealand Insurance Co. vs. Holloway (La.) 123
F. Supp. 642; held unless policy was actually a required policy, the F. R.
law was inapplicable.
Tri-State Insurance Co. vs. Ford, 120 F. Supp. 118; held the Texas
F. R. law did not abrogate a defense of misrepresentation of prior cancellation as against injured third persons.
Farmers Insurance Exchange vs. Ledesma, 214 F. 2d 495; the court
concluded insurer by policy terms had assumed an absolute liability even
though the F. R. law did not apply to the first accident but cites no authorities supporting the decision.
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The "proof" provisions of the F. R. law pertain to future
accidents. They either apply after an accident in which the
motorist was uninsured or in some states apply because of a conviction of a motor vehicle violation. To satisfy the proof provisions, most statutes characterize the policy as a "motor vehicle
liability pa!iey." Certification of the policy t0 some state authority is usually required. Such a certificate is commonly known as
an "SR-22." In keeping with the concept these statutes are
designed for, the protection of the accident victim, such a certified policy in a sense becomes a statutory policy because now the
insurer's liability is controlled by the terms of the statute relating to motor vehicle liability policies rather than the terms of
the policy.rn The terms of the statute will often result in the
abrogation of one or more limitations in the policy. Usually it
is expected that at least some, if not all, of the policy defens es are
not available to the company in an action brought by the injured
person or judgment creditor. When the policy is actually certified to the state authority and only as to accidents occurring
thereafter does the financial responsibility condition operate to
vary other terms of the policy. To clarify this intention, the
Fifth Revision modifies the opening statement in this condition
by saying, "When this policy is certified as proof of financial
responsibility for the future . . .. " To distinguish from the security situation, the word "proof" is used because that is the
term employed by most F. R. laws. For the certified policy, the
condition in effect reads the proof section of the statute into
the policy without the attachment of an endorsement amending
it to conform to the wording of the statute.
These remarks, lengthy though they may seem, by no means
cover all the Fifth Revision changes or the reasoning behind
them. In the allotted time I have sought to highlight those changes
believed to have the greatest over-all significance. In selecting
the changes discussed, I have tried to demonstrate that some are
aimed to clarify the policy on points that have been troublesome
in litigation. Others represent the evolutionary process by which
the companies try to meet the public's desire for more complete
protection.
Any member of the Joint Forms Committee, the drafters of
the standard provisions, I am sure, would readily concede that
the Fifth Revision is not a complete answer even to all the cur15 For a more comprehensiYe study, see "The l\Iotor Vehicle Liability
Policy under Financial Responsibility Laws" by Edward F. Earle, Insurance Law Journal, 1953, 678-684.

376

NEBRASKA ST ATE BAR ASSOCIATION

rent problems. The standard provisions policy is not a static
contract. The work of the committee is a continuous process
carried on by correspondence and by periodical meetings in which
members pool their experience to meet insurance needs. Believe it
or not, theirs is not a narrow company point of view. If some
changes appear to make the policy language more complex, consider that no small part of this complexity is attributable to
broader coverage.
intention of the parties is a basic element of contracts. Just
as it must be translated clearly and concisely into the covenants
of a lease by an attorney anticipating legal and practical problems unforeseen by the parties thereto, in a like manner the Forms
Committee seeks to weave the same elements and safeguards into an insurance policy. The difference is only one of degree, for
in no other private legal document is the expression of intent
subject to such precise and technical scrutiny. All or many parts
of standard provisions annually find their way into literally millions of contracts and, as a consequence, unanticipated factual
situations are bound to arise. When such situations arise, you
gentlemen aid in arriving at the answers. So it is with a degree
of pride and perhaps relief that the legal profession, the insurance
industry and our committee take note that only a minute percentage of these policies are ever presented to a court of last
reso1·t for interpretation.
THE TAXATlON OF LIFE INSURANCEWHERE DO WE STAND NOW?
By
Irving V. Brunstrom
Within the past fifteen years the subject of taxation has
become one of ever-increasing importance to both lawyers and
laymen. Almost no business deal of any consequence is executed
without some consideration of the taxes which may accrue as a
result of the transaction. A flood of literature on taxation has
been one outgrowth of this change in the American scene. Books,
articles and pamphlets pour from the presses, discussing one or
another of the technical phases of taxation, and the literature on
the taxation of life insurance has been no exception. The importance of life insurance and annuities as the foundation for
even the most modest estate is almost universally recognized today, and the impact of taxes on life insurance necessarily is the
subject of closer scrutiny than was the case thirty, or even twenty,
years ago. Loose-leaf services, books and papers without num-
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her have been published on the subject of making the best use of
life insurance and annuities, and the attendant tax consequences.
This being true, what contribution can be made by another
paper traversing such a well travelled road? One answer occurred; instead of placing under the microscope some technical
minutiae of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, or discussing the
uses of business insurance, for example, it might be worth while
to discard the laboratory equipment. Instead of examining the
needles on one branch of a pine tree, let us climb a hill and look
at the forest for a moment. To vary the metaphor, some of us
may have become like some doctors, specialists on the left nostril
only. It is difficult to retain a sense of perspective looking at
the left nostril, so let us back away and look at the whole animal.
A life insurance company has two sources of funds: premiums, and return on invested moneys. Any tax on a life insurance
company or on the funds paid to policyholders and beneficiaries
therefore must be imposed on one or both of these sources. There
are no other accumulations against which to levy a tax. These
facts may seem so patently obvious that they need not be said,
but once stated clearly, it also becomes obvious that a legislative
body must decide which of the two sources is to be taxed. Also
a tax of a certain type might be constitutional if levied against
premiums, for example, and unconstitutional if levied against income. A lack of understanding of these fundamentals may, and
in the past has, led to confusion and uncertainty.
For example, the United States levies an income tax on life
insurance companies. The Congress has struggled with this problem for forty-six years, and at the present time is re-examining
the whole theory of a proper basis for the tax. In this instance
the difficulty is basic: What is the income of a life insurance
company? Assuming, as Congress does, that it is proper to impose an income tax on life insurance companies, then Congress
has the power, under the sixteenth amendment, to impose a tax
only upon income, and not upon capital. All that need be determined is the net income of the company. How has Congress answered the question?
The Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909 imposed a tax upon "every corporation, joint stock company or association, organized for profit and having a capital stock represented by shares,
and every insurance company. . . ." 1 The basis of the tax for
insurance companies as well as for other corporations was the
" ... entire net income ... from all sources." Under the revenue
l

Tariff Act of August 5, 1909, Sec. 38.
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acts of 1913, 1916, 1917 and 1918 this continued to be the basis.2
How did the two sources of funds, premiums and investment return, fare under these laws? For the eleven years 1909-1920 the
gross income of life insurance companies was considered to be
their total revenue from the operation of the business and of their
income from all other sources within the taxable year. Premiums
were included in gross income, with claims paid on policies being
allowed as a deduction. Immediately a controversy arose over
the question whether that portion of the premium income returned
to policyholders as dividends was to be excluded from gross income. The insurance companies, of course, contended that such
dividends were merely the result of a deliberate overcharge and
hence were not taxable as income to the company. In 1911 the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue declared that these dividends
were not merely the return of an overcharge, but were distributions of surplus derived not only from overcharges but from
all sources of company income.3 However this theory was abandoned in the succeeding law. The government conceded that there
should be full deduction of dividends.
Another phase of the same problem came up in connection
with dividends applied to pay renewal premiums, to shorten the
premium-paying or endowment period, or to purchase paid-up
additions. Here the insurance companies argued that such dividends did not constitute income in the year they were so applied
by the company, and should not be included in determining taxable income for the year in which they were so applied. The
commissioner ruled adversely to the companies4 on the ground
that dividends transferred back to the company at the direction
of the policyholder constituted new taxable income received in the
year of application, even though the possession of the dividends
had been received by the company in a previous year and had remained in the company during the year they were applied to pay
renewal premiums, shorten the premium-paying or endowment
period, or purchase paid-up additions. The courts, however, did
not sustain the commissioner.0
2 Tariff Act of 1913, Sec. IIB (1); Rev. Act of 1916, Sec. 10; Rev.
Act of 1917. Sec. 1206 (1); Rev. Act of 1918, Secs. 213 and 233 (a) (1).
3 T.D. 1743, Treas. Dec. under Int. Rev. Law of the U.S., v. 14 (1911),
p. 134, at 136, 137.
4 Supm, note 3.
:; Mut. Ben. Life Ins. Co. vs. Herold, 198 Fed. 199 (D.C.N.J. 1912),
aff. 201 Fed. 918, cert. den. 231 U.S. 755; Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co.
vs. Eaton, 218 Fed. 188 (D.C. Conn. 1914); Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. vs.
Eaton, 218 Fed. 206 (D.C. Conn. 1914); Fink vs. Northwestern Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 267 Fed. 968 (1920).
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A second problem which arose under the 1909-1920 type of
income tax on insurance companies was the deduction allowed for
net additions to reserves required by law. The questions were
what was meant by the word "reserve" and what reserves were
"required by law." The argument raged for years, and resulted
in a. series of administrative rulings and court decisions not necessary to detail here. 6 Mention is made of these two problems only
to point up the fact that by 1921 it was considered advisable to
abandon the philosophy of taxing life insurance companies under
the general corporate tax law. The general corporate approach
was criticized at that time on practical grounds:
(1) There were constant disagreements between the Treasury
Department and life insurance companies.
(2) In a desire to avoid litigation the companies submitted
to many demands which they deemed unfair.
(3) When principles involving large amounts of tax were
involved, litigation was undertaken at great expense to
policyholders.
(4) After eleven years of experience during which companies were taxed on supposed net income, there were
still many matters in dispute.
There were also theoretical grounds for criticism:
(1) There was doubt about the constitutionality of the law.
Under the sbd;eenth amendment, Congress is not free to
declare that to be income which is not income. Serious
question existed about the right of the government to
tax premiums to a life insurance company as income,
particularly in the case of a mutual company.
(2) The tax did not bear equally upon different companies.
(3) It did not provide any certainty of income to the government.
(4) The amount of tax was not easily determinable, and
when determined was not a tax on net income.
( 5) The tax was collectible only after heavy e::qlense by both
companies and government.
61\fut. Ben. Life Ins. Co. vs. Herold, 198 Fed. 199 (1912); Reg. 33.
Art. 147(d); Reg. 33 (revised), Art. 240; Reg. 45, Art. 569; Maryland
Cas. Co. vs. U.S., 251 U.S. 342, 40 S. Ct. 155, 64 L. ed. 297 (1920); O.D.
427, C.B. 2, p. 216 (1920) and L.O. 1032, C.B. 2, p. 216 (1920); Fink
vs. Northwestern l\Iut. Life Ins. Co., 267 Fed. 968 (1920); U.S. vs. Boston
Ins. Co., 269 U.S. 197, 46 S. Ct. 91, 70 L. ed. 232 (1925); l\Iinn. Mut.
Life Ins. Co. vs. U.S., 66 Ct. Cl. 481, cert. den. 279 U.S. 856, 49 S. Ct.
352, 73 L. ed. 998 (1929).
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Therefore in 1920 three suggestions were made for a substitue for the general corporate approach. The first was a direct
tax on premiums. The second was a tax upon the amount of insurance issued. The third was a tax on so-called free interest
income. The only virtue of the first two approaches was simplicity. Speaking of a federal tax on premiums, this comment
was made:
A very serious objection is that the burden would be very unevenly
distributed, and it would fall with greatest weight upon the
younger and smaller companies whose interest income is small
compared with their premium income. The older companies with
many policies carrying high reserves naturally have a much larger
proportionate interest income than the young companies. Furthermore the older companies have upon their books a great many
paid-up policies from which a large interest income is derived,
but no premium income. The young companies have very few
such policies. A premium tax would also bear heavily upon industrial insurance.7

With reference to the second proposal, a tax on the amount
of insurance issued, objection was made that the entire burden
would be placed on new policyholders, and the greatest burden
would fall upon those insured under the cheaper plans. The
younger and smaller companies would be at a disadvantage compared with older and larger companies, as would companies issuing nonparticipating insurance as against those doing a business
on the participating plan. Further, the cost of industrial insurance would be greatly increased.
Both of these proposed taxes would have departed from the
income type of tax, and would have been excise or franchise taxes.
The third suggestion, for taxing so-called free investment income, had been made in 1918 by the Senate Finance Committee.
The recommendation was adopted by the Senate but was rejected
by the Conference Committee. In 1921 the reasoning underlying
the free investment income approach was given in the Senate Finance Committee hearing by Dr. T. S. Adams, tax adviser of the
Treasury Department. Investment income, by definition, included
only interest, dividends and rents, while capital gains and any
other type of income generally regarded as investment income
were excluded. Deductions included investment expenses and
amounts representing investment income needed for policy and
'Proc. Assn. Life Ins. Pres. 1920, p. 142. See this paper also for
general discussion of 1909-1920 period. See also Preliminary Report on
Federal Taxation of Life Insurance C01npanies to the Joint Connnittee on
Internal Revenue, 71st Cong. (1929).
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other obligations.8 In essence this was the theory adopted in
1921. However, since state laws fixed minimum standards for
reserves, and many companies, in the interest of conservatism,
set up higher reserves with consequent lower interest requirements, it was deemed fair to grant the same reserve interest deduction to all companies. This was done to avoid abvious discrimination and the penalizing of conservatism. As Dr. Adams
said:
It has been suggested-and I think it is obviously sound-that

the only true basis of income of a life insurance company is its
investment income-interest, dividends and rents it receives. The
premium payments it gets are a good deal like a bank deposit.
When it takes them over it creates an obligation such as the
obligation of a bank to return a deposit when it is called for.9

This about-face in the philosophy of life insurance company
taxation illustrates strikingly what may occur if sight is lost of
the two sources of funds with which this discussion began. As
Dr. Adams admitted in 1921, the inclusion of premium receipts in
the gross taxable income of life insurance companies was "one
of the faultiest parts of the income tax act." 10 The Supreme
Court of the United States some years later recognized this when
it said:
It had long been pointed out to Congre:;s that these receipts, ex-

cept as to a very minor proportion of each premium, were not true
income but were analogous to permanent capital investment.11

Since 1921, therefore, "life insurance companies" and "insurance companies other than life or mutual" have been taxed
under provisions of revenue acts and the Internal Revenue Codes
of 1939 and 1954 which are applicable specifically to such companies.
Some little space has been devoted to this history for purposes of illustration, as the whole concept of life insurance company taxation is again under examination.12 There is some reason to believe that governmental representatives are inclined to
s Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance ( 67th Cong., 1st
sess.) on H.R. 8245 (1921), p. 83.
9 Ibid., p. 83.
10 Supra, note 9.
11 Helvering vs. Oregon l\Iut. Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 267, at 269, 61 S.
Ct. 207, at 208, 85 L. ed. 180 (1940).
12 See "A Preliminary Statement of the Facts and Issues With Respect
to the Federal Taxation of Life Insurance Companies," Nov. 1954, prepared by the staff of the Subcommittee on the Taxation of Life Insurance
Companies, House ·ways and Means Committee.
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favor taxing "life insurance companies upon their total income
from all sources in the same manner as other corporations. Taxable income, in general, would consist of premiums and investment
income less (1) expenses and other deductions as provided in the
Internal Revenue Code for corporations generally; (2) total
amounts paid to policyholders by reason of death, maturity, or
otherwise, including policy dividends; and (3) net increases in
policy reserves excluding increases in contingent surplus reserves.
An approach similar in principle but different in application govened the taxation of life insurance companies from 1913 through
1920." 13 (Emphasis supplied.) If this proposal should be adopted,

we shall then have come the full circle, from a tax conceived in
ignorance and buried in collapse, through one radically different
in theory, back to the original concept refined as to details but
similar in principle. The outcome will be of interest to every
life insurance policyholder.
Is this discussion of interest to the practicing lawyer? Perhaps only insofar as he is interested in the theory and philosophy
of taxation. This paper assumed such an interest at the outset.
But perhaps there are more applications of historical surveys of
tax theory than may appear at first.
For example, historically the pre-eminent state tax on life
insurance has been a tax on premiums. The tax is paid annually
by the company. Then why should this tax be of interest to anyone but the company? For many years it was not. Let us look
at a little more history. In 1908 a committee of the National
Convention of Insurance Commissioners made a report to the
commissioners on life company taxation.14 One recommendation
was that such taxes should be reduced, and that "upon the insurance companies and their policyholders devolve the great burden
of responsibility for procuring these desirable changes. It is the
duty of the managers representing their policyholders to protect
in this legitimate manner their property from depletion by unjust
taxation."
What is the character of this tax on premiums and who actually pays it? The answers are obvious: it is a tax upon a capital
contribution, and the policyholder pays it. Looking back again
at our two sources of funds, we see this to be a direct tax upon
one source. It is a tax whose only justification is a desire for
revenue. It is imposed only upon the thrifty, upon those trying
note 12, at p. 25.
Proc. Nat. Conv. Ins. Commrs. 1908, pp. 59-61.

13 Supra,
H
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to make provision for the future of themselves and their families, provision which will prevent a future burden upon the state.
The objections to a tax on premiums have been noted earlier,
from the company standpoint. What are the advantages which
cause legislatures to overlook these objections? There appear to
be four such merits:
(1) The tax is reletively simple to compute.
(2) It is easy to collect.
(3) A state with no domestic life insurance companies
collects taxes in proportion to the premiums paid
by its residents.
( 4) The tax increases automatically as insurance in force
increases.
The inequities inherent in the tax are outweighed by these
facts.
What have been the results of the tax, apart from the raising
of premium rates made necessary by this excise? One result
has been the abandonment of the idea which originally underlay
the tax, that the companies should pay for the support of the
state departments which supervise them. Less than five percent
of the taxes collected are now used for that purpose. In addition, fees and examination expenses must be paid by the companies. Over ninety-five percent of the revenue now goes either
into state general funds or is earmarked for schools or some
other special purpose.
Another result has been one which came into being by accident, without design. Prior to World War II the word "annuity"
was one known principally to life insurance companies and to
wealthy individuals. But the passage of the Social Security Act,
the wage stabilization regulations during World War II, and the
increasing power of labor unions combined to bring the fringe
benefit to the fore. One such benefit, fostered and encouraged
by the 1942 Revenue Act, was the employee-pension plan. The
tax benefits given qualified pension plans were an invitation to
the establishment of such plans, especially during the period of
operation of excess profits taxes. Many such plans were underwritten by life insurance companies. Many were not. There are
several reasons which may influence an employer establishing an
employee-benefit program which will lead to the use of a noninsured as against an insured plan. Flexibility of operation is
one. Some employers have used a non-insured plan because they
believed lower costs would result.

384

NEBRASKA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION

Non-insured plans are feasible for the large employer. For
most smaller employers they are not. And one of the major influences militating toward the use of non-insured plans has been
the taxes which are imposed on insured, but not on non-insured
plans. For years efforts have been to secure lower state premium
taxes on annuities, and the allowance of a deduction for returned
annuity considerations, in an effort to place insured pension plans
on an equal plane with non-insured plans taxwise. In Nebraska,
for example, the Supreme Court held15 on May 27, 1955, that
annuity considerations received for annuity contracts are taxable under the premium tax statute.16 These efforts to date
have met with only a modicum of success. And it is not only in
the field of state premium taxes that this discrimination exists.
The federal income tax on life insurance companies has amounted
to a tax on annuity considerations from which non-insured trusteed plans are exempt. This was recognized in "A Preliminary
Statement of the Facts and Issues with respect to the Federal
Taxation of Life Insurance Companies" referred to previously:
This report is immediately concerned only with the taxation of
life insurance companies. However. possible actions in the noninsurance field that may have a bearing on this problem are discussed below.
One po:>sibility would be to impose a tax on noninsured plans corresponding to the insurance-company tax, for example, a tax of
6~{i percent of net investment income.
A difficulty raised in imposing such a tax on employee trusts is that it would require recalculation of the amounts necessary to provide employee benefits
where they are determined by contract. The employer would have
set up such a plan on the assumption that certain contributions on
his part would be adequate to meet the pension that he agreed to
pay. Imposing a tax corresponding to insurance-company tax
would require that he increase his contributions.11

Here we have a lesson in fundamental economics, already familiar to members of the bar, but which is only now seeping down
to those not so conversant with taxes, that a tax differential can
alter basic decisions and influence investments and the entire
course of a business. This lesson is being graphically illustrated
on television every Tuesday night, in the difficulty experienced
by contestants who have to decide whether to take $32,000 or try
for $64,000. The lesson is brought home forcibly to millions of
watchers that if the contestant is a single person with no other
taxable income he can keep about $18,000. The government takes
Bankers Life of Iowa vs. Laughlin, 70 N.W. 2d 474 (19551.
Secs. 77-907, 77-908, Neb. R.S. Supp. 1951.
17 Supm, note 8, at p. 40.

1:;

16
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the other $14,000 in income taxes. If he tries for the $64,000,
he can keep about $26,500, the government taking the remaining
$37,500. This is a purely incidental, but certainly a wholesome
bit of public education.
It seems reasonable to conclude that the taxes on annuities
paid by life insurance companies at the state and federal levels
have had the result of inducing many employers, particularly the
larger ones, to decide upon non-insured pension plans. This has
been recognized in the life insurance company income tax bills
introduced at the last session of Congress,18 in the provisions which
would permit the deduction from net investment income of 100%
of the investment income allocable to group annuities and pension
trust contracts relating to qualified retirement plans. One of
these two identical bills passed the House of Representatives July
18, 1955, but action on the bill was deferred in the Senate for
consideration at the next session of Congress. Final approval of
any tax legislation is always problematical, so that while such
theoretical reco'gnition of this situation is pleasing, it has had no
practical results as yet. The urgent need of the states for revenue yields a no more pleasing picture, as exemplified by the action
of the Minnesota legislature this year in imposing a 2% tax on
annuity considerations where no tax had been levied before. HI
There are good reasons for encouraging life insurance companies
to underwrite pension plans (the safety of their operations and
the actuarial soundness of their rates being among them) instead
of discouraging them by discriminatory taxation.
There is another part of the forest we might look at with a
critical eye to see whether it is composed mostly of evergreens or
of deciduous trees which will shortly shed their leaves. For example, what about the elimination of the premium payment test
for including life insurance proceeds in a decedent's estate? Is
this provision likely to remain in the code, and if not, why not?
And what use should be made of the provision? It may be assumed that all tax practitioners are familiar with this provision
and its history. For those who are not, it may be noted that from
1942 to 1954 the Federal Estate Tax Law20 provided that life insurance covering the life of a decedent must be included in his
gross estate if (1) the proceeds were payable to his estate, or
(2) the insured possessed any incidents of ownership at the time
of his death, or (3) the insured paid the premiums on the insurance, directly or indirectly.
is H.R. 7201, H.R. 7202, 84th Cong., 1st sess. (1955).
19 Ch. 2, Minn. Laws, 1st Spec. Sess. 1955.
20 Sec. 811 (g), I.R.C. 1939, as amended by Sec. 404, Rev. Act 1942.
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Under the 1954 code21 the third test was eliminated, but a
new provision was inserted, to the effect that life insurance must
be included in the decedent's gross estate if the decedent had a
reversionary interest in a policy on his life which exceeded 5 %
of the value of the policy immediately before his death.
There was ample reason for deleting the payment of premiums test, the principal one being that the test made life insurance
the only form of property which could not, for estate tax purposes, be given away by the insured while he was alive.
The Senate Finance Committee report on the 1954 code said,
"To discriminate against life insurance in this regard is not j ustified."22 For Congress to permit an insured to give away a life
insurance policy on his own life, as he could do with any other
form of property, is a distinct gain, of course. But almost immediately after the 1954 code was approved, two fears were expressed. First, that the provision would be amended to reinstate
the premium payment test. One comment stated:
Some Treasury officials are annoyed with the life insurance industry because it has been strenuously "selling" the new provision, telling clients that only through life insurance can they almost completely escape estate tax liability. Such tactics are sure
to increase the Government's revenue loss, officials claim.23

On other words, if the purported idea of some officials should
be followed, life insurance was placed on an equal plane with
other forms of property, but it is improper to make use of this
equality.
The second fear was that, intentionally or unintentionally,
Congress had not placed life insurance on an equal basis with
other property in Sec. 2042, I.R.C. 1954, in that if there should
be a possibility that the insured might inherit the property previously given away, and the possibilities of such inheritance were
more than one out of twenty, the proceeds would be taxable in
his estate.21 Inheritance results from the "operation of law." If
21 Sec.
22 Sen.

2042, I.R.C. 1954.
Rep. No. 1662, 83d Cong. 2d sess. (1954); H. Rep. No. 1337,
83d Cong. 2d sess. 91 (1954).
:?3 Wall Street Joumal, Nov. 17, 1954, p. 1.
:H The pertinent portion of Sec. 2042 reads: " . . . the term 'incident of
ownership' includes a reversionary interest (whether arising by the express terms of the policy or other instrument or by operation of law)
only if the value of such reversionary interest exceeded 5 percent of the
value of the policy immediately before the death of the decedent. As
used in this paragraph, the term 'reversionary interest' includes a possibility that the policy, or the proceeds of the policy, may return to the
decedent or his estate, or may be subject to a power of disposition by him."
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a decedent gave away all his right, title and interest in a life insurance policy to his wife, who then left the policy to the husband
in her will, would he have a "reversionary interest" in the policy?
If so, a policy purchased by the wife originally, and never owned
by the husband, would seem to lead to a similar conclusion. It may
then be asked, upon what constitutional ground could such a tax
be based, to include in the decedent's estate property which he did
not purchase, never owned, and in which he had no interest?
To date there are no guideposts on this question. No regulations have been issued, and no rulings have been forthcoming
from the Internal Revenue Service, in spite of requests for such
a ruling made almost a year ago. This may be the result of a
decision that the answer is so clear no regulation or ruling on
the subject is necessary. However, estate planners could breathe
more easily if the answer were definitely known.
Another problem similar to the one just outlined was described in a rather recent law review article2 ;; by Professor Joseph
Murphy of Syracuse University Law School. In this article Professor Murphy suggests that Sec. 2039, I.R.C. 1954, may attempt
to impose taxes which are unconstitutional. This section deals
with the estate tax treatment of survivorship benefits under annuity contracts. It defines the amount of the value of the survivorship benefits includible in. the gross estate, in the case of nonqualified plans, to be that part of the value proportionate to that
part of the purchase price contributed by the decedent. It then
provides that any contribution by the decedent's employer or
former employer to the purchase price of the contract or agreement shall be considered to be contributed by the decedent if made
by reason of employment.
A proviso then exempts from inclusion in the estate, not
only under Sec. 2039, but under "any provision of law," survivorship benefits received by a beneficiary other than the decedent's
estate, under a pension, stock bonus or profit-sharing plan, or
under an annuity contract purchased pursuant to such a plan, if
the plan is qualified under Sec. 401 of the code.

If the qualified plan was contributory, however, the value of
the survivorship benefits is includible in the decedent's estate in
an amount proportionate to the contributions made by the decedent. Here, though, the contributions of the employer are not
considered contributions by the decedent. Thus there is a distinct advantage in having survivorship benefits provided under a
2;;

1 Howard Law Jollrnal 1-39, January, 1955.
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qualified plan. This is not feasible, of course, in many instances.
One method suggested of avoiding difficulty would be for
the decedent to enter into two contracts, one providing a life annuity for himself, the other providing a survivorship annuity for
his wife. He would immediately assign the second contract to
his wife. Under these circumstances it is quite probable that
the survivorship benefits would not be included in the husband's
estate, either under the retained life estate theory of Sec. 2036,
or under Sec. 2039. This would seem to follow under the decision
in Bohnen vs. Harrison,2 6 where the United States Supreme Court
held that an assignment of the life insurance portion of a life
insurance-annuity combination made the contracts separable, and
prevented the application of the retained life estate theory now
found in Sec. 2036 of the 1954 code.
To return to the thread of the argument, however, the estate
tax is designed to tax the privilege of transmitting property at
death, the basic section being Sec. 2033 of the code. The code
then continues with a group of provisions designed to cover transfers which were between living persons in form, but which were
testamentary in substance. The idea underlying these sections is
to tax some property which had been the subject of a transfer by
the decedent, as in the examples of the usual survivorship benefits under qualified and non-qualified annuity plans.
It appears, however, that Sec. 2039, as interpreted in the
House and Senate Committee reports, 27 apparently does not require that, in order to be taxed, the decedent need ever have owned
certain property or have made a transfer of it. He need merely
be employed by an employer who had a contract, not necessarily
with the employee, which provided benefits for him when employment ceased, and benefits for others after his death.
The conclusion drawn from this study of the network of
estate tax provisions is this: To tax this type of survivorship
benefit in the decedent's estate, where the decedent contributed
nothing, and where there was no contract between the employer
and the employee, but rather, for example, between the employer
and an insurance company, may be unconstitutional, because the
decedent had no property interest in the benefits and he made no
transfer of them.·
2G Bohnen vs. Harrison, 345 U.S. 946. 73 S. Ct. 863, 97 L. ed. 1371
(1953).
27 H. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. A 316 (1954); Sen. Rep. No.
1662, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. 472 (1954).
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CONCLUSION

The statements made thus far may seem to have only a tenuous connecting link. To the writer it seemed worth while to make
at least these two points: Let us not become specialized to the
degree that we lose our perspective, and, as members of the bar,
let us net forget our duty to protect our clients from injustice.
With reference to perspective, this paper has tried to make
clear the fact that taxes which seem far removed from the interests of most clients may actually be determinative of business
decisions. It is therefore suggested that you should be interested
in the form these taxes assume.
With reference to the second point, it is suggested that the
word "unconstitutional" may not belong to a dead language. Merely because laymen in general may regard take-home pay as their
total remuneration, let us, as guardians of the idea of a government of limited powers, not also become so calloused that we disregard the possibility of unjust impositions, of attempts to tax
which lie beyond the enumerated powers of government.
JURY TRIAL OF AUTO INJURY CLAIMS THREATENED

By
George L. DeLacy
Your chairman asked me to present a paper to this section.
I was, of course, flattered, but I've been before this section so
many times that I rather hesitated to appear again.
Having in mind that whatever I say is to be presented to
you in the daytime, and not after an extended cocktail hour and
heavy dinner, I have taken the liberty of reducing my thoughts
to writing. It is much easier on me to do so, and I hope it will
not bore you.
In the past on many occasions I have made the statement
that man in the English-speaking countries has reached his highest attainment in the administration of justice. While I still believe this, I am quite conscious of the fact that there is much
room for improvement. I am conscious of the fact that there is
much uncertainty and inefficiency in the trial of controversies in
our courts, especially where juries are involved. Men hesitate to
submit their controversies to a court and jury. Payments are
made to avoid court procedures and men do not turn to the courts
with the complete assurance that justice will be administered and
that the right will prevail.
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It has been said that the very bulwark of the American
system of life is based upon trials by juries and judges, but if the
system that we have is not going to seek the truth in an expeditious manner, then litigants of all types, whether they be injured
pedestrians seeking damages against the driver of an automobile
or businessmen seeking a solution of differences with other businessmen, will force the legislatures of this country to furnish
some type of bureau to adjudicate their differences.

Some of you will remember that prior to 1913 the trial docket, especially of Douglas County, was crowded with master and
servant cases. There were always pending hundreds of these
cases against the various packing houses and other employers.
Negligence was charged in failing to furnish a reasonably
safe place to work and failing to furnish proper tools, etc. The
defenses were assumption of risk, the fellow-servant rule, and the
plea of contributory negligence. One man recovered nothing;
another man got much more than he was entitled to.
As you know, steps were tak~n in England and later on in
this country to soften these common-law defenses by passing employer's liability acts. These acts either limited or abolished the
defense of assumption of risk or made it a question for the jury.
These acts generally abolished the fellow-servant defense. They
also made contributory negligence a question for the jury, providing that contributory negligence should not be an absolute bar,
but that the recovery should be diminished because of contributory negligence.
The main effort in the trial of these cases was to get to the
jury. This effort resulted in an increased amount of false swearing. It was also necessary for the injured workman, who wished
to sue his employer, to employ an attorney. These cases were
generally handled on a percentage basis. Such litigation was costly and long drawn out and again there was much uncertainty and
many instances of injustice.
The great complexity of relationships in modern life brings
with it the necessity of coping in a comprehensive and systematic
way with problems whfoh owe their existence to that very complexity. In the matter we are discussing, public opinion came to
regard the care and rehabilitation of injured workers as a just
charge upon the industry in which the accident occurred, and
through that industry upon society.
The common-law courts throughout the country had made
such a mess out of this class of litigation that the legislatures of
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the various states passed workmen's compensation laws. These
laws had previously been developed in Germany and in England.
In Nebraska the Workmen's Compensation Law was adopted in
1913. Its passage accomplished a change and it was, therefore,
opposed at the time. The law was submitted to a referendum of
the people, but was adopted.
This Compensation Law eliminated jury trials and provided
first for a Compensation Commissioner and later for a Compensation Court. At this time the adjudication of claims of servants
against their masters, growing out of accidental injury, arising
out of, and in the scope of, their employment is handled in an
expeditious manner. The judges become skilled in handling claims
under the compensation law; in most cases of accidental injury
or death there is no contest and the functioning under the Act is
expeditious and is much less expensive than the handling of the
same claims by a regular common-law court and jury would be.
No one would suggest that we go back to the old system.
It is a matter of common knowledge that the tax courts, established by federal statute to determine the rights of the government and of the taxpayers under the Revenue Codes of the United
States, function expeditiously and in an entirely satisfactory
manner. In these courts a trial v;rith a jury is not involved.

At this time courts and attorneys are presented with the problem of administering justice growing out of the automobile traffic.
We are confronted with the problem of properly handling claims
resulting from personal injuries growing out of that traffic.
How long will the public tolerate the continual upward spiral
of jury verdicts in personal injury cases? You are familiar with
the reports in the press of tremendous verdicts growing out of the
operation of railroads and growing out of the automobile traffic.
Think of a verdict, tax free, of $400,000 to a 44-year-old waiter
for brain injuries and injuries to his legs; of $250,000 for a brain
injury sustained by a 48-year-old freight agent; of $100,000 for
an eye; of $240,000 for the loss of a leg. These enormous figures
have acted as a stimulus for many spurious claims, and a tremendous amount of litigation that has little or no merit has been
instituted. Statistics show that between 1941 and 1951 the cost
of living index had increased 73% while jury verdicts had increased 149 % and are still increasing.
It is true that the citizen of today has become accustomed to
thinking in larger amounts. The high cost of everything, taxes,
etc., develops this; but it must be apparent that there is some
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other reason for these tremendous verdicts in the metropolitan
cities.
The average jury, at least in a metropolitan city, is usually
made up of men and women of average education. They are not
familiar with court procedures and with their duties as jurymen,
but are suddenly called in to act as finders of the fact in a trial.
The plaintiff's counsel is, of course, aware of the natural advantages in his favor where he is representing an injured party, especially if that injured party is one who has to make his livelihood
with his hands. The association of plaintiffs' attorneys, called
N.A.C.C.A., organized in 1946, advises and teaches the use of
demonstrative evidence. The surgical instruments used are produced. Colored photographs are presented showing the wounds,
blood, etc. Not long ago I tried a case in which the surgeon had
taken colored pictures of the injuries, which \Vere the basis of the
suit. The pictures were certainly realistic. This doctor took
pictures on innumerable occasions, i.e., every time he dressed the
wounds; and all of them were exhibited to the jury. This N.A.C.C.A. organization advises the plaintiff's counsel not to rely on
the doctor who .actually treated the claimant, but suggests that
special doctors be employed; that an attempt be made to develop
the possibilities which might result from the accident.
In the modern jury trial the injuries are built up by putting
on a number of physicians, by exhibiting x-rays which have been
blown up, by showing photographs of the blood, the wounds and
the dressings, and by exhibiting the braces and casts, etc., used.
Simple injuries are magnified. The natural sympathy which all
jurymen have is inflamed, and as a result throughout the country
unconscionable and excessive verdicts are prevalent.
If in addition to the use of demonstrative evidence the court
permits a prejudicial and inflammatory closing argument by plaintiff's counsel and 'if the court permits the use of charts whereby
plaintiff's counsel not only writes out the various amounts claimed
for pain and suffering and loss of wages, etc., but is allowed to
leave these charts after the argument is closed, in the presence
of the jury, it is apparent that no proper trial of the controversy
is had. The trial is controlled by passion and prejudice rather
than objective deliberation.
If this trend continues, insurance rates must necessarily be
increased and an excessive burden must be borne by those operating railroads, motor vehicles, etc.

It has been said:
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"No one has any objection to proper evidence that truly assists
a court or jury in determining a controversial question. But when
evidence ceases to truly assist and begins to create 'impulsive
verdicts' it ceases to be a part of an orderly trial. The question
of exhibition of injuries, introduction of surgical instruments, the
use of blackboards in closing argument and similar schemes to
increase awards are all things that a trial judge may regulate in
his discretion. During the last twenty years it has seldom been
considered discreet to restrict these practices. Verdicts continue
to soar. There is considerable alarm from coast to coast about
the trend. There is a contest among plaintiff's lawyers to somehow get a larger verdict than has been before returned. The
trial courts are quite conscious of this, yet there seems to be no
restriction on new schemes designed to stir the emotions of the
jury." In 1925 the Illinois Appellate Court had this to say:
The doctors treating plaintiff for her injuries were permitted to
go into considerable detail, describing the instruments and surgical appliances used in the treatment. There was introduced in
evidence a surgical clamp which had been applied to plaintiff's
broken leg. We strongly disapprove of unnecessary descriptions
of such appliances and their exhibition to the jury. Such exhibitions usually serve no purpose except to excite sympathy. To
permit this in personal injury cases would open a wide door
tending to arouse emotions not conducive to a fair and impartial
consideration of the proper issues presented.

It seems apparent to me that if the courts continue to allow
such procedures and if the courts continue to allow excessive and
unconscionable verdicts to stand, that legislatures will soon be
called upon to provide for the handling of such claims in the same
manner as compensation claims are handled, and this will be by a
bureau or special court and will not be by the ordinary trial court
and jury. This is what happened when the ordinary common-law
courts did not handle efficiently the claims arising out of the relationship of master and servant. It appears to be the rule in
this country that we swing from one extreme to the other. There
was a time when the plaintiff could not recover damages even
though the defendant was negligent if the plaintiff was guilty of
any negligence. There was a time when the plaintiff employee
could not recover for the negligence of a fell ow servant. There
was a time when the doctrine of assumption of risk precluded
recovery by a plaintiff employee. Gradually all of these defenses
were modified. The pendulum has swung back; the adjudication
of the rights of an injured claimant is turned into a dramatic
sketch, false testimony is common, and trivial injuries are played
up and magnified so that unconscionable sums are in many instances allowed to the claimant.
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It should not be forgotten that during the trial there sits upon
the bench a judge; learned in the law, and placed in that position
to see that justice is done between the parties so far as humanly
possible. It is apparent that a fearless and experienced judge can
see to it .that the trial of a jury case is not turned into a theatrical performance, and can see to it that there is no improper use
of demonstrative evidence and charts, etc. I will speak of this
later on in this paper.
The Bar has made great progress in improving trial procedure. I refer to the Federal Court Rules and the discovery statutes in force in,the State of Nebraska. We have all become convinced that the administration of justice requires a full disclosure
of the pertinent facts. If an accident has happened, all parties
should know the names of the witnesses. If the plaintiff has
sustained an injury and is claiming money damages to compensate
him for it, the defendant should know what his doctors report,
he should know what the hospital records show and should likewise have the benefit of an examination by his own doctor or at
least by a doctor appointed by the court. This has been accomplished. You all know that depositions may be taken of either
party. At the taking of these depositions all pertinent facts may
be inquired into. If it is not desired to go to the expense of having a deposition taken, interrogatories may be served, which the
other party is required to answer. By the use of these interrogatories the names of all of the \vitnesses can be obtained and all
other pertinent facts may be inquired into. Under the statutes,
parties may obtain leave to inspect the premises, take pictures of
the premises, make maps of the premises, force the other party
to produce pictures taken at the time of the accident which are
not otherwise available and, in fact, procedures have now been
adopted which, if energetically availed of, results in a full disclosure of the facts. In addition to this in both federal and state
courts we have the pre-trial procedure, wherein the case may be
reviewed before the trial judge. This pre-trial procedure is of
great help to both parties if it is really used and if it is held by a
judge who will really make an effort to conduct a pre-trial as it
should be conducted. If the court's attitude is simply to get
through a task, then nothing will be accomplished by it; if properly used, proper settlements in many cases may result.
All our procedures are now evolved to eliminate surprise and
to do away with the old sporting theory of conducting a trial
(based on surprise) .
We believe that our courts should sense that we are living
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in an age of distorted values and that the developments in trial
techniques unless judicially controlled will unduly magnify these
distorted values.
In a Wisconsin case, Markowitz vs. Miller Electric Railway and
Light Co., 284 N.W. 31, decided in 1939, the court in commenting
on an improper argument said:
Proper administration of justice requires that the court promptly
check such improprieties on its own motion. A verdict returned
upon a record free from such improprieties or after effective judicial control by prompt and positive rulings checking or counteracting them is not as apt to be impaired by reason of prejudice or
passion on the part of the jury. . . .

In the case of Warren Petroleum Corporation vs. Sterling
Pyeatt, the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, reported in 275 S.W.
2d 216, there was a judgment in favor of the plaintiff allowing
him damages for injuries sustained in an automobile accident.
The defendant appealed and the case was reversed. In this case,
the defendant complained of the action of the trial court in permitting plaintiff's attorney over defendant's timely objection to
place three charts upon a blackboard in full view of the jury
immediately prior to commencement of closing argument. In
the opinion the charts are set out. In the opinion, the court
says:
Defendants objected to the placing of said charts upon the blackboard and to their use in the closing argument for many reasons,
the chief objection being that "the use of the charts were highly
prejudicial and effectively injected new and unsworn testimony
for the jury's consideration." With this contention we agree.
We do not believe the use of such charts would be permissible in
any case over timely objection. Most of the statements in the
first two charts are plain positive factual unsworn statements and
were not put there during the argument on each point and not
as a reasonable deduction from the evidence. The statements and
figures in the third chart were not put there during the argument
and as a reasonable deduction from the evidence. Oral argument,
with proper references to the testimony and evidence that would
reveal such factual statements as contained in the charts to be
true might have been permissible. But such bold factual statements made orally in argument without any reference to or inference from the evidence is error. An attorney cannot testify
orally in his argument, and what he cannot do orally he certainly
cannot do in writing. Wichita Transit Co. v. Sanders, Tex. Civ.
App., 214 S.W. 2d 810; Employers' Ins. Ass'n. 'II". Rowell, Tex.
Civ. App., 104 S.W. 2d 613; Huey & Philp Hardware Co. v.
McNeil, Tex. Civ. App., 111 S.W. 2d 1205; Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co. v. Hardy, Tex. Civ. App., 91 S.W. 2d 1075, reversed, 131 Tex. 573, 117 s:w. 2d 418 . . . . The charts were not
put in evidence prior to the time plaintiff and defendants rested
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their case.
argument.

They were effectively put in evidence in the closing

The bar has for many years sanctioned the practice of allowing attorneys to handle personal injury cases on a contingent
basis. Thi~ is the only practical way to handle these cases. In
the larger metropolitan cities (not in Nebraska), runners are attached to some law offices whose duty it is to bring in personal
injury cases which are, of course, handled on a percentage basis.
Where this practice exists it is apparent that the temptation to
introduce false testimony is great and a racket is apt to develop.
It is asserted that these firms have associated with them doctors
who are amenable to suggestions and testify for them in court,
building up and exaggerating the injuries claimed. There is now
added to all this the use of colored pictures, charts, etc., i.e., demonstrative evidence.
I am of the opinion that nearly every member of the Bar will
admit that the handling of personal injury cases, where a jury
trial is involved, is uncertain, is ,not efficient; I believe all will
agree that many injustices result. I believe all will agree that
litigants involved in personal injury cases are apprehensive, are
fearful of the results and that many defendants prefer to pay
more than they should to avoid such an ordeal. This is the year
1955 ; men in other walks of life, I think, wonder at the inefficient
handling of such litigation by our profession and wonder why we
do not improve upon our procedures.
The description of the modern jury trial of a personal injury case, especially in the great metropolitan centers, does not
paint an agreeable picture of our adversary system of administering justice. Mr. Harry LaBrum, Philadelphia lawyer, in an
address given in Milwaukee in August, 1954, said, and we take
the liberty of quoting from his address:
Some time ago in Philadelphia the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit handed down a decision which made the front page and
shocked alm,ost everyone-lawyers and laymen alike.
It was not a political decision; it was not another example of hard
cases making bad la'w; it was an ordinary case under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act.
A railroad employee fell from a bridge and was injured. Aside
from the question of coverage under the Act-which all the Judges
decided in favor of the plaintiff-the only issue in the case was
whether or not the railroad was negligent.
Now what could there possibly be in such a case to justify an
opinion by the Court of Appeals which immediately became a
"best seller." Could it be the amount of the verdict? Certainly
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not-the court upset the verdict, and in any event a $37,000
verdict shocks no one today, except of course the particular defendant and his insurer!
The great public interest and discussion about this case stemmed
from the reasons the Court of Appeals gave for upsetting the jury
verdict in the case. Here is what the court said, in reversing
the judgme.nt:
" . . . Because of the bickering and brawling of both counsel, the
jury could not possibly have decided the real issues on their merits,
but was sidetracked into passing judgment on the .character of
the attorneys."
And-"The conduct of both counsel was of such nature as to
vitiate the entire trial.''
And finally-"The jury did not have an opportunity fairly to
pass upon the real issues, because of the conduct of the attorneys.''
'Now I do not mean to cause any reflection on either of the lawyers
involved. As the Court of Appeals said, they were able and experienced men and they are well known at the Philadelphia Bar.
Their conduct in this case was probably different only in degree
from that which takes place at many trials almost daily.

Professor Joiner of the University of Michigan in the Michigan Law Review, November, 1954, calls attention to a review of
a textbook on trial technique written in 1936. The review appeared in the Harvard Law Review, 1949, page 1389. The reviewer of the book was Mr. E. M. Morgan. Here is what he said
about a book written for lawyers on trial technique:
Intended as a lawyer's book, it will in all probability be read only
by laWYers and those who would be lawyers. And fervent prayers
that the book be read by no others should be raised by those who
want to believe, and want others to believe, that a law suit is
a proceeding for the discovery of truth by rational processes.
If only some lawyer could rise up and honestly denounce l\Ir.
Goldstein as a defamer of his profession! If only l\Ir. Goldstein
himself had written his book as an exposition of the evils inherent
in our adversary system of litigation! If only a reviewer could
assert that this book is a guide not to the palaces of justice but
to the red-light districts of the law! But a decent respect for
the truth compels the admission that l\Ir. Goldstein has told his
story truly. He has told it calmly, without pretense of shame,
and (God save use!) without the slightest suspicion of its shamefulness. He has shown by his own unperturbed frankness with
what complaisance the profession, which would smile the superior
smile of derision at the suggestion of a return of trial by battle
of bodies, accepts trial by battle of wits. In all innocence, he
has produced a document which is a devastating commentary
upon an important aspect of our administration of justice.

Personal injury litigation in recent years has become big
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business on both sides, and it should be handled with businesslike
efficiency across a desk with the opposing counsel seeking a solution and not in the trial courts unless trial is absolutely unavoidable.
There is danger that if the trial courts and trial lawYers do
nothing to improve the situation, disaster will result. As said
by Mr. LaBrum in the same address mentioned above, "The public
will stand just so much, and while I am not one to cry wolf, I can
without fear of contradiction, predict that unless the present situation is corrected and soon, we will lose the bulk of personal injury litigation to either arbitration, or some form of compensation."
Again, Mr. LaBrum said:
This is not idle talk. You know that both arbitration and compensation are-right now-receiving serious study in responsible
circles; and the only thing that can head them off is a drastic
change in the outlook for disposal of personal injury cases in law
offices and in courts.
If we do not take this problem seriously, the parties will not only
take the cases away from the courts--but from the lawyers too;
and the rule of law and the role of lawyers will be weakened
that much more.

I have noticed advertisements inserted in national periodicals
by casualty insurance companies relating to the subject of excessive jury verdicts. They suggest that such verdicts increase insurance rates. That these verdicts must be paid out of premiums
belonging to thousands of policyholders. When premiums collected do not cover claims, everybody's insurance rates have to go
up.
Such advertisement occurred in the Saturday Evening Post
and Life.
One of the ads exhorted jurymen "to be fair with the public's
-and your money." None of the ads called upon the public to
be other than fair and reasonable when on a jury. After such ads
appeared we find lawsuits brought to enjoin such publications
and even to oust the insurance companies from a certain state for
contempt of court, etc.
I ran across the case of People vs. Ame1'ican Automobile Insurance Company, (California) 282 P. 2d 559 (decided April 18,
1955). In this case a quo warranto petition was filed against an
insurance company based on the advertisements to which I have
been referring. A demurrer was filed to the petition and the
demurrer was sustained.
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It has never been my idea that attorneys had a vested interest in court procedures which illy serve the public as a whole.
The spectre of the enlargement or extension of workman's
compensation benefits to the field of all accidents is ever present.
Its accomplishment would be a catastrophe to lawyers whether on
the plantiff's or defendant's side of the problem.
This compensation plan which I have been talking about has
not been adoped in any of the states in this country. Such a plan
was· adopted in the province of Saskatchewan, Canada. It has
been suggested that the imposition of liability, regardless of fault
(a necessary corollary of such a compensation plan) would lead to
individual irresponsibility and fraudulent abuses. Workmen's
compensation is thought to be a feasible system only because of
the existence of the employment relationship which aids investigation of claims and prevention of fraud, collusion or malingering. Under such a relationship there is a fairly uniform class of
beneficiaries.
Employers as a class can pass on the cost of compensation
to the general public and can aid in preventing accidents through
the installment of safety devices, whereas those factors are absent
with the largely unoffending class of motorists. Likewise the
plan would place a heavy burden on the unoffending motorist and
would at the same time provide a scale of benefits so low as to be
inadequate for any injured person, not a wage-earner, leaving
many flagrant wrongs unredressed.
It likewise can be urged that the plan is socialistic and contrary to our system of free enterprise.
This has been a rather rambling disertation.
During my rather extensive experience I have noted the trends
and have come to certain conclusions, which I throw upon the
table for discussion.
I am sure that as practicing lawyers we are vitally concerned
in µiaking our legal and judicial processes both adequate and effective. We should therefore do more than all others to make
them so.
We .must make the courts of law more efficient and attractive to the public for the determining of all kinds of disputes.
The public must believe that justice is really meted out in our
trial courts in an expeditious manner and that it is being done
without too much cost.
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Improvements in the administration of justice have been
largely left to the Bar and the various Bar Associations. This
is as it should be.
Let us not allow the impression to exist among the people
that a jury trial is simply a contest of wits between counsel,
that everything goes; that it is an outdated and ineffective procedure for the determination of the truth and for the doing of
justice between aisputants.
We will all agree, I am sure, that motion picture or television reproductions of a trial are usually a travesty and create a
most unfavorable impression.
The proper conduct of the trial of such cases lies with the
district judge. The district judge should not simply preside at
a battle between plaintiff's and defendant's lawyers; he should
not simply keep order in court; he should see to it that the officers
of the court try each case in a proper manner. Each case should
be a challenge to the judge to see to it that justice Tesults from
the trial before him. Each trial should be a special event, not
one to be hurried through and disposed of simply for the purpose of clearing up the docket. If we have time for nothing else,
we all should take time to see that justice is properly administered
in our courts and in a dignified manner, otherwise the balance of
the community may move in and take charge in a way which will
injure our professions and espe,cially those engaged in trial work.
It follows from what has been said that the obtaining of
high class men upon the trial bench is a goal to be sought. The
Bar has done much to accomplish this. The salaries of judges
have been increased. A pension plan has been evolved, this in
the hope that the bench will attract able attorneys to make it a
life's work.
I am of the opinion that we could have accomplished much
along these lines if we had adopted the Missouri Plan for the
selection of judges at least in Douglas and Lancaster Counties.
It may be in the agricultural districts that the candidates are
known to the voters and that the voters are capable of selecting
proper judge. However that may be, it might be advisable to
give such districts the right to elect as to whether they would
come under the provisions of the statute or not.
I believe we should again vigorously proceed to initiate procedures to have what is know as the Missouri Plan adopted. This
should be our task for the forthcoming year.
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As has been said before, personal injury litigation has become big business-about 85 percent of our trials involve personal
injury or property damage.
Fortunately, in Nebraska there is very little "law's delay."
Both our state courts and federal courts are up-to-date, and a
fairly speedy trial can be had if the attorney is energetic. However, in the large metropolitan cities elsewhere there are crowded
dockets, and a litigant must wait two or tlu·ee years to get his
case for trial. The impatient efforts to cure this condition may
result in panaceas which will spread to our state, to our disadvantage.
As the handling of personal injury business is important, it
should be handled by counsel with businesslike efficiency. After
the facts involved are known and the nature of the injury and
property damage has been ascertained, then the counsel (if the
case is one for settlement) should consult in a fair and frank manner. This should be done at an early time and should not be left
to a time when the case is sent out for trial. Settlements on the
eve of trial are very common, but they discommode the court and
may cause the jury to be idle for the rest of the day. I am sure
that the average juror in Douglas County thinks that there is
too much time wasted in the trial of jury cases. He sits around
for long periods of time waiting to be called into the box; then
the case has been settled and he starts to wait again.
If attorneys for claimants allow their clients to demand unfair and unrealistic amounts in settlements, if they allow the
business to develop into a racket and make of trials a means of
extorting unconscionable verdicts by appealing to the prejudice
and passion of the jury and by other questionable means, or if
defendant's counsel arbitrarily refuse to make fair settlements
and arbitrarily and stubbornly contest cases which ought to be
settled, or if defense attorneys persist in stalling the trials, then,
as I have said before, the impatience of the public may cause the
adoption of poorly conceived plans and procedures to correct the
evils involved.
I have in mind that it is up to us to do the job. Let's keep
in mind the importance of the matter to our clients and to the
public and even to ourselves.
The House of Delegates convened at 4 :15 P.M. to receive reports of the sections, with members of the assembly also present.
The following proceedings were had:
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HOUSE OF DELEGATES
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 7, 1955
JEAN B. CAIN :
be in order.

Gentlemen, the House of Delegates will now

The first item of business is the report of the Section on Real
Estate, Probate and Trust Law, David R. Warner, chairman.
DAVID R. WARNER.: Mr. Chairman and members of the
House. I should probably apologize for not having a written report. I will try to make the report brief anyway.
The Section on Real Estate, Probate and· TruS't Law had its
annual meeting this morning and conducted a program in accordance with the printed program. The program was well received.
We had some excellent speakers. I believe all of the attendance
at the section meeting were well satisfied with the program.
An election was conducted and two members of the Executive Committee were elected; Mr. George Farman of Ainsworth
and Mr. Lynn Heth of Valentine.
Following the section meeting a meeting of the Executive
Committee was held and officers were selected for the coming
year, with Herman Ginsburg as chairman, Bob Simmons as vicechairman, and Lynn Heth as secretary.
There was one item in connection with the program which
was held which I believe should be called to the attention of the
House specifically, and that was the report of the Title Standardization Committee of our section.
The chairman of the section gave the report, and at the section meeting asked that any members of the Association who
have suggestions with respect to revision of the existing title
standards or have suggestions as to new standards communicate
the same to him or to the secretary of the Association.
I believe now that a new chairman of the section has been
selected, and it would be proper also to communicate any such
suggestions to Mr. Ginsburg.
Another item which the Executive Committee of the section
asked me to bring to the attention of the House was referred to
briefly at the close of his talk by Herman Ginsburg, and that relates to the matter of some committee of the Bar Association taking an interest in and following up legislation which is before the
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legislature in addition to bills which are actually sponsored by
the Association.
Any of you who heard Herman's talk had brought to your
attention rather effectively, in my estimation, at least, a couple
of bills that perhaps ought not to have been passed at all by the
last session of our legislature, and had the Bar Association taken
an active stand in connection with such matters perhaps they
would not have passed.
This is being submitted at this time as I stated at the request of the Executive Committee of the Real Estate Section. We
are not submitting it as a recommendation but it is a matter
which our section does feel should receive further consideration
by the Association.
I believe that completes the report of our section.
JEAN B. CAIN:

Thank you very much, Mr. Warner.

If there are no objections, the report of the committee on the
Section on Real Estate, Probate and Trust Law will be received
and made a part of the permanent record of the Association.

ROBERT VAN PELT: Mr. Chairman, may I arise at this moment to inquire about a procedure, because I did hear Mr. Ginsburg's splendid paper, and there was a point raised at a luncheon
that I attended.
Is there some procedure that the Bar Association, either by
the Executive Council or this House of Delegates, can be expressed
in disapproval of a bill, and who does it? Would it be for the
Executive Council to take the action or the House of Delegates to
take action on bills that should be disapproved by the Association?
JEAN B. CAIN:

Do you want to answer that, Mr. Turner?

GEORGE H. TURNER: The Executive Council has all of the
power of the Association between meetings of the Association.
The Executive Council, I think, without question could authorize
the section, for instance, to appear as a representative of the Association.
ROBERT VAN PELT: Yes; and I think then what you have
said probably answers it sufficiently, George, except that that
procedure should be known so that, for instance on this real
estate matter, I think Mr. Ginsburg appeared individually and
tried to get some changes made and did get some changes made.
GEORGE H. TURNER:

Of course the Executive Council ses-
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sions are not held more than three or four times during the year,
but if by the time that you know a bill is about to be introduced
or has been introduced, inquire if there is going to be a meeting
of the Executive Council, and I would anticipate no difficulty on
that.
ROBERT VAN PELT: I think it is a matter that will come
up in the real property section.
JEAN B. CAIN: The next report, Section on Taxation. Who
is to make that-Hale McCown.
HALE MCCOWN: In December, 1954, the Section of Taxation
conducted the Association's annual institute on federal taxation
in two-day sessions held at Alliance, Grand Island and Omaha.
Members of the Association who appeared on the program were
Hale McCown of Beatrice, Warren Dalton of Lincoln, Barton
Kuhns of Omaha, Robert Moodie of West Point, Laurens Williams
of Omaha and Washington, D. C., Robert Adams of Omaha and
Flavel Wright of Lincoln.

Registration at the Tax Clinic included 559 lawyers from 154
towns in Nebraska. As evidenced by the registration, interest
in the tax clinics is increasing and, in the opinion of the Executive Committee of the Section of Taxation, the annual Tax Institute should be continued as a regular part of the program of
the Association.
Arrangements have been made to conduct the 13th annual
tax institute to be held December 12 and 13 at Scottsbluff, December 14 and 15 at Kearney and December 16 and 17 at Omaha.
Subjects to be covered and the personnel appearing on the program will be announced in the near future.
During the early months of 1955, the Section of Taxation
collaborated with the Committee on Legislation in the preparation
and presentation to the Nebraska State Legislature of the following bills:
·
LB 223-which liberalizes the provision for giving a bond in
cases where the amount of inheritance tax is uncertain.
LB 275-which keys the Nebraska estate tax to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954.
LB 276-which provides for the taxation of powers of appointment. The portion of LB 276 which repealed
the provisions relating to previously taxed property
was not passed.
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Except as noted each of these bills was enacted by the legislature
in substantially the form suggested.
This afternoon the section conducted its section meeting which
included an interesting discussion by the Honorable Joseph Sewall
of the changes in social security provisions and a panel discussion (Jf developments under the 1954 Internal Revenue Code.
Participating on the program were Hale McCown as moderator,
Robert B. Denney of Fairbury, Leo Eisenstadt of Omaha, John
C. Mason of Lincoln and John E. North of Omaha.
The new members elected to the Executive Committee of the
Section of Taxation are Thoms M. Davies and Keith Miller. Barton
H. Kuhns was elected chairman; Thomas M. Davies was elected
vice-chairman and Keith Miller was elected secretary of the section.
JEAN B. CAIN: The report of the Junior Bar Section, Albert
G. Schatz, chairman.
ALBERT G. SCHATZ: Mr. Chairman, members of the House
of Delegates. The annual meeting of the Junior Bar Section was
held this morning at 9 :30 as scheduled on the program, a discussion, as you know, by Senator Hruska.

Our attendance was not as large as it was anticipated because we had a pretty tough section to compete with, listening
to the first section report here.
But we had a reasonably good turnout, and we had a good
meeting.
We had an election of the Executive Committee, and the election resulted as follows : Edward McEcham of Omaha is to serve
on the committee for three years; Ray Simmons is to serve three
years; DeWayne Wolf of Kearney, two years; Stu Stewart of
Lexington, three years; Donald Boyd, Lincoln, one year; and myself, Albert Schatz, one year.
After the election of the committee members, the committee
itself met and the following officers were elected for the coming
year: Ray Simmons of Fremont, chairman; DeWayne Wolf of
Kearney, secretary, and Donald Boyd of Lincoln, vice-chairman.
Also at the committee meeting held after the meeting a plan
was adopted for a program for the coming year which the Executive Committee of the Junior Bar Section will undertake. Thank
you.
JEAN B. CAIN:

Thank you, Mr. Schatz.
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If there are no objections, the report of the Junior Bar Section will be accepted and made a part of the permanent records
of the House of Delegates.

The report of the Section on Practice and Procedure, John
L. Barton, Chairman.
GEORGE H. TURNER: Mr. Chairman, the chairman of the section has asked me to deliver this report by reason of his absence.
Your Executive Committee of the Section on Practice and
Procedure respectfully makes the following report:
The following members of the Executive Committee met on
March 5, 1955, at the State House, Lincoln, Nebraska, with President John J. Wilson: C. Russell Mattson, Lowell C. Davis, Raymond McGrath and John L. Barton. The president expressed his
desire that those present organize and elect a chairman, vice-chairman and secretary.
Pursuant thereto, the following officers of the Executive Committee of the Section were elected : John L. Barton, chairman ;
Lowell C. Davis, vice-chairman; and C. Russell Mattson, secretary.
Your Executive Committee then decided that the chairman
select two eminent trial lawyers to appear and speak to the members of this section at the annual meeting on October 6, 1955.
Your chairman invited Lester P. Dodd of Detroit, Michigan,
and William Knepper of Columbus, Ohio. They accepted.
The sections program was given at 2 :15, October 6, 1955, in
the ballroom of the Paxton Hotel, and was very well received.
Your Executive Committee of this section believes that with
the program just concluded the section has made a very fine and
worthwhile contribution to the Association's activities.
Following the program on October 6, the following lawyers
were elected to the section's Executive Committee for three-year
terms: George Healey, Lincoln, and Robert Hamer, Omaha.
Subsequently the Executive Committee then elected the following named lawyers as its officers for the ensuing year: Lowell
C. Davis, chairman; C. Russell Mattson, vice-chairman, and Raymond McGrath, secretary.
JEAN B. CAIN: The report o:f the Section on Municipal and
Public Corporations. Mr. Leininger.
VANCE LEININGER:

This section was newly created, pursuant
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to an amendment to the Association's by-laws adopted at the 1954
annual meeting of the Nebraska State Bar Association. The first
Executive Committee was named by the Executive Council and
consisted of the following members: Albert T. Reddish, Alliance;
Harold Rice, Creighton; Vance E. Leininger, Columbus; Charles
E. McCarl, McCook; Jack M. Pace, Lincoln; and Edward F.
Fogarty, Omaha.
At the first meeting of the new Executive Committee, Vance
E. Leininger was elected chairman; Harold Rice, vice-chairman;
and Edward F. Fogarty, secretary.
Subsequent meetings were held, as a result of which the program at this year's Association meeting was planned and arranged.
An attempt was made to arrange for a program which would
hold as much universal interest for lawyers interested in matters
involving municipal and public corporations as possible. The general topic of eminent domain was settled on for this year's section
meeting.
At the meeting of this section held Thursday afternoon, Herbert M. Fitle of the Omaha Bar presented a concise and well ar1•anged discussion of the Uniform Eminent Domain Procedural
Act, which was adopted in 1951, and called attention to some of
the more pertinent decisions of our court since the adoption of
this Act.
The section was particularly fortunate in obtaining the assistance of Mr. Henry B. Curtis, city attorney for the City of
New Orleans, and president of the National Institute of Municipal
Law Officers, who presented an authoritative and thorough discussion of the problems involved in "Just Compensation under
Eminent Domain," including the principles of valuation and types
of evidence available in establishing valuation.
Mr. Curtis and Mr. Fitle were then joined by Mr. W. Ross
King of the Omaha Bar, attorney for the Omaha School District,
and Mr. Harold S. Salter, assistant attorney general assigned to
the Department of Roads and Irrigation, who participated in a
lively forty-minute panel discussion of procedural and substantive problems in this field. There was splendid participation from
the floor during this discussion.
At the conclusion of the program, elections were held to fill
the expiring terms of Mr. Albert T. Reddish and Mr. Harold Rice
on the Executive Committee. Mr. Reddish and Mr. Rice were
re-elected to membership on the committee, each for three-year
terms.
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The members of the section feel that this section affords an
opportunity for expanded service to members of the Association
who may be handling matters involving public and municipal corporations. Stich further subjects as zoning, school district reorganization, the proper handling of local bond issue proceedings,
and the principles applicable to public bodies in the field of the
law of contracts have been suggested for future section meetings.
We believe they will be of wide-spread interest to members of the
Association and recommend that future executive committees of
this section take steps to expand the list of possible subjects and
pursue their further study in an orderly fashion in future years.
JEAN B. CAIN: Now, Mr. McCown, if you would please come
forward. I first want to say that I very much appreciate the
honor and the privilege of serving as chairman of the House of
Delegates and it is with a great deal of pleasure and I congratulate you upon the selection that you have made of a successor, Mr.
Hale McCown, and I now turn the gavel over to you and turn
the meeting over to you.
HALE MCCOWN: First, may I express again on behalf of
all of you our appreciation for the job that Jean has done as the
chairman this past year. I hope, Jean, that I will be able to accomplish as much in the coming year as you have been able to do
for us already.
I shall have to rely on the support and co-operation of all of
you during the coming year. I hope that I will be entitled to
have it, I will hope to do the best that I can with the job that I
have. I appreciate it very much.
Is there any unfinished business of this House?
C. RUSSELL MATTSON:
that we adjourn.
VOICE:

Since we have a quorum, I move

Second.

HALE MCCOWN:

All those in favor say aye.

Opposed, the same. The motion is carried.
I turn the meeting over to our president, Jack.
PRESIDENT WILSON: Gentlemen, I reconvene the 56th annual
meeting of the Nebraska Bar Association.
Is there any unfinished business, Mr. Secretary?
GEORGE H. TURNER:

I have none, Mr. President.
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Is there anyone else who has any un-

(There was no response.)
PRESIDENT WILSON : If not, will Wilber Aten come to the
rostrum.
Members of the State Bar Association, it has been indeed a
pleasure to serve with this organization as your steward for the
past year. During the past year I have appreciated the opportunity of being your president and acting as your steward.
I hope that the good that has been accomplished will offset
any misfortunes or unwise decisions.
I think this Association is on the road to great success from
the work of past presidents and past Executive Councils and the
work of the House of Delegates.
The remarks. that I have heard from the members present
indicate that all are well aware of the duties and the responsibilities of the House of Delegates.
And now it gives me pleasure to present our president-elect,
who in just a minute will be the president of this organization;
and with that I hand to you your gavel of authority and congratulations.
WILBER ATEN: Fellow members of the Bar, I feel entirely
humble. I appreciate the honor and I will do the best I can.
I am going to need a lot of help. I am going to have to call
on all of you for a lot of help. I'm going to rely considerably upon my co-workers George and Hale and the other officers of the
Association.
I would like at this time to congratulate Jack and his officers
and the fellows that assisted him on a very successful year and
a very successful convention. I think it has been one of the outstanding years of the Association, and I think that we should at
this time thank Jack, and I would like to do that on behalf of
the Association, if I may.
As to business, I believe that it is in order at this time that
the assembly either approve or disapprove, at least take action upon the business that has been had by the House of Delegates.
JUDGE SPENCER:
has been transacted.

I move the approval of the business that
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JOSEPH T. VOTAVA:

Second the motion.

PRESIDENT ATEN: You have heard the motion that the action of the House of Delegates be approved by the assembly.
Is there any discussion 'l
If not all those in favorLAURENS WILLIAMS: Mr. Chairman, I do not like to be rising to points of order, and I am not going to make a point of
order, but I am going to suggest that under the rules the converse
is true. The action of the House stands unless disapproved by the
assembly. Now let us go ahead with the motion. I am all for it.
JEAN B. CAIN : As I understand it, any affirmative action
taken at this afternoon's session must be approved by the assembly. I may be in error.
JUDGE SPENCER:

Question.

LAURENS WILLIAMS:
VOICES:

I did not make a point of order.

Question.

PRESIDENT ATEN: Unless there is a point of order taken we
will vote on the motion.
All those in favor signify by saying aye.
All those opposed the same sign.

The motion carried.

I believe, gentlemen, that this concludes the business of the
session, and therefore at this time I will entertain a motion to adjourn the 56th annual convention of the Nebraska State Bar Association.
HARRY B. COHEN: Mr. Chairman, just before you ask for
a motion I would like to make a remark, and I am perhaps as
guilty as perhaps anybody else here.
I sat here and I saw the new president being inducted before
about twenty-five or thirty members of the State Bar Association.
Now I have always felt that the presidency of the State Bar Association is an honorable position, something to be sought for
with honor by a member of this Bar. I think it is unworthy of
the honor of the position and the connotations that it carries with
it to have an induction before a small body of the organization
as a whole.
I would like to suggest therefore that hereafter because of the
fact you are going to run into the situation year after year after
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year where nobody is going to be around at the end of the session,
that the induction of the incoming president be made at the time
of the banquet. It only takes a few more minutes while you have
everybody there and while you have your biggest crowd, so to
speak. I think that would be a most fitting way to induct our
incoming president.
PRESIDENT ATEN:

Thank you, Mr. Cohen.

Mr. Secretary, is there anything in regard to our rules in 1·egard to that situation?
GEORGE H. TURNER:
PRESIDENT AIKEN :
tion and not a motion.
HARRY B. COHEN:

No restriction against it.
I take it, Harry, that that is a suggesThat

jg

right.

PRESIDENT AIKEN: Well, thank you for the suggestion,
and we will see what can be done about it.
If there is no further business we will vote upon the motion
to adjourn.
All those in favor signify by saying aye.
All those opposed; the same sign.
Motion carried and we are adjourned.
(Thereupon, at 5 :20 o'clock p. m., the 56th annual meeting
of the Nebraska State Bar Association adjourned, sine die.)
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STATEMENT·OF;CASH RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS
OCTOBER 1, 1954 TO SEPTEMBER 24, 1955
Receipts:

Active Memb~rs Dues ..............................$ 37,430.00
Inactive Members Dues ............................
4,865.00
Reinstatements:
1954 ......................................$
1953 ..................................... .
1952 ..................................... .
1951 ..................................... .
1950 ..................................... .
1949 ..................................... .
1948 ..................................... .
1938-1947 ······························

25.00
25.00
6.00
8.00
8.00
6.00
4.00
12.00

94.00

$42,389.00

l\iiiscellaneous ................................................................
Statute Books, Etc. Sold ........
50.65
Less : Remittance to
State Library ......................
50.65

2.95

Over-payments
Less : Refunds

31.25
31.25
42,391.95

Disbu1'sements:

Salaries and Payroll Tax ....................... . 10,326.30
Office Supplies, Printing, Postage
& Stationery ......................................... .
1,561.18
Directory ................................................... .
950.55
Telephone and Telegraph ....................... .
268.58
Officers' Expense ..................................... . 2,298.55
American Bar Association and House
of Delegates Meetings ....................... . 1,016.16
Annual Meeting Expense ........ 7,113.08
Less: Food Cost Reimbursed
and Display .......................... 2,256.00 4,857.08
Executive Council Meetings ................... .

731.87
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Nebraska Law Review ............................. .
Nebraska State Bar
Association Journal ............ 1,433.21
Less: Advertising .................... 1,058.00
Public Service ........................
Less : Reimbursements ............

a,054.80498.37

Tax Institute ........................................... .
Institute and New Legislation ............... .
Aid to Local Bars ..................................... .
Audit ......................................................... .
Insurance and Bonds ............................... .
Office Expense ..........................................
Dues ........................................................... .
Binding Proceedings ............................... .
Judicial Council ....................................... .
Committee on Inquiry ............................
Committee on Oil and Gas Law ........... .
Committee on Crime and Delinquency ... .
Committee-Advisory ............................. .
Committee-Judiciary ............................. .
Committee-Co-operation with
American Bar Inst. ............................. .
Committee-Municipal and Public
Corps ..................................................... .
Committee-American Citizenship ....... .
Committee-Practice and Procedure ..... .
Committee-Real Estate Probate
and Trust ............................................... .
Equipment Purchased ............................. .
Miscellaneous ........................................... .
Football Tickets (See
Note 1) ................................
105.00
A.B.A. Regional Meeting Expense (See Note 1) ............
531.30

4,958.61
375.21
4,556.43
2,266.58
770.46
297.52
175.00
102.45
264.75
50.00
75.00
41.43
535.32
69.25
267.63
973.23
80.75
235.00
87.04
61.03
67.35
48.90
696.46
35.46

636.30

39,737.43

2,654.52
Excess of Receipts Over Disbursements ....................... .
=====
Cash Balance, October 1, 1954 ..
653.25
Excess of Receipts Over
Disbursements .......................... 2,654.52
Cash in Bank, September
24, 1955 ····································

3,307.77
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Represented By:
First National Bank ................
666.95
Continental National Bank .... 2,640.82
3,307.77

Note 1 : Disbui·sements for football tickets and Regional Meeting expense represent amounts which are to be reimbursed.
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ROLL OF PRESIDENTS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

cEleazer Wakely.................. Omaha
°William D. McHugh........ Omaha
*Samuel P. Davidson .. Tecwnseh
•John L. Webster.............. Omaha
•c. B. Letton. ...................Fairbury
*Ralph W. Breckenridge.. Omaha
cE. c. Calkins............... ~.Kearney
*T. J. Mahoney.................... Omaha
cc. C. Flansburg................ Lincoln
•Francis A. Borgan.......... Omaha
ccharles G. Ryan.... Grand Island
*Benjamin F. Good..........Lincoln
*William A. Redick............ Omaha
•John J. Halligan ....North Platte
cH. H. Wilson ....................Lincoln
•c. J. Smyth........................Omaha
•John N. Dryden ............Kearney
*F. M. Hall... .......................Lincoln
cArthur C. Wakely............ Omaha
cR. E. Evans .............. Dakota City
•w. M. Morning................Lincoln
*A. G. Ellick. ....................... Omaha
*George F. Corcoran. ...........York
"'Edward P. Holmes........Lincoln
*Fred A. Wright. ............... Omaha
°Paul Jessen .......... Nebraska City
"'E. E. Good ............................Wahoo
*F. S. Berry..........................Wayne

1.
2.
3.

1900-06 Roscoe Pound .............. Lincoln
1907-08 Geo. P. Costigan, Jr...Lincoln
1909W. G. Hastlngs ............ Lincoln
1910-19 A. G. Ellick .................... Omaha

1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
6. 1905
7. 1906
8. 1907
9. 1908
10. 19()8
11. 1910
12. Hill
13. 1912
14. 1913
15. 1914
16. 1915
17. 1916
18. 1917
19. 1918
20. 1919
21. 1920
22. 1921
23. 1922
24. 1923
25. 1924
26. 1925
27. 1926
28. 19~7

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34".
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
4'5.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1943
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955

Robert W. Devoe............Llncoln
Anan Raymond ..................Omaha
cJ. L. Cleary.......... Grand Island
*Fred Shepherd....................Llncoln
*Ben S. Baker...................... Omaha
*J. J. Thomas ...................... Seward
°John J. Ledwith ................Llncoln
•L. B. Day............................ Omaha
J. G. lliothersead ........ Scottsbluff
cc. J. Campbel! ..................Llncoln
Harvey M. Johnsen .......... Omalm
James 2\I. Lanigan. .........Greeley
E. B. Chappell....................Llncoln
Raymond G. Young.......... Omaha
Paul E. Boslaugh..........Hastlngs
Robert R. Moodie......West Point
George L. DeLacy............ Omaha
Virgil Falloon................Falls City
Paul F. Good. ...................Lincoln
Joseph T. Votava. ............. Omaha
Robert H. Beatty.. North Platte
Abel V. Shotwell................ Omaha
Earl J. Moyer................Madlson
Clarence A. Davis............lincoln
George B. Hastings............Grant
Laurens Wllliams .............. Omaha
J. D. Cronin. ....................... O'Nelll
John J. Wllson.................. Llncoln

ROLL OF SECRETARIES

4".

5. 1920-27 Anan Raymond............ Omaih.a
6. 1928-36 Harvey John·sen. ........... Oma.ha
7. 1937George H. Turner........ Omaha

ROLL OJ;' TREASURERS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

1900Samuel F. Davidson
....................................................Tecwnseh
1901S. L. Geisthardt .......... Lincoln
1902-03 Charles A. Goss ............ Omaha
1904-05 Roscoe Pound ................Lincoln
1906-13 A. G. Ellick .................. Omaha

6.
7.
8.
9.

1914-16 Chas. G. McDonald .... Omaha
1917-22 Raymond M. Crossman
............................................................ Orn.aha
1923-37 Virgil J. Haggard...... Oma.ha
1938George H. Turner...... Lincoln

ROLL OF EXECUTIVE COUNCIJ,
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
1-1.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
2:J.
24".
25.
26.
•>7
28:
29.
30.

1900-04 R. W. Breckenridge.. Omaha
1900-08 Andrew J. Sawyer.... Lincoln
1900-02 Edmund H. Hinshaw
...................................................... Fairbury
1903-06 W. H. Kelligar.......... Auburn
1904-07 John N. Dryden ...... Kearney
1905-08 F. A. Brogan................ Omaha
1907-10 S. P. Davidson ......Tecumseh
1908-09 W. T. Wilcox .... North Platte
1909-11 R. W. Breclrnnridge.. Omaha
1!:110-12 Frank H. Woods...... Lincoln
1910-10 Charles G. Ryan
.............................................. Grand Island
1910-19 Alfred G. Ellick ........ Omaha
1911-13 John A. Ehrhardt .... Stanton
1911-11 Benjamin F. Good .. Lincoln
1912-15 C. J. Smyth .................. Omaha
1912-12 William A. Redick .... Omaha
1913-15 W. M. Morning........ Lincoln
1913-16 J. J. Halligan .. North Platte
1914-14 H. H. Wilson ..............Lincoln
1915-17 EdW1in E. Squires
................................................ Broken Bow
1916-16 John N. Dryden ....Kearney
1916-17 Frederick Shepherd.. Lincoln
1917-17 Frank l\!. Hall ..........Linco1n
1917-18 Anan Raymond .......... Omaha
1918-18 A. C. Wakeley............Omaha
1918-22 Fred A. Wright.. ........ Omaha
1919-19 R. E. Evans......Dakota City
1919-2.2 Geo. F. Corcoran ..........York
1919-20 L. A. F!ansburg........Lincoln
1920-20
:.'II. :.'11orning........Lincoln

• Deceased

,V.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
·10.
41.
42.
43.
4'4.
·15.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
51.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

1920-27 Anan Raymond ............ Omaha
1921-21 Alfred G. Elllck ........ Omaha
1921-23 Guy c. Chambers....Llncoln
1922-24 James R. Rodman.. K1mball
1923-26 E. E. Good ..................Wahoo
1924-26 Robert W. Devoe ..... .Lincoln
1924-24 Fred A. Wright. .......Omaha
1925-28 Paul Jessen ....Nebraska City
1925-27 Clinton Brome.............. Omaha
1927-29 Charles E. Matson..Lincoln
1927-28 Fred S. Berry..............Wayne
1928-29 Robert w. Devoe...... Lincoln
1928-30 T. J. McGulre.............. Omaha
1928-34 Harve3• Johnsen .......... Omaha
19-29-31 E. A. Coufal.. ......David City
1929-29 Anan Raymond.......... Omaha
193.0-32 Paul E. Boslaugh..Hastlngs
1930-30 J. L. Cleary....Grand Island
1931-33 W. C. Dorsey.............. Omaha
1931-31 Fred Shepherd............Lincoln
1932-34 Richard Stout............Llncoln
1931-32 Ben S. Baker.............. Omaha
1933-35 Barlow F. Nye........Kearney
1933-33 J. J. Thomas ..............Seward
1934-36 Chas. F. McLaughlin
............................................................ Omaha
1934-34 John J. Ledwith ........Llncoln
1935-35 L. B. Day...................... Omaha
1935-37 James M. Lanlgan .... Greeley
1935-38 H. J. Requartte ........Llncoln
1935-38 Raymond M. Crossman
............................................................ Omaha
19~5-·IO
F. H. Pollock............Stanton
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62. 1935-41 T. :r. Keenan .............. Geneva
63. 1935-39 Walter D. :rames...... McCook
64. 1935-37 Roland V. Rodman .. Kimball
65. 1936-36 :r. G. Mothersead
.................................................. Scottsbluff
66. 1936-36 :rames L. Brown........ Lincoln
Wi. 1937-39 David A. Fitch..........Omaha
68. 1937-39 Raymond G. Young.. Omaha
69. 1937-41 l\I. M. l\laupin .. North Platte
70. 1937-41 Golden P. Kratz ........Sidney
71. 1938-42 Sterling F. l\Iutz ........ Lincoln
72. 1938-42 Don W. Stewart...•...Lincoln
7:3. 1940-46 George N. Mecham .. Omaha
74. 1940-42 Abel V. Shotwell........Omaha
75. 1940-42 Frank l\I. Colfer......l\IcCook
76. 1941-43 Virgil Fal!oon......Falls City
77. 19411-43 :roseph C. Tye ........ Kearney
78. 1941-47 Earl J. Moyer.......... j.\fadison
79. 1937-37 C. :r. Campbell..........Lincoln
80. 1938-38 Harvey Johnson .......... Omaha
81. 1939-39 :fames' M. Lanigan .. Greeley
82. 1940-4-0 E. B. Chappell..........Lincoln
83. 1942-45 Fred · J. Cassidy........ Lincoln
84. 1!141-41 Raymond G. Young.. Omaha
85. 1942-48 Max G. Towle .......... Linooln
86. 1942-42 Paul E. Boslaugh.. Hastings
87. 1942-45 :rohn E. Dougherty ........York
88. 1942-49 Yale C. Holland ........ Omaha
89. 1943-45 Robert R. Moodie
..................................................West Point
90. 1941-4!5 B. F. Butler........ Cambridge
91. 1943-46 Fran!;: M. :rohnson
.................................................... Lexington
9" 1944-49 Floyd E. Wright..Scottsbluff
93: 1945-50 John J. Wilson ..........Lincoln
!14. 1945-4'8 Robert B. Waring.... Geneva
95. 1944-46 George L. DeLacy.... Omaha
96. 1945-47 Virgil Falloon ......Falls City
97. 1945-49 Leon Samuelson. ..... Franklin

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

194!6-48 Harry W. Shackelford
..........................................................Omaha
1946-48 Paul F. Good ..............Lincoln
1947-48 :roseph T. Votava. ..... Omaha
1947-48 :rohn E. Dougherty......York
1947-55 Lyle E. Jackson ............ Neligh
1948-49 Robert H. Beatty
................................................ North Platte
1947-50 Frank D. Williams .. Lincoln
1947-50 Thomas J. Keenan .. Geneva
1948-51 Laurens Williams ......Omaha
1949-51 Joseph H. McGroarty
............................................................ Omaha
1949-54 Wilber S. Aten ........Holdrege
194'8-50 Abel V. Shotwell...... Omaha
1949·55 Paul L. Martln ............Sldney
1949·55 Joseph C. Tye............Kearney
1949-51 Earl J. Moyer..........Madison
1950Harry A. Spencer....Lincoln
1950Paul P. Chaney....Falls City
1950Paul Bek........................Seward
1950-52 Clarence A. Davis ....Lincoln
1951-55 Barton H. Kuhns........Omaha
1952Thomas C. Quinlan .. Omaha
1951-52 George B. Hastinge .... Grant
1952-53 Laurens Wllliams...... Omaha
1953-54 J. D. Cronin................O'Neill
1954Norris Chadderdon
........................................................Holdrege
1954John J. Wilson ........ Lincoln
1955Wilber S. Aten ....... .Holdrege
1955F. M. Deutsch............Norfolk
195.5Clarence E. Haley
..................................................Hartington
1955R. R. Welllngton ....Crawford
1955Alfred G. El!lck..........Omaha
1954-1955 Jean B. Caln ......Falls City
1955Hale McCown ..............Beatrice

